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Partition: Where Are the Muslims Now?
With the gradual collapse of the Mughal Empire in the face of encroaching
British imperialism, the Mughal system began to lose its power, and with it came
a gradual decline of Muslim status. The British, too, perceived a greater degree
of resistance to their rule from Muslims than from Hindus and hence began to
give preference within the system to the Hindus, whom they felt were more
“reliable” or “pliable.”
Muslims were indeed quite active in the many acts of resistance against the
British Raj, including a central role in the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857, when
Muslim sepoys rioted over the rumor that pig fat was used in making the bullet
cartridges for their muskets. But the Hindus, in the end, demonstrated the same
powers of resistance. Political and social discontent in British India were ripe
enough for a small spark like this incident to set off a national rebellion.
Muslims and Hindus were generally united in opposition to British power and
rule, although their tactical approaches to the problem often differed.
As princely Mughal power gradually broke down or was conquered by the
British, Muslims soon found themselves a minority without power within the
Indian system and partially suspect in British eyes. Some British speculated
about whether Muslims were simply “naturally rebellious to foreign rule.” As
the date of Indian liberation from British rule approached after World War II,
Muslims became primarily concerned about protection of their minority rights
within the coming independent India; they were fearful that in a straightforward
democratic order, they would become a permanently outvoted minority. As a
result, Muslims favored some kind of confederal system in which they would not
always be in permanent minority status (a classic dilemma of all democratic
systems in which minorities can rarely change the system through the ballot
box). Muslims within India were furthermore not homogeneous but themselves
divided by class, regional, and even linguistic differences.
In the end, the actual partition of India into Indian and Pakistani states had
not been the preferred Muslim goal. But under the force of events, and Hindu
concerns over what limitations Muslims might place on the centralized power of
the future independent Indian state, partition suddenly loomed as the likely
option for all.
Interestingly, many of the Muslim ‘ulama in India did not favor the partition
of the country or even the formation of a new independent Muslim Pakistani
state. They correctly perceived that not all Muslims would depart for Pakistan
and that those Muslims left behind would become an even smaller minority in

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the hands of a then overwhelming Hindu majority. Approximately fourteen and a
half million people crossed the newly created borders either into or out of India
in this great British-run process of ethnic cleansing in 1947 called Partition.
Massive and horrifying violence took place during the transfers of populations,
with many terrible massacres on the part of all three religious groups—Sikhs,
Muslims, and Hindus—upon each other. The result was that the new immigrants
—Muslims moving into Pakistan, Sikhs and Hindus coming into India—were
often traumatized and embittered through the process and proceeded to number
among the most religiously intolerant in each new society. Politics created
religious time bombs in both countries. Indeed, for the Muslims who did not
transfer to Pakistan but remained in India, the situation did, in fact, become
worse: they had not only lost numbers and thus political clout, they also now had
their ultimate loyalty to the new Hindu-dominant state cast into doubt. In the
three wars between Pakistan and India in the years to come, Indian Muslims
were often perceived in Hindu eyes as untrustworthy, a potential fifth column.
The situation in Kashmir was equally volatile. Kashmir was a Muslim-
majority province (some 77 percent Muslim in 1947) with its own distinct
historic and ethnic character. It had been promised by the British in 1947 the
right to a referendum about whether to stay with India or join Pakistan; in the
end, India reneged on a genuine referendum, which it would surely have lost.
The majority Muslim Kashmiris remain angry and still continue to agitate for
their right of choice; Indian authorities have ruled with an iron hand and have
administered Kashmir unwisely and insensitively. Given three wars between
Pakistan and India, partly over Kashmir and all of which Pakistan lost, the area
offered fertile ground for Pakistani pressure upon India through covert support to
violent Kashmiri separatist movements. This long-running battle poisons
Pakistani-Indian relations to this day and is a key source of regional terrorism.
Muslims in India today are back up to some 13 percent of the overall Indian
population. The Muslim community is now regrettably divided: on the one hand,
the more religious elements press for establishing a separate self-contained
Muslim community that could live apart from the Hindus—a fantasy given how
scattered Muslims are across India. This policy of promoting communal identity
at all costs has increased the isolation of the Muslims. On the other side, a
smaller group of Muslims seeks to move beyond communalism and become
integrated into the secular Indian state. To find refuge in communalism is an act
of insecurity and fear; to work for secular integration is an act of confidence and
optimism. Both sides can find valid arguments in support of their position.
But the choice is not solely up to the Muslims: a formidable Hindu
ethnic/religious nationalist movement has emerged and targeted non-Hindus,

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especially Muslims, whom they perceive as blocking the way to the formation of
a Hindu religious state. The intolerant Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has
controlled Indian national politics in the past, may do so again, and controls
many state governments. The violence of the Hindu nationalists is a serious
threat to the Muslim community, which drives them together into an intense and
isolated communitarian posture.
Hindu nationalism—Hindutva—can only be based on religion since there is
no “Hindu” ethnicity per se; Hindus come from hugely diverse ethnic
backgrounds and languages, as do Muslims. Hindu nationalists, unlike the more
secular Hindu leadership, had strongly favored partition in 1947 specifically to
expel Muslims, thereby leaving no barrier to establishing a Hindu state. Part of
their resentment against Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians as well is that by their
very presence they require maintenance of a secular and multicultural Indian
state that the Hindu religious nationalists seek to abolish. And ironically, it is the
Muslim population that today overwhelmingly supports a secular state, more
keenly than in any Muslim country; as a minority, they clearly grasp the benefits
of a secular state for preservation of their own culture, society, and religion
against an official Hindu state. Indian Muslims generally feel their culture within
India is richer than that of Pakistan, which had long been largely a feudal
backwater with little cultural heritage; all the cultural glories of Mughal India
remained with India after partition, except for the city of Lahore.
In this atmosphere, communal outrages have not been lacking. The city of
Ayodhya in northeastern India has become a site freighted with emotion for both
sides. It is one of the six holiest Hindu sites in India, known for its beauty and
impressive temples. Nine hundred years ago, it was attacked by Muslim forces
from Afghanistan and looted. Later Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire,
was said to have built a mosque there. Hindus claimed much later that it was
built on the site of a temple to Rama, although the evidence for that is uncertain.
This was the location chosen by the Bharatiya Janata Party in 1992 when it
resolved to create a key Hindu challenge to the concept of Mughal and Muslim
India. After a long build-up campaign, it organized a mob of some 150,000
Hindus, armed them with picks, and attacked the Babri Mosque, pointedly
demolishing it into small pieces. The symbolism was intense for both sides, and
unleashed cycles of retaliation around India. In Ayodhya, it found its response in
2005, when five armed Muslim gunmen attempted to bomb the makeshift new
Rama temple on the site, killing only themselves in the process.
The emergence of the Hindu nationalist party, Shiv Sena, which is based in
Mumbai (Bombay), has further polarized religious and ethnic emotions in the
state of Maharashtra. Strongly hostile to south Indian migrants to Mumbai, the

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movement has particularly targeted Muslims, who make up some 15 percent of
the Mumbai population. The movement has adopted ultranationalist values and
rhetoric and specializes in recruiting street thugs for intimidation purposes
against Muslim neighborhoods, while at the same time managing to run the city
government somewhat capably. Serious anti-Muslim riots in Mumbai occurred
in 1992, in which 900 people, mostly Muslim, died, many burned alive; an
official investigative commission identified Shiv Sena as behind the riots. Then,
in response to these riots, in March 1993 thirteen powerful bombs went off in
Mumbai, in which 250 people were killed; the bombings were traced to a
Muslim mafia organization. Tit for tat violence has sporadically occurred in
other locales as well.
Then in December 2001, a brazen attack took place when five Muslim
gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi in broad daylight;
fortunately, the death toll was limited to security guards and all the gunmen. But
the national shock from the assault on such a major public symbol was immense.
The gunmen were identified by Indian authorities as belonging to the Lashkar-e-
Tayiba and the Jaish-e-Mohamed, groups based in Pakistan that have received
Pakistani support in past years for operations in Kashmir.
The year 2002 then saw ferocious anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat that were