Aspects of Hydrocarbon Insecurity in the Eastern Mediterranean: Maritime Claims, Access, and Quest for Energy Resources

Confronting Current Security Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean

Despite the deadlock in the EEZ dispute, it would be unrealistic to assume that littoral states will give up their long-term interests over the Eastern Mediterranean by fait accompli. There is not going to be a “peace pipeline” that would resolve long-standing disputes with the touch of a button. Politics takes the lead and economics follows. However, cooperation, shared values and commercial interests could help rapprochement. Management of conflict and peaceful resolution of disputes are by vast majority done through bilateral negotiations. Only if all mechanisms of peaceful settlement are exhausted, then under the authority of UN Charter, Article 36:3, parties should submit a legal dispute to arbitration bodies as a last resort.⁵¹ But law presumes the preexistence of a disposition to abide by it, as evidenced by the cases reviewed.⁵²

Although South Cyprus is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty, Turkey, Israel, and Syria are not, and naturally UNCLOS is not binding to non-parties of the treaty. Based on the principle of ius tertii, it is a contractual law governed by the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties that is not legally enforceable through compulsory binding procedures against a state that declines to sign and ratify it.⁵³ Nevertheless, nothing may prevent Greek Cypriots, for instance, to make unconscionable claims on maritime limits under the customary international law. Even though Turkey is not in a position to become a “rules-setter” in the Eastern Mediterranean,⁵⁴ it should reject any tacit acceptance or acquiescence to a particular maritime delimitation imposed by other parties, in order to avoid being bound to it as a custom in the future.⁵⁵

At the crux of the problem is that South Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey are unlikely to agree on the interpretation of the treaty regarding the EEZ delimitation over an area covering approximately 210.000 km². Due to diplomatic non-recognition issue they lack powerful mechanisms to reach a binding mutual consent in order to formally refer to the jurisdiction of arbitration bodies. This legal uncertainty is similar to the case of unsettled counter-claims over the extent of EEZs between Lebanon and Israel over 850 km² to which lack of diplomatic recognition poses a major obstacle. Seismic research and a study of geological formations indicate that the northeast part of Levant basin covered by the Lebanese EEZs has the highest hydrocarbon reserve potential.⁵⁶ It is not a coincidence that Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are embroiled in a bitter confrontation to control Lebanon that culminated in a political crisis and the ensuing chaos over the Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s position. The U.S. has tried to intervene and broker a relationship between the two countries without much success, although little hope remains on both sides that conflict over the disputed area can be resolved through dialogue and mediation.⁵⁷ Three out of five offshore blocks on offer by Lebanon are disputed with Israel.⁵⁸ As the first bidding round for offshore drilling blocks, 4 and 9, attracted the expected level of interest from Russian Novatek, Italian ENI, and French Total, both parties to the dispute should see a benefit to avoid escalation that will otherwise deter potential investors to the field. While Lebanon is optimistic to court international support to protect its maritime borders, Israel would certainly want to wait and see the results of test drills in Lebanese exploration blocks before taking a precipitated action on the border dispute.

It seems a far possibility that a military confrontation will ensue in reaction to unilateral proclamation of 200-mile wide EEZs in the Mediterranean. Counter-moves will probably take the form of a carefully measured tit-for-tat reprisal or coercive diplomacy to demonstrate resolution and to emphasize the credibility of determination to protect each party’s maritime interests.⁵⁹ This may be coupled with an accommodative approach to leave a way out of the quarrel for all sides to avoid unwanted escalation and mitigate the danger of mutual commitment, as experienced in resolution of past crises over disputed sovereignty of continental shelves and islets between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea.

In this tense geopolitical setting, a greater role should be entrusted to regional bodies with geographical affinity to the conflict zones to manage the crisis.⁶⁰ NATO was a source of hope until recent tensions between the U.S. and Turkey regarding regional issues faded the influence of the alliance and, besides, undermined respectability of the UNSC. NATO should develop more unity, resilience, and deterrence in the face of its increasingly fragile southern flank, reconcile different schools of thought of its member states and address emerging threats more effectively.⁶¹ On the other hand, to counter-balance the Euro-Atlantic block’s influence over the region and avoid the “groupthink”, Turkey should continue to engage all stakeholders and invent options for mutual gain, especially with Russia, Iran, and Iraq. These guarantor powers in the Syrian war have taken positive concreate steps towards stabilization, de-confliction, and creation of safe zones. Such pre-emptive security measures that sustain conflict transformation, regional security, and constructive cooperation should extend to cover the wider region.

For hydrocarbon exploitation, a consensus on de-emphasizing territorial sovereign rights for the benefit of a greater common cause could help to unlock the dispute. Parties may offer a menu of pie-expanding gestures in order to build bridges such as Track II diplomacy talks and cross visits through Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Technology-sharing, private sector partnership, and creation of a provisional Joint Development Area (JDA) could partly satisfy the EEZ claims of both parties, apportionment of benefits being the most delicate aspect.⁶² The World Bank could be a possible lender of finance for an underwater pipeline project from Cyprus to Turkey via Israel. This arrangement has been demonstrated to be helpful in other cases where all windfall revenues were deposited in an offshore escrow account, a certain portion of which was required to be used for joint development purposes.⁶³ The existence of a maritime boundary dispute does not necessarily prohibit the exploitation of energy resources that are located in the contested area.⁶⁴

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