Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count Header key is used to encrypt and decrypt the encrypted area of the TrueCrypt volume header (for
system encryption, of the key data area), which contains the master key and other data (see the
sections
Encryption Scheme and
TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification ). In volumes created by
TrueCrypt 5.0 or later (and for system encryption), the area is encrypted in XTS mode (see the
section
Modes of Operation ). The method that TrueCrypt uses to generate the header key and the
secondary header key (XTS mode) is PBKDF2, specified in PKCS #5 v2.0; see References.
512-bit salt is used, which means there are 2
512
keys for each password. This significantly decreases
vulnerability to ‘off-line’ dictionary/’rainbow table’ attacks (pre-computing all the keys for a
dictionary of passwords is very difficult when a salt is used) [7]. The salt consists of random values
generated by the TrueCrypt random number generator during the volume creation process. The
header key derivation function is based on HMAC-SHA-512, HMAC-RIPEMD-160, or HMAC-
Whirlpool (see [8, 9, 20, 22]) – the user selects which. The length of the derived key does not
depend on the size of the output of the underlying hash function. For example, a header key for the
AES-256 cipher is always 256 bits long even if HMAC-RIPEMD-160 is used (in XTS mode, an
additional 256-bit secondary header key is used; hence, two 256-bit keys are used for AES-256 in
total). For more information, refer to [7]. 1000 iterations (or 2000 iterations when HMAC-
RIPEMD-160 is used as the underlying hash function)
of the key derivation function have to be
performed to derive a header key, which increases the time necessary to perform an exhaustive
search for passwords (i.e., brute force attack) [7].
Header keys used by ciphers in a cascade are mutually independent, even though they are derived
from a single password (to which keyfiles may have been applied). For example, for the AES-
Twofish-Serpent cascade, the header key derivation function is instructed to derive a 768-bit
encryption key from a given password (and, for XTS mode, in addition, a 768-bit
secondary header
key from the given password). The generated 768-bit header key is then split into three 256-bit keys
(for XTS mode, the
secondary header key is split into three 256-bit keys too, so the cascade actually
uses six 256-bit keys in total), out of which the first key is used by Serpent, the second key is used
by Twofish, and the third by AES (in addition, for XTS mode, the first secondary key is used by
Serpent, the second secondary key is used by Twofish, and the third secondary key by AES).
Hence, even when an adversary has one of the keys, he cannot use it to derive the other keys, as
there is no feasible method to determine the password from which the key was derived (except for
brute force attack mounted on a weak password).