have to view contemporary Islamic identity. Fifty years ago in the Middle East,
nationalism loomed far larger than Islam as a rallying force. Yet today the
implications of being Muslim may matter more on the global scale than at any
other time in history. Muslims who seek to rally public support against external
intervention will turn to whichever banner will unite more people most
effectively.
When Arabs finally broke with the multiethnic Ottoman Empire at the end of
World War I, Islam obviously played
no role in the event; it was, after all, a
Muslim versus Muslim struggle. When the conflict entailed Arab versus Turk,
only ethnicity could serve as a rallying cry, not Islam. Ethnic nationalism
achieved prominence in the Arab world, for example, under Egypt’s Gamal
Abdul Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s as the basis of resistance against European
intervention and neo-imperialism. But in the face of the ultimate weaknesses of
the Arab nationalist movement, nationalism became discredited as a force and
the Islamic identity took its place—a stage that has not yet ended.
After watching the horrors of ethnically driven
nationalism and war across
the globe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we might well ask whether
ethnicity is, in fact, the most enlightened foundation for the creation of borders.
Or is some sort of multiethnic order perhaps a “higher” form of social
organization? Certainly the immigrant societies of the United States, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand have come to believe that multiethnic orders foster
greater tolerance than ethnically based ones. But then, those immigrant states
had few other options.
In the Muslim world, there is no conviction that ethnicity invariably provides
the best basis for social and political organization. Islam itself instinctively
abhors the forces of nationalism
as narrow and divisive, even while
acknowledging that differences are also enriching. “O humankind! We have
created you male and female, and made you nations and tribes, that you may
know one another” (Qur’an 49:13). From the perspective of Islam, it is better to
aspire to unity under the banner of religion, since it will embrace a vastly
broader swath of mankind, and no one is ever
excluded from becoming a
Muslim if he or she wishes. Thus, to seek solidarity within Islam is a higher
concept than solidarity within a given ethnicity. And in terms of a rallying cry,
Islam operates very effectively when it comes to a struggle against
non-Muslims.
Many Islamists were therefore hostile to ideas of Arab nationalism,
perceiving the very concept of “nationalism” to be a baleful and divisive
Western creation. Indeed, their worst fears were fulfilled in the case of Turkey.
The founder of the modern Turkish state, successor to the Ottoman Empire,
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, crushed nearly all independent instruments of Islamic
power in the new Turkish nationalist state and adopted an unfriendly attitude
toward Turkey’s Muslim neighbors and toward Islam in general.
Worst of all for
devout Muslims, he abolished the very office of the caliphate, the nominal leader
of Islam for all Sunni Muslims—tantamount to an Italian prime minister
deciding impulsively to abolish the papacy. An Islamic world divided by
nationalist differences is seen as impotent against an interventionist West.
In this sense, then, Western wars that are heavily perceived to be directed
against Islam, as in the Global War on Terror, are guaranteed to inflate the role of
Islam and to push Muslim solidarity to abnormal levels.