of the Bible into the vernacular languages of the peoples on the borders of the
empire became a key instrument in their conversion; it brought the Bible to them
in their living language and secured their cultural loyalty, especially since the
translated Bible was often the first document
ever to be written in their
languages—such as what is now called Old Church Slavonic, the liturgical
language of the Slavic Orthodox world. In response, German Catholic clerics in
the region fought unsuccessfully to dissuade the Slavs from adopting the liturgy
in a Slavic language. (Astonishingly, at this same period in the West, the Bible
still had not been officially translated in full into vernacular languages, nor
would it be until the Protestant Reformation five hundred years later. Indeed, the
Catholic Church insisted on maintaining Latin as the sole liturgical language
until the twentieth century—even though the New Testament had originally been
written in Greek.)
A second attractive feature of Eastern Christianity
was the relatively greater
autonomy that Eastern Churches were offered as opposed to the requirement of
rigorous submission to Rome, even on church administrative matters, under
Catholicism. The pope, furthermore, insisted on arrogating to himself immense
secular powers in ways that the Byzantine patriarch did not. The history of the
European Middle Ages is replete with just such massive power struggles
between the pope and worldly princes. This reminds us that there is, in fact, a
much deeper tradition of religious interference into Western secular politics by
the Roman Catholic Church than has ever been
the case in Islam and its
consistently secular (nonclerical) rulers (until modern Iran).
As the East-West rivalry continued in Eastern Europe, the Serbs, Bulgarians,
Romanians, Russians, and the southern half of the Albanian population were
ultimately converted to Orthodoxy. But Rome won out in the conversion of the
Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenians, and Hungarians, who chose
Catholicism. This simple choice of religion fatefully cast the die for the entire
future political and cultural orientation of these countries that lasts until today. A
sharp Latin-Orthodox fault line still runs from the
Baltic Sea down through the
old Yugoslavia to the Aegean.
Thus, without explicitly intending to do so, Constantinople had fused religion
with ethnicity within the Orthodox tradition—a particularly potent combination.
Indeed, the richness of the Orthodox Churches lay in their cultural diversity even
as they remained part of a broader, powerful Orthodox community united in
common spiritual values, belief, and ritual. In sharp contrast, Islam strongly
resisted the creation of any “ethnic” Islamic movements or use of local
languages to replace Arabic for worship; but Islam also
never adopted the highly
centralized model of control that Rome did. Rome had a pope, Islam had a