A comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy
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part of Germany, he sought the support of the West to guard against any Coilllllunist threat. Britain encouraged ratification of EDC but would not join it. It was skeptical, even fearful, of being party to German rearmament. In addition, it did not wish to weaken the London-Washington axis by be coming part of a London/Paris/Bonn-Washington axis. Britain's refusal to join EDC added to the delay in the French Assembly. Without the British as a counterweight, France may soon find its position in EDC weakened if Germany came to dominate the European army. Dulles attempted to hasten the French decision on EDC. If EDC 68 was approved, a major hurdle would be overcome and the European army could start organizing, pending the approval by other national assemblies. If rejected, Dulles could work on an alternative way of unifying Europe and strengthening West Germany--an alternative which officially did not exist in Dulles' mind. In December 1953, while in Paris for a NATO meeting, Dulles stated that if France rejected EDC, the U.S. would be forced into an "agonizing reappraisal" of its European policies. (Drummond & Coblentz, 1960, p. 85) Such a reappraisal might include the withdrawal of U.S. military and economic aid to the European con tinent. Dulles intentionally left his threats vague. He would let the French assemblymen wonder about possible U.S. reaction to EDC's rejection. Ambiguity was also a safe way not to have to punish an ally and risk losing his friendship. Dulles did push France into making a decision, but it was not the 69 one he wanted. On August 30, 1954, the French National Assembly re- jected EDC. Dulles' threats were never carried out. United States troops remained in Europe. Dulles and Sir Anthony Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, worked on an alternative to EDC. The Western European Union . (WEU) was formed by allowing West Germany and Italy to join the Brussels Pact, which consisted of Britain, France, Belgium, the Nether lands, and Luxembourg. Through WEU, West Germany was admitted to NATO in 1955. Massive retaliation When Dulles took office, the U.S. was still involved militarily in Korea. Truce talks were deadlocked. Dulles went to Korea with Eisenhower in December 1952 in fulfillment of the latter's campaign promise. On the return trip, Dulles told Eisenhower that he was sure the Chinese and North Koreans were content with the de facto truce which they could reconvert into open hostilities whenever it suited them. He said the U.S. must act to force the Communists' hand. To force them into an official truce, the U.S. had to threaten dangerous consequences if the North Koreans refused a truce. Dulles noted such a policy risked renewed fighting in Korea, but Eisenhower acted accord ing to his Secretary's advice. "Eisenhower's decision was, as he put it, 'let the Communist authorities understand that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibi tion in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for con fining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula.' ... And innnediately after he took office he acted on his decision." (Middleton, 1965, p. 223) 70 The next step was to convey this policy to the Asian Communists. In his first State of the Union address, on February 2, 1953, Eisenhower announced he was rescinding a Truman order which placed the U.S. Seventh Fleet between Formosa and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The presence of the Seventh Fleet prevented any Nationalist Chinese in vasion against mainland China and was a deterrent to any Communist Chinese aggression. Critics of Eisenhower said he was "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader. Eisenhower and Dulles never expected Chiang to invade the mainland. Eisenhower was simply warning the Chinese Communists that if a truce was not arrived at in the Korean War, the U.S. might use Formosa as an additional base of operations and thus threaten to open another front against the PRC. On May 21, Dulles also issued a warning. In New Delhi, India, he told Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that the U.S. wished to end the Korean War honorably, but if need be it would fight an all-out war and would restrict neither its effort not its weapons. Dulles knew Nehru would convey this message to the Chinese. Truce talks had been hampered by the prisoner of war problem. Some Communist POWs held by South Korea did not wish to return to their country. South Korea said they did not have to. China and North Korea said they did. But on June 4, two weeks after Dulles conferred with Nehru, the Communists proposed a plan whereby the fate of the POWs could be determined by the United Nations. On June 8, a POW agreement was signed. South Korean President Syngman Rhee opposed the truce talks. He wanted to fight until all of Korea was united under his leadership. 71 To disrupt the talks, on June 18 he ordered the release of 27,000 North Korean prisoners who said they wanted to stay in South Korea. The talks were off again. Dulles predicted that the Communists would overlook Rhee's action if they truly wanted a truce and if they were given assurances that South Korea would abide by an armistice agreement. He was correct. Talks resumed on July 10. Dulles let Rhee know that the U.S. would not support a South Korean solitary war with North Korea and offered him a security pact and economic aid, which he ac cepted. The armistice was signed on �uly 27, 1953. Dulles felt it a moral obligation to deter war. Threatening severe punishment to aggressors who wish to dominate others by force was a means to deter war. He believed that wars are created by mis calculation where aggressors believe they can achieve military ends without great risks to their own security. He felt the Korean War was one of miscalculation. When Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Truman stated that Korea was outside the vital interests of the U.S., this in effect gave North Korea (and the PRC) a license to start a war without fear of U.S. military response. Dulles did not want another such miscalculation on the part of other potential ag gressors. He thus stated his position on how to avoid war. In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954, he said, "a potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit him." The way to deter aggres sion is for the free community "to depend primarily on a greater capa city to retaliate, i�stantly, by means and at places of our own choos ing ... Local defense must be reinforced by the further deterrent of 72 massive retaliatory power." (Divine, 1979, p. 66; Grantham, 1976, p. 90) The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was thus introduced into the Eisenhower Administration. Dulles enunciated this concept twice before, at a Paris speech and in Life magazine in 1952. In 1954, it had the status of foreign policy doctrine as it was an official U.S. policy statement. A particular reason for this threat of massive retaliation at that time was that Dulles wanted China to know that it ought not get in volved in fighting in Indochina. In Foreign Affairs in April 1954, Dulles revised his policy and described it as "selective retaliation" because massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstances ..• The heart of the problem is to deter attack. This, we believe, requires that a potential ag gressor be left in no doubt that he would be certain to suffer damage outweighing any possible gains from aggres sion .•. To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility and the facilities __ which make various re sponses available ... The free world must have the means for responding effectively (to open assault by Communist forces) on a selective basis when it chooses .•. That does not mean turning every local war into a world war ••• It does mean that the free world must maintain the collective means and be willing to use them in the way which most effectively makes aggression too risky and expensive to be tempting. (Foreign Affairs, XXXII, 1954, p. 359) Thus, in addition to stating his desire to "have the capacity" to retaliate against aggression (and Dulles did not state he would use it under specific situations), he also emphasized the impor tance of local and collective defense. Collective defense systems, or pacts, such as NATO could be an important part of deterring aggres sion--especially potential Soviet aggression. These pacts would warn aggressors that those members of the pacts were ready to fend off aggression and would be aided by others--especially the United States. Dulles and Eisenhower faced another crisis in Southeast Asia in 1954 and they dealt with it by considering the viability of the mas sive retaliation and collective defense doctrines. On March 20, General Paul Ely, the French Chief of Staff, asked Eisenhower for U.S. intervention in Indochina to help French forces under siege at Dien Bien Phu. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Eisenhower that the fall of Indochina would precipitate the collapse of other states in the area and create a "Soviet position of dominance over Asia". (Divine, 1979, p. 67) Eisenhower concurred with this judgment but decided that the use of limited American forces would not alter the situation and that the American public ·would not stand for a massive intervention. Dulles and Eisenhower wanted to avoid unilateral American action. They did endorse a united action--a plan where the U.S., Great Britain, France, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the Associated States of Indochina would form a coalition to resist Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. This was Dulles' proposal for the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, later known as SEATO. He wanted Britain and France to join SEATO before attending the Geneva Conference on Indochina in late April so that France would be negotiating with the Communists from a position of strength and with allied support. But Britain, the key co-participant along with the the U.S., refused to use force to help France in Indochina. No action--unilateral or united--was used by the U.S. Dien Bien Phu fell to the Communists on May 7. The Geneva Conference, ending the French role in Indochina, 73 convened on April 26, 1954. Dulles stayed for the opening sessions, until May 3, and boycotted the rest of the proceedings. While at the Conference, he turned his back on Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's out stretched hand. Dulles had mixed feelings about the Conference. He did not wish to be seen as a party to French colonialism. Nor did he want to be a "cosignatory with the Communists" to an agreement which he knew would call for the partition of Vietnam. (Herring, 1979, p. 39) The outcome of the Conference, the Geneva Accords of 1954, called for the partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh forces would control the north and Emperor Bao Dai would be the titular head in the south. This would be a temporary division until elections could be held in the summer of 1956 to reunify the nation under one ruler. Neither portion of Vietnam could join a military alliance. Laos and Cambodia were granted independent status. 74 Although the U.S. was not a signatory to the agreement, it unilat erally declared that it would not interfere with the Accords. Dulles and Eisenhower were not totally displeased with the results. If elec tions had been demanded immediately by the Communists, they were certain Ho would win a resounding victory. But, with elections two years away, they could build up the credibility of Bao Dai or his Premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, in hopes of getting a non-Communist elected to rule the whole country. These hopes, however dim, were lost when Diem ousted Bao Dai, set himself up as President, and refused to consider elections for 1956. The U.S. formally recognized Ngo Dinh Diem as President of 75 Vietnam on October 26, 1955� (Branyan & Larsen, 1971, pp. 774-75) Eisenhower told Diem that he would continue to supply aid to Vietnam to maintain a strong state capable of resisting subversion or aggres sion by military means. To guard South Vietnam and other regional states from Communist aggression, SEATO was formally accepted in September of 1954 by Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philipines, and the United States. Dulles hoped the mere existence of SEATO would deter the Communists from overrunning Loas, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Because of the Geneva Accords, these states could not participate in alliances. (Herring, 1979, p. 45) If any of these Indochinese coun tries were invaded, SEATO provided the United States with the legal basis for intervention. Brinkmanship Along with "liberation", "agonizing reappraisal" and "massive re taliation", "brinkmanship" was another word which raised some controversy during Dulles' Secretaryship. Of the four phrases, brinkmanship best typifies his performance as Secretary of State. The term derives from several statements Dulles made in an interview with Life magazine correspondent, James Shepley: You have to take chances for peace just as you must take chances in war. Some say that we were brought to the verge of war. Of course we were brought to the verge of war. The ability to get to the verge without getting into war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you in evitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink, you are lost. We've had to look it square in the face--on the question of enlarging the Korean War, on the question of getting into the Indo China War, on the question of Formosa. We walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action. (Shepley, 1956, p. 78) Brinkmanship was deeply rooted in Dulles' philosophy. It was not a startling revelation. It was merely a phrase used to describe several ideas. Dulles wanted to deter war. By facing a potential aggressor at the brink of war, the U.S. was telling its adversary that it W?S willing to fight to protect an ally or a vital interest. By expressing that willingness to fight--even to the extent of a massive retaliatory attack--the adversary then must decide if the potential benefits of its aggression were worth risking. This open opposition to aggression would avoid wars started by miscalculation, as both sides to a conflict would know beforehand where the other side stood on the issue of a war. The national and international responses to the article were severely critical of Dulles. Adlai Stevenson, Democratic candidate for President in 1952 and 1956, said Dulles was playing Russian Rou lette. The Russians said the story "proved" Dulles' cold-warrior- 76 like intentions against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving nations. "Some attacks were politically inspired. But without question, millions of people were alarmed by the article" and they criticized Dulles for risking the safety of the U.S. "One of the most distressed was John Foster Dulles." (Heller, 1960, p. 230) It disturbed him to think that millions of people regarded him as "gambling" with world peace, as acting recklessly, with human lives at stake. John Foster Dulles had committed his life to search for a just and durable peace. Dulles never started a war; he avoided it 77 throughout his tenure as Secretary of State. He did, of course, take a tough line and spoke often of the consequences of aggression. This, however, was part of the game of international politics. His duty, as he saw it, was to warn potential aggressors that any hostilities they start would be met with far greater hostilities. His was a de terrence game. He sought to keep the peace--"wage peace"--by threaten ing terrible consequences to aggressors where the risks outweigh any possible benefit. Dulles was used to criticism from the press, but the fallout from the "Brink of war" article was more devastating to his career and to him personally than any other barrage of criticism he had encountered as Secretary of State. Dulles weathered the storm over "brinkmanship". Eisenhower had complete confidence in him and rejected any idea of Dulles' resigna tion. Eisenhower used his press conference of January 19, 1956--the first since his September 1955 heart attack--to endorse Dulles' posi tion by calling him "the best Secretary of State I have ever known" and by saying Dulles was devoted to peace. Public confidence in Dulles was at one of its lowest points over the 1956 brinkmanship article. A few months later, however, a Gallup Poll indicated public confidence in Dulles had reached a new high. This dramatic reversal resulted from Dulles' handling of the Suez Crisis. Suez 1956: A case study Dulles' involvement in Egypt and with Gamal Abdel Nasser began in his earliest months as Secretary of State. In May 1953, Dulles set off on a Middle East tour. He hoped to extend to this region the NATO system of military alliances. After SEATO was established in 1954, the Middle East was a gap in the defense system which needed to be filled. Despite his rhetoric against the Truman-Acheson policy of containment, Dulles still felt the need to stop the spread of Soviet influence (Soviet expansion has to stop before liberation can even begin). Cairo was sounded out by Washington on the possibility of starting a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), which would be allied to the West. Cairo refused. Dulles then considered a defense system limited to the so-called Northern Tier, which bordered on Russia. Dulles lobbied for this system and the Baghdad Pact was sign ed by Turkey and Iraq in February 1955. The United Kingdom joined the Pact in April. Pakistan joined in September and Iran in November. The United States did not join. There is some conjecture over why Dulles refused to join the Pact which he formulated. One analyst says that after giving the im pression (especially to Britain) that the U.S. would join, Dulles backed down in an attempt to "play along with Arab nationalism". (Goold-Adams, 1962, pp. 192-3) Another says that Dulles could not be associated with anti-Israel Iraq. (Drummon & Coblentz, 1960, p. 150) A third maintains that Dulles did not want to be associated with Britain (a colonial power) in the Middle East, where anti British sentiment was building in the emerging Arab nations. (Guhin, 1972, p. 150) Nasser saw the Baghdad Pact as an attempt by the NATO powers to drive a wedge between the Arab states. He also feared that Iraq might be trying to take the lead in a pan-Arab movement, a movement in which 78 Nasser had placed himself as its leader. Britain was entangled in the inter-Arab conflict between Nasser and the pro-Western Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Es-Said. Now Britain was aligned with Iraq and others in the Baghdad Pact. And although British forces remained in Egypt, these were to be removed by July 19, 1956. Nasser viewed the Pact as perpetuating Western dominance in the region. He pre ferred Arabs defending themselves with arms supplied by the West. Nasser saw a need to defend Arabism from Zionism and not from Soviet expansionism, as Dulles tried to suggest. The Israeli threat to Egypt's security was made more visible in February 1955, when David Ben-Gurion returned to the Israeli Cabinet as Defense Minister and Israel launched a destructive reprisal on Egyptian forces in thee Gaza Strip. Nasser reacted by forming the Fedayeen, a guerilla unit to mount reprisals across Israel's borders. (Bowie, 1974, p. 10) Nasser tried to buy arms from the West in the summer of 1955. But these arms were not forthcoming. France, Britain, and the U.S. had signed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 guaranteeing Middle East borders and regulating the arms flow to the region. The British used this declaration to refuse to sell large amounts of arms to Nasser. Although the British delivered previously purchased arms to Egypt, they did not wish to sell any more weapons fearing they would be used against British forces. Moreover, the French said they would supply arms to Nasser only if he would stop inciting and training the Alger ians to revolt against them. Dulles told Nasser he could have the arms if he joined in a Middle East defense alliance. (Bindra, 1969, p. 34) 79 Given the conditions placed on the West's sale of arms, Nasser turned to the Soviet bloc. By September 1955, he announced an agree ment to buy from Czechoslovakia a supply of arms in exchange for Egyptian cotton and rice. Nasser called this deal a simple commercial transaction. Dulles did not, of course, view it as such. He saw it as the first of many Soviet politico-military moves to infiltrate and even tually control the Arab world. With Nasser's announcement of a Czech arms deal, Dulles became a victim of self-fulfilling prophecy. He 80 had proposed the Baghdad Pact as a defense system to keep the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in the Middle East. By his constant pressure on Nasser to join the alliance, Dulles achieved that which he sought to avoid. Nasser did not like to be pressured and he did the opposite of what Dulles tried to force him to do. He brought Soviet influence to the heart of the Middle East. But Dulles was not willing to forfeit the region to the Soviets without a fight. He also sought to aid Egypt--not on a military but on an economic basis. In December 1955, the U.S. and Britain, together with the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), offered to finance Egypt's High Aswan Dam project. The reservoir created by the dam would retrieve land for cultivation and add up to 25 percent to Egypt's arable land. The project appealed to Dulles because it would improve the economic conditions of the Egyptian people whereas the Communist aid would be military in nature. The Communists would be in Egypt as merchants of death; America was offering the means for growth and 1 if e . (Mos 1 ey , 19 7 8 , p . 3 96) Also, the project would cost $1.3 billion and would take 12 to 15 years to complete. Since U.S. assistance would basically be in loans to Egypt, the U.S. would have a long-term claim to Egypt's re sources. Dulles saw this as an opportunity to control Egyptian fi nances thus preventing Egypt from buying more arms from the Soviet bloc, The initial assistance offered was $56 million from the U.S., $14 million from Britain and $200 million from IBRD. "Negotiations dragged on for months, with Nasser objecting strenuously to the fiscal safeguards requested by the IBRD." (Bowie, 1974, p. 11) During the months it took for Nasser to decide if he wanted West ern aid with, as he saw it, so many strings attached, the U.S. and Britain were also wondering if they should pursue the financing or if they should let the.project dwindle without either rescinding their offer or pushing Nasser to accept. Dulles was certain Congress would not approve the aid package to Nasser, who was perceived as an upstart dictator, friendly with the Soviets and Communist China and belliger- ent toward Israel. Furthermore, Dulles had doubts that Egypt could 81 pay back the loans, even if they were granted. Nasser insisted he could meet his . debts with the increased revenues from the cotton and rice produced from the reclaimed land. But both Dulles and Congress shared the view that Egypt's revenues wquld go to pay for Czech arms, leaving no resources to either pay back U.S. loans or to finance its portion of the Aswan Dam project. (Bowie, 1974, p. 12) Congress was so against the package that Dulles decided not to continue his fight for it. Dulles believed Dean Acheson had failed in his foreign policy because he did not listen to the voice of 82 Congress and he would not make the same mistake. The dam was not worth risking his effectiveness as foreign policy formulator, especially since his "brinkmanship" interview of January 1956 had dealt a harsh blow to his image. Britain was also uncertain about its offer. In early February 1956, Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, and Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary, arrived in Washington for three-day talks with Eisenhower and Dulles. Dulles, Eden and Lloyd agreed that Nasser would not be able to finance his portion of the Aswan Dam project and that, due to his pledging of Egyptian cotton for Czech arms, he would not be able to keep the Egyptian economy viable during the construction period. More important, however, Nasser was not playing ball with the West. He not only refused to join the Baghdad Pact, he continued to verbally attack it. He mounted pressure on Jordan, which subsequently refused to join the Pact in December 1955. And he did not lessen his support for Algeria in its struggle for independence from France. The Americans and British both decided not to go through with their offer of aid. The intention was to let the offer die without public announce ment about the change in plans. When, on March 1, King Hussein of Jordan dismissed General Glubb ("Pasha"), a British subject in charge of Jordan's Arab Legion, Eden was sure his decision was correct. He would not aid the "fascist" Nasser, who was accredited with Glubb's dismissal. (Dooley, 1976, p. 10) Hussein dismissed Glubb as pro-Nasser Jordanians accused Glubb of portraying himself as the real ruler of Jordan. Some Jordanians started "whispering campaigns ridiculing the King as a weak, ineffective parody of a monarch who would not remain on his throne for one day if Glubb's Legion were not there to support him." (Robertson, 1964, p. 26) Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador to Washington, returned to Cairo in the summer of 1956 to tell Nasser that opposition to the Aswan Dam project was mounting in Congress and "that if he wanted to go through with it, it was now or never. To his astonishment, Nasser, who had procrastinated so adroitly,now instructed him to go back to the U.S. and gave him carte blanche to accept all Foster Dulles' con ditions." (Mosley, 1978, p. 400) Nasser had been hinting that the Soviet Union had also made him an offer to finance the Dam. But the bid had not been made public. The news of the Egyptian Ambassador's impending visit with Dulles preceded him to the U.S. and it made headlines in many newspapers. Dulles called a meeting with his staff to discuss how to handle Ahmed Hussein. It was decided to withdraw the U.S. offer instead of "ne gotiating· the thing to death," as Robert Bowie wanted to do . . Dulles feared that Bowie's plan would give Congress a false impression that 83 the Secretary of State still hoped to pursue the offer. He did not wish to do this. Dulles privately informed Eden and Lloyd that he was going to withdraw his offer. The advance notice was conveyed to London by Henry Cabot Lodge, then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. He told Anthony Nutting, Britain's U.N. delegate, that Dulles was ready to act. Eden and Lloyd made no attempt to dissuade Dulles. In the meantime, Britain had completed its Suez base evacuation five days early on June 13, 1956. Ahmed Hussein landed in New York on July 17 and spoke to the press-- 84 who already knew of his planned acceptance. On July 19, 1956 Hussein met with Secretary of State Dulles for about one hour. Hussein an nounced Egypt's acceptance and added that he hoped the Americans were not planning to renege on their offer because, if they did, he had a promise from the Soviet Union to finance and build the dam instead. This gave Dulles the opportunity to fake a loss of temper over this "insult" and withdraw his offer. He told Hussein that conditions had changed since the offer was made and he implied that he did not think Egypt was credit-worthy. He also tried to color his rejection by saying that who ever builds the dam would earn the hatred of the Egyptian people because the burden would be crushing. He said Americans did not wish to be hated in Egypt and he was leaving that "pleasure" to the Soviet Union--if they really wanted to do it. (Mosley, 1978, p. 402) Even if there was a Soviet offer, Dulles believed the Soviet econ omy was too weak to finance the whole project. At about the same time that Dulles spoke to Hussein, the press was issued a State Department communique outlining the U.S. decision to reject the Aswan project. By this act, Dulles gave Nasser an additional rebuff and also demon strated U.S. impatience with neutrals seeking to exploit East-West rivalries. Within 24 hours of the U.S. move, Britain also withdrew its offer to help finance the Aswan Dam. On July 26, 1956 at a rally celebrating the fourth anniversary of the Young Officers' coup which overthrew King Farouk, Nasser announced the nationalization (or Egyptianization) of the Suez Canal Company. Simultaneously, Egyptian troops moved into the Canal area to insure the movement of traffic through the Canal. The announcement was not unexpected but the swiftness of the action caught Western officials 85 off guard. These officials had discussed the possibility of such a move, given Nasser's nationalistic tendencies. Indeed, Nasser had asked an advisor to study the Canal issue as early as 1954. And Nasser told U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Henry Byroade (after the nationalization) that he had decided to nationalize the Canal if the West dropped its offer to finance the Dam project. Dulles was in Peru for an inauguration of a new President when news came of Nasser's move. He sent Robert Murphy, Assistant Under secretary of State, to London to gauge the likely British-French re sponse. Britain and France not only owned virtually all shares in the Suez Canal Company, those countries also depended on the Canal for their existence as maritime and industrial powers. If their oil imports were not allowed to flow through the Canal, their industrial production could be seriously impaired. Eden told the U.S. charge' d'affaires it was in tolerable for Nasser "to have his thumb on our windpipe". (Finer, 1964, p. 62) As Dulles admitted later, his purpose during the early days of the Suez Crisis was to gain time in the hope of defusing the situa tion and relieving the pressure on the British and French. Dulles and Eisenhower were dead set against the use of force. They feared the use of force in the region would be a "dangerous spark which was likely to set off the Third World War". (Goold-Adams, 1962, p. 207) They also had to consider the fact that Eisenhower was involved in an upcoming election, and "peace" was part of Eisenhower's campaign slogan--peace, prosperity and progress. Dulles also firmly believed in the U.N. and its ability to work for peace. He wanted to use the U.N., not force to resolve the dilernna. If diplomacy failed, "world opinion" reflected in the U.N. would produce a solution. Dulles, how ever, did not immediately move the issue before the U.N. The Secretary feared for world peace if the U.N. were used first and failed to solve the Suez Crisis. He knew he could not prevent Britain and France from using force if the U.N. failed and he attempted to buy time. British and French leaders decided to go along with Dulles' diplo matic efforts. They also needed time to develop a military plan. These secret plans went forward as the Tripartite powers met at the Foreign Office in London: Murphy for the U.S., Christian Pineau for France, Lloyd for the United Kingdom. But Murphy soon learned of the Anglo-French military program and he reported to Dulles that Paris and London were determined to use force. Dulles flew irnrnediately to London. Dulles also recognized the British-French resolve to not only force the Canal out of Nasser's control, but also to force Nasser out of power. Dulles showed sympathy for the European position and he argued that Nasser should be made to "disgorge" the Canal. (Finer, 1964, p. 97) Nevertheless, Dulles was steadfastly against the use of force. Within Britain there was division of opinion over the use of force. Opposition Leader Hugh Gaitskell denounced any use of force as a means to achieve "justice". In France, however, public opinion supported Prime Minister Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Pineau. Many 86 87 Frenchmen believed Nasser's destruction would also solve the problem in Algeria by reducing support for the insurgents. American public opinion, however, was against the use of force and it reinforced Dulles' diplomatic efforts. During the discussions in London, Dulles formulated a plan for the international operation of the Suez Canal. The three powers then called a Conference of 24 maritime nations with special interest in the Canal. The Conference opened in London on August 16. Twenty-four countries were invited; two did not attend--Egypt and Greece. The British and French rested their legal right to justice on the Constantinople Convention of 1888 which governed the status of the Canal. The Convention guaranteed free passage to all vessels at all times and left the operation of the Canal to the Universal Suez Canal Company, an international organization. Nasser had already violated this agreement even before he nationalized the Canal by refusing free passage to Israeli ships. Under the terms of the Convention, the Canal was to revert to Egyptian control in 1968. "Eden relied on the international character of the Canal Company, which 'although ..• registered in Egypt, is of course an international organization.' Accordingly, the normal right of a state to nationalize could not properly be exercised to take over such an international public utility." (Bowie, 1974, p. 23) At the London Conference, Dulles spoke of the need for "a permanent operation of the Canal under an international system which will in fact give confidence to those who would normally wish to use the Canal ... Confidence is what we seek; and for this it is indispensable that there should be an administration of the Canal which is non-political in its operation ... The Canal should not be allowed to become an instrument of the policy of any nation or any group of nations." (Finer, 1964, p. 153) The Conference formulated a plan, the 18-Nations Proposal, which was largely of Dulles' making. The Soviet Union, India, Indonesia, and Ceylon did not support the plan. Nevertheless, it was presented to Nasser as a basis for negotiating a more formal agreement. It was not looked upon as an ultimatum. The proposal called for: inter national operation of the Canal; respect for Egypt's sovereignty; a fair return to Egypt by the users of the Canal; compensation to the Universal Suez Canal Company; negotiable Canal tolls; and greater de velopment of the Canal. Dulles refused to lead the mission that offered the 18-Nations Proposal to Nasser. Some analysts assert Dulles felt the mission was doomed to fail anyway and that he did not want to have his reputation wrapped up in the proposal. Dulles, however, felt the proposal satis fied all parties. He wanted it to succeed because it promised to keep the peace. Dulles also knew Nasser was bitter toward him after the United States withdrew its Aswan Dam offer. By going to Nasser Dulles could risk the defeat of the proposal. He therefore urged the Confer ence to send a strong leader, one who did not represent the Tripa�tite powers. Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, was selected for this task and he led the mission to persuade Nasser to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Suez dispute. Nasser said he would meet the mission on Tuesday, September 4. While Menzies was in Cairo, Eisenhower held a news conference at 88 which he said, "We are connnitted to a peaceful settlement of the dis pute, nothing else." (Finer, 1964, p. 189) When his words reached Cairo, the Menzies mission was doomed. Nasser felt no great need to negotiate a settlement of the dispute. By Eisenhower's words, he knew the U.S. would not support the use of force against Egypt and there- fore Egypt was under no threat to resolve the crisis to Britain's or France's satisfaction. Even before Nasser heard of Eisenhower's state- ment, he had not been willing to give Britain and France what they wanted. Eisenhower's news conference merely reassured him that he would not have to face U.S. military retaliation. Menzies reported to Dulles after leaving Cairo: I had been making some impression on Nasser by keeping him guessing as to whether the United Kingdom and France would actually resort to force. Then came newspaper reports of Eisenhower's statements. That did it ... Nasser became cool, confident and impossible to deal with. (Robertson, 1964, p. 87) Nasser rejected the 18-Nations Proposal outright and the mission returned to London having achieved absolutely nothing. Dulles tried again to find a peaceful and final solution to the problem--and if that failed, at least he would gain time to defuse the tense situation. His new idea was the Suez Canal User's Associa- tion (SCUA). Dulles' reasoning was that "since the 1888 Convention entitled the users to transit the Canal, they could band together to form a co-operative to exercise their rights under the Convention." (Bowie, 1974, p. 43) The users could hire their own pilots to navi gate the ships through the Canal, organize convoys, collect dues, and pay Egypt its due compensation for tolls. Dulles saw SCUA as 89 provisional, but it might lead to alternatives for solutions. Mollet was not happy with the proposal as it was premised on Egypt's cooperation. But Eden accepted SCUA and presented the plan 90 to the House of Commons on September 12. Amid cries of "deliberate provocation" and "You are talking about war!", Eden told the House that if Nasser rejected SCUA, "Her Majesty's Government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps as seem to be required either through the U.N., or by other means, for the assertion of their rights." (Finer, 1964, p. 226) Eden saw SCUA as a certain failure. But he could say, when it did fail� that he exhausted diplomatic efforts. Moreover, given the U.N. 's inability to resolve the crisis, Eden felt justified in using force. Dulles' view of SCUA was different than Eden's or Mollet's. He viewed it as provisional until a more permanent peaceful solution was found. It was not an effort to merely go through the motions or a prelude to force. He said if Egypt rejected SCUA, the U.S. would divert its ships around the Cape of Good Hope. And the U.S. did not intend to shoot its way through the Canal. Nasser denounced SCUA on September 15, four days before the Second London Conference met to decide on whether to use SCUA as a basis for further negotiations with Nasser. Nevertheless, the confer�nce met from September 19 to the 22nd and the 18 nations (the same nations which agreed on the 18- Nations Proposal) agreed to set up SCUA on October 1. In reality, however, SCUA was stillborn since Egypt refused to recognize or deal with it. Britain and France had decided to appeal to the U.N. if SCUA failed to secure a satisfactory settlement. But Dulles "advised that at all costs Britain and France should avoid reference to the United Nations until Yüklə 3,51 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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