Russian Orthodoxy; in its broader formulations, it reaches out to a loose concert
of interests that includes Muslim states and China, possibly even India and
Japan. It may seem a bit extraordinary to contemplate convergence or
cooperation with four civilizations that have, over much of the past, been
antagonists, rivals, or even opponents of the Russian Empire. Yet it is a measure
of the distrust of the Western—now American—drive for hegemony and global
dominance that Eurasianism seeks common new
interests to replace past
antipathies with key Asian states.
Eurasianism originated in the 1920s, drawing on earlier Slavophile roots. The
scholar Dmitry Shlapentokh interprets Eurasianism as an argument that “Russia
is a unique blend of Slavic/Orthodox and Muslim, mostly Turkic people. Russian
Muslims, not Slavs outside Russia, are Russia’s natural allies.” Eurasianists see
Russia not as a part of Europe, but of a Eurasian continent whose two main
ethnic elements are Russian and Turkic. The old working coexistence between
Russian Orthodoxy and Islam that we saw in the political structure of the
Russian Empire survives in this new vision. Undoubtedly, there still remains a
considerable legacy of suspicion among these parties,
and none is willing to cede
dominance to the other. At the popular level, there are deep anti-Muslim strains
—even racism—in Russian society. Nonetheless, striking new political and
geopolitical rapprochement between Turkey and Russia over the past decade
lends much substance to this interesting ideological school of thought. Ancient
geopolitical suspicions of the West in the Middle East have thus repeatedly
emerged in all three cultures: Byzantine Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, and
Islamic—all with common roots. These are persuasive indicators of how a world
without Islam might react toward the West even today.
Russia will never wish to lose its own unique historical character that is
rooted in Orthodoxy. Russia has never been truly accepted
as part of the West by
the West. Nor can Russia’s strategic orientation ever lie solely with the West; it
will continue to seek partners from Eastern cultures to bolster it—emphasizing
Russia’s abiding Eurasian and Orthodox character. Russia’s serious engagement
in the Sino-Russian-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization further
demonstrates this geopolitical orientation, which includes many Central Asian
states and a strong expression of interest from Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey. Geopolitics transcends religion—Islam, in this sense, is mere frosting on
the broader geopolitical cake that is driven by suspicion or fear of Western
power and intentions, deeply rooted in history.
With or without an
explicitly Eurasian doctrine, Russia remains deeply
engaged in the Middle East, both to portray itself as a friend of the Muslim
world to recruit support against American hegemonic expansion in Asia, and to
utilize its own Muslims to this end, as well as placate them within the Russian
Federation. Russia’s close ties and support to Iran are important indicators of this
engagement, as are deepening Russian ties with Turkey over the past decade.
The politics of the situation would be readily recognizable to Persians and
Semitic peoples going way back in defending the Middle East region against the
encroachments of Alexander the Great of Greece, or the Roman Empire’s deep
thrusts into Eurasia. Islam has simply joined the game. And whatever this
complex relationship
between Russia and Islam is, it can hardly be summed up
as one of “Islam’s bloody borders.”