contemporary
rivalry with Rome (framed,
incidentally, in terms of
Roman
mythology) than any real feelings of cultural animosity. Secondly,
for what it is worth, Carthage (a completely new city, built on the site of Rome’s one time rival,
which had been razed to the ground), had at this time been a loyal Roman city and capital of the
imperial province of Africa for four hundred years. It is perhaps
this casual attitude to the
telescoping of history and the reifying of retrospectively invented tradition which leads Fuller to
subtitle a chapter on Russia’s present day relations with its Muslim minorities ‘Byzantium lives!’!
Whether substituting cultural determinism for theological determinism is really much of a step
forward is, of course, moot. After all, Western popular culture seems perfectly capable of dreaming
up the same negative orientalist stereotypes for pre-Islamic periods as for post-Islamic ones. But
having set off down this road, one might at least expect some interesting scenery on the way.
Unfortunately, Fuller goes on to miss many of the more interesting points that this line of argument
might suggest. He is eager to point out that Islam shares many similarities with Christianity and
Judaism. No one denies it. But such is his reverence for orthodox
Muslim accounts of Islamic
history that he largely bypasses a whole school of important, if controversial, revisionism which
might, at the least have added some zest to his case. According to this, Islam did not spring fully
formed from the revelations and deeds of its prophet, but rather
in a process of accretion, taking
place over roughly two centuries, in which an elite of Arab conquerors gradually combined
elements of Christianity and Judaism, together with a miscellany of their own oracular heritage, to
produce a partially retrofitted tradition which, expediently, helped
guard against cultural
assimilation into the conquered. If so, the very origins of Islam might be said to have their roots in
the underlying political culture of the Middle East, rather than vice versa. Fuller is happy to note
similarities between some strands of late antique Christian thought and Islam. But he prefers to use
this as a jumping off point for lambasting the small mindedness of those who would fight over mere
details in religion. This might be useful rhetoric, but it seems like poor argumentation. After all,
even the most dyed in the wool essentialist would hardly deny the
similarities
between monotheistic
religions. The question is where the
differences
come from, and whether they actually matter.
Indeed, for a book with such an imaginative premise, the fundamental flaw in this work is lack of
imagination. Ironically, given his liberal vision, Fuller seems so wrapped up in his own world view
that he cannot even countenance the possibility that there could be any truth to the position against
which he is arguing. As a result, he seems not to see the need to actually make his case. For
instance, he flatly asserts on numerous occasions that where religion
seems to be a source of
unpleasantness, it is inevitably the result of political interference. ‘It is really the
cultural glue of
theology -
any theology - that sustains a community on an ethnic and religious basis’, he tells us.
‘The religion can be Judaism, Christianity or Islam; it doesn’t really matter’ (p. 37). True religion is
all about ‘personal life, philosophy and conduct’ (p.38). If it gets nasty, then it must be ‘the
exploitation of religion for secular ends’. (p.12). Without the state,
theological decisions would
merely be about ‘obscure proceedings of theologians sitting solemnly in council’ (p.48) and, in any
case, these wouldn’t matter very much as ‘heresy gets a bad rap’, but is actually ‘in the eye of the
beholder’ (p.38). Fair enough. But Fuller offers no explanation for why things must be this way
round (though much later he nods to the issue as a ‘chicken and egg problem’- p. 62). Nor does he
recognise any possible objection. After all, if the specificities of religion matter so little, if politics
always trumps it, then why did the Roman emperor Diocletian’s attempt to impose an official
version of paganism fail, while his successor, Constantine, was able
to establish an already
unstoppable looking tide of Christianity as the state religion of the empire? For scholars like
Rodney Stark monotheistic religions like Christianity have built-in sociological characteristics
which help to ensure their viral success.
2
Fuller barely even recognises that such views exist.
By parts two and three of the book, Fuller has – it seems – more or less abandoned the entire
project. In presenting sweeping chapters on the status of Muslims
in rival Huntingtonian
‘civilisations’ of Russia, India, China and the West and on Islam’s troubled encounter with
modernity, Fuller offers a decent synthesis, but very little that is original. The bold imaginary of a
‘world without Islam’ has decayed to yet another well-meaning refutation of essentialist claims
about Islam. What would the world be like without this book? Not much different, one has to
assume.
2
R. Stark,
The Rise of Christianity
, Princeton,
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1997