4
Results
Table 1 presents the results for the simple gravity equation. Regional dummy
variables are included all together and then separately and jointly for the case of
ASEAN and APEC. The signs of the coefficients on the variables in the first half of
Table 1 are as expected and are generally highly significant. The coefficient on GDP
for example, is generally between 0.7 and 0.8 suggesting that trade increases as
economic capacity grows.
22
We also find the traditional negative sign on distance
and positive sign on our common border variable. The complementarity index also
records a positive and significant coefficient and seems to support the hypothesis that
trade is greater when two countries endowments (reflected in the structure of the
commodities traded) are complementary. Only per capita GDP differences records a
decline in significance (and even changes sign) over time. One possible explanation
21
Ideally we would have liked to include all possible RTA’s to avoid bias in the results.
By including the main groupings in terms of trade volumes however, the bias is likely to be
minimal. Se e Endoh (1999) for further discussion.
22
Frankel (1993) notes that a coefficient of less than one reflects the phenomenon that the
smaller the country the greater the trade/production ratio.
17
is the Linder hypothesis that emphasises income similarity as the driver of trade
instead of income differences.
The intra-regional dummies for regressions (1) and (2) are positive for ASEAN and
APEC implying that countries located within these regions do trade more with each
other over and above the levels predicted by the basic explanatory variables. In
regression (3) we observe that the EU and NAFTA dummies are also generally
positive and significant.
23
The inclusion of all four regional groupings in regression
(4) reveals however, that the NAFTA coefficient was negative and significant for the
first two periods (prior to the setting up of NAFTA) before becoming positive. Our
results, showing a positive and significant ASEAN effect, differ from a number of
previous studies such as Sharma and Chua (2000) and Soloaga and Winters (2001)
who both observe a negative relationship albeit for a different estimating equation and
country coverage but are similar to Frankel et al. (1995) and Endoh (2000) who
recorded positive and significant coefficients for APEC. Note that the ASEAN
coefficient falls between 1993-1997 after the AFTA process started and it was not
until after the Asian economic crisis that the trend reverted to an upward one. One
possible suggestion is that it took a regional economic shock of the form of the
currency crisis to trigger the latent forces of ASEAN regional integration that could
not be stimulated by mere political rhetoric.
Observe that when we include both ASEAN and APEC dummies the ASEAN
coefficient is significantly lower. This is consistent with Frankel (1993) who
23
Previous studies have included a variety of European regional dummies that have
generally been found to be insignificant. The results tend to differ depending on the
country coverage and method of estimation. When we included EU12 or EU15 dummies
the variable was also insignificant.
18
observed that in 1980 and 1990 the ASEAN dummy was only significant when no
other Asian bloc dummies were included and concluded that ASEAN did not seem to
be an appropriate bloc around which to draw a border.
This leads us to enquire whether the AFTA process has been trade creating or trade
diverting and whether ASEAN is a discriminating bloc or exhibits “open
regionalism”.
24
The lack of a consistent upward trend in the ASEAN dummy over
our period of analysis deserves closer examination. In Table 2 we include our two
additional dummies to represent the case where only the import or export country is a
member of the RTA. As previously discussed, AFTA is trade creating if the
ASEAN coefficient increases and that of the others do not change after the AFTA
process started and the AFTA is trade diverting in two cases; (i) ASEAN member’s
welfare is reduced if the ASEAN coefficient increases and that of imASEAN
decreases, (ii) non- member’s welfare is reduced if the ASEAN coefficient increases
and that of exASEAN decreases.
In Table 2 the three regional dummies are generally significant and justifies their
inclusion. A comparison of the RTA coefficients with Table 1 demonstrates that the
largest differences are for the ASEAN dummy (the EU and NAFTA coefficients
remain relatively stable).
Concentrating on ASEAN, observe that ASEAN, imASEAN and exASEAN all record
positive and significant coefficients with the former the largest in all periods. The
fact that all three dummies are positive and significant means that members and
24
For a discussion of the concept of “open regionalism” see Bergsten (1997) and
Yamazowa (1992).
19
non- members have traded with each other more than the hypothetical trade level.
Examining coefficient changes over time we observe again that ASEAN falls between
1993 and 1997 and then rises while imASEAN increases until 1997 (despite the
ongoing AFTA process) and then decreases while exASEAN demonstrates a consistent
rise (with a significant jump after the crisis). Considered jointly, the imASEAN and
exASEAN coefficients reveal the extent of the extra-ASEAN trade bias over the
period. The generally increasing trend means that there has been a negative trade
diversion effect. More specifically, the upward trend in exASEAN indicates that
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