From chanakya to modi evolution of india’s foreign policy

participant in the BRICS grouping.
In South Asia, Indian leaders view themselves as the dominant power.
India is the geographical, socio-cultural and economic centre of South Asia.
New Delhi expects not just its neighbours but even external powers like
China, the United States and the West both to accept Indian dominance as
well as bear in mind India’s interests in the region. Modern India expects its
neighbours to consider India as the Chakravartin; South Asia is the only
region where India has been willing to send its army or use force to defend
its interests. The principle was applied during takeovers of the princely state
of Hyderabad in 1948 and the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961, while
sending the Indian Peacekeeping Force to Sri Lanka in 1987, and also
fighting four wars with Pakistan.
Yet, as ancient philosophers noted, the Chakravartin asserted primacy but
never forcefully took over territory. Modern India too has never taken over
territory that belonged to another neighbour. After the 1971 war with
Pakistan that led to the creation of Bangladesh, India withdrew its forces
within a short period of time from the territory of the new country.
India faced several challenges to being viewed as the dominant power in
South Asia and its desire that neighbours look only to India and not to
outside powers. Slow economic growth for decades meant that India did not
have the economic clout to provide its neighbours with the assistance they
needed. Fabian socialism, a mixed economy and the principle of economic
autarky meant that until the 1990s India only grew at 3 per cent a year, a
growth rate that precluded India’s ability to assist neighbours. The growth
of India’s economy in the last two decades has opened the way for India
offering aid to neighbours as an instrument of influence.
India’s effort to woo its poorer South Asian neighbours with aid now face
competition from China under the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative.
China launched the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and has

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promised to invest US $46 billion in Pakistan over the course of the next
few years. Economic incentives are also being offered by China to Nepal,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Indian leaders are aware that managing a sphere
of influence is not only a function of telling others what to do but being able
to expend resources that deny space to competitors.
India’s neighbours complain that India has a history of big promises and
extremely slow follow-through on aid projects. The gap between promise
and delivery is seen in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and even Afghanistan
where India is currently the largest regional bilateral donor. Under Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, and especially since the election of Narendra
Modi, India has sought to offer trade concessions, such as zero tariff or
removing non-tariff barriers, and concessional loans and credit to
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.
As prime minister, Modi has articulated a more assertive vision for
India’s external relations. South Asia, India’s immediate periphery, is as
critical to India under Modi as it was under his predecessors. Modi invited
all South Asian heads of government to his inauguration and has travelled
to Bhutan, Nepal, Mauritius, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh within
less than two years of coming to office. He even attempted a strategic thaw
in relations with Pakistan through his short stopover in Lahore in December
2015 to meet with Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif though that effort
remained unfruitful.
On the first stand-alone bilateral tour to Sri Lanka since 1987 by an
Indian prime minister, Modi pushed for reducing non-tariff barriers,
encouraging economic cooperation, promised to address Colombo’s
concerns about trade, offered US $315 million in a line of credit to upgrade
Sri Lankan rail infrastructure and promised to help the port of Trincomalee
to become a petroleum hub. Modi also sought to reassure Sri Lanka over
New Delhi’s policy on the Tamil issue, stating, ‘We stand with you in your
efforts to build a future that accommodates the aspirations of all sections of

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society, including the Sri Lankan Tamil community, for a life of equality,
justice, peace and dignity in a united Sri Lanka.’
1
Modi visited Nepal twice in the space of six months – August 2014 and
November 2014. On the first bilateral visit by an Indian prime minister to
this critical Himalayan neighbour since 1998, in August 2014, Modi spoke
of the old civilizational relationship between India and Nepal, referring to
them ‘as old as the Himalayas and the Ganga’. Like Sri Lanka, here too
Modi tried to assuage resentment of India as big brother by saying, ‘We
have not come here to interfere in your internal matters but we want to help
you to develop.’
2
During his November 2014 trip, $1 billion line of credit
was offered for building Nepalese infrastructure and hydropower. Regular
bus services between the two countries are now envisaged in addition to
creating ease of travel for private vehicles across the border, promoting
trade, tourism and regional connectivity.
3
While relations with Sri Lanka have improved, those with Nepal seem to
have their ups and downs. In late 2015, political unrest over the new
Nepalese Constitution resulting from disagreements between Madhesis
(ethnic Indians who have lived in Nepal for centuries) and the Nepalese
government adversely impacted India–Nepal ties. The subsequent unrest
and violence also resulted in Madhesis blocking all entry points from India
into Nepal. Given Nepal’s dependence on transit trade through India, the
blockade lasting several weeks hurt landlocked Nepal and was perceived as
having been supported by New Delhi.
4
Nepal offered to sign a fuel deal
with China during Prime Minister Oli’s maiden trip to Beijing in an obvious
effort to get India’s attention. Instead of signing a fuel agreement with
China, the Nepal government preferred seeking a meeting of the Eminent
Persons Group (EPG) created in 2014 to review the gamut of India–Nepal
relations including the 1950 treaty of peace and friendship.
5
Regional connectivity – trade, tourism and travel – between the South
Asian countries has been key to Modi’s push for South Asia. It would

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require building infrastructure within India and connecting it to the
neighbouring countries. That would be a long-term endeavour requiring
consistent investment and policy support. Further, for this connectivity to
actualize, a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
agreement along these lines would be needed. That is still a long way away.
In November 2014, the inking of the SAARC connectivity agreements,
including the motor vehicles pact, was stalled as Pakistan asked for time
arguing ‘it was yet to complete its internal process’.
6
 Seven months later, in
June 2015, India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh signed a Motor Vehicles
Agreement ‘for the regulation of passenger, personnel and cargo vehicular
traffic’.
7
 India is thus trying to build connectivity with its neighbours even if
Pakistan remains unwilling to cooperate. New Delhi believes that sooner or
later Islamabad will understand that if it doesn’t participate it will be left
out.
On Modi’s first trip to Bangladesh in June 2015, the two countries
resolved their boundary dispute by signing the Land Boundary Agreement
(LBA) that had been negotiated for four decades. Agreements were also
signed on cooperation in maritime safety, curbing human trafficking and
checking counterfeit Indian currency allegedly circulated by Pakistan’s
intelligence service through Bangladesh. India offered Bangladesh $2
billion in line of credit and the two countries agreed to set up special
economic zones(SEZs). Dhaka also promised to adopt a policy of ‘zero
tolerance’ against terrorists and insurgents operating in India’s north-east.
8
India’s relations with Afghanistan have also deepened. In December
2015, Modi inaugurated the new building of the Afghan parliament in
Kabul that was constructed with Indian aid. In his address to the Afghan
parliament Modi referred to ties with Afghanistan as ‘timeless’ and
‘ancient’, and pointed out that ‘in the shifting contours of history, there
were times we have been one. There were times we saw wars. But, through
the ages, we have always enriched one another.’ Emphasizing strategic

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bonds but attempting to reassure Pakistan, which looks on India–Afghan
relations with suspicion, Modi stated, ‘You know that India is here to
contribute, not to compete; to lay the foundations of future, not light the
flame of conflict; to rebuild lives, not destroy a nation. You know, as we do,
that Indians and Afghans have always stood for each other, never against
another.’
9
South Asia is not the only region where India seeks to expand its
influence. India offers other developing countries technical and economic
assistance provided through the International Technical and Economic
Cooperation (ITEC) programme. Almost 64 per cent of the annual budget
outlay of the Ministry of External Affairs is spent as international aid under
this programme.
10
Other avenues of Indian assistance to developing
countries are educators, teachers, doctors and technical trainers. An
immensely successful mode of expanding India’s civilizational sphere of
influence has been the export of Bollywood movies, which have access to a
global market.
In addition to defining South Asia as its virtual sphere of influence and
asserting leadership in the developing world, India has always taken pride
in its civilizational inheritance and made it an integral part of its world
view. This pride has also created a sense of Indian exceptionalism: the
belief that India is unique, it is special, was one of the centres of the ancient
world and will, once again, find its rightful place. India’s rise is seen as an
inevitability, an eventuality that is waiting to happen and that nothing and
no one can prevent. During the national struggle for independence, Indian
leaders and thinkers also emphasized the idea of India as a beacon for the
world, both because of its ancient past but also because of the expected
future.
In this iteration of India’s exceptionalism, other developing countries
could learn from India and benefit from the Indian experience. Because
India is different, it would not be a leader like the former colonial powers or

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the cold war superpowers; India would be different because of its unique
history and civilizational experience. Such beliefs are not just the ‘feel
good’ avowals of leaders trying to rally their people but something believed
by the lay Indian. Its deep-rootedness is visible in the presence of this belief
even in the global Indian diaspora. Like other nations, including the US,
who believe in national uniqueness and manifest destiny, Indians tend to
abide by what they see as their principles and not give up on them as part of
a compromise. This means firmly hanging on to non-alignment in a world
that no longer has differing ideological blocs as well as seeking an
independent position in the World Trade Organization that is often starkly
opposite that of the Western countries.
India’s external relations reflect India’s view of self, which, in turn, is
derived not just from ancient Hindu philosophers but has also been
influenced by other developments through subsequent history. Medieval
Muslim sultans added religious and cultural pluralism to Indian life. This
legacy helped modern India shape its relations with Muslim countries to the
west and north-west of India. Another heritage from the medieval era was
the intense personalization of administration. The Mughals bequeathed to
the British Raj a political culture focused on absolute personal power rather
than on permanent institutions. The Raj left behind strong institutions with
personality-driven administration to modern India.
The country was deeply influenced by almost two centuries of British
rule, 110 years of it under the East India Company and another ninety
directly under the British Crown. The British brought to India modern
education, technology and institutions. They also made Indians more aware
of their greater neighbourhood, stretching from the Middle East to South-
East Asia and contributed to Indian understanding of contemporary global
affairs. British Raj saw India as the jewel in its crown and the heart of its
overseas empire. India provided a large supply of recruits for the colonial
army; it was a low-cost producer as well as a captive market for British

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manufactured goods and a critical geo-strategic location for Britain to
ensure its global presence.
The ancient belief in India’s civilizational sphere of influence spreading
from the Middle East to South-East Asia and beyond was translated during
the British Raj into a strategic reality. The British viewed India as the
springboard for the security of the entire region from the Persian Gulf to
South-East Asia. As early as 1943 Indian strategists like K.M. Panikkar
championed the British world view to argue for India to step in as the
security provider for this vast region. India under Nehru, however, was
reluctant to be seen as continuing the policies of a colonial power.
Nehru and his successors did not create a large military presence in the
Indian Ocean littoral. Yet, even the idealist Nehru was realist enough to
understand the importance of this region to India’s security and ensuring
India’s future as a great power. Thus Nehru built close ties with his peers in
Egypt and Turkey and reached out to Arab and Persian politicians and
intellectuals. Further, Indian leaders sought to build India’s stature through
groupings like the Non-Aligned Movement and even the United Nations. In
recent years, however, with the growth in Indian economic and military
power concomitant with the rise of China, there have been demands that
India play this role.
The United States and its allies in East Asia like Japan, South Korea and
even Australia appear open to the idea of India as a major power in the
Indian Ocean. During the days of the British Empire this had meant a
military presence and Britannia ruling the seas. India has so far preferred to
build on its cultural ties, boost its economic relations and gradually
emphasize strategic ties including military exercises. Slowly, the Indian
Navy is emerging as a blue-water navy that might play a role beyond just
protecting India’s territorial waters.
Modern India is cognizant of President Roosevelt’s maxim of speaking
softly while keeping a large stick. Yet her leaders have demonstrated a

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preference to high words instead of quiet actions. Nehru understood the
importance of maintaining a large military and he was not averse to the use
of force as was demonstrated in 1948 in Kashmir and 1961 in Goa. Yet, he
banked more on India’s stature in global politics as insurance than on
investing in Indian defence. Similarly, while Nehru knew the importance of
a strong economy as the backbone of foreign policy, he created a
paternalistic state apparatus that, over time, especially under Indira Gandhi,
suppressed the growth of India’s economy. This, in turn, meant that it was
only with the liberalization of the economy in the 1990s that India was able
to have the economic wherewithal to demand a seat at the global high table
and also invest in its military apparatus.
Now, the primary objective of Indian foreign policy is to create a global
environment that ensures India’s economic development. While India’s
leaders continue to emphasize autonomy in decision making, the leverage
obtained by India’s deepening economic clout has ensured that it is easier
for India today than it was in the early years after Independence. Narendra
Modi has brought an activism to India’s foreign policy that was missing for
some time. In his first thirty-one months in office, Modi has travelled to
forty-five countries including the United States, Japan, China, Australia,
France, Germany, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United
Kingdom.
Although they represent somewhat different outlooks, Modi is as
passionate about foreign policy as Nehru. Modi conducts foreign policy
with the help of a small group of advisers he trusts. He prefers to deal
directly with his officers, instead of through their ministerial superiors, a
practice similar to that of Nehru. He has also built a direct relationship with
the Indian public, using both traditional media – his monthly