From chanakya to modi evolution of india’s foreign policy

India’s Foreign Policy
written by Iqbal Singh, which argued for defence-
based regional groupings both for the Middle-East and South-East Asia,
with India at the core of both.
59
In a 1948 pamphlet titled 
Regionalism and Security
, published by the
Indian Council of World Affairs, Panikkar argued for the creation of a
regional organization comprising several countries: India, Pakistan, Ceylon,
Burma, Malaya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Thailand, French Indo-China,
Indonesia, Australia and Britain. VT Krishnamachari, in his chapter for
Panikkar’s book, argued for the creation of a defence council of all these
countries and even spoke of military and naval bases in Socotra, Mauritius,

---

India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Singapore.
60
For both Krishnamachari and
Panikkar the dominant country in the grouping would be India.
61
Several other Indian strategists too saw Independence as the opportunity
for India to break out of its isolation and play a role on the world stage. One
of them, P.N. Kirpal, wrote in 1945, ‘Three great highways connect her
[India] with the rest of the world. From Calcutta towards the South and
South-East, the sea routes reach Australia and New Zealand, the islands and
countries of South- East Pacific and the great powers of China and Japan in
the Far East. From Bombay and Karachi here are old and easy sea routes to
the Middle East, Africa and Europe. From Delhi to the passes of the North-
West our railway system reaches the most ancient of the world’s highways
of commerce and culture, the land route from India to Europe.’
62
 According
to K.N.V. Sastri, India was to become not only a first-rate military power
but also a country that achieves ‘moral greatness and spiritual height’.
63
These views of several early Indian strategic thinkers and policy planners
reflected the British outlook about India’s neighbourhood, national interest
and sphere of influence, albeit with an Indian twist. According to British
strategists the British Indian Empire was at its core, a ‘kernel’ comprising
the British Indian provinces and princely states. The next layer were states
like Bhutan and Nepal over whom the Raj exercised control of their defence
and security policies. A further layer was that of a ring of buffer states or
territories like Afghanistan, Tibet and Persia – and even Xinjiang – that the
British hoped would remain neutral in any conflict. In this world view,
India’s area of interest stretched from the Gulf on the one hand to Indo-
China on the other.
64
To those trying to weave in ancient Indian philosophy with British strategic
thought, there was a Kautilyan quality to the foreign policy of India under
British colonial rule. As Caroe explained: ‘A large idea lay behind all

---

consideration of the defence of British India, an idea of a great circle of
security, continental and oceanic, radiating from the then India, surrounded
by buffer states on the landward frontiers, the seas securely held by the
Royal Navy and overall in latter days the mantle of airpower. It dated from
a period when maintenance of the security of India was a ruling principle of
every British government and it was developed as part of the world order
enforced during the century of the Pax Britannica.’ 
65
The British had, in
some ways, operationalized Kautilya’s mandalas even if British officers
were unfamiliar with the 
Arthashastra
.
Like British policymakers, modern Indian strategists have consistently
spoken of India’s abiding strategic interest – economic and defence – in the
Gulf and the Middle East. In 1944 Hriday Nath Kunzru, a member of the
Indian National Congress, wrote that India’s importance to the global
community lay in her geostrategic location and large military and economic
resources.
66
According to Panikkar, ‘The Indian Ocean area together with
Afghanistan, Sinkiang and Tibet as the outer northern ring constitute the
real security of India. Geographically also this is one strategic unit, with
India as its great air and land centre and as the base and arsenal of its naval
power. From the central triangle of India the whole area can be controlled
and defended.’
67
It is under British colonial influence that India’s neighbourhood is
deemed to stretch from the Gulf and East Coast of Africa to South-East
Asia. Indian strategists often seem to agree with Caroe’s assertion that it is
‘impossible’ to visualize the Gulf unless that prism includes India which
‘stands at the centre of the Ocean that bears its name’. 
68
 Modern India has
always seen itself as a key player in the Middle East. Even before
Independence, Nehru built close ties with his peers in Egypt and Turkey
and reached out to Arab and Persian politicians and intellectuals.
Unlike the British era, independent India did not base its ties across the
region through military prowess. Nehru did not like military alliances and

---

preferred political, economic and cultural relations on a bilateral basis. Still,
India’s policy towards its immediate neighbourhood or periphery has been a
continuation of the British policy where the interests of the Raj dictated the
interests of the nearby states, not vice versa. This is the root of
contemporary India’s oft-expressed desire to keep outside powers from
gaining influence in South Asia – a sort of Indian Monroe doctrine.
India’s independence from British rule came after a protracted struggle led
by the Indian elite that had been fostered over time during the colonial era.
This national movement, comprising differing strands of thoughts and
views, has deeply influenced contemporary India in all aspects, including
foreign policy. Some leaders of the national movement sought to retain
India’s past while others sought to modernize India. The underlying belief
of all, however, was that ‘India with a more ancient civilization, longer
religious and social traditions, and with its ancient literature and intellectual
tradition, had much to contribute to the rest of the world’.
69
According to
writers like Paul Power, the anti-colonial and anti-fascist stands of the
Indian National Congress before Independence have been more influential
in modern India’s foreign policy than ‘the amoral political advice of
Kautilya’s