“Negotiating” with Terrorists In viewing terrorist movements around the world, the Bush administration
rejected distinctions among terrorist groups—there is no such thing as a “good”
terrorist. But for all their inveighing against terrorism in principle, statesmen do
end up regularly negotiating with many terrorist groups—precisely because they
grasp that negotiations might eventually bring about a resolution. The British did
end up talking to the IRA; considerable numbers of Israelis believe that they
must talk with Hamas. (Remember when Israel, on principle, refused to talk to
the terrorist PLO?) Many Americans believe we must talk to Hamas and
Hizballah, or elements of the Ba’thists in Iraq, or the Taliban in Afghanistan, for
example, because they are perceived as “rational” groups with domestic, finite
political goals.
“Rational” political groups engaged in political violence usually do possess
specific, finite, concrete goals. They have offices that can be visited, possess
programs, pamphlets, promotional materials and articles in their lobbies, are led
by identifiable figures who can be interviewed and who speak publicly. We
understand their goals and perceive them as rational, even if we oppose them for
political reasons. Some evoke sympathy in our eyes, others rebuke. To label
them all strictly as “terrorists” is analytically crude and counterproductive.
Authorities endlessly repeat they “will never negotiate” with terrorists—until
they do; we “will never recognize…”—until we do. Often these supposed
principled positions on terrorism end up being little more than negotiating
postures on the way to a more serious negotiated settlement.
The statement that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is
facile, yet very close to the truth. It is an argument that infuriates most
governments because it creates “moral equivalency” between warring parties—a
concept hated by both sides. The nub of the problem is that what we recognize as
“resistance” eventually is a political call, depending on whether one favors the
authority or the resisters. Major governments around the world talk about
principle, but end up choosing their definitions of who is a “terrorist” in
accordance with their own transient interests. If we are hung up on the idea that
all these movements are driven by some implacable radical Islamic agenda, then
we will never find ways to reduce the problem. Nearly all of the movements
have nonreligious, ultimately negotiable goals.