From chanakya to modi evolution of india’s foreign policy

party in 1938–39. In 1939, Nehru visited China and established contacts
with leaders of the Kuomintang government including Chiang Kai-shek.
8
The Indian National Congress organized a boycott of Japanese goods in
response to Japanese aggression against China and also sent a medical
mission under Dr Kotnis in support of the Chinese resistance.
By the time Viceroy Lord Archibald Wavell formed India’s interim
government in September 1946 in anticipation of Independence, Nehru had
sufficient international exposure to be assigned the portfolios of external
affairs and Commonwealth relations. In his first radio broadcast in that
capacity on 7 September 1946, Nehru stated that India would try ‘as far as
possible, to keep away from power politics of groups, aligned against one
another’. Nehru envisioned the world as one torn apart by ‘rivalries and
hatreds and inner conflicts’ and envisaged India’s role as working towards
‘a world commonwealth’.
9
 In a speech given on the floor of the Constituent
Assembly on 13 December 1946, Nehru laid out the broad contours of his
foreign policy: ‘This ancient land attains its rightful and honoured place in
the world and makes its full and willing contribution to the promotion of
world peace and the welfare of mankind. We approach the world in a
friendly way. We want to make friends with all countries.’
10
For Nehru,
these were not just words but deeply held beliefs.
Over the years, Nehru repeatedly asserted that his foreign policy was not
something crafted by him alone. ‘It is a policy inherent in the circumstances
of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental
outlook of India, inherent in the condition of the Indian mind during the
freedom struggle and inherent in the circumstances of the world today.’
11
However, Satchidananda Murty argues convincingly that there was
nothing inevitable about the way India’s foreign policy evolved and the

---

policy was ‘shaped almost exclusively’ by Nehru.
12
According to Murty
India’s geography and the legacy of history may have created a certain
environment but Nehru’s unique beliefs shaped India’s foreign policy, using
circumstances and history as justification.
Nehru’s British education and his close ideological ties with British
socialist intellectuals built during the 1930s and ’40s served as major
influences on his persona. His foreign policy outlook had a touch of Fabian
socialism and liberal internationalism along with a deep belief that a strong
state – not the market – is critical for the growth and development of a
country like India. The spirit of freedom that Nehru imbibed in England and
his close observation of British parliamentary democracy made him an
‘uncompromising’ opponent of all forms of totalitarian rule. 
13
Hence,
Nehru sympathized with the Allies during the World War II, refused to meet
with Mussolini in 1936 and supported the Congress decision to send fifty
volunteers to help the leftist struggle against fascism in Spain.
‘NEHRUVIANISM’
Indians often refer to Nehru’s foreign policy as ‘Nehruvian’ and one might
as well describe the ideas behind that policy as ‘Nehruvianism’. In his
lifetime, Nehru avoided labels tied to his name, though he did speak of
Gandhian principles. His mark on some ideas is so strong that they can only
be associated with Nehru rather than with Gandhi or someone else. The key
pillars of Nehruvianism were the concept that India was a great civilization
that could regenerate itself at all times; the desire for independence and
non-alignment in relation to great powers; a strong belief in economic
autarky; and support for international institutions in maintaining global
order and world peace. These ideas remain influential in Indian thinking to
this day.
In his three-volume biography of Nehru, Sarvepalli Gopal, son of India’s
second president Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, outlines Nehru’s belief that

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‘India would develop an active concern in world affairs, pursuing an
independent policy compatible with her own national interests – a statement
of objective which remained true throughout his years in office’. However,
according to Gopal ‘at the start there was little precision and definiteness
about this objective. It appeared to consist primarily of vague and rather
grandiose hopes of closer ties between Asian countries and even the
formation of two or three Asian federations.’ In Gopal’s words ‘the foreign
policy of a newly independent nation does not emerge overnight’ and ‘with
the general directions clear in his mind, Nehru set about building up the
foreign policy of India brick by brick, in the process discarding the
generalizations which had taken the place of rigorous thought’. 
14
Echoing the views expressed by many of his colleagues and the feelings
of fellow Indians, Nehru assumed that India was destined to play a major
role in the globe because of its rich history, tradition, resources, location
and population. In a speech in March 1949 Nehru stated: ‘Remember that
India, not because of any ambition of hers, but because of the force of
circumstances, because of geography, because of history and because of so
many other things, inevitably has to play a very important part in Asia.’
15
There was an inevitability to India’s greatness, in his mind. ‘India need only
wait until others understand and accommodate to the Indian position,’ he
once declared. Nehruvianism implies waiting for the ‘inevitable
consequence of what India is and what a free India must be’
16
instead of
scrambling to seek alliances or take advantage of global conflicts and
crises.
Tied to the notion of India’s inevitable rise was the view that India had a
moral obligation to use her influence for good in the world. On the one
hand, the claim to higher moral ground had an emotional appeal and
connected India – and Nehru – to the father of the nation, Mahatma Gandhi,
who had emphasized ethics in pursuit of politics. At another level, there
was a realist rationale for painting India as a preachy, altruistic global actor.

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Nehru understood that until India built its economic and military potential,
the only way it could punch above its weight was as a champion of smaller
nations in promoting a just and moral order in the world.
Championing the eradication of imperialism and colonialism were part of
this strategy to rally the world’s weak and downtrodden nations and emerge
as their leader. It followed closely from India’s own anti-colonialist struggle
and was helpful in building close ties with other former colonies. The moral
imperative and strategic dimension went hand in hand. The British legacy
of viewing India as the dominant power in South Asia, with its power
extending to the Middle East and South-East Asia, was echoed in Nehru’s
early speeches when he referred to India and China as the rising powers of
Asia. Indian leaders saw their country as the natural leader for Asia and
Africa, especially for fellow newly decolonized nations. According to
veteran Congressman Jivatram Bhagwandas Kripalani, India’s ‘prestige’
ran high even though it had just emerged as an independent state because it
‘stood for the freedom of all nations and peoples and against all colonial or
racial domination of one people over another’. 
17
As subjects in a former colony, India’s leaders saw anti-colonialism as
the defining issue in the post – World War II world. They refused to be
drawn into the cold war or to let fear of communism frame their world
view. Nehru declared in his first broadcast to the nation that India was
‘particularly interested’ in the emancipation of all dependent countries [or
peoples] and in decolonization’.
18
India’s founding generation viewed the
legacy of colonialism as a threat to India’s security and territorial integrity.
Nehru saw non-alignment as an element of a scheme to ‘pre-emptively
contain the spread of the Cold War’ as, in his view, conflict would have hurt
recently decolonized countries like India.
19
Nehru’s goal of seeking the end of imperialism and colonialism tied in to
his policy of building closer ties between India and the rest of Asia. The
desire to rekindle India’s ancient economic, political and cultural influence

---

with fellow Asian countries was the rationale for hosting the first Asian
Relations Conference in New Delhi on 23 March 1947, just months before
India’s independence. Under Nehru’s leadership, India championed regional
initiatives (such as the Afro-Asian Conference, also known as the Bandung
Conference) as well as international organizations (most significantly the
United Nations).
20
British India was one of the signatories to the United
Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 and in 1947 independent India inherited the
status of being one of the UN’s founding members.
An analysis of Nehru’s pronouncements on international affairs reflects
the influence of colonial rule and the British legacy on his world view. For
Nehru, India’s neighbourhood included not just South Asia but West Asia
(India’s term for the Middle East), Central Asia and South-East Asia. Nehru
chose different policies towards India’s immediate periphery than towards
distant countries or those in the broader Asian neighbourhood. Immediately
after Independence and through the initial cold war years, for example,
India sought to continue the British policy of buffer zones around India,
especially to the north. It built close ties with Nepal and Bhutan in order to
‘fortify its Himalayan defense structure’.
21
India under Nehru also sought to prevent neighbours like Nepal, Bhutan
and Sri Lanka from joining military alliances with either cold war bloc and
was particularly irked by Pakistan’s participation in Western military
alliances. According to former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit, Nehru’s ‘sense
of history’ and awareness that India’s neighbours were critical to India’s
security led him to adopt this policy. 
22
 Dixit argues that Nehru was aware
of the asymmetry in size between India and its immediate neighbours. He
sought to reassure these smaller neighbours by attempting to build ties on
the basis of Panchasheel or principles of equality, non-interference and
respect for territorial integrity.
Former diplomat and writer S.D. Muni asserts that Nehru had a
Curzonian mindset – derived from the British imperialist Lord Curzon – on

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issues relating to national security. According to this view, Nehru sought to
‘retain the core British strategic framework’ for India’s defense while
‘shedding off its imperial and colonial façade’. 
23
Muni states that India
treated each of the three Himalayan kingdoms with ‘nuanced differences’ in
terms of sovereignty and degrees of independence. Sikkim was viewed ‘as a
protectorate’ (which was later absorbed as a state of the Indian Union in
1974), Bhutan ‘evolved’ into a sovereign state and Nepal was always
considered ‘a fully sovereign’ country.
24
The treaties India signed with each
of these countries – Bhutan (1948), Nepal (1950) and Sikkim (1950)
reflected these differences. Muni states that while minor changes occurred
over the years, what remained intact was this policy of ‘keeping the
neighbouring countries free from adversarial strategic influences and
forces’.
25
Muni echoes views expressed as early as 1951 by international relations
scholar Werner Levi. Levi stated that when it came to India’s immediate
neighbours Nehru was ‘very much the realist’ who understood that in a
Westphalian system of states ‘national survival is the primary aim of
foreign policy’. For Levi, policies adopted towards Hyderabad, Kashmir,
Afghanistan and Nepal demonstrate the realist aspect of Nehruvianism.
Levi quotes Nehru as defending India’s interference in the internal affairs of
Nepal on the grounds that ‘much as we appreciate the independence of
Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by any happenings in Nepal which
permit that barrier being crossed or which otherwise weaken our
frontiers’.
26
Beyond the immediate neighbourhood, Nehru wanted India to find its
place in the sun by playing a leadership role in Asia and on the global stage.
He acknowledged that India was too weak militarily or economically to
stand up to the superpowers. India had to adopt a policy whereby it could
maintain its independence and yet be part of the world, receiving support
for its development from all major powers. Non-alignment – the notion of

---

aligning with neither superpower while maintaining friendship with both
and adopting positions on different international issues not because of
alignment but on a case by case basis – appeared to be the way out. Michael
Edwardes refers to non-alignment as Nehru’s ‘doctrine of defence by
friendship’, a policy that appealed to Nehru on both practical and moral
grounds.
27
Nehru leveraged India’s ties with former colonies to create a
third bloc of nations refusing to join either bloc during the cold war. Burma,
Egypt, Ghana, Yugoslavia and Indonesia joined India as the founding
members of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.
Veteran diplomat, Kunwar Natwar Singh, who joined the Indian Foreign
Service during Nehru’s tenure, argues that while Nehru sought non-
alignment he was not in favour of turning it into a movement as, for Nehru,
non-alignment was ‘a state of mind’, not ‘a dogma or doctrine’. According
to Natwar Singh, Nehru treated non-alignment as ‘an instrument’ which
would strengthen ‘forces of peace, disarmament and economic cooperation’
and ‘provide a platform’ for the recently decolonized nations of Asia,
Africa and South America.
Like Murty, Natwar Singh asserts that for Nehru non-alignment meant
retaining ‘our thought, judgement and action under conditions of the Cold
War’ instead of becoming a camp follower of the United States or the
Soviet Union. Being non-aligned, India could stay out of foreign
entanglements it sought to avoid while speaking out on issues that mattered.
A formal Non-Aligned Movement of states went beyond that by tying India
to a group of other mid-sized and small powers, each with issues of its own.
According to Natwar Singh, it was Krishna Menon, defence minister and
Nehru’s close confidant, who ‘convinced’ Nehru into agreeing to convert
the non-aligned idea into a movement comprising several countries.
28
On non-alignment, Sarvepalli Gopal argues that Nehru was not
‘priggishly parading principles and was determined to develop, at whatever
cost, a policy of independent judgement of each issue because that was

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ethically the right position’. Nehru emphasized ‘the practical advantages to
India of non-alignment and judged its efficacy on a pragmatic basis’.
According to Gopal, non-alignment ‘was firmly based on the current
realities of the world’. Nehru often expounded the moral virtues of non-
alignment, especially in later years, and reportedly annoyed other
governments by appearing to demand a lot for India. Still, his policy
reflected utilitarian advantage as much as idealism. ‘It was not so much a
code of conduct as a technique to be tested by results,’ Gopal explained that
Nehru did not consider it ‘a wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket’
and considered an honest and independent policy the best option ‘from the
point of view of opportunism’. 
29
Americans, in particular, objected to Nehru’s non-alignment, terming it
‘neutralism’ and suggesting that it was not a moral position in a world
threatened by the spread of communism. Escott Reid, who served as
Canada’s high commissioner to India (1952–57) did not agree with his
American counterparts who considered Nehru’s non-alignment as a heresy
that benefited global communism. ‘Mr Nehru is a man of very great
intellectual ability, highly articulate and of great personal charm,’ he wrote,
adding, ‘He is also, like other great men, sensitive and complex.’ Reid
argued that Americans ‘should not only be conscious of Mr Nehru’s
difficulties but should also not expect him to behave as if he were a North
American politician. It is important not to alienate Mr Nehru by treating his
suggestions as second-class advice from a third-class friend. Democratic
leadership in Asia can be developed only if the Western powers deal with
Asian leaders as equals, seeking their counsel and occasionally deferring to
their opinions.’ 
30
Reid explained that by adopting non-alignment, Nehru was not tilting
away from the Western powers, in favour of the Soviet Union and its
communist allies. ‘Nehru is, I submit, not neutral between our side and the
USSR. He is a member of our side,’ he insisted, pointing out that India as a

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whole saw the West with ‘half reluctant admiration, half volatile
resentment’ as a result of ‘the tutelage of the British’.
31
According to Indian strategic thinker K. Subrahmanyam, non-alignment
was an attempt to balance Indian foreign policy in a world of superpower
dominance. For Subrahmanyam, it was a ‘sound strategy in realpolitik
sense and in terms of balance of power’.
32
 According to Devdutt, Dixit and
E. Malcolm House, non-alignment helped India achieve both ‘internal
stability’ and ‘external security’ as it enabled India ‘to speak in one voice’
based on a positive consensus-driven policy.
33
 Non-alignment also ensured
that while India did not join either bloc, it maintained ties with both the
camps and hence was able to obtain aid and technical assistance from both
blocs, allowing it to build its resources without getting drawn into conflicts.
According to Levi, following the policy of non-alignment enabled India to
‘retain greater freedom of action to play its leadership role in Asia’. 
34
Paul F. Power attempts to analyse Nehruvianism through two broad
principles, order and strategy. The desire for order led Nehru to pursue
friendship towards all states; champion anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and
anti-imperialism; seek economic self-sufficiency; and oppose military
alliances, arms build-up and nuclear weapons.
35
Non-alignment provided
the underpinnings of strategy or as Power prefers to call it, an ‘independent’
policy. For Power, like Murty, non-alignment was a calculated response to
the prevalent international situation. It was not just ‘an ad hoc response’ to
the cold war. It reflected the desire to accomplish what Nehru had stated in
a September 1946 speech: Stand up to the existing system of world affairs
which was framed by imperialism, military alliances and war making and in
its place create a world with no camps where all worked towards global
peace and prosperity.
36
Pursuing non-alignment ensured a domestic consensus on foreign policy
that might not have been possible had India aligned itself to either
superpower. The strong Indian left would have objected to alignment with

---

the West while a similar reaction would have ensued from the right in case
of alliance with the communists. Averting polarization on foreign policy
gave Nehru a relatively free hand in dealing with divisive politics over
domestic problems. Nehru preferred cooperation and reasoning over
confrontation and conflict. Nehru’s speeches in the Constituent Assembly
and later as prime minister reflect this desire for consensus and his hope
that people ‘who differ considerably in regard to our internal policy’ would
agree on a ‘more or less unified foreign policy’.
37
Subrahmanyam points out that Nehru had deployed non-alignment as a
tactic specifically for the cold war but it became ‘a moral code of conduct’
for executing foreign policy in the post-Nehruvian era.
38
Journalist Inder
Malhotra also echoed Subrahmanyam’s views that for Nehru non-alignment
was a policy, not a doctrine or a ‘mantra to be chanted in season and out of
season’. Malhotra recalls that on one occasion Nehru made a speech in the
Indian parliament that ‘he could not be non-aligned against himself’.
39
In a recent book, Andrew Kennedy, professor, Australian National
University, points out that Nehru’s ‘moralistic concern for world peace was
not simply contrived for public purposes, it reflected his “genuine” concern
about the world while protecting narrower Indian interests’. Non-alignment
helped India diversify its relationships and prevent dependence on any one
superpower. Kennedy also argues that Nehru sought to convert India into
‘an industrial power in its own right’ but knew that in the short term, India
would need to be dependent on other countries. To prevent India from being
involved in conflicts that would hurt her economic growth, Nehru chose the
path of non-alignment. The idealist in Nehru, Kennedy argues, saw non-
alignment ‘as a means of maximizing India’s influence’ whereas the realist
in him ‘anticipated from the very beginning that a non-aligned stance would
be difficult to maintain’.
40
In a series of interviews conducted over several years, a majority of
diplomats, both serving and retired, stated that while every country needs to

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adjust to changing environment, Nehruvianism is still the bedrock of Indian
foreign policy. In the words of Natwar Singh, Nehru ‘studied history, wrote
history, made and shaped history’. 
41
As an American political scientist
wrote in 1958, the ‘principal source’ of Indian thinking on international
affairs and the ‘high emotional content’ of Indian foreign policy are due to
the ‘omnipotent influence’ of Nehru on the conduct of foreign policy and
the ‘immense popular support’ given to his declarations.
42
Most analysts agree Nehru’s greatest legacy is the underlying framework
of ideas and institutions that have governed India’s external relations since
1947. Just as he received praise for laying the foundations, Nehru has also
been criticized for being overly idealistic and for crafting a foreign policy
with a strong moralistic tone. Under his successors, India came to be seen
as a nation that judged and preached to others instead of accepting the
dynamic of conflicting national interests that shapes international relations.
Like the United States, India has often attracted the charge of hypocrisy in
foreign policy because its proclaimed ideals do not always match its
actions.
During what Paul Power describes as the ‘Age of Nehru’, moral concerns
dominated a wide spectrum of diplomatic, ideological and strategic
considerations.
43
Nehru’s global stature and his role in organizations like the
United Nations, coupled with his championing of the anti-colonial and anti-
racist cause, won India recognition from other former colonies in Africa
and Asia. However, Michael Edwardes asserts that Nehru mistook ‘respect
for Nehru’ as being the same as acceptance of India as a major power on the
world stage and as the undisputed leader of non-aligned nations. According
to Edwardes, ‘Nehru had created for India an international persona which
was not congruent with her actual status as an underdeveloped country.’
44
Nehru’s knowledge of foreign affairs was so vast that none of his
contemporaries or successors ever attempted to disagree with him. The
dictum of ‘Panditji [Pandit Nehru] knows best’ often prevented

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disagreement with him. Veteran diplomat Katyayani Shankar Bajpai notes
that his father Girija Shankar Bajpai, the first Secretary General of the
Ministry of External Affairs, was one of the few advisers who were able to
speak the truth to the powers that be. Nehru’s successors simply followed in
his footsteps because, in the words of B.M. Jain, political scientist and
professor at Rajasthan University, ‘they lacked either the intellectual
stamina or political courage to tinker with the basic premises of the foreign
policy as laid down by him’.
45
G.P. Srivastava echoes Edwardes when he asserts that the claim that
Nehru’s foreign policy ‘raised the moral prestige of India’ and helped
maintain world peace was illusory. Srivastava cited a letter to an editor
written in 1951 by Sir Jagdish Prasad, former member of the Governor
General’s Executive Council. According to Prasad, India was left with no
friends in the West because of ‘self-praise’, ‘arrogant self-conceit’ and the
belief that India’s foreign policy was ‘superior to that of all other powers
because it is claimed to be based on truth and non-violence’. He wrote:
‘The great powers do not wish to be told by implication that in contrast to
our foreign policy theirs is based on trickery and violence; that we are the
only people in the world to handle international affairs on a moral basis, and
that our superiority on this score is now universally recognized and receives
worldwide homage.’
46
Even J.B. Kripalani, Praja Socialist Party (PSP) leader and a Congress
stalwart during the freedom struggle, admitted in an article in