A comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy

partisan or non-partisan, the effect of their services was the same: 
both men, though Republican, worked for Democratic and Republican 
presidents. 
Dulles was a trained lawyer. Kissinger was critical of lawyers 
and businessmen in politics because he viewed them as too limited in 
their outlook on foreign affairs. Kissinger was a scholar who sought 
to influence foreign policy first through his writings and later 
through his personal involvement in the field. Dulles wrote two books 
and several articles, but he was more involved personally in the 
field of foreign affairs. 
Dulles' writings stressed the inevitability of change and caution­
ed against the maintenance of the status quo. His philosophy was 
that peaceful change was essential in maintaining order. Without 
such change, violent change would occur. Kissinger thought that 
stability was the primary objective of foreign policy. The achievement 
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137 
of peace was merely the bonus once stability was reached. Change was 
necessary, but it could not outdistance a nation's experience. 
The element of force is also found in both men's philosophies. 
Kissinger believes force is acceptable in attaining certain goals. 
Force, or power, is neutral--it can be used toward good or evil ends. 
It should be used when no other means are available and only to attain 
good ends. For Dulles, the threat of using force is a deterrent to 
aggression. If the aggressor is not deterred, Dulles is not so clear. 
His policy may call for retaliation, but his practice was ambivalent. 
Dulles favored massive retaliation while Kissinger believed that limit­
ed nuclear war was preferable--at one point in their careers. They 
were later to rethink and adapt these theories. 
Early-life experiences are a major cause for the development of 
ideas and philosophies a person holds. These experiences may also 
cause an individual--consciously or unconsciously--to develop a goal 
in response to those experiences. When solving a crisis or formulat­
ing a policy, the individual will relate the new situation to past 
experiences and strive for a familiar goal. 
At the Versailles Peace talks, John Foster Dulles witnessed the 
attempts by victors of war to stifle peaceful development and change. 
From this experience, he developed as a goal the desirability for 
peaceful change. He assumed that change was inevitable and that 
forceful maintenance of the status quo would lead to violent change. 
These assumptions and this goal were the key inputs Dulles relied on 
when making policy decisions as Secretary of State. In the Suez Crisis 
of 1956, he opposed the British-French reliance on force to retain 

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control of the Suez Canal. He preferred peaceful diplomacy to force. 
He also approved of the United Nations plan to work toward a peaceful 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
As an adolescent, Henry Kissinger witnessed the impact a revolu­
tionary state had on a people. As a young adult, he witnessed this 
same state's impact on world peace. He committed his ideas on the 
subject to writing in a doctoral dissertation. His goal was a stable 
world order. He assumed that such an order was impossible to achieve 
if a revolutionary state existed in the state system. He further 
assumed that power was a neutral element, to be used for either good 
or evil. Diplomacy combined with force was the way to achieve his 
goal. He sought to stabilize the Middle East, and thus the world, by 
making ·sure the Arabs and the Israelis gave up the use of force to 
achieve political ends. His shuttle diplomacy was supplemented by 
the power of the Presidency. Nixon and Ford saw the necessity of 
giving incentives or making threats to the Middle East adversaries 
to give up their reliance on force and rely instead on peaceful nego­
tiations. 
Analyzing personality also gives insight to the general workings 
of an individual's mind. It suggests how he confronts a situation-­
with confidence or with uncertainty, with assertiveness or with lack­
adaisical disinterest. It can also suggest how he deals with various 
situations--i.e., it indicates his style of work. 
138 
When Dulles was confronted with the Suez Crisis, he utilized per­
sonal diplomacy in order to defuse the potentially calamitous situation. 
Through his actions, enough time lapsed between Nasser's seizure of the 

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Canal and the British-French response with force that world opinion 
was brought to bear on the belligerents, chiefly through the United 
Nations, to give up their military intervention. 
Where Dulles' main contribution to peace came before a Middle 
East war began, Kissinger's came after a war ended. Both men, of 
course, contributed to the cessation of hostilities. Kissinger's 
shuttle diplomacy after the October War achieved two disengagement 
of forces agreements and the beginning of Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied Arab territories. These initial steps proved to be pre­
requisites for the peace agreement which was reached between Egypt 
and Israel in 1979. 
Dulles and Kissinger achieved what each saw as successes in re­
lation to his world view: Dulles was avoiding war by effectuating 
peaceful change; Kissinger was stabilizing the world order. Despite 
the confidence each man had in himself, the public saw Dulles and 
Kissinger as two of the most controversial figures in the history of 
American foreign policy formulation. Neither man was offended by this 
fact. They realized that people either approved of their actions or 
did not. They did not let public opinion dictate their decisions, 
although they were not totally l.lllaffected or unmoved by that opinion. 
Both men attempted to mold that opinion. They realized that not all 
of their decisions would be l.lllderstood completely by the populace 
and that these decisions were subject to criticism and debate. They 
also took into account that mistakes were possible. They made deci­
sions on foreign policy as they saw best able to achieve their indivi­
dual goals. 
139 

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Although both considered the impact of public opinion in their 
decision making process, that impact was a greater consideration for 
Kissinger than for Dulles. When Kissinger was in office, especially 
after Watergate, the media had taken on an air of greater self­
confidence in its role to inform the populace. It is not that the 
media was less informative when Dulles was Secretary of State. But 
in Kissinger's time, the public placed greater trust in the media as 
its chief source of information and had less trust in the statements 
and actions of politicians than in Dulles' time. Kissinger learned to 
manipulate this situation. He had a secretive style of diplomacy, 
not open to public scrutiny. What he wanted the public to know about 
his diplomatic initiatives, he would inform them through his close 
ties with newsmen. Most often, the newsmen had no other source for 
their news tips. What they printed or broadcast about Kissinger's 
secret diplomatic initiatives was most often what he wanted to be 
broadcast or published. 
Dulles did not have to be as secretive as Kissinger would later 
be. Through his numerous news conferences, he too kept the public 
informed of his point of view. The media and public had no reason to 
doubt his remarks as he appeared sincere and open in expressing admin­
istrative policies. 
Both men, therefore, sought to inform the public of their poli­
cies from their point of reference. For its part, the public came to 
approve of some of each man's actions and to disapprove of other 
actions. It would admire and respect these men and also criticize 
them. But Kissinger and Dulles rode every storm out. Neither man was 
140 

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141 
forced into resignation from his post by an overwhelming public chas-
tisement. Kissinger did contemplate resignation, but he did not go 
through with it. And Dulles did resign his post before the end of 
his appointment, but this was due to failing health. 
It could easily be argued that Dulles and Kissinger were two of 
the most powerful Secretaries of State this nation has known. Even 
with their utilization of their power, did both men use their full 
potential as Secretaries of State? Was one more "successful" than 
the other--successful either in terms of personal goals achieved or 
national interests maximized? 
In viewing their personalities, there is a distinct difference 
between Dulles and Kissinger. Dulles had the air of a restrained man. 
He was not the type of person to break from tradition. He consistently 
behaved as others expected him to behave. He was anti-Communist and 
righteously so. He may have made some shocking statements, but once 
analyzed, these could be seen as consistent with his well-known 
beliefs. In addition to his being anti-Communist, he also had a 
distaste for colonialism (of which Communism may be seen as a new 
form). He preached a desire for independence for all countries while 
maintaining that neutrality was not possible--independent countries 
still must take sides and align themselves with either the East or 
the West. But Dulles was not one to make major diplomatic break­
throughs. 
It is difficult to place one specific description on Dulles. He 
was neither a visionary nor a realist, although he exhibited elements 
of both. His visions included a non-Communist, peaceful, progressive 

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world. He held out great hopes for the future. What he saw as an 
impediment to the achievement of these hopes was the Connnunist world, 
and in this was his view of his realistic assessment of the world. 
He did, in fact, take a tough stance against Communists, and espe­
cially the Soviets. Many people, who shared his distrust of the 
Soviets, applauded his behavior. 
This behavior, however, is the reason Dulles can be placed 
neither in the realist nor visionary camps. By failing to take ac­
count of the existence of the Soviets (or other Communists), he was 
unable to realistically deal with them. Because of this inability, 
the Soviets could not be expected to cooperate; in any respect, with 
the United States. And, with lack of cooperation between the super­
powers, a better future was impossible. 
These statements are not intended to diminish the importance of 
Dulles or of his successes as Secretary of State. Although people 
disagree with how he dealt with the Soviets, it cannot be disputed 
that Dulles kept the United States at peace during his tenure in 
office--regardless of the ways he used to do so. 
Kissinger was not the same type of man which Dulles was in at 
least one respect. He was able to break from tradition when he saw 
benefits accruing to such a move. For example, for whatever reasons 
Kissinger was able to break with his faith--a great part of his 
142 
family tradition--whereas Dulles would probably never have been able 
to make such a drastic step, if he ever wanted to do so. This is 
merely an example of a distinct difference between the two men. In 
the realm of foreign policy, Kissinger was known for his revolutionary 

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143 
diplomacy and diplomatic breakthroughs. He was thus able to pursue 
non-traditional, even drastic, policies. 
In this sense, Kissinger was more successful than Dulles. Al­
though Kissinger too was anti-Communist, he was able to put his feel­
ings to the side in order to mark out a cooperative future between 
the two superpowers. Yet, he always was on guard. He knew he could 
not trust the Soviets too much. He could thus be described as a 
visionary, with hopes of a stable world order, and as a realist, who 
knew how to exploit an established set of circumstances in order to 
achieve his goals. 
Kissinger thus developed his potential more fully than did Dulles. 
Both men were given much autonomy to achieve what they wished in the 
way of foreign policy. Kissinger established and utilized a larger 
"constituency" than did Dulles. That is, he had easy access to many 
world leaders of various ideologies and he allowed himself to confront 
those leaders face to face. Dulles was limited (self-limited) to 
those on "his side". He refused to acknowledge Communist leaders 
(e.g., by refusing to shake Chou En lai's hand). Kissinger was more 
willing to meet with adversaries in hopes of enlisting their help to 
create a stable world order. Dulles could never do this. 
Kissinger's goals, although personal, were transformed, via his 
positions as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, to 
within the national interest. The same can be said for Dulles' 
goals. Dulles was quite satisfied with his ability to meet his goal 
of a peaceful, progressive world. He saw himself as in a struggle 
for peace and freedom against Communism and he was pleased with his 

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144 
achievements in that struggle. Kissinger was also engaged in a 
struggle. He sought to achieve a stable world order. His various 
successes as chief foreign policy formulator for two presidents--
SALT, the China opening, his Middle East peace initiatives--were im­
portant steps toward his goal, but he did not fully achieve a stable 
order while in office. And Kissinger knows this. Perhaps that is 
the main reason he wants to get back in power. He needs a position 
similar to the one he held under Nixon and Ford to keep striving for 
his goal. He may not feel his life has been worthwhile unless he 
does make another major effort--as a U.S. official--toward his goal. 
Dulles did feel complete. He led a full life and achieved his goal-­
peace--as best he could. In this sense, and at this point in time, 
Dulles could be said to have been more successful than Kissinger in 
that he was happy with his achievement of his stated goals. If 
Kissinger becomes satisfied with his efforts to achieve his personal 
goals, then he too will be a success, in his own eyes at least. Then 
no one can say that one was more successful than the other for both 
will have viewed their efforts as successful. 
The methodology used in this research focused on two personality 
theorists. However, their theories are to be used as a general guide 
to further research. They are not to be used as straitjackets re­
stricting analysis or closing the doors to further insight from other 
sources. These methods are not sacrosanct. They are offered to give 
insight as to the workings of the minds of two of America's more noted 
Secretaries of State. They indicate one way of explaining the 
policies of these Secretaries. Other points of view are needed for 

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a fuller perspective. 
The application of this methodology to the real-life experiences 
of Dulles and Kissinger allows the conclusion that both men were 
successful and achieved much of what they sought. Success may be 
gauged both in terms of personal satisfaction and public acclaim for 
a person's actions. If both gauges are working together, a person 
is undoubtedly a success. 
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Document Outline

• A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy
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