From chanakya to modi evolution of india’s foreign policy

Party). Inspired by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS – National
Volunteer Organization), an ideological movement seeking revival of Hindu

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identity and culture, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) (literally Indian
Peoples Association) was the first major incarnation of Hindu nationalist
politics. The Jana Sangh emerged in 1951 and maintained that name until
1977 when it merged with the anti-Congress multiparty alliance, the Janata
Party. In 1980, the Hindu nationalists broke from the Janata Party to
become the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which became the first right-wing
party to wield power in India.
Like the Swatantra Party, the Jana Sangh and its successors have seen
China as a threat, but unlike the Swatantra Party, the Hindu nationalists
viewed Pakistan as an equal threat to India’s security. According to Howard
Erdman, an American political scientist who wrote one of the earliest books
on right wing political parties in India: ‘The basic instinct of BJS is to be
chauvinistic and isolationist, building Indian power and involving India
only when she is directly and immediately involved.’ 
67
While the Jana
Sangh sought to be sufficiently distinct from the Congress, in some ways it
was closer to specific aspects of Nehruvianism. ‘The party’s basic instinct is
to be “Gaullist” and relatively isolationist,’ explained Erdman, adding that
for Jana Sangh, Western colonialism and neo-colonialism were not dead
issues, nor were some racial considerations. The party accepted non-
alignment ‘but in a more negative sense’, one that ‘would still leave India
freer to serve as an arbiter or as a third force’ in international matters.
68
A leading stalwart of the Jana Sangh, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, became
minister for external affairs during the brief period of non-Congress rule
from 1977 to 1980. In his inaugural address in May 1978 to the Foreign
Service School, Vajpayee gave a speech titled ‘Continuity and Change in
India’s Foreign Policy’. In the speech Vajpayee asserted that the main
purpose of India’s foreign policy was ‘to promote harmony, trust and a
cooperative spirit among nations’. He asserted that India’s ‘concept of
security is not militaristic’ but rather the desire to ‘create around us an
environment of peace, trust, and stability which would permit optimum

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utilization of our natural and manpower resources for economic, social and
cultural advancement.’ He stated that his government’s policy was ‘strict
non-interference in the internal affairs and seeking cooperation of India’s
neighbours’.
69
 The speech combined the Jana Sangh’s ‘India First’ approach
with Nehruvianism.
POST-NEHRU SEARCH FOR POWER
The Nehruvian framework secured India global attention and, in V.P. Dutt’s
words, ensured that ‘a country with very little military muscle on the
morrow of independence and with no economic clout either could still be a
significant factor in the international arena’. 
70
Notwithstanding right-wing
criticism of Nehru’s policies during his years in power most Indian
intellectuals agreed even after his death that his vision reflected national
consensus. A study conducted in the early 1960s of around 100 Indian
intellectuals who worked on foreign policy showed that the majority (83 per
cent) endorsed non-alignment as the basis of India’s foreign policy.
71
 After
Nehru’s death in 1964, his successors felt the need to assert Indian power
though they insisted their actions did not deviate from the first prime
minister’s structural design.
Scholars such as Kennedy argue that Nehru’s ‘bold diplomacy reflected
his belief that his country had a unique capacity to promote international
cooperation, and that such sacrifices were therefore worth making’. This
confidence in India’s diplomatic prowess, was not shared by Nehru’s
successors, which to Kennedy explains why ‘none of them have acted with
as much ambition or achieved as much global renown as he did’. Kennedy
acknowledges that Nehru’s successors have not ‘suffered such painful
setbacks’ as Nehru did because they pursued more modest and realistic
foreign policy goals. 
72
In recent years, Narendra Modi reflects a passion resembling Nehru in
his zealous focus on foreign policy. After winning the 2014 general

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elections in a landslide, Modi has expended a lot of time and political
capital on travelling around the world, wooing world leaders and global
corporate executives, hoping to boost India’s stature and also to strengthen
its economy and military. We have to wait and see how far he will succeed
in this endeavour.
Nehru’s immediate successor as prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri,
remained in office rather briefly from 1964 to 1966. As a former colleague
of Nehru, Shastri did not alter Nehru’s policies during his short stint. India’s
second war with Pakistan, in 1965, was the key event during Shastri’s
tenure. By most accounts, Shastri handled the war and India’s foreign and
defence policies extremely well though he had no foreign policy experience
before becoming prime minister. Until then, domestic politics had been his
forte.
India’s foreign policy evolved significantly when Nehru’s daughter,
Indira Gandhi became prime minister in 1966, two years after her father’s
death. She served in that job from 1966 to 1977 and then again from 1980
until her assassination in 1984. Indira had grown up amidst politics as the
granddaughter of Motilal Nehru (1861–1931) and the daughter of
Jawaharlal Nehru, both important figures in India’s independence struggle.
After her father became prime minister, Indira was, in Dixit’s words, ‘a
personal witness to and participant in major political developments both
domestically and in terms of India’s external relations’. 
73
She knew almost
every leader of not just the Congress party but of the national movement
since her childhood.
Indira served as her widower father’s official hostess and companion
during his years in power. She had interacted with many of the world’s
leaders and policymakers well before taking office as prime minister. But
Nehru, reluctant to be seen as practising dynastic politics, avoided anointing
Indira as his successor. It was only in 1959, twelve years after he took over
as premier and after she had earned her spurs, that Indira was chosen

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president of the Congress party. Nehru also nominated her on behalf of
India to the Executive Board of UNESCO on which she stayed from 1960
to 1964.
In her work on Indira Gandhi, international relations professor Surjit
Mansingh analyses how Indira’s childhood and youth framed her views on
foreign and domestic politics as well as on governance. Indira, according to
Mansingh, was convinced that ‘she embodied the will of the Indian people’
or as the then president of the Congress Dev Kanta Barooah, in a fit of
sycophancy, said, ‘Indira is India and India is Indira.’
74
 Just as Indira had a
lonely ‘insecure’ childhood so India faced a global environment that was
‘indifferent and often hostile.’
75
 Asia and the world had been Nehru’s focus
and his scepticism of the superpowers had led him to maintain a healthy
distance from both. Indira, on the other hand, chose the South Asian region
as her focus, and suspicions of the intentions and policies of the
superpowers, especially the United States, in India’s immediate
neighbourhood was coloured by her international outlook.
There were other differences between Nehru and Indira. Nehru’s policies
were shaped by his knowledge of history and sympathy towards socialism,
whereas Indira did not have any ideological predispositions. Both pursued
what they deemed to be India’s national interest but their approach to the
world was markedly different. Nehru’s world view had a moralistic tinge
because of the influence of Mahatma Gandhi and the strongly moral
national struggle. Indira, on the other hand, one spoke the language of
realpolitik and where she used moral slogans it was in her search for power
and desire to boost India’s status in the world. According to Dixit, Indira
undertook a ‘radical’ change in India’s foreign policy orientation by
changing India ‘from an idealistic player into a force to be reckoned with.’
76
In a broadcast two days after becoming prime minister in January 1966,
Indira asserted that the principles guiding India’s foreign policy were based
on ‘national interest, honor and dignity.’
77
Thus, Nehru’s policy of peace

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and friendship towards all countries would continue but India’s security and
territorial integrity would be the paramount concern.
78
Indira believed that
only a stronger and more united India ‘would we be able to stand up to
other nations.’
79
 Under her leadership, the Indian state became increasingly
concerned about its security and defence, something that had not received
Nehru’s full attention.
Under Indira Gandhi, Indian strategists embraced the belief that India’s
security would be negatively impacted unless its smaller neighbours
followed pro-Indian foreign policies. This led to what has come to be
known as the Indira doctrine whose core principles were firstly that ‘no
foreign power should be allowed to cross the crest of the Himalayas’ and
secondly that ‘India would consider the presence or influence of an external
power in the region as adverse to its interests unless that power recognized
Indian predominance’.
80
The Indira doctrine was in effect a South Asian
equivalent of the US Monroe doctrine. It led to actions during the East
Pakistan crisis leading to India’s military victory in 1971 against Pakistan,
which, as Dixit points out, ‘restored national self-confidence’ after the 1962
military loss against China.
81
Indira explained the contours of what became known as the Indira
doctrine in a 1970 seminar organized by the Congress party. Like her father,
she insisted that foreign policy was based on both history and geography
and hence the way India looked at things would differ from other countries.
Indira stated that under her father India was able to make a mark on the
international stage even though it lacked economic and military strength.
This was because India was ‘in the forefront of the freedom struggle’ and
had ‘leaders of stature’.
82
 The realist in Indira acknowledged that India no
longer punched above her weight, as it had been able to do under Nehru.
However, Indira’s strategy for increasing India’s international weight was
not alignment with one of the superpowers. It lay in building India’s
economic and military strength, preferably indigenously. Under Indira,

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therefore, India’s foreign policy became ‘a search for power’ and not for
moral influence.
83
A key part of building India’s military strength and security was the
nuclear dimension. Indira maintained the dual policy of Nehru with respect
to championing disarmament while continuing to build India’s nuclear
potential. It was under Indira that India undertook its first nuclear test in
1974 and despite condemnation and threat of sanctions Indira continued
with India’s nuclear weapons programme. She saw it as the natural course
for India as both its adversarial neighbours, China and Pakistan, were also
building their nuclear weapons programmes.
The desire for an independent foreign policy remained strong under
Indira as it did under Nehru. For her it meant both India’s territorial
integrity as well as economic autarky. A constant refrain in her
pronouncements was that while India was ‘politically free’ but economic
and technological dependence on other countries meant that it did not enjoy
‘complete freedom’. She said, ‘My idea of freedom is a self-reliant nation.
It is true no nation today can be fully self-reliant. We shall have to have
something from outside; but at least there should be a base of self-
sufficiency and self-reliance.’
84
 Her economic and security policies tied in
to her particular take on non-alignment as well.
For Indira, non-alignment was not simply ‘avoidance of entanglement’
with the two blocs but rather ‘preserving independence despite close
relations with one or both of them.’
85
While India under Indira continued to
champion non-alignment, Indira sought to narrow its focus more in terms of
the interests of the developing countries. Under Indira’s leadership, there
was a growing ‘insistence on autonomy’ which was in sharp contrast to the
reality – India’s need for economic and military aid. The reduction or
elimination of direct US aid was seen as ‘a badge of honour’. Hence for
Indira, deeper ties with the Soviet Union and even the 1971 treaty of
friendship with the Soviets (concluded amidst US backing for Pakistan

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during the East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis) did not mean that India was no
longer non-aligned. As Indira often stated, India was too large a country to
be part of any bloc but it needed economic, military and scientific resources
to be able to follow an independent policy.
For Indira, non-alignment meant India reserved ‘the right to judge each
international issue on its merits and keeping in view our national interests
and interest of world peace’.
86
Like Nehru, non-alignment for Indira was
‘an assertion of our freedom of judgement and action’ as it demonstrated
that India was not a camp follower.
87
 Indira saw non-alignment as ‘the only
hard-headed, practical path that is open to any country which wants to keep
itself independent’.
88
While India under Indira still talked about the need for global peace and
prosperity, what Indira sought was a ‘new international economic order’ 
89
where the developing countries had a say and where only a few countries –
like the permanent members of the UN Security Council – did not
determine the balance of power.
90
While Nehru saw colonialism as the
major threat facing the world, Indira saw neocolonialism as the new threat
that India had to stand up against. In Indira’s view, the Western world was
trying to impose neocolonialism on the developing countries and India as
their champion had to fight back.
91
Indira wanted India to play the role of a leader in helping create this new
economic order. In this she echoed the views of her fellow Indians, most of
whom believed it natural that India would be a leader or guide to other
developing countries. Indira’s speeches critique the superpower blocs for
seeking ‘overseas possessions’, for carving out ‘spheres of influence’ and
erecting ‘cordon sanitaires’.
92
In a 1972