PART I
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
Rational choice explanations for conflict and the lack of cooperation in international politics frequently point to
factors such as
incomplete information, and a lack of credibility.
Chances of cooperation and peaceful
resolution can be increased through costly signaling, long shadows of the future, and tit-for-tat bargaining
strategies.
According to rationalist analyses,
institutions may facilitate cooperation by increasing information, reducing
transaction costs, and reducing collective action problems.
Rational choice analyses tend to conceptualize norms as adhering to a "logic of consequence" rather than the
constructivist “logic of appropriateness”.
The “logic of consequences” entails that actors are assumed to
choose the most efficient means to reach their goals based on a cost-benefit analysis. This stands in contrast to
the logic of appropriateness whereby actors follow “internalized prescriptions of what is socially defined as
normal, true, right, or good, without, or in spite of calculation of consequences and expected utility”.
According to Jeffrey Checkel, there are two common types of explanations for the efficacy of norms:
o
Rationalism: actors comply with norms due to coercion, cost-benefit calculations, and material incentives
o
Constructivism: actors comply with norms due to social learning and socialization
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