Yami: The Autobiography of Yami Lester, (Alice Springs, Jukurrpa Books, 2000
The American veto of Australian nuclear weapons - Secretary of State Dean Rusk: “I opened up all stops.”
But the policy continued until 1972: Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy - 1971, Department of Defence (cabinet paper)
192. Finally there is, in our opinion, no present strategic need for Australia to develop or acquire nuclear weapons; but the implications of China’s growing nuclear military capacity, and of the growth of military technology in Japan and India, need continuous review.
We consider that the opportunities for decision open to the Australian Government in future would be enlarged if the lead time for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability could be shortened.
We recommend regard to this, without undue claims upon resources, in the future development of Australia’s nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes, in the Defence research and development programme, and in other relevant ways.
3. Australia and extended nuclear deterrence: absurd, obscene and dangerous
The Australian model of extended nuclear deterrence
lack of public presence and awareness
a lack of certainty about its standing and character in American eyes
offshore location of potential deterrent force
lack of an identifiable direct nuclear threat
hosting of United States targeting-related intelligence facilities justified as Australian contribution to maintenance of global nuclear stability
concomitant government secret acceptance of certain targetting of those facilities in the event of nuclear war
Evaluating claims for the need for nuclear defence or nuclear deterrence for Australia
what are the actual threats to Australia against which extended nuclear deterrence is invoked?
what are the probabilities attached to such threats?
where threats are deemed to be actionable with nuclear response, what alternative responses or means of addressing the issue exist or could be generated?
No government has addressed these questions in a systematic and open manner.
Question: why are Australians so accepting of their government’s 50-year history of commitment to defence by nuclear weapons?
Pine Gap functions today
Two systems, primary and secondary
two separate space-based intelligence systems downlinked through Pine Gap
Primary systems: signals intelligence (SIGINT)
One of three primary control and command stations
Advanced Orion satellites detecting radio transmissions
Massive downlink of intercepted data, then processed
Processed data used in Iraq, Afghanistan, and counter-terrorism operations (incl. drone killings), as well as strategic planning
Secondary system: Missile launch detection by infra-red imagery
Remote Ground Station
Defence Support Program (DSP) legacy satellites
successor SBIRS [Space-Based Infra-Red Satellite] systems
information facilitates US second strike targetting
Pine Gap, signals intelligence and drone assassinations
A US Air Force Predator on patrol
CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan 2004–2013
Total US strikes: 371
Obama strikes: 320
Total reported killed: 2,505-3,584
Civilians reported killed: 407-926
Children reported killed: 168-200
Total reported injured: 1,111-1,493
US Covert Action in Yemen 2002–2013
Confirmed US drone strikes: 54-64
Total reported killed: 268-393
Civilians reported killed: 21-58
Children reported killed: 5
Reported injured: 65-147
Possible extra US drone strikes: 81-100
Total reported killed: 285-461
Civilians reported killed: 23-48
Children reported killed: 6-9
Reported injured: 83-109
Minimum number confirmed killed by drones in Yemen (to 14/8/2013
Australian nukes on the agenda again? Lowy Institute Poll May 2010 attitudes to Australian nuclear weapons development
Nuclear target Australia?
Bases map
The alliance bargain - US bases as the price of “nuclear protection”
Part 1: Australian security depends on US maintenance of a stable world nuclear order.
Part 2: “We accepted that the joint facilities were probably targets, but we accepted the risk of that for what we saw as the benefits of global stability.”
Kim Beazley, presentation to Seminar on the ANZUS alliance, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Parliament of Australia, 11 August 1997.
“We judged, for example, that the SS-11 ICBM site at Svobodny in Siberia was capable of inflicting one million instant deaths and 750,000 radiation deaths on Sydney. And you would not have wanted to live in Alice Springs, Woomera or Exmouth -- or even Adelaide.”
Paul Dibb, former deputy Secretary for Defence, “America has always kept us in the loop”, The Australian, 10 September 2005.
Joint intelligence facilities as “the strategic essence” (Desmond Ball)
Pine Gap (and previously, Nurrungar and Northwest Cape) = core utility of Australia for United States
Despite the risks, hosting the intelligence facilities is usually justified by three rationales for the Australia-US alliance for Australian governments:
Australia derives crucial intelligence from joint facilities
Australia gets access to higher levels of US military equipment (unlike non-UKUSA partners)
Australia gets a seat at the highest strategic discussions in Washington
Strategic considerations: why Pine Gap is still a high priority target in the event of major conflict
US-Russia
recessed deterrence
US-China relations
cooperation or conflict?
“power transition” theory and its devotees
unbalanced deterrence = unstable deterrence?
US/Japan missile defence and the erosion of Chinese nuclear deterrence capacity
China, the US ‘pivot’ strategy, and Australia: why would China care about Pine Gap:
Source: Peter Tait, Effects of a 1 Mt airburst over Pine Gap (April 1985), drawing on Desmond Ball, “Limiting nuclear attacks”, in D. Ball and J.O.Langtry, (eds. ) Civil defence and Australia’s Security in the Nuclear Age, 1984
What has changed in this picture since 1985?
Building resources for an informed democratic debate about security and defence
Building resources for an informed democratic debate about security and defence
Understanding Australian interests vs. US interests
What are the consequences of our current and projected force structure and basing arrangements?
Thinking deeply about China and making genuinely realistic assessments about China
What actual security threats does Australia face?
What intelligence and military force structure does Australia need for actual threats?
What are the alternatives, and what are the consequences for the bases?
“Nuclear weapons today are not relevant to the United States, they are not relevant to the defence of any country”
“Nuclear weapons today are not relevant to the United States, they are not relevant to the defence of any country”
We must end nuclear weapons for all time.
Malcolm Fraser 23 April 2007
4. Australia and the abolition of nuclear weapons
Australian national interests?
the human interest?
the foundations of genuine security?
Why has the Australian government shown such hostility to the Red Cross initiative on the humanitarian effects of nuclear war?
The “Joint Facilities” revisited – Desmond Ball, democratic debate on security, and the human interest, Special Report, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 12 December 2012:
“The nuclear bomb is the most anti-democratic, anti-human, outright evil thing that man has ever made.
“The nuclear bomb is the most anti-democratic, anti-human, outright evil thing that man has ever made.
If you are religious, then remember that this bomb is man’s challenge to God. It’s worded quite simply: We have the power to destroy everything that you have created.
If you are not religious, then look at it this way. This world of ours is four thousand, six hundred million years old. It could end in an afternoon.”
