From chanakya to modi evolution of india’s foreign policy

Nitisastra
s and refers to this as the
‘positivistic Kautilyan theory’.
4
A key element of Indian realism was that
this theory was applicable only for ‘states within India’ and did not apply
beyond the subcontinent.
For Murty, the idealistic and moralistic stream in Indian politics comes
from Buddhism and Jainism. Murty refers to this as the ‘autochthonous and
moralistic Ashokan theory’ and according to him, these views were
intended to have ‘universal application’ in contrast with locally applicable
Indian realism. 
5
Ashoka (269–232 
BC
) was the greatest emperor of the
Mauryan dynasty who embraced Buddhism and attempted to govern
according to his new religion’s humanitarian tenets.
Murty divides ancient Indian realists into two groups: the ‘
Arthasastrins
’
and the ‘
Dharmasastrins
.’ Those he refers to as the Arthasastrians, or the
followers of Kautilya, were akin to ‘Machiavelli’s “foxes”’ who
‘recommend artifice, infiltration, subversion, propaganda and economic
pressure in preference to war which was always risky and expensive’.
6
Opposed to them were the Dharmasastrins, or those who follow Manu, who

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are ‘Machiavelli’s “lions”’ who ‘advocated heroic war for just ends, win or
die’.
7
Murty divides ancient Indian idealists into two schools as well: the
Buddhists and the Jain–Hindu pacifists. The former ‘thought the entire
world could be converted to dharma [cosmic order] by peaceful means’,
while the latter ‘advocated ahimsa or non-violence but did not rule out the
use of force’.
8
Thus, India’s ancient diplomatic tradition was a mix of
isolationism and involvement, not very different from non-alignment in
modern times. For that reason, Nehru often described non-alignment as ‘a
positive concept with an implicit philosophy behind it’ and insisted that ‘its
roots go back to the time of Asoka and earlier’.
9
American political scientist Quincy Wright thought that Indian
philosophers provided a better framework for understanding international
relations than Western ones. Unlike the West, which has been influenced by
the Platonic insistence on universality, ancient Indian philosophy and
political thought did not assume a universality of ideas. Hence, it is not
surprising that Indian governments ‘have seldom been consistent in the
application of whatever principles they may profess’. 
10
Echoing Quincy
Wright’s views, Giri Deshingkar points out, ‘One prominent characteristic
of the Hindu reading of reality is that the good is always mixed with or
accompanied by the evil.’ 
11
This ties into Nalini Kant Jha’s assertion that ancient Indian philosophers
did not equate ‘public with private morality’ and understood that ‘a
statesman acting on behalf of the state has to take into account the interests
and wishes of his people while deciding on his action’. 
12
Nehru frankly
admitted this in his speeches over the years, and some of his actions, such
as the police action in Goa, reflected this view. Unlike his approach to the
French Indian colonies of Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanam, Mahe and
Chandernagore, now called Chandannagar, where he waited for the colonial

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power to hand over territory to India after a referendum, he chose to annex
Goa by force against the objections of the colonial power, Portugal.
For Nehru, such inconsistency was a necessary function of statecraft.
France was willing to return its Indian possessions to an independent India
whereas Portugal was not. The annexation of Goa reflected India’s concern
that Portugal would delay giving up its sovereignty interminably. Waiting
and negotiating were better options in case of a liberal France while force
was the only course in dealing with an intransigent Portugal. Nehru had
already stated in a speech on 8 March 1948 in the Constituent Assembly: ‘I
can quite conceive of our siding with even an imperial power. I do not mind
saying that in a certain set of circumstances that may be the lesser of the
two evils.’
13
Any study of the influence of ancient Indian thought and practice on
modern India must start with Kautilya. Also known as Chanakya, Kautilya
(c. 370–283 
BC
), was a philosopher who served as adviser to Chandragupta
Maurya, the founder of the Mauryan Empire, the first of India’s dynasties to
hold sway over large parts of the subcontinent. A lot has been written on the
influence of Kautilya on India’s strategic thinking. His magnum opus, the
Arthashastra
(the craft of politics and economics) espouses his famous
‘mandala’ theory – the idea that the king or state (
vijigishu
) seeking
extended influence by becoming universal monarch (
chakravartin
) must
view himself as being at the heart of a series of concentric circles
(mandalas). The 
Arthashastra
is spread over fifteen books, totalling 150
chapters and covers all subjects from political philosophy and theory to
public administration, diplomacy, foreign policy and intelligence gathering.
Like Machiavelli’s 
Prince
, Kautilya’s treatise addresses a king who is
desirous of effectively managing an empire. The book lays out the world as
Kautilya sees it, pointing out challenges and opportunities for the king. Like

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classical realists – Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes – Kautilya too saw
the world as anarchic and as one where every state had to depend solely on
itself. In order to survive in this anarchic world, the king needed to
distinguish between friends and enemies as well as potential allies and
potential foes.
In Kautilya’s concentric circles, your immediate neighbour is your
natural enemy as he covets your territory and resources and is positioned to
take them if he is more powerful than you. The neighbour’s neighbour,
however, is your natural friend because he can covet your neighbour’s
territory but cannot invade you until he becomes your neighbour. This
identification of friends and potential rivals proceeds outward in mandalas
or circles. Every state in the mandala system faces the same predicament:
they all face a series of concentric circles of enemies and friends.
While Kautilya’s influence on the Indian approach to the world is
undeniable, scholars differ on the depth of his impact on modern Indian
strategic thought. According to analysts such as Bangladeshi political
scientist Rashed uz Zaman and German international relations scholar
Michael Liebig, Kautilyan thought is at the root of Indian strategic thinking
and India’s policies can only be understood if we understand Kautilya.
Others disagree, arguing that Indians admire Kautilya for writing a treatise
on statecraft twenty-three centuries ago but do not always consult him
before making policy. The admiration manifests itself in symbolic gestures
like naming the diplomatic enclave in New Delhi as Chanakyapuri (literally
‘Chanakya’s city’) after Kautilya. But according to these scholars,
Kautilyan thought is not the principal inspiration for people such as Nehru,
who shaped Indian foreign policy in the formative years after
Independence.
According to Rashed, Kautilyan influence is evident when one contrasts
the ‘rhetoric’ of Indian policies and ‘their actual implementation’.
14
Rashed
asserts that Indian leaders like Nehru used a ‘façade’ to present their policy

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in moralistic terms when in reality India was building its military potential
15
– something Kautilya would have advised. Rashed further argues that even
after the end of the cold war India still follows Kautilya in being ‘wary of
depending on one group of allies’. 
16
 Despite close relations with Western
countries, India still maintains ties with Russia, old friends in the
developing world from the Non-Aligned Movement and is an active