Standard 2: Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation
2.1
Will the proposed Project result in significant
13
greenhouse gas emissions or may exacerbate
climate change?
No
13
In regards to CO
2,
‘significant emissions’ corresponds generally to more than 25,000 tons per year (from both direct and
indirect sources). [The Guidance Note on Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation provides additional information on GHG
emissions.]
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2.2
Would the potential outcomes of the Project be sensitive or vulnerable to potential impacts of
climate change?
Yes
2.3
Is the proposed Project likely to directly or indirectly increase social and environmental
vulnerability to climate change now or in the future (also known as maladaptive practices)?
For example, changes to land use planning may encourage further development of floodplains,
potentially increasing the population’s vulnerability to climate change, specifically flooding
No
Standard 3: Community Health, Safety and Working Conditions
3.1
Would elements of Project construction, operation, or decommissioning pose potential safety
risks to local communities?
No
3.2
Would the Project pose potential risks to community health and safety due to the transport,
storage, and use and/or disposal of hazardous or dangerous materials (e.g. explosives, fuel and
other chemicals during construction and operation)?
No
3.3
Does the Project involve large-scale infrastructure development (e.g. dams, roads, buildings)?
No
3.4
Would failure of structural elements of the Project pose risks to communities? (e.g. collapse of
buildings or infrastructure)
No
3.5
Would the proposed Project be susceptible to or lead to increased vulnerability to earthquakes,
subsidence, landslides, and erosion, flooding or extreme climatic conditions?
No
3.6
Would the Project result in potential increased health risks (e.g. from water-borne or other
vector-borne diseases or communicable infections such as HIV/AIDS)?
No
3.7
Does the Project pose potential risks and vulnerabilities related to occupational health and safety
due to physical, chemical, biological, and radiological hazards during Project construction,
operation, or decommissioning?
No
3.8
Does the Project involve support for employment or livelihoods that may fail to comply with
national and international labor standards (i.e. principles and standards of ILO fundamental
conventions)?
No
3.9
Does the Project engage security personnel that may pose a potential risk to health and safety of
communities and/or individuals (e.g. due to a lack of adequate training or accountability)?
No
Standard 4: Cultural Heritage
4.1
Will the proposed Project result in interventions that would potentially adversely impact sites,
structures, or objects with historical, cultural, artistic, traditional or religious values or intangible
forms of culture (e.g. knowledge, innovations, practices)? (Note: Projects intended to protect and
conserve Cultural Heritage may also have inadvertent adverse impacts)
No
4.2
Does the Project propose utilizing tangible and/or intangible forms of cultural heritage for
commercial or other purposes?
No
Standard 5: Displacement and Resettlement
5.1
Would the Project potentially involve temporary or permanent and full or partial physical
displacement?
No
5.2
Would the Project possibly result in economic displacement (e.g. loss of assets or access to
resources due to land acquisition or access restrictions – even in the absence of physical
relocation)?
No
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5.3
Is there a risk that the Project would lead to forced evictions?
14
No
5.4
Would the proposed Project possibly affect land tenure arrangements and/or community based
property rights/customary rights to land, territories and/or resources?
No
Standard 6: Indigenous Peoples
6.1
Are indigenous peoples present in the Project area (including Project area of influence)?
No
6.2
Is it likely that the Project or portions of the Project will be located on lands and territories claimed
by indigenous peoples?
No
6.3
Would the proposed Project potentially affect the rights, lands and territories of indigenous
peoples (regardless of whether Indigenous Peoples possess the legal titles to such areas)?
No
6.4
Has there been an absence of culturally appropriate consultations carried out with the objective
of achieving FPIC on matters that may affect the rights and interests, lands, resources, territories
and traditional livelihoods of the indigenous peoples concerned?
No
6.4
Does the proposed Project involve the utilization and/or commercial development of natural
resources on lands and territories claimed by indigenous peoples?
No
6.5
Is there a potential for forced eviction or the whole or partial physical or economic displacement
of indigenous peoples, including through access restrictions to lands, territories, and resources?
No
6.6
Would the Project adversely affect the development priorities of indigenous peoples as defined
by them?
No
6.7
Would the Project potentially affect the traditional livelihoods, physical and cultural survival of
indigenous peoples?
No
6.8
Would the Project potentially affect the Cultural Heritage of indigenous peoples, including
through the commercialization or use of their traditional knowledge and practices?
No
Standard 7: Pollution Prevention and Resource Efficiency
7.1
Would the Project potentially result in the release of pollutants to the environment due to routine
or non-routine circumstances with the potential for adverse local, regional, and/or trans
boundary impacts?
No
7.2
Would the proposed Project potentially result in the generation of waste (both hazardous and
non-hazardous)?
No
7.3
Will the proposed Project potentially involve the manufacture, trade, release, and/or use of
hazardous chemicals and/or materials? Does the Project propose use of chemicals or materials
subject to international bans or phase-outs?
For example, DDT, PCBs and other chemicals listed in international conventions such as the
Stockholm Conventions on Persistent Organic Pollutants or the Montreal Protocol
No
7.4
Will the proposed Project involve the application of pesticides that may have a negative effect on
the environment or human health?
No
7.5
Does the Project include activities that require significant consumption of raw materials, energy,
and/or water?
No
14
Forced evictions include acts and/or omissions involving the coerced or involuntary displacement of individuals, groups, or
communities from homes and/or lands and common property resources that were occupied or depended upon, thus eliminating
the ability of an individual, group, or community to reside or work in a particular dwelling, residence, or location without the
provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protections.
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Annex 15
1) Results of the capacity assessment of the project implementing partner;
and 2) HACT micro assessment
Results of the capacity assessment of the project implementing partner
UNDP CAPACITY ASSESSMENT SCORECARD (FROM MONITORING GUIDELINES OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN
GEF OPERATIONS) http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/environment-
energy/www-ee-library/mainstreaming/monitoring-guidelines-of-capacity-development-in-gef-
operations/Monitoring%20Capacity%20Development-design-01.pdf
At the project level
Project Cycle Phase: CEO Endorsement
Date: September 25, 2016
Capacity
Result /
Indicator
15
Staged
Indicators
Score
Comments
Next Steps
Contribution
to which
Outcome
CR 1: Capacities for engagement
1.1. Degree
of
legitimacy/
mandate of
lead
biosecurity
organization
s
Authority and
legitimacy of
lead
organization
responsible for
biosecurity
management
recognized by
stakeholders
3
The Biosecurity Promulgation of
2008 recognizes and mandates
the Biosecurity Authority of Fiji
(BAF) to prevent the
introduction and spread of
animal and plant diseases and
pests and manage quarantine
controls at borders to minimize
the risk of exotic pests and
diseases entering the country.
Constitution and early
notification of a National IAS
Committee with clear Terms of
Reference would go a long way
in close supervision and project
monitoring.
1
1.2 Existence
of
operational
co-
management
mechanisms
for
biosecurity
Some co-
management
mechanisms are
formally
established
through
agreements,
MOUs, etc.
2
BAF has established a number of
MOUs with some of its key
partners to facilitate and
support the prevention of
introduction of pests and
diseases into the country,
including IAS, but no-formal
cooperation mechanisms
beyond a few government
partners and sectors and is
largely ad-hoc and a
coordination function needs to
be institutionalized to facilitate
effective coordination. A
national coordinating body is
absent, even though the existing
The establishment of the
national coordinating body,
preparation of NISFSAP and re-
activation of the Fiji Invasive
Species taskforce will facilitate
determining key stakeholders
and their individual and
collective roles and
responsibility for biosecurity
related actions in the country
and institute a mechanism that
will facilitate effective
coordination.
1
15
All capacity result/indicators follow standard template, with exception that the focus is on “biosecurity” rather than
environment, in general
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National Environment Council
established by legislation could
serve that function.
1.3.
Existence of
cooperation
with
stakeholder
groups for
biosecurity
Stakeholders are
identified, but
their
participation in
decision-making
is limited
1
BAF participates with a few
partner agencies to ensure
biosecurity at key international
airports and seaports, but
cooperation with stakeholder
groups beyond this is very
limited, especially with
research, scientific and non-
governmental entities
Based on NISFSAP,
development of supportive
legislative framework,
regulations and MOUs to
support participation of key
stakeholders in decision-
making on biosecurity issues in
the country
1
CR 2: Capacities to generate, access and use information and knowledge
2.1. Degree
of
biosecurity
awareness of
stakeholders
Some
stakeholders are
aware about
global
biosecurity and
IAS issues, but
not of possible
solutions
16
1
At national level, stakeholders
have basic understanding of
biosecurity and IAS concerns,
with buy-in limited to a few
sectors. There is overall limited
knowledge to identify IAS and
address biosecurity issues, with
most stakeholders unable to
adequately participate in
prevention and control. At the
local-level, stakeholders have
little or no understanding of
global environmental issues.
Expansion of biosecurity
outreach, initially to the four
islands to enhance awareness
and capacity of community to
actively become partners in in
prevention and control of IAS
movement. Based on initial
trailing in four islands, its
extension nationally
3, 4
2.2. Access
and
sharing of
biosecurity
related
information
by
stakeholders
The biosecurity
information
needs are
identified but
the information
management
infrastructure is
inadequate
1
There are no comprehensive IAS
informational sources
developed at the national level,
without which prevention,
management and awareness of
IAS in Fiji will remain under
capacitated as existing
knowledge and information will
Development of database
regarding IAS present on these
four islands, established
invasive species for each
island. A national IAS database
will be based on the successful
completion of the four-island
group IAS database. This
1, 4
16
This indicator is slightly modified from standard template, as follows: Stakeholders are not aware about global biosecurity
and IAS issues and their related possible solutions (0); Some stakeholders are aware about global biosecurity and IAS but not
about the possible solutions (1); Stakeholders are aware about biosecurity and IAS issues and the possible solutions but do not
know how to participate (2) and Stakeholders are aware about biosecurity and IAS issues and are actively participating in the
implementation of related solutions (3).
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not be readily accessible to all
stakeholders and no
comprehensive source of
information will exist.
database will support IAS
prevention and management
across multi-sectorial efforts
and allow both managers and
policy makers to better
understand IAS and improve
development and
implementation of regulations,
policy and field actions
throughout the country to
address IAS concerns by
complying both existing and
new IAS information for the
nation into one database that
policy makers and managers
can readily access.
2.3 Extent of
inclusion/use
of traditional
knowledge in
biosecurity
decision-
making
Traditional
knowledge is
ignored and not
taken into
account into
relevant
participative
decision-making
process
0
Traditional knowledge,
especially in regards to native
biota could be used to augment
outreach messages throughout
the country and support
sustainable use of native species
Traditional knowledge should
be taken into consideration for
the development of IAS
awareness strategy and
campaign(s). What native biota
are/were beneficial and how
these may be being impacted
by non-natives can be used to
focus IAS awareness material
to relevant topics which will be
supported by local
communities
4
2.4.
Existence of
biosecurity
awareness
and
education
programs
Biosecurity
education
programs are
partially
developed and
partially
delivered
1
Programs are available,
particularly to reach
international visitors, but
outreach to local and rural
populations are minimal or non-
existent. For the majority of
local stakeholders there is no
comprehensive outreach effort
to reach such communities.
There is no comprehensive
strategies exist for the nation or
specific islands/island groups
Targeted outreach and
education programs would be
developed for citizenry,
particularly to ensure the
management of inter islands
transfer of IAS
3, 4
2.5. Extent of
the
linkage
between
research/sci
ence
and
biosecurity
policy
development
No linkage exist
between
biosecurity
policy and
science/research
strategies and
programs
0
Virtual absent are linkages with
research and scientific
institutions
The NISFSAP would provide the
framework for helping to
identify gaps, research needs
for policy development and to
identify institutions that could
undertake biosecurity related
science and research and
facilitate linkages with policies
1
CR 3: Capacities to strategy, policy and legislation development
3.1. Extent of
the
The biosecurity
planning and
0
Some efforts are being made to
under IAs risk assessment and
The NISFSAP will provide the
overall planning framework
1, 4
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biosecurity
planning and
strategy
development
process
strategy
development
process is not
adequately
coordinated and
does not
produce
comprehensive
biosecurity plans
and strategies
emergency responses, although
not comprehensive. While
biosecurity promulgation act
exists, there is no clear
comprehensive strategy or
coverage. There is no overall IAS
multi-party planning document
for biosecurity in the country,
resulting in an under-
capacitated IAS management
system that does not support
synergistic, multi-party use of
resources including cross-
agency planning and action
implementation.
and strategy for biosecurity in
the country and the national
coordinating body and FIST will
oversee coordination of the
planning and implementation
3.2.
Existence of
an adequate
Biosecurity
policy and
regulatory
frameworks
Some relevant
biosecurity
policy and
regulatory
frameworks
exists, but few
are
comprehensive,
and are not
adequately
implemented
and enforced
them
17
1
Gaps in legislation and policy
should be identified as part of
the stakeholder consultations in
development of the NISFSAP.
Gaps should be clearly
documented in the NISFSAP and
anticipated avenues for
addressing any gaps provided
through stakeholder input. Gaps
such as the lack of biosecurity
inspection services for domestic
flights are already known and
concepts on how to resolve such
issues should be part of the
NISFSAP development with clear
timelines spelled out in the BAF
strategy
Establishment of a national
level IAS committee to
coordinate activities
throughout the nation is
essential to improving existing
components into a
comprehensive framework.
Development of a NISFSAP to
guide IAS efforts. Development
or re-engagement of an IAS
taskforce, made up of
local/regional experts, who can
inform and support the
national IAS committee is
essential. Development of a
biosecurity authority multi-
year strategy, so that
comprehensive and clear
planning are available for the
lead agency involved in IAS
prevention and management.
Determination through the
NISFSAP development process
of potential gaps in existing
policy, legislation and
regulations in regards to IAS
1
17
This indicator is modified from the standard template to reflect the situation in Fiji as follows: The biosecurity policy and
regulatory frameworks are insufficient; they do not provide an enabling environment (0); Some relevant biosecurity policies
and laws exist but few are comprehensive, and not adequately implemented and enforced (1); Adequate biosecurity policy and
legislation frameworks exist but there are problems in implementing and enforcing them (2); and Adequate policy and legislation
frameworks are implemented and provide an adequate enabling environment; a compliance and enforcement mechanism is
established and functions (3)
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prevention and management
and addressing these gaps
through the national IAS body
and BAF multi-year strategy
3.3.
Adequacy of
the
environment
al
information
available for
decision-
making
Some
biosecurity and
IAS information
is available to
decision-makers
but is not
sufficient to
support decision
making
18
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