From chanakya to modi evolution of india’s foreign policy

participate whenever defence- related issues are discussed. The top
bureaucratic heads – secretaries – of the ministries that are a part of the
committee are also present, as is the head of the civil service, the cabinet
secretary. According to protocol, a cabinet committee meeting cannot be
held unless the prime minister and the cabinet secretary are both present,
unless of course the prime minister designates someone in his or her place.

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By the time Nehru died and Lal Bahadur Shastri became prime minister
in 1964, decision making on foreign policy had become extremely
personalized. The prime minister and his office were the key policymaking
institution for foreign affairs. As a domestic politician with little interest in
foreign affairs, Shastri gave more leeway to his external affairs minister
Sardar Swaran Singh, who influenced foreign relations between 1964 and
1966.
Unlike Nehru, Shastri was not a prime minister willing to do everything
himself. He needed someone he trusted to explain the content of
voluminous diplomatic cables and administrative files. Thus, Lakshmi Kant
Jha, a member of the Indian Civil Service from the British era, became
secretary to the prime minister. Jha set up the prime minister’s secretariat
(PMS) that over time grew in power and size. During Shastri’s time the
permanent bureaucracy regained lost ground and, as Surjit Mansingh points
out, Shastri made the prime minister’s secretariat into ‘a kind of super-
ministry’. Diplomatic traffic was now routed through this secretariat and
those serving in it had the prime minister’s ear.
Indira Gandhi renamed the prime minister’s secretariat as the Prime
Minister’s Office (PMO), which grew further not just in size but also in
power and influence. The office now comprised officers, including those
from the foreign service, who were deputed to the PMO to be the prime
minister’s eyes and ears. Missives and phone calls from the prime
minister’s office carried more weight than those from the Ministry of
External Affairs (MEA). Indira Gandhi maintained control of foreign policy
even as she appointed a succession of heavyweight Congress party leaders
as her foreign ministers. These included Mahommedali Currim Chagla
(1966–67), Dinesh Singh (1969–70), Sardar Swaran Singh (1970–74),
Yashwant Rao Chavan (1974–77) and Pamulaparti Venkata Narasimha Rao
(1980–84). The prime minister entrusted evaluations to a small group of
advisers while Indira’s foreign ministers simply implemented her decisions.

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Indira’s well-known advisers included Principal Secretary Parameshwar
Narayan Haksar, Chairman, Policy Planning Committee Durga Prasad Dhar
and some journalists such as G. Parthasarathy and Inder Malhotra. For
advice, Indira chose people whose views aligned with hers but she was also
known to be paranoid about loyalty. The slightest suspicion of disloyalty or
perceived attempt to outgrow one’s shoes would lead to even senior
politicians or advisers being barred from even meeting with Indira. ‘Indira
Gandhi used men of ability almost as errand boys,’ wrote Surjit Mansingh,
who is known otherwise for being sympathetic to Indira Gandhi. ‘When she
valued their advice, trusted their discretion and had confidence in their
loyalty to her person, she set them a variety of tasks, irrespective of their
institutional position.’
19
Indira’s son, Rajiv, carried on his mother’s tendency of accumulating
power in the PMO when he stepped into office after his mother’s
assassination in 1984. He was not a traditional politician and was, therefore,
not as interested in domestic politics. Rajiv was, however, impatient to
bring about change in India and saw foreign policy as an important
instrument of integrating India with the modern developed world. Faced
with an entrenched bureaucracy and unsure of whom to trust in the
domestic sphere, he found it easier to deal with foreign than domestic
politics.
Reluctance to trust a bureaucracy that he saw as an impediment to change
led Rajiv to concentrate even more authority within his office. Not only did
he increase the number of foreign service officers attached to the PMO but
he also sought out civil servants he could personally trust. Rajiv retained the
foreign affairs portfolio for some time, like his grandfather, but ultimately
appointed politicians from the Congress party as external affairs minister.
Kunwar Natwar Singh, a former foreign secretary who had grown close to
Indira, was appointed as minister of state for foreign affairs.

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Rajiv often turned to Natwar Singh, not the cabinet minister for external
affairs, for advice on key policies. For example, Rajiv’s decision in 1987 to
use the Indian Air Force to air drop emergency supplies to besieged Tamils
in the Jaffna area of north-east Sri Lanka is attributed to advice proffered by
Natwar Singh and not the cabinet minister or the professional bureaucracy.
The Indian Air Force violated Sri Lankan sovereignty in conducting the
ostensibly humanitarian mission. Later, Rajiv decided to send Indian
peacekeeping troops to Sri Lanka without consulting his cabinet. In fact,
even External Affairs Minister Narasimha Rao was informed of the decision
after it had been made.
20
For twenty-nine of India’s seventy years of Independence, Indian prime
ministers have also held the portfolio of external affairs. Even when
external affairs ministers have been appointed, they have operated only
under their prime minister’s shadow. This runs contrary to the Westminster
model of parliamentary system of government in which, according to
Bandyopadhyaya, the foreign minister is ‘the pivot’ of the decision-making
process in foreign policy.
21
The Indian practice of the prime minister
playing a more direct role in making and executing foreign policy made
India’s foreign ministers less important than in most parliamentary
democracies. A former foreign secretary lamented, ‘I have even served
foreign ministers who when I went for orders would say, “Why come here,
just go down the corridor,” pointing to the prime minister’s office.’
22
The pre-eminence of prime ministers in shaping India’s foreign policy
has endured over the years. As prime minister, Rao navigated his way in the
post-cold-war world by boosting ties with the United States. He also
initiated economic reforms to restart India’s economy and championed the
‘Look East’ policy that was aimed at encouraging economic and trade ties
with India’s East Asian and South-East Asian neighbours. Rao was a

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polymath and a lifelong politician who had served as external affairs
minister under Indira and Rajiv. He knew foreign service officers well and
they expected him to give greater say to the professionals in the ministry
and in diplomatic missions abroad. Instead, Rao continued to concentrate
decision making in the prime minister’s office.
Another prime minister with prior experience as foreign minister under
his belt was Inder Kumar Gujral, who was passionate about foreign policy
like Nehru and retained the post of foreign minister during his short tenure
as prime minister. Gujral came to power intent on leaving a legacy in
foreign policy especially with respect to India’s immediate neighbourhood,
South Asia – the Gujral doctrine. Without weakening the PMO, Gujral
distinguished himself from his predecessors by relying heavily on outside
experts and academics. This led to frequent clashes between the prime
minister and the permanent foreign service.
23
The BJP’s Atal Bihari Vajpayee restored a semblance of consultation in
the making foreign policy. He had served as external affairs minister during
the Janata Party government (1977–79) and, after short stints as prime
minister in 1996 and 1998, presided over a full five-year term as prime
minister beginning in 1999. As a consummate politician, Vajpayee knew
almost all opposition leaders and was able to reach out to them to build
consensus on external relations. On certain issues he consulted his cabinet,
his party and other members of the coalition government and even members
of the opposition Congress party. One such issue was US president George
W. Bush’s request in 2003–04 for Indian troops for the war in Iraq. The
decision to not get militarily involved in Iraq reflected a wide consensus.
On other issues, for example his decision to extend a hand of friendship to
Pakistan while giving a speech in Kashmir, Vajpayee acted alone and
without too much consultation.
Under Vajpayee, a major institutional change occurred when the BJP-led
government created the National Security Council (NSC) Secretariat

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headed by a national security adviser (NSA). Vajpayee appointed his trusted
adviser, former diplomat Brajesh Mishra, as India’s first national security
adviser. Mishra was also principal secretary to the prime minister. This dual
position combined with Vajpayee’s total trust in him meant that after Rajiv
this was the first time the prime minister’s office fully ran foreign and
domestic policy. According to former officials, the depth of the intrusion
was demonstrated even with respect to administrative issues like
appointment of ambassadors.
Two incidents during the Vajpayee government illustrate the prime
minister’s role as the key decision maker, with only a secondary role for his
cabinet. The first of these occurred when in May 1999, while India was
engaged in peace talks with Pakistan, its military was caught off-guard by
Pakistani troops that captured mountainous territory across the line of
control in Kashmir in the Kargil region. This marked the beginning of the
Kargil crisis, which is said to have brought India and Pakistan to the brink
of a nuclear exchange. The Indian Army eventually beat back the Pakistani
intruders and international public opinion was unanimously on India’s side.
Even China joined the United States and other countries in demanding
Pakistan’s withdrawal from territory it had surreptitiously captured.
Several official reports have detailed India’s intelligence failure (both
human and technical) that led to the Kargil crisis. Once the crisis had
presented itself, the prime minister made the major decisions about
militarily confronting the intruders as well as to mobilize world opinion
against Pakistan’s stab in the back. However, Vajpayee was mindful of
likely criticism at being caught napping and over-trusting Pakistan without
putting in place mechanisms for verifying its trustworthiness. He, therefore,
ensured that the Cabinet Committee on Security met daily, often a couple of
times every day, during the course of the crisis. These meetings were
attended by all service chiefs and intelligence heads so that no one could
absolve himself of responsibility for decisions taken during the period.

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The second major crisis where Vajpayee needed to create an appearance
of collective decision came when, in December 1999, an Indian Airlines
flight from Kathmandu to Delhi was hijacked by Pakistani terrorists. Once
again, the Indian government was taken by surprise. Even though time was
of the essence, the government was unable to make quick decisions from
the first landing of the aircraft in Amritsar, to its subsequent landing in
Lahore, Dubai and finally Taliban-controlled Kandahar. According to
Kanchan Gupta, who was then an aide to Vajpayee, the prime minister and
his team were on a flight and had no information about the hijacking for
over an hour.
24
Former Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) chief A.S.
Dulat in his book