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1.2. Meaning of the Word
Culture and Definitions of the Concept The origin of the Latin word cultura is clear. It is a derivative of the verb colo (infinitive colere), meaning “to tend,” “to cultivate,” and “to till,” among other things (Tucker, 1931). It can take objects such as ager, hence agricultura, whose literal meaning is “field tilling.” Another possible object of the verb colo is animus (“character”). In that case, the expres- sion would refer to the cultivation of the human character. Consequently, the Latin noun cultura can be associated with edu- cation and refinement. The etymological analysis of “culture” is quite uncontroversial. But in the field of anthropology, the situation is much more complex. Definitions of culture abound and range from very complex to very simple. For example, a complex definition was proposed by Kroeber and Parsons (1958): “transmit- ted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic- meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behavior” (p. 583). An even less easily comprehensible definition was provided by White (1959/2007): “By culture we mean an extrasomatic, temporal continuum of things and events dependent upon symbol- ing” (p. 3). Often cited is also a definition by Kluckhohn (1951): Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their The Concept of Culture ◆ 11 embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached val- ues. (p. 86, no. 5) But that is not all. Geertz (1973) noted sarcastically that “in some twenty-seven pages of his chapter on the concept, Kluckhohn managed to define culture in turn as . . . [what follows is 11 differ- ent definitions]; and turning, perhaps in desperation, to similes, as a map, as a sieve, and as a matrix” (p. 5). This lack of clarity and consensus about anthro- pologists’ main object of study may be one of the reasons that, in the words of Cochran and Harpending (2009), the social sciences—and especially anthropology— “haven’t exactly covered themselves in glory” (p. ix). 2 It also explains why to many researchers and practitioners, culture is “the c-word, mysterious, frightening and to be avoided” (Berry, 1997, p. 144). Some have even denied the utility of the concept (Barber, 2008b). At the other extreme is a well-known simple and narrow definition: Culture is shared mental software, “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 2001). The group or category can be a national society but Hofstede believes that his defi- nition applies also to other collectives, such as regions, ethnicities, occupations, orga- nizations, or even age groups and genders. According to Jahoda (1984), “culture” is the most elusive term in the vocabulary of the social sciences and the number of books devoted to the topic would fill many library shelves. A practical solu- tion was proposed by Segall (1984), who believed that it was not worth the effort to enhance the concept’s clarity or attempt to articulate a universally acceptable defini- tion. In his view, cultural analysts should abandon the struggle to conceptualize cul- ture. Instead, they should “turn to the real business at hand,” which is to “intensify the search for whatever ecological, socio- logical and cultural variables might link with established variations in human behavior” (p. 154). Segall’s call for pragmatism in cross- cultural analysis is laudable. Theoretical debates about the meaning that “should” be attributed to the concept of culture are pointless. There is no absolute reason why one abstract theoretical concept of it should be better than another. However, disagreements have been voiced not only with respect to abstract definitions of culture but also concerning specific mat- ters, such as whether artifacts should or should not be considered part of culture (see the debate between Jahoda, 1984, and Rohner, 1984). The answer to a ques- tion of this kind can have practical conse- quences: It may determine what should or should not be studied for the purpose of a dissertation on culture or be published in a journal devoted to culture. Culture can be pragmatically defined by the contents and boundaries of the inter- ests of the scholars who study it. Even bet- ter, we should look at what is in the focus of their interests. A culturologist may study climatic differences (for instance, van de Vliert, 2009), although climate is unlikely to be viewed by anybody as part of culture. Yet, that researcher would not be interested in climate per se, but in how it affects variation in values, beliefs, and behaviors, which could be considered ele- ments or expressions of culture. Defining the contents and boundaries of culture may also be necessary for the purposes of clarity and avoidance of con- fusing statements. According to Jahoda (1984), if culture is seen as including behaviors, it is incorrect to say that culture causes behavior because that would be a circular explanation. Likewise, Fischer and Schwartz (2011) discuss the question of whether culture determines values. This makes sense only if values are not viewed as part of culture; otherwise the debate would be like the question of whether light produces photons. |