In financing logistics infrastructure, the objective is to maximise return from investment in
infrastructure while minimising cost by creating an efficient well-managed project. The returns
expected from investment reflect the level of risk. The appropriate identification, allocation and
37
management of risk therefore become critical to creating the most cost effective and efficient
financing structure.
Failure to properly identify risks may lead to underestimation of particular costs. For example,
public finance seems cheaper only because the taxpayer is underwriting the associated risk.
Effective risk management is a crucial element in the creation of a fundable proposition. Whilst
attempts may be made to cover every foreseeable risk in contracts, the nature of infrastructure projects
is such that they are inevitably exposed to change. This is inherent in the nature of the long time scale
for their planning, completion and operation. There is constructional and operational risk in that
logistics infrastructure will need to change throughout both the development and operational stages of
its life. Supply and demand variations, macroeconomic change, and changes in policies including
threat of expropriation may also occur.
Efforts have been made to manage projects to accommodate changing circumstances. For
example, policy adjustments on privatised highway projects include: a) rescheduling the construction
programme to allow staggered construction of priority stretches first and lengthening the construction
period, b) staging construction of carriageways, to be upgraded only if warranted by traffic demand,
and c) deferring the construction of interchanges which have low traffic demand.
Those responsible for risk allocation need to be responsive to problems in order to maximise the
speed with which they are rectified, minimise risk associated with delays and in particular identify and
resolve serious problems quickly. Re-negotiation must be feasible in order to accommodate changes
with minimum costs and delays. Control clearly affects renegotiations. Parties who are in control and
are best positioned for efficient renegotiations should therefore provide financing.
Parties most capable of managing risk should be given incentives to do so. Incentive-based
performance will ensure that proper reward is provided to the parties who make the scheme a success
and manage risk. The equity partners in the project should not have their equity merely capped, but
should share the benefits of success in a true public-private partnership arrangement. The extent to
which returns are shared should relate to the original allocation of risk. Risks that cannot be allocated
appropriately to any one partner should be spread as widely as possible.
Many transportation projects involve considerable commercial and policy risks that call for
government guarantees. Government guarantees against risks are a major issue in private financing
and public/private partnerships. On the one hand, if a government shoulders most of the risks, the
private sector loses its incentive to minimise costs. On the other hand, if government does not share
the risks, the project may appear too risky to attract private sector investment. This arrangement
requires maintaining a delicate balance.
It is especially important to synchronise guarantees with major environmental protection efforts.
For instance, private toll road operators should not be offered guarantees of traffic volume level that
would counter competition from other modes or from public transit. This could be counter-productive
as it could encourage increased use of passenger cars and create problems for public transit operations.
Dostları ilə paylaş: