particularly when citizens want to confront the authorities in power.
2. The framework
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical framework of this study and depicts the interface
between generalized social representations and the individual uses of such
representations in social perception, interaction and discourse (Van Dijk, 1990). At
the center of this model is the social actor group which may include any organization or
individuals who use social network sites to get their messages out to the public. In the
context of this study, this group represents mainly bloggers, grassroots journalists and
other opinion makers who are actively involved in communication discourse, as
depicted in Figure 1. This group plays an important role in building meanings and
openly criticizing the elites in power. This group manifests its presence in social media
in both active and passive capacities thus enabling them to disseminate articles and to
post pictures and video that capture the events as they occur as well as to respond to
their government’s messages and to support other activists in other regions. In
particular, their success stems from the fact that they were actively involved in
creating a two-way discussion reflecting the discourse disseminated through digital
media and street-level protests and demonstrations. Some of the members of this group
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also play an important role in mobilizing the masses for democratic change in their
respective countries and/or even across the region.
Other social actors are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including
environmental groups, human rights and women’s rights activists. It is also important
to note that despite the fact that authorities and political actors in power and their agencies
have a strong physical presence in the traditional media, they have also extended their
power and presence into the digital world. As argued by Stevenson and Greenberg (2000),
this group of socio-political actors is more likely to take advantage of information and other
communicative resources than other groups. Many powerful elites including the leaders of
official political parties, presidents, speakers in parliaments, military, religious and other
powerful leaders have an online presence through their own web sites and/or blogs.
The second component of this framework (depicted in Figure 1) comprises social
media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, blogs). Social networks, particularly social media, are a
key means for acquiring and disseminating information and knowledge about various
matters of concern. The actors of the social media may represent political parties
which otherwise have a weak or vulnerable presence in the physical world due to the
lack of institutional democracy and the fact that the political structure of MENA
countries has favored a handful of well-organized elites. Perhaps the largest presence
on the social media networks is that of the grassroots journalists including bloggers
and other individuals who are active on various social networking sites.
The third component of our framework is the political structure. Kitschelt (1986)
argues that political structures are compromised of specific configurations of
resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization,
which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain
them in others, as we have seen in the MENA region. However, political structures do
not completely determine the course of social movements. The long-standing political
leaders and elites in power attempt to impact the social movements in the region by
mobilizing their resources including the massive use of national broadcasting agencies
and newspapers. In many cases they impose heavy media filtering including the
Social media
Political
structures
Framing of situation,
social reality
(discourse)
Social actors
Meaning
Action
Source:
Adapted and modified from Stevenson and Greenberg (2000)
Figure 1.
Social media, meaning
and action
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temporary shutdown of internet connections in order to restrict citizens’ access to
available information and, in particular, to disrupt communication discourse.
Both social actors and political structures have active presence in social networks.
As argued by Stevenson and Greenberg (2000) the social actors may impact political
structures and vice versa. However, because of the non-democratic characteristics of
political structures in MENA countries, oppositional views have limited influence on
political structure. Social actors who have different views from those who are in power
can express themselves openly and freely through social networks. As a consequence,
social media are the main loci for discourse, as depicted in Figure 1.
Van Dijk (1990) argues that discourse is a form of language use involved in social
interaction and is interpreted as a complete communicative event in a social situation.
Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1998) argue that communicative action takes place by the
means of language or another sign systems through which mutual understanding
about the world is achieved. One of the main outcomes of discourse is the process of
building meaning which may result in a form of action. An empirical study conducted
by Donnellon
et al.
(1986) shows that despite interpretational differences among
organizational members, communication discourse has enabled members of groups to
create equifinal meaning through which organized action can be followed.
Stevenson and Greenberg’s (2000) agency and social networks paradigm evaluates
the roles of social actors and interest groups in mobilizing masses within the context
of democratic institutes in which the socio-political structures endure and tolerate
the formation and activities of opposition groups and other social actors. It also
acknowledges the legitimate rights of opposition groups to participate in political
discourse with the aim of influencing the decision-making processes by challenging the
existing power. However, in the context of MENA countries where democracy does not
exist, the relations between social actors on one hand and the elites in the power on the
other differ substantially from those of democratic societies. While in the latter there
are opportunities for the opposition to articulate their political agendas, in the former,
any act by social actors to mobilize the masses against the rulers or for a more just and
fair society is considered an act of an enemy and therefore illegitimate and subject to
prosecution. Figure 1 was adopted and modified from the original work of Stevenson
and Greenberg (2000) to reflect the current political situations in the MENA region and
to highlight the relationships between the social actors and the political structures
mediated by ICTs (e.g. social networking sites).
2.1 Communication discourse and social action
According to Habermas (2006), mass media based on the technologies of mass
communication constitute a source of power. As such social media provide citizens in
many developing countries including MENA region a platform through which to
practice democracy in the form of public discourse without the limits of time, place or
other physical conditions (Hacker and van Dijk, 2000). Reaching mutual understanding
is the foundation of public discourse as argued by Habermas. According to Habermas
(2001, pp. 136-7), within the context of theory of communicative action “every
communicative actor has to commit to fulfilling universal claims to validity. Insofar as
she participates in communication (i.e. a process of reaching understanding) at all, she
cannot avoid raising the following claims:
(1)
to express herself intelligibly;
(2)
to make something understood;
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(3)
to make herself understood in doing so; and
(4)
to reach a mutual understanding with another.”
Once in complete agreement, which encompasses all four components (Habermas,
2001), reaching mutual understanding with others can help the individual arrive at
other levels of social activity, namely the organization of social actions (Habermas,
1989). Hacker and van Dijk (2000) argue that ICT enables citizens to address the social,
cultural, political and economic issues that matter to them with regard to institutional
politics; if they so desire, citizens can even try to create their own political system and/
or organize social actions to bring these issues to the larger public.
As such, communication discourse is a central component of sense-making
processes and organization (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2005) and of the framing of a situation,
as depicted in Figure 1. The framing of a situation defines the construction of “social
reality” (Scheufele, 1999) by new media or specific socio-political movements. Through
the process of communication discourse, social network participants try to make sense of
events happening in their physical environment. As argued by Donnellon
et al.
(1986),
despite differences in interpretation among participants, communication discourse links
meanings and actions (see Figure 1). In this arrangement, communication discourse
enables members to create shared meaning from which organized action can follow and
members can modify and/or adjust the previously shared meaning through the cycle of
discourse. This process helped citizens in the MENA region to discuss and analyze social
events as they occurred and allowed discussants to accumulate shared meanings and to
organize future actions. Fiss and Hirsch (2005) argue that sense-making and framing are
conceptually related to each other in such a way that the framing of knowledge involves
many aspects of sense-making. In this context, framing and sense-making combine
to create the meaning (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005) of events as will be discussed later. The
ultimate results of such processes are their implications in the form of social actions as
well as their reflexive capacities which impact other components of our model, as
depicted in Figure 1. Users are involved in adding their entries using sense-making
capacities through posted articles, pictures, videos, messages and comments to better
understand and gain knowledge to answer questions such as “What helped? What
hindered? What are the barriers? What do you conclude? What emotions/feelings relate?
What would help? What things need to be discussed here that aren’t being discussed?
Whose voice needs to be heard that is not being heard?” (Dervin, 1998, p. 9). The ultimate
outcome of such discourse is to build capacities in mobilizing citizens for social
actions and for the sake of socio-political changes. What we have seen in the MENA
region is a shift from participants as passive observers and/or posting soft critique
articles on blogs and other social networking sites (see Etling
et al.
, 2009) to participants
having a more active role in mobilizing masses for social actions in the material world.
It is also important to note that the social actors were active in using other means of
communication such as sending out e-mails, SMS and telephone conversation to inform
each other of the planned events as well as sending out their messages to the authorities
directly. This includes, for example, conducting online petitions directed toward
authorities requesting respect for human rights by making them accountable for the
unjust social, legal and political conditions, conducting interviews with international
news agencies as well as sending their messages to various international human rights
organizations. The overwhelming amount of posted materials on social networking sites
(as will be discussed in the upcoming section) were to support the ongoing street
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demonstrations and to support freedom and democracy regardless of the country under
study. The outcomes of such actions have been reflected and further discussed in social
media as depicted in Figure 1. Arrows in this figure may represent both positive and
negative impacts. For example, the ultimate responses from the “political structures” to
such intense online activities and discourse as experienced in Iran, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria
and Yemen, were severe network restrictions and increased internet content filtering and
censorship. In other cases where the internet content filtering was not sufficient due to
massive network traffic, authorities ordered the temporary shutdown of internet access
and e-mail services (Quinn, 2010; Huffington Post, 2011).
3. Stages of discourse development
Figure 2 shows the ladder of socio-political development in MENA region and the
stages of progression in communication discourse. In the first stage, an event which
responded to an unjust socio-political situation (a young and educated man burned
himself as a protest to the unemployment situation in Tunisia) was captured in videos
and photos which were posted on social networking and video sharing sites. Soon the
footage and surrounding events became the main topic of discourse on a variety of
social media sites (stage II). As a result of such discourse we can see an amplified
demand for social actions not only on the social networking sites but also on blogs and
other critical web sites. The discourse expresses that the political establishment and
the head of state be accountable for the unjust socio-political situation in these
countries thus transferring the discussion from the streets of Tunisia to a global
sphere. In particular, the younger generation in the MENA region is echoing similar
demands for respect for human rights, calling for a free and transparent election and
constructive reforms of their countries’ election processes. The key demands at this
stage were for human rights to be respected, the rule of law under which all agencies
including the military must abide, and for the protection of free speech.
As a result of this discourse we are witnesses to organized mass demonstrations
through the integrated social networking cells that bridge the virtual and the
physical worlds (stage III). It is also important to note the active role of women as
opinion makers and organizers and for their roles as key activists on the frontlines
as speakers and opinion makers and, in many cases, as the leaders of demonstrations.
The governments of the MENA countries responded with severe and cruel punishment
Captured events
Social network
discourse
Organized
protests
Military forces
Radical demands
Intensity
Time
Figure 2.
Stages of discourse
development
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despite the pacifist nature of the demonstrations. Security forces and military were
dispatched to crackdown on street demonstrations (stage IV). As a consequence, many
demonstrators were killed, wounded and arrested during the clashes with military
forces. However, the elites in power used a variety of techniques to quell the
demonstrations from promises to reform, to the intensive use of military to end
the demonstrations through the use of force. The more brutal actions from the security
forces, the more radical the demands (stage V) for political and social changes from the
street demonstrators’ slogans and from the unfolding discussion on social media sites.
This is a turning point from peaceful demands for reform in earlier stages to an
antagonistic demand for regime change. This was a common process in all countries in
the MENA region despite some differences, particularly in countries such as Tunisia,
Egypt and Yemen. In other countries such as Iran and Bahrain the military and elites in
power were temporarily successful in cracking down on the street demonstrations but
we could see a shift from the physical to the digital world. In digital communities the
discourse among many different groups and individuals has intensified. In this context
we can also see more radical views about the socio-economic and political situations
and demand for regime change compared with earlier stages where the main focus
was social reform. In Libya, however, the situation was unique in the sense that the
street demonstration turned into military clashes with demonstrators which resulted in
the involvement of coalition forces in Libya. As a consequence, an immediate armed
conflict between demonstrators and the government forces transpired, circumventing a
multivocal communication discourse through social networks. Figure 2 shows these
separate but interrelated stages from the perspective of their intensity within a
timeframe. In fact, the recent political events the MENA region demonstrate agenda-
building activities initiated by the actions occurring in the physical world and further
developed through communication discourse on social media. Smith
et al.
(2001) argue
that political protesters are ultimately interested in shaping the agenda-building
process by helping to define how issues are represented in the media. In this context
the communication discourse plays a central role in determining the success
of political protest (Smith
et al.
, 2001). Cobb
et al.
(1976) argue that the process of
agenda building is associated with the ways in which different groups of a population
become aware of and eventually participate in political conflicts whether the issues
are initiated by individuals or groups in the general public or by political leaders.
In this context, the role of social media is particularly important mainly because
the mainstream media were under heavy governmental control and censorship. These
media published and broadcasted different views from the events occurring on
the streets. Their views were mainly anchored with governments’ and military’s
view of the events in which peaceful demonstrators were called the agents of enemies
with the ultimate goal of destabilizing society and destroying the country’s unity
and its socio-economic development. This view is discussed in greater detail in
the following section.
4. CDA and social networks
To better understand the role of meaning as generated through the process of
communication discourse and its impact on mobilizing social actions, a method known
as CDA was deployed. CDA is based on Habermas’ theory of communicative action as
discussed above. The main objective of using CDA methodology is to distinguish the
emphatic pattern in the use of language from the ideological and/or authoritative
perspectives and their relationship to democratic discourse (see Figure 3). In this
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context, CDA allows us to identify the perspective from which a speech, a written text
or a symbol will facilitate mutual understanding among people of different cultures
and beliefs (Wei-Hao, 2008). In particular, the Habermasian discursive action tries to
discover and evaluate the arguments proposed for or against a message, in terms of its
clarity, truthfulness, correctness and appropriateness (Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1998).
As such, CDA may be used to reveal systematic communicative distortions in which
power relations underlie discourse (Cukier
et al.
, 2008, 2009). This study claims that
those who try to distort communication discourse through authoritative command
are those who are facing serious challenges from their own citizens – citizens who were
commanded for decades and do not trust their leadership. These citizens are demanding
constitutional changes. The recent wave of street protests and demonstrations in the
MENA region confirms citizens’ mistrust of their leadership. In this context, CDA will
help us to critically investigate the use of language and its implications for emancipation.
It interrogates texts to understand the deep structures, systematic communicative
distortions and power relations that underlie discourse (Cukier
et al.
, 2008). Dellinger
(1995) argues that CDA has turned the study of language into an interdisciplinary tool
that can be used by scholars from a variety of backgrounds. Most significantly, it offers
researchers the opportunity to adopt a social perspective in the cross-cultural study of
media texts. Calhoun (1999) argues that discourse on validity claims is important since
truthfulness, sincerity and rightness drive discourse forward in a cumulative fashion
toward “truth and certainty, even if these are only approached asymptotically” (p. 50).
Arguments
Comprehensibility
Truth
Legitimacy
Sincerity
Meaning
Validation
False
assurance
Illegitimacy
Mis-
representation
Confusion
Potential
distortion
CDA analysis
Speech/text
-Do metaphors and connotative
words promote or suppress
understanding?
-Do metaphors and connotative
words create false assurances?
-Who is speaking, who is silent,
what are their interests?
-What is missing or suppressed
in the discourse?
-How are the decisions
legitimized?
-What evidence has been
provided to support these
arguments?
-Are there ideological claims
which are unexamined?
-Is the communication sufficiently
intelligible?
-Is the communication complete?
-Is the level of detail too
burdensome for the reader or
hearer?
Figure 3.
The process of discourse
using CDA analysis
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Cukier
et al.
(2009) use Habermas’ discourse theory to validate claims made by
popular media in the context of e-learning technology in higher education.
Integrating Habermas’ theory of communicative action into CDA methodology,
the authors interrogate the comprehensibility, truth, legitimacy and sincerity of
claims made by popular media. These elements are used to construct a framework
for analyzing empirical observations within the context of communication in
speech or text. Comprehensibility deals with the pragmatics of language in terms of
syntax and symbolic representation, while truth is concerned with potential violations
of the truth claim.
Further, legitimacy addresses the norms and social context embedded in the claim;
sincerity deals with examining the consistency of the claim (i.e. that what is said is
what is meant). Stahl (2007) suggests the importance of focussing on language when
investigating the link between ideology and ICTs. For example, metaphors can be
employed to advance a particular point of view and obscure or ignore equally valid
alternate perspectives. Metaphors can “take on a life of their own [
y
] [and] be turned
into reifications” (Stahl, 2007, p. 40).
We used CDA methodology to investigate the texts of government officials in the
MENA region when they confronted social unrest and citizens’ demand for political
and social changes.
4.1 Data collection and research approach
We analyzed 3,635 messages posted on Farsi and Arabic blogs as well as on Twitter
and Facebook and video sharing sites such as YouTube. These texts, pictures, audio
and video clips document the citizens’ demand for freedom and democracy and the
state officials’ responses to those demands. Three assistant researchers fluent in Farsi,
English and Arabic translated messages posted on social network sites from Farsi and
Arabic into English for the purpose of this analysis.
In step 1, the empirical data were searched in Facebook, Twitter, blogs and
YouTube. We were particularly interested in messages and articles posted in Farsi and
Arabic. In step 2, an English transcription for each message was created and saved as a
PDF. In step 3, the PDFs were imported into ATALS.ti software (version 6) for analysis.
ALTALS.ti allows for not only a textual content analysis but also allows us to analyze
other meaningful web objects (e.g. a video, audio, picture, graph, banner or poster and
so on). For example, a video clip is marked as critical because it captures a street
demonstration where slogans against the elites in power were used. As noted by
Habermas (2001), there is a linkage between primitive linguistic expression and
non-linguistic gestures and action: “Communicative symbols express behavioral
expectations and thus remain rooted in a context of action, whereas non-linguistic
actions are connected to linguistically interpersonal relations as the fulfillment or non-
fulfillment of behavioral expectations” (p. 140). In step 4, the content of documents was
analyzed and coded (e.g. keywords associated with events). Finally in step 5, the codes
were exported to Excel in Comma Separated Value (.csv) format for frequency analysis
(see Table AI).
Two types of documents emerged: first, messages and statements published by
authorities and their supporters; and second, messages posted by citizens, which
are explained below.
Around 1,206 or 33.2 percent of posted messages either posted new material about
the events as they occurred (stage I in Figure 2) or were posted in response to the
authorities’ broadcasted messages/rhetoric (stage II in Figure 2). About 786 messages
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(21.6 percent) were directly related to mobilizing messages encouraging people to join
the organized rallies or to continue their presence on the streets. These messages
contained exact dates, times and locations about the street protests occurring across
many major cities in the MENA region (see stage III in Figure 2).
Also, 541 messages (14.9 percent) were directly related to the authorities’ rhetoric
and statements about the events and street protestations. Messages posted by
supporters of the regimes and/or by people who had a neutral view about the events
were also placed in this category (see Table AII). In addition, 818 messages (22.5
percent) were related to radical social action, revolution and demand for regime change
(stage V in Figure 2) including possible armed conflict against the regime. Messages of
this nature were bolder, particularly when the military were heavily engaged in violent
confrontations with live ammunition against protesters (stage IV, in Figure 2).
The remaining 284 or 7.8 percent of the messages were classified in the “others”
group. Messages in this group pertain mainly to the critical artistic responses to the
events and include a range of creative items such as posters, banners, poetry and text,
songs and video clips expressing the oppressive political situation and supporting civil
unrest. Some of these videos used the posted video clips created by grassroots
journalists in stage I and were remixed and revised to deliver stronger messages for
the sake of mobilizing the masses (stage III) for democratic change. The results of the
above frequency analysis with regard to citizens’ responses are shown in Table AI.
4.2 The CDA analysis
In the following section, the widely discussed statements published by authorities,
military officials as well as religious leaders are investigated. Figure 3 represents the
process of CDA analysis as the discourse is tested against the four validity claims.
In June 2009, Iranian President Ahmadinejad, whose recent reinstallation was much
disputed, called the peaceful demonstrators who took to the streets, “dirt and dust”
(Tait, 2009), further fueling anger among many citizens and other social actors who
demanded a recount of their votes and a fair and transparent election. His speech
incited a new wave of mass demonstrations in Tehran and other major cities and these
were mainly organized through social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Many
artists, poets, musicians and grassroots journalists posted their artwork and video
clips responding to his insult (YouTube, 2009). Two years later, President Al-Assad of
Syria called citizens “germs” as they protested against his government and demanded
freedom and democracy.
All dictators in the region used a common language, as was widely discussed on
social networking sites, blogs and other social media outlets. We see the authorities
calling protesters the “agents of enemy,” “outlaws,” “criminals,” “bandits,” “drug
traffickers” and other metaphors which distort and disguise their desire crackdown on
protesters and to put an end to the ongoing demonstrations. A simple search on
YouTube for posted video clips taken by grassroots journalist in the region clearly
demonstrates the brutality of the military and security forces against demonstrators,
following the leaders’ threatening messages. For example, a search on YouTube
conducted on June 23, 2011 for discussions of Iran’s protest (2009 onward) and protests
in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen in 2011 returned
over 90,000 video results documenting the events in the region as they occurred. As a
Bahraini wrote, “We deserve a better life and future but the government’s brutal
actions against demonstrators who wanted these simple things made us realize that we
do not have any freedom in this country.” Another common practice by the government
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officials in MENA was to temporarily shut down the internet and mobile cell phone
systems in order to restrict citizens’ access to social media and the ongoing discourse
as well as to limit organizers’ ability to inform other citizens of upcoming events.
This practice was widely used in Iran during the 2009 waves of street demonstrations
and thereafter by other governments in the region. In addition, there are many reports
that online activists were arrested and/or expelled from their work or university.
For example, a Bahraini student was expelled from university and another young
woman was sentenced to one year in jail for making a political comment on Facebook,
another for making a public protest speech and one web activist was sentenced to life
imprisonment for posting comments about the human rights violations in Bahrain
(International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), 2010). There are also many
other reports of mass arrests of bloggers and other web activists in Iran, Egypt,
Yemen, Tunisia and Syria according to international agencies such as Reporters
Without Border (RWB) (2011) and Freedom House (2011).
As discussed on social media sites as well as in news agency interviews with the
opposition leaders, the main characteristics of demonstrations in the region (except for
Libya) were an emphasis on non-violent, civil disobedience, peaceful demonstrations,
strike actions and other means of civil resistance. Many of these civil actions turned
into violence due to the authorities’ or military’s intolerance of any critique against the
status quo. In almost all of the uprisings from Iran in 2009 to Egypt and Libya and
Syria in 2011, the nations’ government and security forces attacked demonstrators
with live ammunition. Many of the video clips posted on YouTube, blogs and other
social networking sites clearly demonstrate the brutality of governments and security
forces against demonstrators. For example, in Egypt the widespread political protests
which demanded the removal of President Mubarak and his government, have led to
violence and the suppression of opposition forces. This situation ultimately started the
events in Tunisia and was not only discussed among many Facebook users but also
broadcasted by international news agencies such as the popular Al Jazeera news
agency in the Arab world. The same responses have come out of other countries and
have been discussed widely among Facebook users in Iran, Bahrain and Morocco
(Tremlett, 2011). The ultimate result has been a brutal crackdown on peaceful
demonstration which has radicalized the social movements in this region. The
demonstrators’ slogans and actions ultimately turned from requesting social-political
reforms and fair and transparent elections to demanding a regime change (see Table AI)
in many countries such as Iran, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.
It is important to note that the use of Arabic language has been one of the major
drivers in the recent movement in this region (expect for Iran) as it is the common
language used among social media followers, particularly on Facebook and Twitter.
For example, it is estimated that there are nearly 19 million Facebook users (Internet
World Stats, 2011; Preston, 2011) in the Arab countries of this study (Bahrain, Egypt,
Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen), many of whom
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