Table of contents introduction

Countries' attitude to the problem

XVIII AD between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the Karabakh issue, which dates back to the turn of the century, Russia's demographic policies have undermined the region's demographic structure. The problem, which grows with the claims of ethnic-national boundaries between the parties, has reached an international dimension, including the globalization of Russia, where it is impossible for Russia to mediate alone (Özyılmaz, 2013: 193). The influential countries and international organizations in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, the USA, Iran, the EU, the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Latifaci, 2011: 2).

In the post-Soviet period, the re-shaping of the territories of the states, especially Russia, Iran and the United States, within and outside the region, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue extends from the Caucasus to Central Asia. 2017: 70).

The fact that the region has oil resources and that the newly independent republics are in a state of instability has an important role in the inclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue on the world agenda. This has led Turkey, Iran and the Russian Federation (RF) to reassess the economic benefits of major powers such as the United States (US) and European countries as they increase their competition in the region (Acar ve Çemrek, 2015: 123).

1. 
   USA
   

The strength of the Armenian lobby in the United States in its approach to the issue, its efforts to maintain good relations with independent Azerbaijan, and various factors, such as Turkey, have led to policies in the region. He influenced the Armenian lobby in making decisions on the region and encouraged the American Congress to make decisions in the direction they wanted (Latifaci, 2011: 74). The United States initially provided financial assistance to Armenia. Later, the increase in the share of oil companies in Azerbaijan led to a change in the attitude of the United States and began to look for a way to solve it. The United States has also provided assistance to Azerbaijan in indirect ways since 1996, claiming that the situation was a source of misinformation and that no assistance was provided to Azerbaijan (Izzatov, 2006: 86).

The United States, which is Azerbaijan's confidence in bringing its natural resources to world markets, has played an active role in the country's foreign policy in terms of the safety of Caspian oil. Therefore, instead of taking the US approach to the issue, it was to try to balance the economic and strategic issues and support the process of democratization of Azerbaijan by showing a transparent approach. However, the Armenian population in the United States and the Armenian lobby, which has a 25% congressional support, have influenced US regional policies (Özyılmaz, 2013: 204). Despite this influential Armenian lobby in the United States, Armenia will not be an ally that the United States is looking for, as it also has close ties with Russia (Mardanov, 2012: 43).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the independence of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia led to a change in US foreign policy. The United States aims to include the region in its population, which it perceived as a threat to its individual until 1991. The United States, Germany and Russia are in a serious race to join the world trade in oil from the Caspian Sea (Jamilli, 2004: 181).

The United States chose to stay in the background for a while after seeing that the SSCB had left the Russian Federation after thinking that it could enter the region through Turkey with the collapse of the SSCB. It can be said that the reason under this decision is to think that instability in the region can only be prevented by the Russian Federation. Ancak; With the advent of Caspian energy sources, the use of high-potential RF as a risk has led the United States to worry. All of these factors have led the United States to pursue a policy of maintaining good relations with Azerbaijan and not losing them (Latifaci, 2011: 74-75). US political priorities over Azerbaijan; It is based on bringing the United States and Western Europe closer to each other, strengthening their stability, supporting their democratization and economy, making investments, and strengthening bilateral trade relations. He also worked to prevent Azerbaijan from being occupied or influenced by states such as Russia and Iran (Mardanov, 2012: 44).

These efforts of the United States in relation to Azerbaijan were overshadowed by a resolution adopted by the US Congress in October 1992 (Mardanov, 2012: 225). Article 907 provides for US financial assistance under the Freedom Support Act to all former SSCB countries outside Azerbaijan. This decision, taken by Congress under the influence of the Armenian lobby, prevented US intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh war; It has also rendered the United States inactive in the operation of Caspian oil. For this reason, the United States has been forced to hand over the presidency of the body set up in 1992 to BP, known as a British company, to operate Caspian oil (Jamilli, 2004: 181-182). This article, which deprives Azerbaijan of any US assistance, is not in line with the principle of respect for human rights and is one of the obstacles to peace in the region (Mardanov, 2012: 225).

On Saturday, February 20, 1993, the Minsk Conference President Rafaelli reached an agreement on the provision of a ceasefire in the region (Caferov and Aslanli, 2016: 246).

Since 1994, AGIT has been the mediator of the Minsk Group and has been advocating a meeting on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although a three-party committee: the United States, Russia and France, was set up to find a final solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Azerbaijani regime has refused to recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and meet with it directly. The countries in question wanted to maintain peace in the disputed region in order to get their economic gains from Hazar Petroleum.

In 1999, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia met in Washington on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan (President of Armenia) signed an agreement on the Goble Plan, which covers land change on both sides, given by former US President Paul Goble (Mardanov, 2012: 89). The plan, which is also interpreted as a ground wedge, is as follows; There will be a corridor in the southern region of Armenia Meghri to Azerbaijan and a passage to the Nakhchivan region; In return, the Lachin corridor will be given to Armenia. The failure to clarify the details, especially the lack of understanding of where the corridors will go and how deep they will be, and the idea that land loss will create controversy in the country have failed (Guide, 2017: 58-59). As a result, this plan also failed to solve the problem (Khan, 2021: 29).

The United States has provided U.S. military training and financial assistance to Georgia's northeast. The aid was allegedly carried out by al-Qaeda militants on the Chechen border. This counterterrorism activity of the United States has also affected the Caucasus (Jamilli, 2004: 184).

In 2001, the United States suspended an additional article (Article 907) that decided to ban aid to Azerbaijan. On March 15, 2001, Colin Powell, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States, was invited to negotiate with the parties. When the details of my discussion in the US-owned state of Florida and under the supervision of AGIT were examined, the official report "On the Settlement of the Karabakh Problem" issued by the USA before the discussion was an important development. For the first time, statements about the occupation of Azerbaijani lands by the Armenian army are included in this report. This plan is for the public; The granting of an important autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, the opening of a corridor over the Lachin region to Armenia and, in return, the opening of a corridor over Mehri by Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, is reflected in the form of: 87). These meetings, which welcomed the invitation of both Azerbaijan and Armenia, did not result in another result (Latifaci, 2011: 76).

The diplomacy that the United States has embarked on with the goal of maintaining regional security seems to have failed. It did not reach its targets until September 11, 2001. With the change in world politics after the events of September 11, the US policy on the Caucasus has also changed significantly. The US administration under Bill Clinton has chosen not to interfere in events too much and not to face its rivals in foreign policy, which has prevented the US population from reaching a sufficient level in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. With the rise of C. Bush, the United States began to prove itself as the only superpower, and for the most part lived it (Jamilli, 2004: 184).

2. 
   Russia
   

The Caucasus has an important role to play in Russia's path to the warm seas. The Black Sea and Caspian coasts are important geographies for Russia. Energy sources and pipelines are important for Russia in the Caucasus. Russia characterizes the Caucasus as a bridge between Europe and Central Asia. Various underground and surface resources and oil in Baku increase the strategic importance of the region. XIX. Azerbaijani oil, which began to be extracted at the end of the 19th century, formed an important part of the Russian economy during the Soviet era (Babayev, 2019: 62).

XIX. from the beginning of the century, respectively; The military, diplomatic and political support provided by the Russian Empire, the USSR and the Russian Federation to Armenia has made a great contribution to the political existence of Armenia. At the same time, the Armenians' inclination to the Orthodox sect, like the Russians, was a religious element used by the Armenians during Russia's expansion into the Caucasus (Tuysuzoglu, 2018: 218). With Russia's effective Slavicization policy in keeping silent about the Armenian attacks and supporting the Armenians, the Russians wanted to unite the Slavs together. As a result, the decisions of the Russians, the Turkmenchay (1828) and the Edirne Treaty (1829) on migration led to the resettlement of Armenians in the Caucasus (Pehlivan, 2016: 99).

Russia has also made Armenia dependent on itself in economic and energy matters. As a result, Moscow, where Armenia's energy market is strictly controlled, condemned Yerevan's decisions and actions; It has limited oil and natural gas support to the country, controlling Yerevan-Iran relations and controlling the operation of pipelines. Russia is also operating the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, which is still in operation despite its economic size and is located on the Turkish border (Tüysüzoğlu, 2018: 222).

Azerbaijan's independence in 1991 shifted the Karabakh issue to foreign policy. In response to the increase in Armenian attacks declaring the Artsak Armenian Republic in return, the Soviets arranged meetings to prevent conflicts. The Zheleznevodsk negotiations, which took place on September 24, 1991, resulted in a peace agreement. In this agreement, which includes the decision of the Soviets to remain in the region and to separate the political groups in the region by laying down their arms, Armenia has confirmed that Karabakh is connected to Azerbaijan. However, the decisions in question were decisions that Armenians would not want to implement, as well as their non-implementation. With this agreement, a temporary peace was established in the region, but after that, the Turkish-Armenian relations reached the size of a reciprocal struggle (Pehlivan, 2016: 105).

Towards the end of the 1980s, with the increase in the problem, solution initiatives, and with the escalation of the shortcomings in the early 1990s, interventions related to peace were on the agenda. Although there were many peace initiatives during or after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ceasefire, which was the most valuable and stopped the war, was achieved in May 1994, mainly with the mediation of Russia. Although the Bishkek Protocol and the ceasefire agreement signed after it officially stopped the war, it did not stop the fire, and the details of the agreement with this ceasefire violation and the possibility of the current situation leading to a war were questioned (Caferov and Aslanli, 2016: 241).

18 Since October 1991, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have begun to develop in many areas. In the post-Cold War period, which ended with the collapse of the SSCB in 1991, two important currents emerged in Russian foreign policy. The first of these was the "New Eurasian Movement", which emerged as a response to the "Atlantic Ecol", claiming that the country's products could be best protected by joining Western organizations such as AGIT and NATO. The new Eurasianists saw the West's attempt to fill the gaps in the political and economic space that emerged after the SSCB period, and the continuation of the US's political and cultural rule from economic and technological branches as a threat to the international order and Eurasia. Babayev, 2019: 62-63).

The economy that collapsed with the independence of the former Soviet Republic has weakened economic ties between Russia and Azerbaijan. However, until 1994, the Azerbaijani economy remained dependent on Russia. Economic tensions between the two sides began to worsen in August 1994 as the situation in Chechnya escalated. Since then, Azerbaijan has faced a one-way embargo from Russia (the Kremlin). Although it has been understood many times that the embargo between Moscow and Baku has been lifted, no significant result has been achieved. It is a fact that the embargo has damaged the Azerbaijani economy. As a result of all these events, the focus of the country's economy has shifted to other countries, and the national currency, the manat, is no longer under the influence of the Russian ruble. After becoming independent and rich in oil fields, Azerbaijan, which has become the center of world-renowned oil producers, has been flooded with “great foreign investors” in recent years (“Şıhaliyev, 2004: 34).

The concept of national security, launched in January 2000, focuses on the development of Russia's relations with the CIS member states and the "protection of the legal rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad." In addition, the loss of power in Russia is seen as a threat to the country's security, and "under certain conditions, the need for Russia's military presence in some strategically important regions of the world." However, after the collapse of the SSCB, the regional states, in addition to declaring their independence, made a number of attempts to get rid of Russian control. Although Yeltsin, who dealt with central issues until 2000, did not show much interest in the Caucasus, Putin, who came to power as President in 2000, increased interest in the Caucasus region and strengthened the position of the central government (2019, 2019):

In August 2008, it showed the fact that it was "not frozen" in other problems in the region, and efforts were made to solve the problem. However, the fact that the interventions did not yield any meaningful results and the coming together of other actors resulted in serious shortcomings on the front line in April 2016. Following these shortcomings, which resulted in a new peace agreement after Russia's intervention, the importance of maintaining the ceasefire was brought up. As long as Russia's possibilities and claims do not change, the problem will be less likely to result in a permanent solution (Caferov and Aslanli, 2016: 239).

In summary; Russia has always been the key point in this issue. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has pursued a balanced and, as far as possible independent foreign policy pursuit (Caferov and Aslanli, 2016: 256).

3. 
   Turkey
   

In the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Turkey was seen at an important point in the process due to its historical and cultural ties with Azerbaijan and its position as a border neighbor to the said region. Turkey, whose military intervention was discussed in the time of conflict, has made an effort to ensure that the solution of the problem ends in peace on the international platform by applying a measured policy, if we make a general assessment (Gökçe, 2011: 1139).

In the late 1980s, with the strengthening of the independence movements in Azerbaijan, a revival in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations began. Turkey has always been seen as a supporter of the independence movement in Azerbaijan and has made this approach felt to Azerbaijan (Baba-zada, 2017: 13).

On February 13, 1988, the Armenian population in the DKÖB, which was bordered by Azerbaijan, hung the flag of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSC) on the administrative institutions in the region, and it was decided to include the autonomous region in Armenia with a negotiation (Baba-zada, 2017: 13). On July 12, 1988, the DKÖB local assembly decided to leave Azerbaijan, but the next day, the decision was deemed invalid in the meeting held by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which came together for negotiations on July 18, evaluated the decisions of the parties and announced that the borders of Karabakh could not be changed. The said decision led to the reaction of the Armenians and the acceleration of their activities to leave Azerbaijan (Ekici, 2017: 67).

Before the disintegration of the USSR, Turkey did not intervene in the events as it saw the Nagorno-Karabakh problem as an internal matter of the USSR (30). In the 1989-1991 period, Turkey followed an unclear and unpredictable approach, did not interfere with the nationalist movements in the Soviet republics and kept Moscow at the center of its relations in its usual foreign policy structure. Even Turgut Özal's approach to the subject, which often clashed with the traditional structure of Turkish foreign policy at that time; it has been appropriate to adopt the approach of not interfering in foreign affairs with Atatürk's principle of "Peace at Home, Peace in the World". As a matter of fact, despite the intense pressures of some of the public to support Azerbaijan, Turkey preferred not to intervene in the suppression of the Turkish people by force in Baku (Şıhaliyev, 2004: 156-157).

In 1990, Turkey understood that Armenia would gain its independence, and tried to carry out a strategy of taking a step towards a new beginning, aiming to keep the relations with the new Armenian state well, due to the disasters that took place on both sides in the Ottoman (Turkish)-Armenian relations. Thus, he provided aid to Armenia before and after Armenia's independence, and provided food and electricity support to Armenia when it suffered from the economic problems caused by the great earthquake in Gyumri and its surroundings in 1988 and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the existence of undesirable possibilities such as the smuggling of weapons due to the Karabakh conflict, Turkey has allowed other countries' humanitarian aid to Armenia through its own territory. Despite all this, it cannot be said that this approach of Turkey received a response from Armenia (Lütem, 2015: 235).

With the disintegration of the USSR, he initially wanted to proceed impartially in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and to act as a mediator between the parties (30). On November 9, 1991, Turkey became the first country to recognize Azerbaijan, one month after the other Soviet Republics. Meanwhile, bilateral relations could not develop rapidly due to Azerbaijan's preoccupation with internal and external problems (Gasımlı, 2018: 102). However, it can be said that there is an effort to keep the relations dynamic in technical and cultural fields, with the priority of education. This approach, along with the desire to develop in bilateral relations, also came from the idea of ​​removing Azerbaijan from the influence of Russia (Ekici, 2017: 71).

We can say that Turkey did not take any action against Armenia until 1992, when the conflicts intensified. Starting from May of the same year, Turkey's attempts to solve the problem within the framework of the OSCE and similar international organizations were considered an appropriate approach and an attempt was made by the UN Security Council in May 1992 (Gökçe, 2011: 1148). The OSCE decided to hold a conference in Minsk in March 1992 to find a solution to the Karabakh problem, but no result was reached (Baba-zada, 2017: 17).

On May 8, 1992, after the Armenians conquered the city of Shusha, the conflicts started again. With the capture of Lachin on May 17, almost all of the Nagorno-Karabakh region belonged to the Armenians (Baba-zada, 2017: 17). Turkey insisted that Armenia withdraw from the Azeri towns, villages and Lachin it occupied, and held negotiations with Armenia to establish political relations. Turkey has tried both to improve its bilateral relations with all Soviet Republics and not to be involved in any party in the problems between these countries (Ekici, 2017: 70).

Armenia's occupation of Karabakh quickly changed everything. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenia's continuation of the genocide allegations were the first concrete reflections of the anti-Turkish policies on the new state and became an issue that directly concerns the history of the Republic of Turkey. This situation of mutual hostility strengthened Turkey-Azerbaijan relations and made Turkey and Azerbaijan natural allies in the next period (Gasımlı, 2018: 101).

Armenia's occupation of Kelbajar and similar plans on Nakhchivan caused Turkey to begin to impose mandatory sanctions against this country. The first of these sanctions was the closure of the Alican border crossing point between Turkey and Armenia. Subsequently, the air corridor was also closed (30). The decision to close the border with Armenia in 1993 was the most important step of Turkey in this problem. As a result, the relations that started with Armenia lasted for a short time, and the steps taken to normalize the relations did not result in positive results due to the problems in the past with Armenia and the continued occupation of Azerbaijani lands (Gökçe, 2011: 1139).

When the Khojaly genocide was heard in Turkey, the people protested in Istanbul. President Turgut Özal, in a statement he gave to the British Financial Times newspaper, put forward the idea of ​​imposing a siege on Armenia as an initiative to support Azerbaijan. Hikmet Çetin, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, presented a peace plan with 6-item recommendations to international institutions and the members of the UN Security Council to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh issue during the meeting held in Brussels. In return, Armenia refused to examine this plan, accusing it of being neutral on the grounds that Turkey was on the Azerbaijani side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Baba-zada, 2017: 17).

Although diplomatic relations were not established during the time the borders were closed, steps were taken regarding commercial and political relations. In 1997, businessmen from Turkey and Armenia established the Turkish-Armenian Trade Council. On June 9, 2001, with the mediation of the USA, the Turkey-Armenia Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was established to improve relations between Armenia and Turkey (30). The "Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia", signed by the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey on October 10, 2009, also included an article related to the opening of the common border, and these negotiations led to negative reactions of Azerbaijan against Turkey. On the other hand, the government has declared that it will not open the border gates if the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is not resolved (Gökçe, 2011: 1149). The process that can be described as the most serious problem in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations since 1991 has been the reflection of the Turkey-Armenia protocols process on Turkey-Azerbaijan relations (Aslanlı, 2020: 178).

4. 
   Iran
   

For Iran, the Karabakh conflict has become a pressure tool that can be used in its relations with Armenia. He took advantage of the Karabakh conflict to make Armenia as dependent on him as possible. This problem was perceived as an opportunity for outside forces to intervene in the South Caucasus for Iran (İbrahimov, 2017: 70).

Despite officially saying that Nagorno-Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijan, Iran has been in favor of continuing the problem as it is. Considering that Iran would pose a threat in the Karabakh region, the increase in power in Azerbaijan was contrary to its interests and did not want Turkey to gain much power over the region (Latifaci, 2011: 86).

Iran, which entered into diplomatic relations with the independent Republic of Azerbaijan on March 12, 1992, became the subject of discussion in Azerbaijan's foreign policy with these relations. Two factions have emerged: those who are in favor of the idea of ​​adopting the division of Azerbaijan as their main goal and taking a hard stance towards Iran, and those who are in favor of approaching sincere bilateral relations with Iran based on the current situation of Azerbaijan (Şıhaliyev, 2004: 110). The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 forced Iran to develop a different policy in the region (İbrahimov, 2017: 58). Perceiving that the disintegration of the USSR is a threat on the one hand and an opportunity on the other, Iran has begun to gain population and seek strategic friends in Eurasia. Iran during the USSR period; Despite its historical, religious and cultural similarities, it resisted in recognizing the independence of Azerbaijan. On 20-23 June 1989, Iran signed an agreement in which it was stated that the borders of the parties would remain fixed in their own lands and that they would not allow other national institutions to emerge. Tehran-Moscow relations strengthened over time, and the negotiations that followed focused on uniting the parties with the steps taken on issues such as the partition of Azerbaijan. After Armenia gained its independence in September 1991, after December 25, 1991, that is, after Iran officially announced that it recognized Armenia's independence, Iran became the country that entered into close strategic relations with Armenia the most after Russia (Şıhaliyev, 2004: 111). .

Iran made its first mediation attempt to stop the Karabakh War by stating that they wanted to mediate in its negotiations with the foreign ministry in November 1991, but no result was reached. For the same purpose, he made the second attempt by signing a ceasefire agreement with the participation of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, who met in Tehran in February 1992. However, the town of Khojaly, one of the largest areas inhabited by the Azerbaijani people in Nagorno-Karabakh, was besieged and destroyed a large part of the population in the region. The day after the negotiations and ceasefire protocol signed by the Azerbaijani and Armenian administrations in Tehran on May 7-8, Armenians occupied the city of Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh. This mediation, which provided significant advantages to the Armenians in the course of the Karabakh conflict, also created a negative perception about Iran in the Azerbaijani society and caused Azerbaijan to respond negatively to the mediation attempt it carried out after Iran. By supporting the Armenians, Iran wanted to benefit from their lobbying activities in the USA and Europe. On the other hand, it will be difficult for western companies to invest in a region where instability continues, that is, western companies will be prevented from entering the region (İbrahimov, 2017: 55-56).

Although Iran's efforts to resolve the conflict in the Karabakh War resulted in ceasefires between the parties, each ceasefire resulted in the regional gain of the Armenians. Iran has displayed a very pragmatic attitude by leaving religion-based ideology in the background, especially in the Caucasus energy issues, and there have been times when it has taken the side of Russia and Armenia against some Muslim countries in the region. The fact that almost half of the Iranian people are Azeris has caused Iran to approach Azerbaijan cautiously. It has been argued that under these circumstances, Iran secretly preferred to support Armenia rather than supporting Azerbaijan (Latifaci, 2011: 86).

The basis of Iran's foreign policy has been to defend the inviolability of the territorial integrity of the countries, with the concern that the deterioration of the territorial integrity of any country may lead to the deterioration of the territorial integrity of the country in the future. In this context, since the beginning of the Karabakh conflict, it has officially recognized the integrity of Azerbaijan's lands and has had negative consequences for Azerbaijan in line with its national interests. As a result; Iran saw the Nagorno-Karabakh problem as a serious threat to its national security. In this respect, Iran has followed a policy in this issue to prevent instability in the region, to prevent the intervention of other powers and to prevent the strengthening of the Azerbaijani state structure. In this context, it both mediated for the solution of the problem and became a party from Armenia (İbrahimov, 2017: 54).

3.