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impossible to secure the computer (see below) and, therefore, you must stop using it (instead of 
relying on TPM). 
 
If the attacker has administrator privileges, he can, for example, reset the TPM, capture the content 
of RAM (containing master keys) or content of files stored on mounted TrueCrypt volumes 
(decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an 
unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it later, when he gains 
physical access to the computer). 
 
If the attacker can physically access the computer hardware (and you use it after such an access), 
he can, for example, attach a malicious component to it (such as a hardware keystroke logger) that 
will capture the password, the content of RAM (containing master keys) or content of files stored 
on mounted TrueCrypt volumes (decrypted on the fly), which can then be sent to the attacker over 
the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive (from which the attacker might be able to read it 
later, when he gains physical access to the computer again). 
 
The only thing that TPM is almost guaranteed to provide is a false sense of security (even the 
name itself, “Trusted Platform Module”, is misleading and creates a false sense of security). As for 
real security, TPM is actually redundant (and implementing redundant features is usually a way to 
create so-called bloatware). Features like this are sometimes referred to as ‘security theater
’
 [6]. 
 
For more information, please see the sections
 Physical Security
 and 
Malware
. 
 
 
Why does Windows Vista (and later versions of Windows) ask me for permission to run