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Policy Response
In the end, terrorism cannot be separated from the conditions, concerns, and
distress of people in the Middle East. We all know that terrorism is the tool of
the weak. But Muslim recourse to terrorism, however unacceptable, does not
delegitimize their grievances either. For the al-Qa’ida hijackers, Islam functioned
as a magnifying glass in the sun, collecting these widespread, shared common
grievances and focusing them into an intense ray, a moment of clarity of action
against the long-standing source of foreign intrusion. The grievances preexisted
the attacks and still largely exist.
As we noted, history did not begin with 9/11. The past several decades have
demonstrated an accelerating American effort to bend the Muslim will to US
goals; not only has the effort failed and solved no problems, it has vastly
heightened the intensity of fervor against the United States across the Muslim
world and has cost the country dearly.
Terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere can eventually be greatly
reduced, but only as the conditions that promote it recede. Ever greater efforts by
US armies to hunt down and kill the existing radicals only produce new, more
motivated generations of radicals. Military action may organizationally weaken
them, but their numbers are quickly bolstered by shock troops of a Muslim
foreign legion traveling from conflict zone to conflict zone, or cause the
population to turn to violence against their own authoritarian regimes—often
American-supported. It does not take that many insurgents or terrorists to tie
countries and armies up in knots. Forty-plus years of ongoing Israeli occupation
in Palestine vividly demonstrates this kind of failure; Israel has only achieved
the creation of an iconic resistance with region-wide, almost global
reverberations.
Ultimately, the burden of ending terrorism falls upon Muslim populations
themselves. But for this to happen, there must first be an end to the conditions
that foster this radicalism and that generate widespread anti-Americanism. In
bluntest terms, that means no more foreign boots on the ground in Muslim
countries, and no more foreign military attacks by foreign soldiers—images that
remain daily fare on all the television screens of the world, except in America
itself. Muslim societies must be given a chance to calm down and return to a
state of normalcy. Second, only Muslims themselves can begin to change
thinking in their own societies to truly fight terrorism. Indeed, it is probable that
moderate Islamists are the ones best equipped to intellectually and physically
disarm the radicals, to delegitimize whatever legitimacy they have sought in

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invoking Islam—even for non-Islamic causes. They perhaps can delegitimize the
Islamic foundation for the use of terror, but not the practical grounds that spur it.
It is not because the Islamists are religious that their voice is strong, but because
they are the sole remaining political faction at this point in modern Muslim
history that enjoys much legitimacy and respect. And realistically, credible
Muslim leaders are not going to push for moderation as long as existing
conditions make it difficult to argue for it. Present conditions will not last
forever. But in the meantime, the very presence of foreign armies actually
undercuts the authority of moderates, whose views cannot prevail under
radicalized circumstances.
“Zero tolerance for terrorism” is another slogan that needs to disappear. It is
an empty phrase, demagogic and utopian in character, just as “zero tolerance for
crime” has no functional meaning in contemporary society.
It does not take immense insight to suggest that Muslims are no more likely
to welcome heavy-handed foreign intervention in their societies than American
society would. It does not take special insight to conclude that stopping the
activities causing these violent responses from Muslim societies might be a
reasonable policy alternative to the present disastrous American course. At this
stage, things have deteriorated so far that terrorism against the United States will
not even come to an end abruptly upon the departure of US troops from the
region. But it will be the first critical and indispensable step in winding it down.
A military withdrawal will seriously undercut a key justification for the
existence of radical movements like al-Qa’ida. Within individual Muslim
countries, where once their presence may have been justified as a means to fight
the foreign invader, they will no longer be welcome. The space for terrorism will
rapidly shrink under new strategic circumstances when Muslim populations
themselves will no longer need or accept outside warriors visiting violence upon
them. We must not Islamize this problem if we are to grasp its practical, concrete
nature. Regrettably, Washington has been slow to abandon its determination to
exert US strategic dominance over the Muslim world, and globally—a key
source of the problem.
President Obama’s change of style and direction in Washington and his
openness to new approaches have commanded much attention in the Muslim
world. It is apparent to all that he understands the feelings and motivations of the
Muslim world and other developing nations. He is aware of the important role of
dignity and respect in communications, replacing bluster, swagger, and force.
But whether he can turn a policy supertanker around is another question, and so
far it looks like the task may be beyond his powers. Most Muslims are heartened
by Obama, but they want to see real change, new realities on the ground. US

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military forces, nonetheless, are still expanding their overseas reach with
military solutions to political, cultural, and economic problems.
THROUGH GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS over the past half century, Islam has
become the most politically self-conscious culture in the world today.
Nonetheless, I have tried to portray Islamic civilization in a broader context of
world events, from historical times to the present; it should by now be clear how
so many of the events that we associate with Islam are actually political and
social impulses shared by most other cultures as well. For some readers, this
kind of explanation may seem to constitute an apologia for Islam—seemingly
“excusing” Islam. But this book is not about narrating the glories or the failings
of Islamic civilization. I do not attempt to create a balance sheet of all that is
good and bad on both sides. The goal is rather to make Muslim impulses,
emotions, and choices clear and comprehensible to non-Muslims—to outline the
reasons and conditions that make so many Muslims feel and act the way they do.
That is the key to finding solutions, not ignoring the issues or fighting the
problem. Feelings, in any case, are not homogeneous across the Muslim world.
But the worse the conditions, the greater the degree of consensus that emerges.
Awareness of the dynamics that drive other societies might have helped to
avoid the decades-long series of predictable American crises and confrontations
with Iraqis, Palestinians, Afghans, Pashtuns, Somalis—or with other nationalist
movements in other countries like China, Vietnam, Venezuela, or even Russia
today. Such insights would have permitted us to see the inexorable buildup of
pressure that eventually burst forth on 9/11. Certainly those policy makers that
reject this kind of an understanding of Muslim societies, and who prefer their
own self-serving version of “why they hate us,” have pursued demonstrably
failing policies at a huge cost to everyone—producing the greatest mess in the
history of American dealings with the Muslim world.

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