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How Terrorism Ends
One of the most comprehensive and interesting statistical analyses on terrorists
conducted in recent years is the 2008 RAND report “How Terrorist Groups
End.” The RAND group examined 648 movements that operated from 1968 to
2008; the key finding was that “transition to the political process is the most
common way in which terrorist groups ended.” In brief:
The largest group, 43 percent of terrorist groups, ended through transition
into the political process, in other words, through compromise. The RAND
study also determined that “the possibility of a political solution is inversely
linked to the breadth of terrorist goals.” In other words, the more finite,
practical, and local the grievances and goals, the greater the likelihood of
their being accommodated.
In the 40 percent of cases in which the terrorist organization was not able or
willing to make the transition to political accommodation, it was policing,
rather than military action that was by far the most effective means of
neutralizing the group. Police and intelligence organizations are far more
capable of understanding, penetrating, and neutralizing such groups than
the indiscriminate blunt instrument of military means.
In 10 percent of the cases, the terrorist groups came to an end because their
goals were achieved. In only 7 percent of cases was military action effective
in terminating the activities of terrorist groups.
“Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups.” On
the other hand, “Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives.” The
report also states: “Size is also a significant determinant of a group’s fate.
Big groups of more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than
25 percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller than
1,000 members.”
“When a terrorist group becomes involved in an insurgency, it does not end
easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time, groups ended by negotiating a
settlement with the government; 25 percent of the time, they achieved
victory; and 19 percent of the time, military forces defeated them.” This
speaks to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The simultaneous existence of “global” movements mixed in among

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“pragmatic” ones, as we see in Iraq and Afghanistan, likely reinforces the overall
radicalization of the public, including moderates. Similarly, political settlement
with “pragmatic” terrorist groups greatly reduces the charged political
atmosphere, and the local public then becomes less accommodating to groups
like al-Qa’ida, who then are seen fighting for a cause no longer truly relevant to
the local public interest.

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