A world Without Islam pdfdrive com

particularly horrific—up to two thousand Muslims died in them. According to
the UK Guardian:
Two hundred and thirty unique Islamic monuments, including an
exquisite 400-year-old mosque, were destroyed or vandalised during the
recent anti-Muslim riots in the Indian state of Gujarat, according to a local
survey. Experts say the damage is so extensive that it rivals the better
publicised destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan or the
wrecking of Tibet’s monasteries by the Red Guards. In other disturbances,
Hindu gangs have smashed delicate mosque screens, thrown bricks at
Persian inscriptions, and set fire to old Korans…. “This has been a
systematic attempt to wipe out an entire culture,” said Teesta Setalvad of
Sapara, a body opposed to communal strife, who compiled the list.
Thus, the terrible terrorist attack of Muslim jihadists in Mumbai in December
2008 needs to be seen as part of a series: this one outrage indiscriminately
butchered some two thousand people at random, in multiple attacks on public
places and big hotels—the kind of incident that has played back against the
Muslims of India, even though few if any seem to have had a hand in it. All

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these incidents intensify Muslim communal insecurity and serve to impel the
core Muslim identity into a hunkered-down and defensive mode that now
typifies Muslim communities across much of the Muslim world.
A 1995 study of communal tensions in India prepared by the US Library of
Congress attributes most of this communal violence in India not so much to
“ancient hatreds” or to religious fundamentalism but to the interaction between
socioeconomic problems and the irresponsible strategies and tactics of India’s
politicians since 1980. This study identifies the destabilizing character of rapid
urbanization, and increased competition among diverse groups for livelihoods.
The Library of Congress study also singles out changes in the nature of India’s
political process that lead politicians to dangerously exploit religious sentiments
and appeal to chauvinistic caste biases among the Hindu majority, all for short-
term gain at the polls. Violence by Muslim guerrilla groups in Kashmir and by
Sikhs in Punjab have also contributed to the sentiment among the Hindu
majority that “religious minorities employ aggressive tactics to win special
concessions from the government.” The study concludes, “The manipulation of
India’s religious tensions by militants, criminals, and politicians highlighted the
extent to which religious sentiments in India had become an object of
exploitation.”
Special coverage in Time magazine in 2003 on rioting in India reported a
disturbing divide between the Hindu and Muslim populations in India. In terms
of violence alone:
India’s Muslims are far more likely than Hindus to be victims of
violent attacks. In all the communal riots since independence, official
police records reveal that three-quarters of the lives lost and properties
destroyed were Muslim, a figure that climbed to 85 percent during [the
2002] riots in Gujarat.
Yet in the nearly six thousand deaths resulting from Hindu rioting (as of
2003), there had been hardly any prosecutions of those guilty of rape, arson, or
murder. The tacit support of Indian local or national government under the BJP
to Hindu-sponsored violence is scarcely concealed.
Time also noted that in the cities, 40 percent of Muslims exist at the lowest
end of the income scale, compared to 22 percent of Hindus. Although Muslims
make up 13 percent of the population, they occupy only 3 percent of government
jobs, and even fewer are employed by Hindus in the private sector. In the cities,
Muslims also have an illiteracy rate of 30 percent, as opposed to 19 percent

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among Hindus. An Indian leader of a moderate Hindu party, K. C. Tyagi,
comments that “there is often a tendency in India to treat Muslims as them rather
than us. And this tendency does have terrible manifestations. Even today, by and
large, Muslims have not been admitted to what we call the Indian mainstream.”
The emergence of nationalism(s) in India is actually a modern vehicle for
many forces simultaneously at work: anticolonialist reactions, “patriotism” and
nationalism, ethnic, class, and regional differences, and economic competition.
The disturbing events of recent history in India demonstrate the potential
ugliness of the forces of modern nationalism at work, even within a democratic
order.
Nonetheless, the historical Muslim experience in India overwhelmingly
indicates the fruitful coexistence in which both Muslim and Hindu profoundly
enriched each other. The two cultures are now inextricably linked, cannot be
spoken of as civilizational “borders,” and have little option but to find some
newer forms of coexistence in the Indian state to come. In this sense, Islam has
indeed changed the course of history in India, but primarily through integration,
assimilation, and fusion. Muslims are diverse, disparate, and scattered across
India. Yet today, ironically, “Islam” has simply come to crystallize and embody
the resentments that many Hindus feel over many other issues that have nothing
to do with religion and everything to do with diverse communal struggles for
power and influence. In this context Muslims are only one of many communal
groups that compete on what can be a rough playing field. The role of Pakistan,
caught in its own shaky national identity, troubled geopolitical fears, and
involvement in Kashmir and Afghanistan, intensifies the problem. It would be a
tragedy if in modern times, narrow-minded forces on all sides should take these
deeply interwoven cultural strands and attempt to permanently rip them asunder.
It is reasonable to ask: If there had never been a British Raj, or any British
control of India as an imperial colony, would there have been an eventual