Of the United States of America d e c e m b e r 2 0 1 7
ADOPT NEW TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
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ADOPT NEW TRADE AND INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND MODERNIZE EXISTING ONES: The United States will pursue bilateral trade and investment agree- ments with countries that commit to fair and recip- rocal trade and will modernize existing agree- ments to ensure they are consistent with those principles. Agreements must adhere to high stan- dards in intellectual property, digital trade, agri- culture, labor, and the environment.
The United States will counter all unfair trade practices that distort markets using all appropriate means, from dialogue to enforcement tools.
Using our eco- nomic and diplomatic tools, the United States will continue to target corrupt foreign officials and work with countries to improve their ability to fight corruption so U.S. companies can compete fairly in transparent business climates.
The United States will work with like-minded partners to pre- serve and modernize the rules of a fair and recip- rocal economic order. Together we will emphasize fair trade enforcement actions when necessary, as well as multinational efforts to ensure transpar- ency and adherence to international standards within trade and investment projects.
Th e United States will partner with countries as they build their export markets, promote free market com- petition, and incentivize private sector growth. We will expand U.S. trade and investment oppor- tunities and increase the market base for U.S. goods and services. Lead in Research, Technology, Invention, and Innovation The United States will build on the ingenuity that has launched industries, created jobs, and improved the quality of life at home and abroad. To maintain our competitive advantage, the United States will prioritize emerging technolo- gies critical to economic growth and security , such as data science, encryption, autonomous tech- nologies, gene editing, new materials, nanotech- nology, advanced computing technologies, and artificial intelligence. From self-driving cars to autonomous weapons, the fi eld of artifi cial intelli- gence, in particular, is progressing rapidly. Th e United States must continue to att ract the inno- vative and the inventive, the brilliant and the bold. We will encourage scientists in government, aca- demia, and the private sector to achieve advance- ments across the full spectrum of discovery, from incremental improvements to game-changing breakthroughs. We will nurture a healthy inno- vation economy that collaborates with allies and partners, improves STEM education, draws on an advanced technical workforce, and invests in ear- ly-stage research and development (R&D).
To retain U.S. advantages over our competitors, U.S. Government agencies must improve their understanding of worldwide S&T trends and how they are likely to influence— or undermine—American strategies and programs. ATTRACT AND RETAIN INVENTORS AND INNOVATORS: The U.S. Government must improve our collab- oration with industry and academia and our recruitment of technical talent. We will remove barriers to the full use of talent across Federal agencies, and increase incentives for hiring and retaining Federal STEM employees. Initiatives
21 P I L L A R I I : P R O M O T E A M E R I C A N P R O S P E R I T Y will include rapid hiring, swift adjudication of national security clearances, and offers of com- petitive salaries. We must create easier paths for the flow of scientists, engineers, and technol- ogists into and out of public service.
The U.S. Government will use pri- vate sector technical expertise and R&D capabili- ties more eff ectively. Private industry owns many of the technologies that the government relies upon for critical national security missions. The Department of Defense and other agencies will establish strategic partnerships with U.S. compa- nies to help align private sector R&D resources to priority national security applications. RAPIDLY FIELD INVENTIONS AND INNOVATIONS: The
United States must regain the element of surprise and field new technologies at the pace of mod- ern industry. Government agencies must shift from an archaic R&D process to an approach that rewards rapid fielding and risk taking. Promote and Protect the U.S. National Security Innovation Base America’s business climate and legal and regu- latory systems encourage risk taking. We are a nation of people who work hard, dream big, and never give up. Not every country shares these characteristics. Some instead steal or illicitly acquire America’s hard-earned intellectual prop- erty and proprietary information to compensate for their own systemic weaknesses. Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at hundreds of bil- lions of dollars. Stealing proprietary technol- ogy and early-stage ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of free societ- ies. Over the years, rivals have used sophisticated means to weaken our businesses and our econ- omy as facets of cyber-enabled economic war- fare and other malicious activities. In addition to these illegal means, some actors use largely legit- imate, legal transfers and relationships to gain access to fields, experts, and trusted foundries that fill their capability gaps and erode America’s long-term competitive advantages. We must defend our National Security Innovation Base (NSIB) against competitors. The NSIB is the American network of knowledge, capabili- ties, and people—including academia, National Laboratories, and the private sector—that turns ideas into innovations, transforms discoveries into successful commercial products and com- panies, and protects and enhances the American way of life. Th e genius of creative Americans, and the free system that enables them, is critical to American security and prosperity. Protecting the NSIB requires a domestic and inter- national response beyond the scope of any indi- vidual company, industry, university, or govern- ment agency. The landscape of innovation does not divide neatly into sectors. Technologies that are part of most weapon systems often originate in diverse businesses as well as in universities and colleges. Losing our innovation and technologi- cal edge would have far-reaching negative implica- tions for American prosperity and power.
Th e U.S. Government will develop a capability to integrate, monitor, and better understand the national security implica- tions of unfair industry trends and the actions of our rivals. We will explore new ways to share this information with the private sector and academia so they bett er understand their responsibilities in curtailing activities that undercut America’s NSIB.
Th e United States will reduce the illicit appropriation of U.S. pub-
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y S T R A T E G Y 22 lic and private sector technology and technical knowledge by hostile foreign competitors. While maintaining an investor-friendly climate, this Administration will work with the Congress to strengthen the Committ ee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to ensure it addresses current and future national security risks. Th e United States will prioritize counterintel- ligence and law enforcement activities to curtail intellectual property theft by all sources and will explore new legal and regulatory mechanisms to pre- vent and prosecute violations. T I G H T E N V I S A P R O C E D U R E S : The United States will review visa procedures to reduce economic theft by non-traditional intelligence collectors. We will consider restrictions on foreign STEM stu- dents from designated countries to ensure that intellectual property is not transferred to our competitors, while acknowledging the importance of recruiting the most advanced tech- nical workforce to the United States. PROTECT DATA AND UNDERLYING INFRASTRUCTURE: The United States will expand our focus beyond protecting networks to protecting the data on those networks so that it remains secure—both at rest and in transit. To do this, the U.S. Government will encourage practices across companies and universities to defeat espionage and theft. Embrace Energy Dominance For the fi rst time in generations, the United States will be an energy-dominant nation. Energy dom- inance—America’s central position in the global energy system as a leading producer, consumer, and innovator—ensures that markets are free and U.S. infrastructure is resilient and secure. It ensures that access to energy is diversifi ed, and recognizes the importance of environmental stewardship. Access to domestic sources of clean, affordable, and reliable energy underpins a prosperous, secure, and powerful America for decades to come. Unleashing these abundant energy resources—coal, natural gas, petroleum, renewables, and nuclear—stimulates the econ- omy and builds a foundation for future growth. Our Nation must take advantage of our wealth in domestic resources and energy efficiency to promote competi- tiveness across our industries. The United States also anchors the North American energy sys- tem, which is one of the most highly integrated in the world. Our vibrant cross-border energy trade and investment are vital for a robust and resilient U.S. economy and energy market. We are com- mitted to supporting energy initiatives that will attract investments, safeguard the environment, strengthen our energy security, and unlock the enormous potential of our shared region. Climate policies will continue to shape the global energy system. U.S. leadership is indispensable to countering an anti-growth energy agenda that is detrimental to U.S. economic and energy secu- rity interests. Given future global energy demand, much of the developing world will require fossil fuels, as well as other forms of energy, to power their economies and lift their people out of poverty . Th e United States will continue to advance an approach that balances energy security, economic develop- ment, and environmental protection. The United States will remain a global leader in reducing tradi- tional pollution, as well as greenhouse gases, while expanding our economy. Th is achievement, which can serve as a model to other countries, fl ows from innovation, technology breakthroughs, and energy efficiency gains, not from onerous regulation. For the fi rst time in generations, the United States will be an energy- dominant nation. 23 P I L L A R I I : P R O M O T E A M E R I C A N P R O S P E R I T Y As a growing supplier of energy resources, technol- ogies, and services around the world, the United States will help our allies and partners become more resilient against those that use energy to coerce. America’s role as an energy exporter will also require an assessment of our vulnerabilities and a resilient American infrastructure. Finally, the Nation’s long-term energy security future rests with our people. We must invest in our future by supporting innovation and R&D, includ- ing through the National Laboratories.
Th e United States will promote clean and safe development of our energy resources, while limiting regulatory burdens that encum- ber energy production and constrain economic growth. We will streamline the Federal regula- tory approval processes for energy infrastructure, from pipeline and export terminals to container shipments and gathering lines, while also ensuring responsible environmental stewardship. PROMOTE EXPORTS: The United States will pro- mote exports of our energy resources, technolo- gies, and services, which helps our allies and part- ners diversify their energy sources and brings economic gains back home. We will expand our export capacity through the continued support of private sector development of coastal terminals, allowing increased market access and a greater competitive edge for U.S. industries. ENSURE ENERGY SECURITY: The United States will work with allies and partners to protect global energy infrastructure from cyber and physical threats. The United States will support the diver- sification of energy sources, supplies, and routes at home and abroad. We will modernize our stra- tegic petroleum stocks and encourage other countries to develop their own—consistent with their national energy security needs. AT TAIN UNIVE RSAL ENERGY ACCESS: The United States will seek to ensure universal access to affordable, reliable energy, including highly effi- cient fossil fuels, nuclear, and renewables, to help reduce poverty, foster economic growth, and promote prosperity.
We will
improve America’s technological edge in energy, including nuclear technology, next-generation nuclear reactors, better batteries, advanced com- puting, carbon-capture technologies, and opportu- nities at the energy-water nexus. Th e United States will continue to lead in innovative and efficient energy technologies, recognizing the economic and environmental benefi ts to end users. 25 P I L L A R I I I Preserve Peace Through Strength “As long as I am President, the servicemen and women who defend our Nation will have the equipment, the resources, and the funding they need to secure our homeland, to respond to our enemies quickly and decisively, and, when necessary, to fi ght, to overpower, and to always, always, always win.” P R E S I D E N T D O N A L D J . T R U M P | D E C E M B E R 2 0 1 7 A central continuity in history is the con- test for power. The present time period is no different. Three main sets of chal- lengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particu- larly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively com- peting against the United States and our allies and partners. Although differing in nature and magnitude, these rivals compete across politi- cal, economic, and military arenas, and use tech- nology and information to accelerate these con- tests in order to shift regional balances of power in their favor. These are fundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive sys- tems and those who favor free societies. China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacifi c region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders. The intentions of both nations are not necessarily fi xed. Th e United States stands ready to cooperate across areas of mutual interest with both countries. For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integra- tion into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sov- ereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corrup- tion and the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is grow- ing and diversify ing. Part of China’s military mod- ernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, includ- ing America’s world-class universities. Russia aims to weaken U.S. infl uence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners. Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) as threats. Russia is investing in new military capabilities, includ- ing nuclear systems that remain the most signifi- cant existential threat to the United States, and in
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y S T R A T E G Y 26 destabilizing cyber capabilities. Th rough modern- ized forms of subversive tactics, Russia interferes in the domestic political aff airs of countries around the world. The combination of Russian ambition and growing military capabilities creates an unsta- ble frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to Russian miscalculation is growing. Th e scourge of the world today is a small group of rogue regimes that violate all principles of free and civilized states. The Iranian regime spon- sors terrorism around the world. It is developing more capable ballistic missiles and has the poten- tial to resume its work on nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States and our part- ners. North Korea is ruled as a ruthless dictator- ship without regard for human dignity. For more than 25 years, it has pursued nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in defi ance of every commit- ment it has made. Today, these missiles and weap- ons threaten the United States and our allies. Th e longer we ignore threats from countries deter- mined to proliferate and develop weapons of mass destruction, the worse such threats become, and the fewer defensive options we have. The United States continues to wage a long war against jihadist terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qa’ida. These groups are linked by a common radical Islamist ideology that encourages vio- lence against the United States and our partners and produces misery for those under their control. Although the United States and our partners have infl icted defeats on ISIS and al-Qa’ida in Syria and Iraq, these organizations maintain global reach with established branches in strategic locations. The threat from jihadist terrorists will persist, even as we intensify efforts to prevent attacks on Americans, our allies, and our partners. Protecting American interests requires that we compete continuously within and across these contests, which are being played out in regions around the world. The outcome of these con- tests will influence the political, economic, and military strength of the United States and our allies and partners. To prevail, we must integrate all elements of America’s national power—political, economic, and military. Our allies and partners must also con- tribute the capabilities, and demonstrate the will, to confront shared threats. Experience suggests that the willingness of rivals to abandon or forgo aggression depends on their perception of U.S. strength and the vitality of our alliances. The United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength, fore- most by ensuring our military power is second to none and fully integrated with our allies and all of our instruments of power. A strong mili- tary ensures that our diplomats are able to oper- ate from a position of strength. In this way we can, together with our allies and partners, deter and if necessary, defeat aggression against U.S. interests and increase the likelihood of managing competi- tions without violent confl ict and preserving peace. Renew America’s Competitive Advantages The United States must consider what is endur- ing about the problems we face, and what is new. The contests over influence are timeless. They have existed in varying degrees and levels of inten- sity, for millennia. Geopolitics is the interplay of these contests across the globe. But some condi- tions are new, and have changed how these com- petitions are unfolding. We face simultaneous threats from different actors across multiple are- nas—all accelerated by technology. The United States must develop new concepts and capabili- ties to protect our homeland, advance our pros- perity , and preserve peace.
27 Since the 1990s, the United States displayed a great degree of strategic complacency. We assumed that our military superiority was guaranteed and that a democratic peace was inevitable. We believed that liberal-democratic enlargement and inclu- sion would fundamentally alter the nature of international rela- tions and that competition would give way to peaceful cooperation. I n s t e a d of bu i ld i n g m i l i- tary capacity, as threats to our national security increased, the United States dramatically cut the size of our military to the lowest levels since 1940. Instead of developing import- ant capabilities, the Joint Force entered a nearly decade long “procurement holiday” during which the acquisition of new weapon systems was severely limited. The breakdown of the Nation’s annual Federal budgeting process, exem- plified by sequestration and repeated continu- ing resolutions, further contributed to the ero- sion of America’s military dominance during a time of increasing threats. Despite decades of efforts to reform the way that the United States develops and procures new weap- ons, our acquisition system remained sclerotic. The Joint Force did not keep pace with emerg- ing threats or technologies. We got less for our defense dollars, shortchanging American tax- payers and warfi ghters. We also incorrectly believed that technology could compensate for our reduced capacity —for the abil- ity to fi eld enough forces to prevail militarily, con- solidate our gains, and achieve our desired polit- ical ends. We convinced ourselves that all wars would be fought and won quickly, from stand-off distances and with minimal casualties. In addition, after being dismissed as a phenom- enon of an earlier century, great power competi- tion returned. China and Russia began to reassert their infl uence regionally and globally. Today, they are fi elding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of cri- sis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical com- mercial zones during peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and try- ing to change the international order in their favor. Moreover, deterrence today is sig n if ica ntly more com- plex to achieve than during the Cold War. Adversaries stud- ied the American way of war and began investing in capabil- ities that targeted our strengths and sought to exploit perceived weaknesses. The spread of accu- rate and inexpensive weap- ons and the use of cyber tools have allowed state and non-state competitors to harm the United States across various domains. Such capabili- ties contest what was until recently U.S. domi- nance across the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. They also enable adversar- ies to att empt strategic att acks against the United States—without resorting to nuclear weapons—in ways that could cripple our economy and our abil- ity to deploy our military forces. Deterrence must be extended across all of these domains and must address all possible strategic attacks. In addition, adversaries and competitors became adept at operating below the threshold of open military conflict and at the edges of interna- tional law. Repressive, closed states and orga- nizations, although brittle in many ways, are often more agile and faster at integrating eco- nomic, military, and especially informational P I L L A R I I I : P R E S E R V E P E A C E T H R O U G H S T R E N G T H
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y S T R A T E G Y 28 means to achieve their goals. They are unencum- bered by truth, by the rules and protections of pri- vacy inherent in democracies, and by the law of armed conflict. They employ sophisticated politi- cal, economic, and military campaigns that com- bine discrete actions. They are patient and con- tent to accrue strategic gains over time—making it harder for the United States and our allies to respond. Such actions are calculated to achieve maximum effect without provoking a direct mil- itary response from the United States. And as these incremental gains are realized, over time, a new status quo emerges. Th e United States must prepare for this ty pe of com- petition. China, Russia, and other state and non- state actors recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either “at peace” or “at war,” when it is actually an arena of continuous competition. Our adversar- ies will not fi ght us on our terms. We will raise our competitive game to meet that challenge, to pro- tect American interests, and to advance our values. Our diplomatic, intelligence, military, and eco- nomic agencies have not kept pace with the changes in the character of competition. America’s mili- tary must be prepared to operate across a full spec- trum of confl ict, across multiple domains at once. To meet these challenges we must also upgrade our political and economic instruments to operate across these environments. Bureaucratic inertia is powerful. But so is the tal- ent, creativity, and dedication of Americans. By aligning our public and private sector efforts we can field a Joint Force that is unmatched. New advances in computing, autonomy, and manufac- turing are already transforming the way we fi ght. When coupled with the strength of our allies and partners, this advantage grows. The future that we face is ours to win or lose. History suggests that Americans will rise to the occasion and that we can shift trends back in favor of the United States, our allies, and our partners. Renew Capabilities Given the new features of the geopolitical envi- ronment, the United States must renew key capa- bilities to address the challenges we face.
U.S. military strength remains a vital compo- nent of the competition for influence. The Joint Force demonstrates U.S. resolve and commit- ment and provides us with the ability to fight and win across any plausible conflict that threat- ens U.S. vital interests. The United States must retain overmatch— the combination of capabilities in sufficient scale to prevent enemy success and to ensure that America’s sons and daughters will never be in a fair fight. Overmatch strengthens our diplomacy and permits us to shape the inter- national environment to protect our interests. To retain military overmatch the United States must restore our ability to produce innovative capabilities, restore the readiness of our forces for major war, and grow the size of the force so that it is capable of operating at sufficient scale and for ample duration to win across a range of scenarios. We must convince adversaries that we can and will defeat them—not just punish them if they att ack the United States. We must ensure the abil- ity to deter potential enemies by denial, convinc- ing them that they cannot accomplish objectives through the use of force or other forms of aggres- sion. We need our allies to do the same—to modern- ize, acquire necessary capabilities, improve read- iness, expand the size of their forces, and affirm the political will to win. 29 Priority Actions
Ensuring that the U.S. military can defeat our adversaries requires weapon sys- tems that clearly overmatch theirs in lethality. Where possible, we must improve existing systems to maximize returns on prior investments. In other areas we should seek new capa- bilities that create clear advan- tages for our military while posing costly dilemmas for our adversaries. We must elimi- nate bureaucratic impediments to innovation and embrace less expensive and time-intensive commercial off-the-shelf solu- tions. Departments and agen- cies must work with industry to experiment, prototype, and rap- idly field new capabilities that can be easily upgraded as new technologies come online. ACQUISITION: The United States will pursue new approaches to acquisition to make better deals on behalf of the American people that avoid cost overruns, eliminate bloated bureaucra- cies, and stop unnecessary delays so that we can put the right equipment into the hands of our forces. We must harness innovative technolo- gies that are being developed outside of the tradi- tional defense industrial base. CAPACITY: The size of our force matters. To deter conflict and, if deterrence fails, to win in war, the Nation must be able to field forces capa- ble of operating in sufficient scale and for ample duration to defeat enemies, consolidate mili- tary gains, and achieve sustainable outcomes that protect the American people and our vital interests. The United States must reverse recent decisions to reduce the size of the Joint Force and grow the force while modernizing and ensuring readiness. IMPROVE READINESS: Th e United States must retain a ready force that is capable of protecting the home- land while defending U.S. interests. Readiness requires a renewed focus on training, logistics, and maintenance. We must be able to get to a the- ater in time to shape events quickly. This will require a resilient forward posture and agile global mobility forces.
The Joint Force must remain capable of deterring and defeat- ing the full range of threats to the United States. The Department of Defense must develop new operational concepts and capa- bilities to win without assured dominance in air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace domains, including against those operating below the level of conventional military con- flict. We must sustain our competence in irregu- lar warfare, which requires planning for a long- term, rather than ad hoc, fight against terrorist networks and other irregular threats.
A healthy defense industrial base is a critical ele- ment of U.S. power and the National Security Innovation Base. The ability of the military to surge in response to an emergency depends on our Nation’s ability to produce needed parts and systems, healthy and secure supply chains, and a skilled U.S. workforce. The erosion of American manufacturing over the last two decades, how- ever, has had a negative impact on these capa- bilities and threatens to undermine the ability of U.S. manufacturers to meet national security requirements. Today, we rely on single domes- tic sources for some products and foreign supply chains for others, and we face the possibility of not being able to produce specialized components for P I L L A R I I I : P R E S E R V E P E A C E T H R O U G H S T R E N G T H
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y S T R A T E G Y 30 the military at home. As America’s manufactur- ing base has weakened, so too have critical work- force skills ranging from industrial welding, to high-technology skills for cybersecurity and aero- space. Support for a vibrant domestic manufactur- ing sector, a solid defense industrial base, and resil- ient supply chains is a national priority. Priority Actions UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM: We will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of our defense indus- trial base, including the identification of materi- als essential to national security, contingencies that could affect supply chains, and technologies that are likely to be critical for the future.
The United States will promote policies and incentives that return key national security industries to American shores. Where possible, the U.S. Government will work with industry partners to strengthen U.S. competitiveness in key technolo- gies and manufacturing capabilities. In addition, we will reform regulations and processes to facili- tate the export of U.S. military equipment. PROTECT AND GROW CRITICAL SKILLS: The United States must maintain and develop skilled trades and high-technology skills through increased support for technical college and apprentice- ship programs. We will support STEM efforts, at the Federal and state levels, and target national security technology areas. Nuclear Forces Nuclear weapons have served a vital purpose in America’s National Security Strategy for the past 70 years. They are the foundation of our strat- egy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States, our allies, and our partners. While nuclear deterrence strat- egies cannot prevent all conflict, they are essen- tial to prevent nuclear att ack, non-nuclear strategic attacks, and large-scale conventional aggression. In addition, the extension of the U.S. nuclear deter- rent to more than 30 allies and partners helps to assure their security, and reduces their need to possess their own nuclear capabilities. Following the Cold War, the United States reduced investments in our nuclear enterprise and reduced the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy. Some parts of America’s strategic nuclear Triad of bomb- ers, sea-based missiles, and land-based missiles are over 30 years old, and much of our nuclear infra- structure dates to the World War II era. At the same time, however, nuclear-armed adversaries have expanded their arsenals and range of delivery sys- tems. The United States must maintain the credi- ble deterrence and assurance capabilities provided by our nuclear Triad and by U.S. theater nuclear capabilities deployed abroad. Significant invest- ment is needed to maintain a U.S. nuclear arsenal and infrastructure that is able to meet national security threats over the coming decades. Priority Actions SUSTAIN U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS: The United States will sustain a nuclear force structure that meets our current needs and addresses unanticipated risks. The United States does not need to match the nuclear arsenals of other powers, but we must sustain a stockpile that can deter adversaries, assure allies and partners, and achieve U.S. objec- tives if deterrence fails.
We will modernize our nuclear enter- prise to ensure that we have the scientific, engi- neering, and manufacturing capabilities nec- essary to retain an effective and safe nuclear Triad and respond to future national secu- rity threats. Modernization and sustainment require investing in our aging command and control system and maintaining and growing
31 the highly skilled workforce needed to develop, manufacture, and deploy nuclear weapons.
To avoid miscalcu- lation, the United States will conduct discussions with other states to build predictable relation- ships and reduce nuclear risks. We will consider new arms control arrangements if they contribute to strategic stability and if they are verifiable. We will not allow adversaries to use threats of nuclear escalation or other irresponsible nuclear behav- iors to coerce the United States, our allies, and our partners. Fear of escalation will not prevent the United States from defending our vital inter- ests and those of our allies and partners.
The United States must maintain our leadership and freedom of action in space. Communications and fi nancial networks, military and intelligence systems, weather monitoring, navigation, and more have components in the space domain. As U.S. dependence on space has increased, other actors have gained access to space-based systems and information. Governments and private sector fi rms have the ability to launch satellites into space at increasingly lower costs. Th e fusion of data from imagery, communications, and geolocation ser- vices allows motivated actors to access previously unavailable information. Th is “democratization of space” has an impact on military operations and on America’s ability to prevail in confl ict. Many countries are purchasing satellites to sup- port their own strategic military activities. Others believe that the ability to att ack space assets off ers an asymmetric advantage and as a result, are pur- suing a range of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The United States considers unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space to be a vital inter- est. Any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space archi- tecture that directly affects this vital U.S. inter- est will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing. Priority Actions ADVANCE SPACE AS A PRIORITY DOMAIN: America’s newly re-established National Space Council, chaired by the Vice President, will review America’s long-range space goals and develop a strategy that integrates all space sectors to support innova- tion and American leadership in space.
The United States will simplify and update regulations for commer- cial space activity to strengthen competitiveness. As the U.S. Government partners with U.S. com- mercial space capabilities to improve the resil- iency of our space architecture, we will also con- sider extending national security protections to our private sector partners as needed.
To enable human exploration across the solar system and to bring back to Earth new knowledge and opportuni- ties, we will increase public-private partnerships and promote ventures beyond low Earth orbit with allies and friends.
Malicious state and non-state actors use cyberat- tacks for extortion, information warfare, disinfor- mation, and more. Such att acks have the capability to harm large numbers of people and institutions with comparatively minimal investment and a troubling degree of deniability. These attacks can undermine faith and confidence in democratic institutions and the global economic system. Many countries now view cyber capabilities as tools for projecting influence, and some use cyber tools to protect and extend their autocratic regimes. Cyberattacks have become a key feature of modern conflict. The United States will deter, P I L L A R I I I : P R E S E R V E P E A C E T H R O U G H S T R E N G T H
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y S T R A T E G Y 32 defend, and when necessary defeat malicious actors who use cyberspace capabilities against the United States. When faced with the opportunity to take action against malicious actors in cyber- space, the United States will be risk informed, but not risk averse, in considering our options.
We will invest in capabilities to sup- port and improve our ability to attribute cyber- attacks, to allow for rapid response. ENHANCE CYBER TOOLS AND EXPERTISE: We will improve our cyber tools across the spectrum of conflict to protect U.S. Government assets and U.S. critical infrastructure, and to protect the integrity of data and information. U.S. depart- ments and agencies will recruit, train, and retain a workforce capable of operating across this spectrum of activity.
We will
improve the integration of authorities and pro- cedures across the U.S. Government so that cyber operations against adversaries can be conducted as required. We will work with the Congress to address the challenges that continue to hinder timely intelligence and information sharing, planning and operations, and the devel- opment of necessary cyber tools. Intelligence America’s ability to identify and respond to geo- strategic and regional shifts and their political, eco- nomic, military, and security implications requires that the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) gather, analyze, discern, and operationalize information. In this information-dominant era, the IC must con- tinuously pursue strategic intelligence to antic- ipate geostrategic shifts, as well as shorter-term intelligence so that the United States can respond to the actions and provocations of rivals. The ability of the United States to modernize our military forces to overmatch our adversar- ies requires intelligence support. Intelligence is needed to understand and anticipate foreign doc- trine and the intent of foreign leaders, prevent tac- tical and operational surprise, and ensure that U.S. capabilities are not compromised before they are fielded. In addition, virtually all mod- ern weapon systems depend upon data derived from scientifi c and technical intelligence. Th e IC, as well as the law enforcement community , offer unique abilities to defend against and miti- gate threat actors operating below the threshold of open conflict. Both communities have exception- ally strong liaison relationships throughout the world, allowing the United States to cooperate with allies and partners to protect against adversaries. Priority Actions IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING: To prevent the theft of sensitive and proprietary information and main- tain supply chain integrity , the United States must increase our understanding of the economic pol- icy priorities of our adversaries and improve our ability to detect and defeat their attempts to commit economic espionage. HARNESS ALL INFORMATION AT OUR DISPOSAL: The
United States will, in concert with allies and part- ners, use the information-rich open-source envi- ronment to deny the ability of state and non-state actors to attack our citizens, conduct offensive intelligence activities, and degrade America’s democratic institutions. FUSE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS: Th e United States will fuse our analysis of information derived from the diplomatic, information, military, and eco- nomic domains to compete more effectively on the geopolitical stage. 33 Diplomacy and Statecraft
Across the competitive landscape, America’s dip- lomats are our forward-deployed political capa- bility, advancing and defending America’s inter- ests abroad. Diplomacy catalyzes the political, economic, and societal connections that create America’s enduring alignments and that build positive networks of rela- tionships with partners. Diplomacy sustains dia- logue and fosters areas of cooperation with compet- itors. It reduces the risk of costly miscommunication. Diplomacy is indispens- able to identify and imple- m e nt s olut ion s t o c on- f licts in unstable regions of the world short of mili- tary involvement. It helps to galvanize allies for action and marshal the collective resources of like-minded n a t i o n s a n d o r g a n i z a - tions to address shared problems. Authoritarian states are eager to replace the United States where the United States withdraws our diplo- mats and closes our outposts. We must upgrade our diplomatic capabili- ties to compete in the current environment and to embrace a competitive mindset. Effective diplomacy requires the efficient use of limited resources, a professional diplomatic corps, modern and safe facilities, and secure methods to commu- nicate and engage with local populations.
Our
diplomats must be able to build and sustain rela- tionships where U.S. interests are at stake. Face- to-face diplomacy cannot be replaced by tech- nology. Relationships, developed over time, create trust and shared understanding that the United States calls upon when confronting secu- rity threats, responding to crises, and encour- aging others to share the bu rden for tack ling the world’s challenges. We must enable forward-deployed field work beyond the con- fines of diplomatic facilities, including partnering with military colleagues in con- flict-affected states. ADVANCE AMERICAN INTERESTS: In the ongoing contests for power, our diplomats must build and lead coali- tions that advance shared interests a nd a rticu late America’s vision in interna- tional forums, in bilateral relationships, and at local levels within states. Our diplomats need additional flexibility to oper- ate in complex conflict-affected areas.
Diplomats must iden- tify opportunities for commerce and coop- eration, and facilitate the cultural, educa- tional, and people-to-people exchanges that create the networks of current and future polit- ical, civil society, and educational leaders who will extend a free and prosperous world. P I L L A R I I I : P R E S E R V E P E A C E T H R O U G H S T R E N G T H
N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y S T R A T E G Y 34
Retaining our position as the world’s preemi- nent economic actor strengthens our ability to use the tools of economic diplomacy for the good of Americans and others. Maintaining America’s central role in international financial forums enhances our security and prosperity by expand- ing a community of free market economies, defend- ing against threats from state-led economies, and protecting the U.S. and international economy from abuse by illicit actors. We want to create wealth for Americans and our allies and partners. Prosperous states are stron- ger security partners who are able to share the burden of confronting com- mon threats. Fair and recip- rocal trade, investments, and exchanges of knowledge deepen our alliances and partnerships, which are necessary to succeed in today’s competitive geopoliti- cal environment. Trade, export promotion, targeted use of for- eign assistance, and modern- ized development finance tools can promote stability, prosper- ity, and political reform, and build new partnerships based on the principle of reciprocity. Economic tools—including sanctions, anti-mon- ey-laundering and anti-corruption measures, and enforcement actions—can be important parts of broader strategies to deter, coerce, and constrain adversaries. We will work with like-minded part- ners to build support for tools of economic diplo- macy against shared threats. Multilateral eco- nomic pressure is often more effective because it limits the ability of targeted states to circumvent measures and conveys united resolve. Priority Actions R E I N F O R C E E C O N O M I C T I E S W I T H A L L I E S A N D Yüklə 1,74 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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