From chanakya to modi evolution of india’s foreign policy

participant in the BRICS organization. The layered alliances and the
mistrust of all allies reflects an embrace of the mandala theory.
Like Rashed, Liebig too argues that non-alignment is simply Kautilyan
realism adapted to the modern world. Liebig asserts that not only did Nehru
read the 
Arthashastra
but also mentioned it in numerous writings and even
wrote an article under the pseudonym ‘Chanakya.’
17
Liebig sees Kautilyan
influence in everyday Indian life. To him the naming of the diplomatic
enclave as Chanakyapuri and of a street in Delhi called Kautilya Marg
(Kautilya Road) represent this influence. Liebig sees great significance in
television serials about Chanakya or about the Mauryas. He observes that
Chanakya’s portrait hangs prominently on the walls in departments of
political science at various Indian universities.
Some of these arguments, however, seem facile. Television serials on,
say, Henry VIII and his wives in Britain reflect entertainment value and
interest in the life of the monarch, not his philosophical influence on current
British foreign policy. Moreover, political science departments in European
universities might display portraits of Machiavelli, Thucydides or
Morgenthau even when their professors and students embrace views critical
of these realists. Not only does New Delhi have a Kautilya Marg, it also
names its streets after other historic figures and foreign dignitaries. Even
the Mughal emperor, Aurangzeb, who is seldom admired by Hindus or
tolerant Indian Muslims, till recently, had a street named after him. The
main road in almost every Indian city is named after Mahatma Gandhi but

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that does not lead to Liebig to conclude that Gandhi’s views on non-
violence form the core of India’s foreign policy.
Modern India’s founding generation was divided between realists and
idealists and both helped shape India’s world view in varying degrees.
Kautilyan realism inspired Nehru’s colleagues, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, both of whom are viewed as classic
Indian realists in their views as well as policies. In his book 
Makers of
India’s Foreign Policy
(2004), former Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit
asserts that for Patel and Bose the main aim of foreign policy was to
safeguard India’s national interests ‘by whatever means available and
whatever equations necessary’ and, if necessary or warranted, they did not
rule out use of force.
18
On the other hand, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi to
most people) represented the moralistic legacy in politics, represented in
Ashokan and Buddhist values. Gandhi referred to his movement for
independence from British rule as Satyagraha (literally ‘truth force’) and for
many he ‘defined and continues to define the normative and moral terms of
reference of India’s foreign policy’.
19
Gandhi’s contribution to the moral
dimension of India’s foreign policy lay in the championing of principles
that were later adopted by independent India’s officials. Gandhi espoused
the ideals of tolerance, insisted that good ends can only be attained by good
means and emphasized peace and non-violence in all circumstances. His
views provided the framework for the doctrines of 
Panchasheel
(five
principles of peaceful coexistence) and non-alignment that became the
bedrock of Nehruvian foreign policy. 
20
Nalini Kant Jha, an Indian international relations scholar, argues that the
Buddhist doctrine of ‘the middle path’ influenced India’s foreign and
economic policies in the modern era. In economic policy India chose a
mixed economy instead of either full-fledged socialism or free-market
capitalism. Jha asserts that India preferred to stay in the middle during the

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cold war because it shared values with both blocs. With the Western
countries India shared ideals like democracy, individual liberty, human
rights, rule of law, secularism and pluralism as well as the need for a
scientific temper. At the same time, India appreciated the anti-colonialism
and Asia-centrism of the Soviet Union even as it was ‘repelled by the
Soviet submerging of the individual in the name of the State’. 
21
India’s preference for the middle path had emerged even before
independence from Britain. In his first official pronouncement on foreign
policy on 7 September 1946, Nehru, as interim prime minister and external
affairs minister, stated: ‘We propose as far as possible to keep away from
the power politics of groups aligned against one another. … We send our
greetings to the people of the US, to whom destiny has given a major role in
international affairs … To that other great nation of the world, the Soviet
Union, which also carries a vast responsibility for shaping world events, we
send greetings.’
22
This, in effect, was a succinct statement of non-alignment
even before that term had been coined.
In a recent book, Priya Chacko furthers the argument that moral
influences lay at the core of India’s post-Independence foreign policy.
According to Chacko, for Nehru foreign policy was a tool to help construct
India’s identity as a post-colonial state. However, there was an underlying
contradiction at the core of this policy: modernity was perceived both as
responsible for India’s past colonization as well as the cure for India’s
backwardness. Chacko maintains that this ambivalence is the reason for the
strong moral dimension of Indian foreign policy. The only way out of this
ambivalence was by asserting India’s ‘civilizational exceptionalism – the
idea that India is equipped with unique moral qualities’. India as a ‘moral
power’ would change the existing global norms and ways of conducting
international relations and move the world from violence towards peace.
23
The idea that India could lead the world, albeit in a different way than
traditional global or regional hegemons, has periodically surfaced in Indian

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political thought only to be questioned or criticized by Indian leaders. At
the 2006