lessening of the external threats, the need for these armed bands had greatly
diminished, yet they continued to wander and fight among themselves, pillage
villages, and devastate public order. The pope had struggled for years to end
their attacks against local populations and their own destructive internecine
warfare; an outlet was needed for their aggressive and expansionist energies.
And at this point, traditions of “crusades” against Muslims had already become
familiar through campaigns of Christian knights in
northern Spain against the
long-standing Muslim Empire in southern Spain. (Although it would not be until
well after the Crusades, in 1492, that the final expulsion of Muslims and Jews
from Spain, on pain of death, would take place.)
In his speech at Clermont, Pope Urban III notably referred to the need for
“those who for a long time, have been robbers, now become knights.” We also
learn a good bit about the efficacy of inflamed religious rhetoric in galvanizing
military expeditions against distant enemies. The religious symbolism of the
“infidels”—never “Muslims”—and the affront to God of their actions provided
the chief emotional and ideological basis for these foreign wars; the pope also
appealed for Christian solidarity with their Christian brethren in the Middle East
—who indeed often ended up being slaughtered by crusader bands, along with
the Muslims.
What were the primary motives of the main players?
They were diverse and
complex. The Byzantines had lost control of the Holy Lands to Arab Muslim
forces in the seventh century and continued to lose further territory to Islam as
the Seljuk Turks in later centuries came out of Central Asia and moved deeper
into Anatolia, further shrinking the empire. Constantinople desperately needed
military assistance against both Turkish and Arab forces and had often turned to
the West for aid in the defense of Christendom. But we have also seen how the
Byzantines maintained fully justified suspicions about ultimate Western
intentions. Many Western rulers, including the pope, nourished hopes of
weakening Greek Byzantine rule and returning the Eastern Empire to “Latin,” or
Rome’s control. If Rome could wrest the Holy Lands from Muslim rule, it would
not only restore Christianity to the area, but would also serve as a redoubt for
expansion of Rome’s power against Constantinople itself.
Who knew it could
possibly lead to the reunification of the divided empire, this time fully under
Rome’s auspices? Thus, in seeking Western aid against the Muslims, was not
Constantinople inviting the fox in to guard the chicken coop?
And then there were numerous economic factors. The great trading city-states
of Venice and Genoa had a huge stake in the increase of military activity in the
eastern Mediterranean. It was a win-win situation under any circumstances for
them: boats and logistical supplies would be required in full measure, and these
two cities were uniquely qualified to act as willing and experienced middlemen
between the warring parties.
Additional geopolitical imperatives emerged with the First Crusade. Growing
new social stability in Europe produced a new European warrior aristocracy,
who formed the backbone of the “Princes’ Crusade.” After arriving in the
Levant, some of these princes founded four separate kingdoms of their own on
Muslim soil along the Mediterranean coast from Asia Minor to Egypt. These so-
called crusader states—Jerusalem, Antioch, Edessa, and Tripoli—represented
perhaps the earliest form of actual European colonization
in the heart of the
Middle East. While their size and fortunes waxed and waned from battle to
battle, three of these crusader states lasted for over 150 years; all of them were
eventually to fall to Muslim armies. The establishment of Latin crusader power
in these four new states also meant, incidentally, the expulsion of the Orthodox
patriarchs from both Jerusalem and Antioch, a serious loss of key religious
centers to the Orthodox Church.
It was therefore a convenient excuse that the lands conquered had been in
Muslim hands. But can there be much doubt that restless European adventurers
would not at some point have undertaken similar expansionist activities into the
Near East if the whole area had been under Eastern Christian and not Muslim
control? Other pretexts could have been found as various European princely
forces were already picking off parts of Byzantine territory in the same period
anyway. Indeed, the “Latin Massacre” in 1182 could have served as a perfect
justification if the more obvious Muslim target had not been available.
In short,
European power was all armored up and ready to go someplace. It is hardly far-
fetched to imagine a crusade in the name of the Latin Church against the
despised Greek Church. Indeed, such an assault against the Eastern Church did
take place in the Fourth Crusade, but the ostensible target was, of course, Islam.
Cultural interchange between the Muslim and Western sides tended to be
somewhat limited, as most populations stuck to their own communities.
Crusaders were impressed with the level of civilization of the Muslims, their fine
arts, and their textiles, which all exerted influence upon European arts. And
while Muslims were generally viewed only as infidels, a legend did develop in
the West about Saladin, the Muslim commander who ultimately recaptured
Jerusalem; he was seen to personify the character of honor and chivalry.
Muslims, however, were less impressed by the crusaders,
whom they regarded as
rough, unkempt, smelly, not given to Muslim traditions of use of the public bath,
and crude in their manners.
It’s interesting to note that the First Crusade also marked the first vigorous
use of a Muslim call for
jihad against Western invaders. It came from ‘Ali bin
Tahir al-Sulami, a legal scholar and philologist in Damascus. Al-Sulami did not
see the Crusades in isolation but as part of a broader threat against Muslim
civilization, especially since they coincided with an ongoing struggle in Spain
between Christian crusaders and Muslim states. The Crusades marked the first
time when Muslim populations had frequent encounters with Westerners on
Muslim soil; otherwise Muslim forces had up to that time mostly encountered
Eastern peoples serving as Byzantine mercenaries. Byzantium was a well-known
element, but the Muslim world was barely beginning to think in terms of a
generalized challenge from the European West. And just as the pope blamed the
failure of the Second Crusades on the sins of the crusaders, al-Sulami blamed
Muslim defeats during the Crusades on Muslim abandonment
of the true faith
and urged Muslims to first turn to “inner
jihad”—cultivating one’s inner
resources and control over one’s baser instincts to be able to conduct a
successful Muslim war (
jihad) against the crusaders. Both sides portrayed their
struggles in terms of holy wars, obscuring the geopolitical struggle. Al-Sulami’s
call for
jihad was ignored by Muslim rulers, however; it was not until many
years later in the Crusades that the linking of
jihad with military expeditions was
articulated by Saladin.