Market-Oriented Approaches to Food Safety:
Economic Incentives
As discussed earlier, food safety problems flow from
market failure due to lack of consumer information about
food safety and from few incentives for private producers
to provide this information. One possible approach to
correcting this market failure would be to strengthen
market mechanisms for promoting safer food. For
example, property rights to safe food and product liability
could provide a strong incentive for producing safe food.
A case in point is how the British Food Safety Act of 1990
changed the domestic and international food safety
relationships among producers, retailers, and traders
(Hobbs and Kerr, 1992). This statute changed the liability
laws for companies selling in the UK by adding a “due
diligence” defense clause. Food firms can protect
themselves from liability by increasing compliance
monitoring and by increasing vertical quality control.
However, Viscusi (1989) argues that tort liability cannot
provide the economic incentives necessary to reach the
optimal level of health and safety because of the high
information requirements for documenting liability suits.
Establishing a cause-and-effect relationship among
illness, food product, and producer remains problematic.
Still, HACCP could provide economic incentives that
either augment or substitute for incentives found in the
private marketplace and other regulatory programs.
Pathogen reduction was a prominent issue in the meat
industry prior to the HACCP regulations. Public outrage
over the 1993
E. coli O157:H7 outbreak motivated the
beef industry to increase research on pathogen control.
Klepper (1996) stresses the importance of demand
factors “in shaping the rate and direction of technological
change” (p. 563).
Foodservice companies and restaurant chains (institu-
tional markets) have strong economic incentives to avoid
publicized outbreaks, product liability suits, and brand
image deterioration. Lower pathogen levels provide
other benefits, such as less product spoilage, longer
shelf life, access to more distant markets, and fewer
customer complaints about product quality.
U.S. companies with internationally recognized HACCP
programs will be more competitive. The 1996 Russian
ban on U.S. chicken because of alleged food safety
concerns illustrates potential market losses. Other
countries expect that pathogen control will expand their
export markets (Roberts et al., in press). For example,
New Zealand has a HACCP program for sheep slaugh-
ter, largely to protect its export market. Similarly, the
Dutch Government and food industry instituted an
Integrated Quality Control system for slaughter pigs to
regain its export market.
HACCP will likely improve economic incentives for
innovation, by clarifying firms’ responsibility for food
safety, by setting public health targets, and by removing
regulatory obstacles. New and affordable tests are
improving pathogen monitoring and are permitting new
production options, thus expanding production opportuni-
ties. An incentive to develop new technology is the first-
mover advantage, whereby the first firm that markets a
safer product will gain new markets and increase market
share (Porter, 1983). If producers were able to prove
claims of food safety through verification and testing,
then certain products could develop a reputation for
safety. Labeling foods or establishing brands with a
reputation for safety would allow firms to capture some of
the consumer demand for safer food.
As an example, certification by FSIS’s Technology
Assessment and Research Coordination Division that a
production process significantly reduces pathogens
reduces the purchaser's cost of information about safety
performance. Processors’ legal liability decreases
because they are using the best pathogen reduction
processes for meat and poultry slaughter and process-
ing. And, it enables equipment purchasers to advertise
foods as produced using the latest pathogen-reducing
technology.
New technologies are becoming available that producers
can adopt to reduce pathogen incidence in slaughter
plants, and the new HACCP pathogen reduction rules
may accelerate adoption of these technologies. In
December 1995, Frigoscandia’s steam pasteurization
19
Economic Research Service/USDA
An Economic Assessment of Food Safety Regulations
process became the first process to receive FSIS
approval for significantly reducing pathogens. Before
sides of beef go into the chiller, they are treated with
steam to kill pathogens. A large unit can process 410
head/hour, is fully automated, and costs about $750,000.
Frigoscandia has installed it in Excel/Cargill’s large plants
and another 60 units have been ordered by U.S. and
international firms. Capital costs are minimal in a large
plant and less than a half a cent/pound of beef in the
smallest plants. Other options include increased hand
trimming for lots with high pathogen counts, steam
vacuums on the kill line in the plants, and chemical
dehairing of animals. As firms respond to the new rules,
we may see different plants adopting different methods
to achieve pathogen reduction.
As with education and labeling, market-based incentives
for safer food may prove a useful addition to regulatory
efforts to promote food safety. As market trends lead to
more consolidation and vertical integration in the food
sector, we can expect more efforts by firms to use food
safety as a marketing opportunity.
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