From chanakya to modi evolution of india’s foreign policy

Foreign
Affairs
in 1959 that India’s prestige built up under Nehru had not helped
‘advance any vital interests of India or diminish tension on her borders’.
Kripalani argued ‘…the Indian government thought that the whole business
of diplomacy consisted in enunciating the principles of international policy.
But international politics is not concerned merely with enunciation of
abstract principles. It is very much concerned with international diplomacy,
strategy and tactics.’
47
According to Kripalani, there was always ‘a danger

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in overemphasizing moral and ideological principles in international affairs.
There are bound to be contradictions in the actual conduct of nations in
dealing with each other.’
48
Whereas others criticized Nehru for his ‘idealistic presumptions’ in a
Hobbesian world based on realpolitik, Dixit critiques Nehru for his naive
belief that since India ‘had no expansionist or aggressive designs against
any other country, India would not face any threats to its unity or territorial
integrity’.
49
 Nehru apparently held the view that since India had decided to
keep away from power blocs, it would be protected from negative
implications of the cold war equations.
50
Dixit points out that India’s
neighbours joined the cold war – Pakistan in alliance with the United States,
and China’s initial alliance with the Soviet Union – and brought war to
India’s neighbourhood. India’s lofty principles were not enough to deter
others from pursuing cynical realism. Even though India was a status quo
power, her neighbours China and Pakistan were revanchist as was amply
demonstrated in the wars of 1948, 1962 and 1965.
Dixit and other analysts believe that Nehru’s policies were reasonably
successful until the India–China war of 1962. India was recognized as a
major Asian power and as a leading voice on anti-colonialism and against
racial discrimination in the United Nations. India was involved in the post-
crises negotiations in Korea and Indo-China and was a leading contributor
to UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. Even though the United
States and its allies were disenchanted and ‘estranged’
51
with India, they
still maintained close ties and provided economic and technological
assistance to India. Nehru’s desire to build ties with fellow Asian countries
was reflected in the 1947 Asian Relations Conference, followed by the
Bandung Conference of 1955 and eventually the Non-Aligned Movement
of 1961. But the war with China in 1962 exposed the chink in India’s
armour. Non-alignment and absence of superpower support had ended up
encouraging Chinese aggression against India.

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Nehru’s biographer Gopal described Nehru’s assessment of China’s
attitude to India as ‘naive’
52
and said that there was ‘much idealism in his
China policy’. According to Gopal, Nehru had ‘hoped fondly that
friendship with the new China would not only maintain peace in Asia but
start a new phase in world affairs with Asia giving the lead in a more
humane as well as a more sophisticated diplomacy. The Chinese did not
reciprocate India’s trust, taking advantage of Nehru’s favourable disposition
and exploited the goodwill generated by the ‘Hindi–Cheeni bhai bhai’
(Indians and Chinese are brothers) rhetoric. ‘The basic challenge between
India and China,’ Gopal points out ‘ran along the spine of Asia,’ something
‘China never seemed to forget and Nehru could not finally help
recognizing’.
53
INDIAN REALISM
For all his idealism, and notwithstanding the validity of some of the critique
of his China policy, Nehru was still a pragmatist and realist. When asked in
1947 to define his foreign policy, Nehru replied that India would have to
maintain ties with all countries irrespective of whether or not India
approved or disapproved of their policies. He emphasized that since India is
not ‘strong enough to be able to have our way’ the policy to adopt would be
that of ‘peace-makers and peace-bringers’.
54
Nehru did realize that while
India would seek to avoid any entanglement with power politics,
realistically speaking that would not be completely possible.
55
 India would
therefore try to play the part of ‘a bridge for mutual understanding’ between
the two cold war blocs.
56
Nehru was also not completely blind to the challenge of China. In a letter
in 1950 to British statesman and Labour Party politician, Ernest Bevin, he
wrote ‘Chinese psychology, with its background of prolonged suffering,
struggle against Japan, and successful communist revolution, is an
understandable mixture of bitterness, elation and vaulting confidence to

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which the traditional xenophobia and present-day isolation from outside
contacts have added fear and suspicion of the motives of other powers.’ He
saw his role as ‘inducing a more balanced and cooperative mentality in
Peking’ based on his understanding of the psychological factors affecting
Chinese policy.
57
Andrew Kennedy describes Nehru’s foreign policy as an attempt to
reconcile realism and idealism. According to Kennedy, Nehru ‘was
idealistic in the sense that he sought to transform international norms and
institutions on the basis of moral principles. In doing so, however, Nehru
also sought to secure advantages for India and in that sense his idealism
often had a realist edge.’ Kennedy argues that even if we focus on Nehru’s
‘most important “idealistic” preoccupations in foreign policy: the UN, non-
alignment and nuclear disarmament’ we see that he ‘was both sincerely
committed to what he saw as a moral cause and convinced that advancing it
would serve India well’. Nehru did not support the UN simply out of an
idealist desire to make the world a better place. He saw the prospect of a
stronger UN advancing important Indian interests. 
58
In Kennedy’s view,
Nehru saw the United Nations ‘as an opportunity to reshape the
international system in ways that were both morally desirable and
consistent with India’s interests in particular’.
59
Nehru saw the UN as a
guarantor of India’s sovereignty while promoting international peace and to
him ‘it offered a foundation on which India could establish itself and
commence its rise to greatness’.
Nehru’s realism also manifested in his stance on nuclear weapons. Nehru
championed nuclear disarmament as a key part of his campaign for global
peace. In Kennedy’s words, ‘While making the case against nuclear
weaponry India’s Prime Minister often sounded like an idealist who was
both anxious about the threat of nuclear war and optimistic about the
possibility of international cooperation.’ However, Nehru’s disarmament
diplomacy reflected not only ‘some degree of idealism’ but also ‘his

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perception of narrower Indian interests. Nehru was not willing to sign on to
any sort of disarmament arrangement regardless of the implications for
India.’ Nehru believed that disarmament ‘was very much in the interests of
relatively weak powers like India’ and ‘hoped that the disarmament process
would come to constrain India’s rivals, particularly China.’ 
60
Further,
Nehru’s support for civilian nuclear energy and the work of Indian nuclear
scientists demonstrated that he understood the need for India to have the
requisite nuclear power potential just in case circumstances ever changed.
According to Murty, Nehru’s foreign policy was ‘cold and rationally
calculated’, bearing in mind that India, a country with ‘pride in its glorious
past and great civilization’, was industrially and technologically backward
and underdeveloped. Hence, democracy at home and global peace were
critical if India sought to grow economically and build its security.
61
Nehru led India from Independence in 1947 to his death in 1964.
Although he forged a domestic consensus on foreign policy, support for his
world view was far from unanimous. There were many who disagreed with
his basic premises or with specific elements of his policies. Some criticized
him openly while others voiced their views only in private. Some dissenters
stayed in the Congress party and tried to reform it from within; others
founded new parties after Independence to advance their alternative
viewpoints.
A major rival to Nehru in defining India’s external relations was Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s first deputy prime minister and home minister.
Patel was a foreign policy realist who often disagreed with Nehru though he
expressed this disagreement in private or through letters the two wrote to
each other until Patel’s death in 1950. While agreeing that India needed to
avoid being involved in power politics, Patel was amongst those who
deemed a pro-Western orientation was to India’s advantage. He argued that
India needed strong ties with the United States more than the formal

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association with the British Commonwealth and asserted that ‘we depend
on the USA more than on the UK’.
62
The Swatantra [literally Independent] Party of the 1960s led by veteran
Congressman Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (or Rajaji as he was popularly
known) also opposed Nehru’s liberal internationalism and Fabian socialism.
It reflected the views of the business community, former bureaucrats and
former royal families from British India’s princely states. Swatantra Party’s
major policy planks included support for free-market economics, desire for
close ties with the US and not the Soviet Union during the cold war and
realism, not liberal internationalism, as the basis of India’s foreign policy.
While these views had some support among intellectuals and elite groups,
the party lacked a mass base. Moreover, different party leaders espoused
differing views at times. Rajaji, referred to by Mahatma Gandhi, as the
‘keeper of his conscience’, was a pacifist whereas another leader Minoo
Masani was vehemently anti-communist and pro-Western and was not
prepared to forsake war.
The Swatantra Party offered a sharp contrast to Nehruvianism. It
championed ‘alignment’ or building regional alliances including joint
defence with non-communist countries from Israel in the Gulf to East Asia
including Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
63
It is interesting that the
foreign policy initiatives of Prime Minister Narendra Modi since his
election in 2014 embrace some of the ideas championed by the Swatantra