DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Investigating the effects on the marine environment
MARYNA POVITKINA
SVERKER C. JAGERS
MARTIN SJÖSTEDT
AKSEL SUNDSTRÖM
WORKING PAPER SERIES 2013:2
QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG
February 2013
ISSN 1653-8919
© 2013 by Maryna Povitkina, Sverker C. Jagers, Martin Sjöstedt and Aksel Sundström. All rights reserved.
2
Democracy and economic development. Investigating the effects on the marine environment.
Maryna Povitkina
Sverker C. Jagers
Martin Sjöstedt
Aksel Sundström
QoG Working Paper Series
2013:2
February 2013
ISSN 1653-8919
ABSTRACT
Is democracy favorable or adverse for the environment? While some studies find democracy to
increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable development, others propose that democracy rather
has negative effects on the environment. This paper contributes explicitly to this debate, but also
adds insights from research arguing that the effects of democracy are conditioned by surrounding
institutions. More specifically, building on this literature, we argue that the way democracy works –
whether it is an instrument for collective action beneficial to the environment or an instrument for
patronage and clientelism – depends on levels of economic development. The overall objective of
the article is to test this proposition empirically. Using the Marine Trophic Index as a proxy for
overfishing, we investigate the impact of democracy on the health of the marine environment in a
global sample from 1972 to 2006. The analysis provides interesting insights regarding the condi-
tional role of economic development. We report negative effects of democracy in settings of low
gross national income, while this pattern is reversed when economic development has reached a
certain threshold. Finally, we discuss how democracy affects the prospects for sustainable devel-
opment and based on our conclusions offer suggestions for future studies in this field of research.
Maryna Povitkina
The Quality of Government Institute
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Marina.povitkina@gu.se
Sverker C. Jagers
Political Science Unit
Luleå University of Technology
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Sverker.jagers@pol.gu.se
Martin Sjöstedt
The Quality of Government Institute
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Martin.sjöstedt@pol.gu.se
Aksel Sundström
The Quality of Government Institute
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Aksel.sundström@pol.gu.se
3
Introduction
In a growing body of literature, scholars debate the effect of democracy on environmental degrada-
tion. While some studies find democracy to increase the likelihood of, e.g., sustainable develop-
ment, others claim that democracy has negative effects, alternatively only appears to have positive
effects on the management of some specific resources (Scruggs, 2009; Li and Reuveny, 2006; Mid-
larsky, 1998; Arvin and Lew, 2011).
This article, however, argues that the debate over democracy’s virtuous or vicious effects
may be partly misinformed. More specifically, we assert that there are substantial reasons to believe
that the effect of democracy on the environment is fundamentally conditioned by level of econom-
ic development. This proposition originates from the literature on modernization and democratic
consolidation, where it is typically argued that in societies lacking economic development, the gov-
ernance logic is quite different from that in more affluent countries (Leftwich, 1993; Collier, 2009;
Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Keefer, 2007; Zakaria, 2003; Lipset, 1959). Accordingly, if not pre-
ceded or accompanied by institutions that generate economic development (such as rule of law and
the protection of property rights), the instrumental mechanisms of democracy cannot be expected
to automatically strengthen collective action, civil society, political culture, or other factors held to
be indispensable to foster accountability, political participation, and, in the end, sustainable devel-
opment. Without such complementary institutions there are serious concerns that democracy in
many cases may be no more than an empty shell, in fact potentially opening up yet other arenas for
exploitation, patronage, and clientelism (Collier, 2009, 2007; Keefer 2007; Walker 1999). This ar-
gument also highlights the importance of sequencing. While democracy in the well-developed parts
of the world was commonly preceded by rule of law and constitutional liberalism, many of today’s
developing states are forced to complete the construction of the modern state project while at the
same time competing in general elections (Zakaria, 2003; Collier, 2009; Diamond, 2008; Persson
and Sjöstedt, 2010). Moreover, in low-income settings, democracy is often imposed from outside,
implying that there might be severe legitimacy problems and little correspondence between formal
and informal institutions, which in turn might imply that democracy does not have as positive ef-
fects in low-income settings as in more affluent societies (see Bratton, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky,
2006; Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004).
Taken together, there are substantial reasons to believe that the way democracy works –
i.e., whether it is an instrument for collective action beneficial to the environment or an instrument
4
for patronage, clientelism, and redistribution to the ruler’s closest allies – depends on level of eco-
nomic development.
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether level of democracy affects the marine environment and, if so,
whether this impact differs depending on national levels of economic development.
In order to test the relationship between democracy and the marine environment empiri-
cally, we use the Marine Trophic Index as a proxy for overfishing and available data measuring
democracy as the independent variable. The empirical analysis is in many ways more ambitious than
previous tests in the literature, with a sample of 148 countries and the health of their marine envi-
ronment over the years 1972-2006. Hence, we have a larger sample size across both more countries
and years than normally used in this literature. Our findings provide interesting insights regarding
the conditional role of development, thus developing the claim recently made by Scruggs (2009),
arguing that previous studies have not adequately taken into account the role of economic devel-
opment. We report negative effects of democracy in settings of low gross national income and
positive effects when economic development has reached a certain threshold. Moreover, we con-
tribute by adding knowledge of when democracy can be expected to generate positive environmental
outcomes.
The remaining article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explore the theoretical ori-
gins of our argument and provide an overview of the debate over the relationship between democ-
racy and the environment. Section 3 specifies the empirical model and spells out the methodologi-
cal considerations. The statistical analysis then follows in Section 4 and, finally, Section 5 provides
conclusions and implications.
Theoretical framework
The effect of democracy on the environment is heavily debated. While some scholars argue that
democracy increases the likelihood of successful collective action and sustainable development,
others hold that democratic systems tend to fall prey to the public’s unwillingness to adopt envi-
ronmentally sound policies. According to the latter perspective, democracy either needs to be ex-
changed for a more authoritarian political system with the capacity to reorient society away from
unsustainable development paths (Ophuls, 1977; Heilbronner, 1974; also see Paehlke, 1995) or
should be guided by more deliberative and participatory ideals (Dryzek, 1987, 1992; Folke et al.,
2003; Nadasty, 2007). The scholars holding that democracy is beneficial for the environment in-
stead tend to argue that democracy is an efficient coordination mechanism and that democratic
5
values and procedures, e.g., freedom of speech and freedom of information, increase the likelihood
of sustainable development (Achterberg, 1993; Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1995; Barrett and Grad-
dy, 2000; Jagers 2007).
The arguments proposed in this debate are as contrasting as compelling. Li and Reuveny
(2006) list five causal mechanisms for why democracy might improve environmental performance: 1)
political rights and freedom will often lead to public awareness and environmental action, 2) sys-
tems with electoral accountability will be more responsive to the influence on policy from envi-
ronmentalists, 3) due to the dominating principles of rule of law, aversion to war and respect for
life, democracies tend to produce less environmental destruction than autocracies, 4) the elite in an
autocratic society will be less pro-environmental than the public mass, and 5) relatively short time
horizons of autocratic leaders will tend to promote overexploitation. Moreover, though, the same
authors also list four mechanisms for why democracy may worsen environmental degradation: 1) the
(unlimited) freedom in a democracy will lead to unchecked behavior by overharvesting individuals,
2) autocracies can impose strict regulations on population growth, 3) democracies are often market
economies where corporate interests have more influence than environmentalists, and 4) in democ-
racies leaders will enact election-winning policies and thus tend to promote policies supporting the
employment of voters rather than the environment.
This debate has spurred numerous empirical investigations studying the relationship be-
tween the level of democracy and the quality of the environment. While some studies indicate a
positive correlation between democracy and environmental quality (Neumayer, 2002; Li and Reu-
veny, 2006; Wurster, 2011; Jagers and Sjöstedt 2011), others find negative correlations or no rela-
tionship at all (Midlarsky, 1998). For example, Li and Reuveny’s (2006) find that higher levels of
democracy reduce CO
2
and NO
x
emissions and lead to less water pollution, less land degradation,
and lower deforestation rates. In a comprehensive overview of this growing literature, Scruggs
(2009) finds 58 published studies that directly deal with the impact of democracy on measures of
environmental performance. When performing an empirical test of these propositions, the author,
interestingly, points to the role of economic development: “[Our results] raise doubts about the
environmental efficacy of democracy. The limited evidence that we do find to support a positive
democratic effect is accounted for more by economic change (specifically the collapse of the East-
ern bloc), not political liberalization. Economic wealth and the speed of economic growth (or de-
cline) have the most consistent impact on environmental performance” (Scruggs, 2009:2).
When it comes to the relationship between economic development and the environment,
empirical findings are equally confused and conflicting. The well-known Environmental Kuznets
6
Curve, named after S. Kuznets’ proposed inverted U-shaped pattern between income inequality and
economic growth (Kuznets, 1955, 1965, 1966), has been the subject of substantial debate and scru-
tiny. Yet, research is still far from reaching consensus over its validity. An inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between economic development and the environment was for example found in cross-
country studies of air pollution, such as CO
2
, NO
x
, and SO
2
, as well as of energy use, clean water,
urban sanitation, nitrates, suspended particulate matter, waste, and deforestation (Shafik and Ban-
dyopadhyay, 1992; Cole Rayner and Bates, 1997; Galeotti and Lanza, 1999; Panayotou Sachs and
Peterson, 1999; Bhattarai and Hammig, 2000; Kallbekken, 2000; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2002). At
the same time, a number of studies have demonstrated an N-shaped pattern for the relationship
between income and CO
2
, NO
x
, SO
2
, and smoke (Grossman and Krueger, 1993, 1995; Selden and
Song, 1994). Moreover, scholars have discovered a linear logarithmic pattern, implying that an in-
crease in emissions is strongly correlated with income, but that further improvements in environ-
mental quality does not necessarily depend on further economic growth (Bruyn, Bergh and Op-
schoor, 1998). Other scholars instead address the issue of reverse causality, assuming that it is envi-
ronmental degradation that causes income to decrease (Stern et al., 1996), since economic activities
depend on environmental resources and that their unsustainable use “reduce[s] the capacity of gen-
erating material production in the future” (Arrow et al., 1995).
Taken together, the effects of democracy on the environment, as well as the effects of economic devel-
opment on the environment, or even the effects of democracy on economic development and vice versa, are obviously
subjects of considerable controversy and disagreement. In an attempt to contribute to these research fields, we set out to
perform a more fine-grained empirical analysis, including levels of economic development and democracy in a joint
analysis. Taking a departure in the discussion on causal mechanisms by Li and Reuveny (2006), we
argue that there are reasons to believe that these mechanisms function differently depending on
surrounding institutions and especially levels of economic development. The five mechanisms of
positive impact of democracy might be more functioning when economic development is high.
Conversely, the four negative effects of democracy might very well be better functioning when
economic development is low. In order to develop this argument, we are theoretically informed by the
well-established – yet in this context partly overlooked – literature on modernization and democratic consolidation.
This literature holds that low-income settings per definition lack institutions stimulating economic
development, and that in the absence of such institutions democracy might be a less effective way
to govern. In short, if not preceded by a constitution, rule of law or secure property rights generat-
ing economic development, democracy does not necessarily function as an instrument of collective
action, but rather risks being used as an instrument of patronage and clientelism (Leftwich, 1993;
7
Zakaria, 2003; Keefer, 2007; Walker, 1999, Diamond 2008, 2007). Moreover, in low-income set-
tings, democracy is often imposed from abroad, lacking legitimacy and correspondence between
informal and formal institutions, which induces leaders to act for their short-term survival rather
than engaging in the provisioning of long-term public goods such as protection of the environment.
This in turn makes the legitimacy of the system decrease even more. In addition, without welfare
improvements, citizens tend to distrust the democratic system and risk ending up engaging in pat-
ronage and clientelism themselves (Collier, 2009; Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Keefer 2007). In
sum, this literature holds that the workings of democracy differ significantly depending on levels of economic in-
come, and if democracy does not deliver, its positive effects as an instrument for collective action will
hence be absent. We thus have reason to believe that the causal mechanisms discussed by Li and
Reuveny (2006) are in fact conditioned by democratic consolidation, and more specifically, the
institutional arrangements prevailing at different levels of economic development.
The case of marine resources
A focus on marine resources when investigating the effect of democracy during different stages of
economic development is appropriate in many respects. For example, being a fungible natural re-
source, it accentuates many of the governance challenges associated with common pool resources
(Ostrom, 1990). Fisheries are in fact often used as textbook illustrations of common pool resource
problems and the importance of collective action mechanisms such as democracy or other govern-
ance arrangements. Yet, empirical studies on the effect of democracy on the marine environment
are scant, and demonstrate conflicting results (Jagers and Sjöstedt, 2011). Similarly, the effect of
economic development on marine resources is far from settled empirically. In a study on the rela-
tionship between income and marine resource exploitation in Turkey over time, Kamanlioglu
(2011) finds an inverted N-shaped relationship between the deterioration of marine environmental
quality and economic growth. However, the author points out that such a pattern is shaped by
country-specific factors. Sabah (2011), on the other hand, finds an N-shaped relationship between
economic development and coral reef bleaching. Clausen and York (2008a, 2008b) report, however,
that the rise of per capita income leads to the decline of the marine trophic level, without further
improvement of the indicator at higher income levels.
In the next section, we further specify how we proceed in testing the impact of democra-
cy and economic development on the marine environment.
8
The investigation
The health of marine ecosystems is determined by various factors in a complex and interlinked
system (UN-DESA 2008). More specifically, in order to operationalize this concept, we use a well-
established indicator, the Marine Trophic Index (MTI). This measurement captures to what extent
countries “fish down the food chain” within their exclusive economic zones. Pressure on fisheries
from harvesting tends to affect fish at the top of the food chain as humans often target larger pred-
atory fishes (Pauly 2005; Pauly and Watson, 2005; Pauly and Palomares, 2005). The MTI is calculat-
ed by assigning a number to each species according to its location in the food chain, where carni-
vores receive higher and herbivores receive lower numbers. The measure averages the trophic levels
from the overall catch, based on a dataset of commercial fish landing compiled by the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Lower values of the index mean that
catches consist of smaller fish. A negative trend in this measurement is thus a proxy measure for
overfishing and that “fisheries are not being sustainably managed” (Sea Around Us, 2011). Over-
fishing affects the marine ecosystem health as overexploited fish stocks lead to the loss of biodiver-
sity and ecosystems stability. The index has been criticized for not adequately reflecting the true
situation in marine ecosystems as it is built on the catches of commercial species, excluding the
impact of unregistered fishing (Branch et al., 2010; Caddy et al., 1998). However, there exist few
alternative measures of overfishing. The MTI is widely used by researchers and remains the most
well-established measure for marine trophic stability across countries and time (Clausen and York,
2008a; Emerson et al., 2010; Pauly and Watson; 2005). The MTI is also considered to be “a meas-
ure for overall ecosystem health and stability” and was included as such in the 2010 Environmental
Performance Index (Emerson et al., 2010).
In order to measure the main independent variable of the study, i.e., the degree of democ-
racy in a country at a given point in time, we use one of the most established regime type indicators
– the Freedom House/Polity index. This index reflects two important composites of regimes –
political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2010). Political rights measure whether elections
in the country are free and fair, whether political rights are equal to all members of the society and
the competitiveness of political participation. The civil liberties value includes an assessment of
freedom of the press, of academic freedom, of freedom of public and private discussions, of free-
dom for NGOs’ operations, of rule of law, of an independent judiciary and other relevant aspects
(Lonardo, 2011). The average value of political rights and civil liberties in turn serves as an approx-
9
imation of the level of democracy in a country. In the present study we will use an imputed version
of this index, designed especially for time-series analysis, covering a broader sample using imputed
values for the cases where data was initially missing. The imputed version of the index is available
for the period 1972-2009 and varies from 0 to 10, where 10 corresponds to the most democratic
regimes (Teorell et al., 2011).
Following the reasoning of, for example, Li and Reuveny (2006), we include a measure of a
country’s openness to and engagement in world trade as a control variable. A country’s openness to
world trade is held to relate to environmental outcomes in several ways. For example, it has been
argued that trade and globalization encourages establishment of higher environmental standards
according to the demands from markets and also promotes technologies and innovations of a high-
er standard (Esty and Gentry, 1997; Vogel, 1995; Porter and Linde, 1995; Braithwaite and Drahos,
2000). However, others have argued in line with the hypotheses of the “race to the bottom,” hold-
ing that countries fearing to lose competitiveness will dismantle environmental standards (Sheldon,
2006). In addition, Daly (1993) and Meadows et al. (1972) conclude that trade has negative effects
on the environment, since it raises production levels and GDP, which in turn negatively affects the
environment. Indeed, empirical investigations show both positive (Frankel and Rose, 2005; Antwei-
ler et al., 2001) and negative (e.g., Managi, 2004) correlations between openness to trade and envi-
ronmental quality and they also find different effects of trade openness on different pollutants be-
tween country groups (Managi et al., 2008). The indicator of openness to trade is taken from Penn
World Trade (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009), and measures total trade as a percentage of GDP
in constant 2005 prices. The data covers the years 1950-2007. The variable required log-
transformation to correct for its skewed distribution.
In addition, following Delgado et al. (2003), who discuss the impact from growing human
populations on the pressure put on fisheries, we include a control variable for the size of a coun-
try’s population. The data on population is taken from the World Bank database for the years 1971-
2010, and is measured in numbers of inhabitants. The variable is logarithmically transformed due to
its skewed distribution.
Of all the gears used in harvesting marine fish resources, bottom trawls and dredges are
recognized as considered to be the most destructive ones (Watson et al., 2004, 2006). They cause
chronic disturbances in coastal waters and lead to changes in trophic structures (Jennings et al.,
2001). We therefore include a control for trawling intensity in our analysis. We use the Coastal Shelf
Fishing Pressure Index, developed by the Environment Performance Index (2012). The index
10
measures intensity of gears operating in the coastal waters. The unit of measurement is metric tons
of catch from trawling and dredging gears in a country for a given time divided by the area of its
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in square km. The data is available for 1950-2006. Due to its
skewed distribution, the variable is logarithmically transformed.
Following our theoretical argument of the impact of democracy on environmental perfor-
mance at different stages of economic development, we want to control for national income levels
at a given time. The measure we use is real GDP per capita in constant 2005 prices, chain series
(Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009). Chain series remove effects from price changes and include
only the values of production volumes, which is very useful for the time-series analysis (Teorell et
al., 2011). The indicator is available from 1950 to 2007 and is log-transformed due to its skewed
distribution.
In order to model different stages of economic development for countries, we divide na-
tions at different points in time into groups according to their gross national income (GNI) per
capita, following the World Bank methodology (World Bank, 2011). Low-income countries have a
GNI below $1,005 per capita, lower middle-income countries have a GNI between $1,006 and
$3,975 per capita, upper middle-income countries have a GNI between $3,976 and $12,275 per
capita, and high-income countries have a GNI above $12,276 per capita (World Bank, 2011). GNI
per capita is calculated with the World Bank Atlas Method, which allows for smoothing exchange
rate fluctuations when comparing countries. This measure does not account for “welfare and suc-
cess in development,” but is recognized as “the best single indicator of economic capacity and pro-
gress" (World Bank, 2011).
Specification and methodology
In order to model the impact of our independent variables on changes in MTI across countries and
years, we use time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis. Since we are interested in changes of
trophic levels and not the absolute levels as such, the dependent variable is here measured as the
first difference of MTI instead of annual values.
We make sure to deal with problems inherent to TSCS data. The Hausman test confirms
the existence of unobserved unit heterogeneity, indicating that country-specific effects are correlat-
ed with our independent variables. This implies that a random effects model will be inconsistent
when applied to our data and confirms the necessity to use a fixed effects model for correct estima-
11
tion (Greene, 1997). A Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root in a time series sample shows that our data
is stationary. Potential autocorrelation of the data is initially dealt with by using the first difference
of MTI. The Wooldridge-Drukker test confirms that autocorrelation disappears after performing
differencing of the dependent variable.
In order to make sure that independent variables are measured before the change in the
dependent variable takes place, we use a one-year lag of all the independent variables in our models.
We use one-year lags in combination with the first differencing of the dependent variable, as used
by Bohrnstedt (1969, cited in Liker, 1985, p.87).
As mentioned, the raw data of openness to trade, population, GDP per capita and trawling
intensity required logarithmic transformation before inclusion into the model due to skewed distri-
bution. Based on the discussion above and after the necessary adjustments to our model, our final
specification can be presented in the following equation:
;
where i corresponds to each country in the sample and t refers to the year.
and corresponds to the change in the marine trophic index for a
given country in a given year,
is an intercept term for i,
(j=1,2,3,4,5) denotes the coefficients
to be estimated,
is a Freedom House/Polity index for democracy for a given country in a giv-
en year, O
it
is openness to trade (country, year), P
it
stands for population (country, year), G
it
refers to
real GDP per capita for a certain country in a given year,
is trawling intensity in the EEZ of
each country per year, and
is an error term for each unit of analysis.
The equation will be estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) with a fixed effect and
robust standard errors per country and per year (Wooldridge, 2002). An alternative way to estimate
the equation would be to use OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors as suggested by
Beck and Katz (1995). However, taking into account the necessity to include fixed-effects estima-
tion into our model and control for significant but unobservable unit-specific effects, we have to
give preference to the GLS regression, since introducing fixed-effects specification into Beck and
Katz’s model in our case is problematic.
The MTI assigns values for each major marine coast or island colony of a nation. For this
reason some problems arose in our analysis, since our independent variables are measured at the
national level and are not available specifically for coastal regions or island colonies of a nation.
1
,
t
i
it
it
MTI
MTI
MTI
i
j
it
D
it
T
it
12
Hence, seven countries (the U.S., Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Russia)
have several MTI scores – one for each of their coastlines - while having only one national value of
independent variables to correspond to them. This is also the case for sixty-seven island-colonies,
where MTI values are available but there are no corresponding values of the independent variables.
We therefore chose to exclude these cases from the analysis. In doing so, considerable variance in
our dependent variable is lost, but we still consider our strategy of excluding cases a safer option
than alternative approaches. An alternative strategy would have been to average the values of MTI
for countries with several coastlines in order to obtain a single national score for the dependent
variable to correspond with other variables. Another strategy would have been to impute data for
independent variables to the regions or islands-colonies with no regional measures. However, both
of these other strategies have obvious problems. The strategy of creating average values of MTI for
coastal regions would distort the data. The strategy of imputing data for the coastal regions or col-
onies, might not correspond to reality and may thus produce misleading results.
The results presented in the next section follow the model described above. However, we
also performed a number of alternative estimations. We tested several lag structures. Using differ-
ent lags of the independent variables in time indicated that the one-year lag produced the most
significant results. Since previous studies found a U-shaped relationship between GDP and envi-
ronmental outcomes (e.g., Grossman and Kreuger, 1993, 1995) as well as between democratic de-
velopment and environment (e.g., Buitenzorgy and Ancev, 2011), we also tried a similar model but
with squared values of those variables included. However, the results were similar to those present-
ed in the tables. Granger causality testing seems to confirm that no reversed causality exists be-
tween our dependent and independent variables.
Results and analysis
In this section we empirically explore the relationship between levels of democracy and annual
changes in the marine trophic index during different stages of economic development. We first
apply our equation to the whole sample to investigate the relationship between our variables of
interest on the global scale and across time. In order to find out whether democracy exerts an influ-
ence on the changes in marine trophic levels during different stages of economic development, we
then explore this relationship in different income groups.
13
Table 1 presents the results from our multivariate model on the global sample over all
available years. The unit of analysis is country-year and the sample includes 142 marine coastal
states over the years 1972-2006. The analysis shows that democracy is significantly and negatively
correlated with changes in marine trophic levels. According to this pattern, less democratic coun-
tries tend to have less healthy marine ecosystems. However, when we proceed to divide countries
based on their income, we can note some more detailed trends, not visible in the first analysis.
TABLE 1. THE INFLUENCE OF DEMOCRACY ON CHANGES IN MARINE TROPHIC LEVELS
DV: Differenced MTI
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Democracy
-0.00220**
-0.00226**
-0.00301***
-0.00298***
-0.00269**
(0.000792)
(0.000774)
(0.000854)
(0.000845)
(0.000907)
Openness to trade
0.00218
0.000177
0.00111
-0.00334
(0.00505)
(0.00480)
(0.00590)
(0.00715)
Population
0.0196*
0.0199*
0.0210*
(0.00779)
(0.00789)
(0.00818)
GDP per capita
-0.00329
-0.00345
(0.00741)
(0.00660)
Trawling intensity
0.00314
(0.00290)
Constant
0.0122**
0.00338
-0.284*
-0.263*
-0.251*
(0.00447)
(0.0213)
(0.123)
(0.122)
(0.125)
Observations
4,255
4,133
4,100
4,100
4,015
R-squared
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.002
0.003
Number of countries
142
138
137
137
137
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Groups are divided based on GNI per capita in
2010 constant US dollars. All the independent variables are lagged 1 year. Openness to trade, population, GDP per capita and
trawling intensity are log-transformed.
14
Table 2 reports our findings related to the impact of democracy on the changes in marine
trophic levels throughout the countries’ economic development. We aim at finding different
thresholds of economic development where countries display different effects of democracy on the
changes in MTI. We keep the classification from the World Bank of low-, lower middle-, upper
middle-, and high-income countries, but also aim to show differences within these categories
(World Bank, 2011). A full list of countries and years when they are included in each of the groups
is available in Appendix 1.
TABLE 2. THE INFLUENCE OF DEMOCRACY ON CHANGES IN MARINE TROPHIC LEVELS
THROUGHOUT THE COUNT
RIES’ ECONOMIC DEVEL
OPMENT PROCESSES
DV: Differenced MTI
Low-income coun-
tries
Lower middle-income countries
Upper middle-
income countries
High income-countries
1
2
3
4
5
6
GNI/c<$1005
$1005< GNI/c
<$2000
$2000< GNI/c
<$3975
$3975
<$12275
$12275<
GNI/c
<$20000
GNI/c>
$20000
Democracy
-0.00170
-0.0121***
-0.00293
0.00679
0.00422
0.0749**
(0.00102)
(0.00360)
(0.00348)
(0.00540)
(0.0454)
(0.0212)
Openness to trade
-0.00543
0.0201
-0.0128
-0.00789
-0.0920
-0.00149
(0.0137)
(0.0356)
(0.0286)
(0.0168)
(0.0943)
(0.0425)
Population
0.0164*
0.0376
-0.000622
-0.0333
0.0858
0.0415
(0.00781)
(0.0433)
(0.0512)
(0.0526)
(0.0833)
(0.0390)
GDP per capita
-0.00717
-0.00995
0.0107
-0.0371
0.207
0.0855
(0.00897)
(0.0656)
(0.0424)
(0.0352)
(0.112)
(0.0581)
Trawling intensity
-0.00396
0.00121
0.0234
0.0112
0.0107
0.0123
(0.00491)
(0.00894)
(0.0210)
(0.0146)
(0.0274)
(0.00706)
15
Constant
-0.190
-0.502
0.0912
0.869
-3.023
-2.200
(0.167)
(0.795)
(0.989)
(0.709)
(1.914)
(1.111)
Observations
1,299
543
563
600
219
253
R-squared
0.002
0.011
0.015
0.009
0.038
0.036
Number of ccode
82
70
68
59
29
24
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Groups are divided based on GNI per capita in 2010
constant US dollars. All the independent variables are lagged 1 year. Openness to trade, population, GDP per capita and trawling inten-
sity are log-transformed.
Column 1 presents the results for the countries in the lowest income group, classified by
the World Bank as low income countries. The results in Column 1 show that the impact of democracy
on our dependent variable is not significant in countries where the gross national income is below
1,005 USD per capita. In the lower middle-income group, the picture is a bit more complex. Look-
ing at Column 2, the effect of democracy is negative and significant in the group of countries with a
GNI between 1,006 and 2,000 USD per capita are included. Yet, another cluster of countries within
the lower middle-income group, where GNI is between 2,000 and 3,975 USD per capita, display
insignificant results, as shown in Column 3.
As presented in Column 4, democracy shows no significant effect on changes in the health
of the marine environment in the upper middle-income countries. The results indicate that at these
development stages a country’s level of democracy does not seem to be a strong predictor of the
subsequent change in the health of its marine environment. However, the results are contrastingly
different when we proceed to analyze countries with higher levels of economic development.
Columns 5 and 6 report the results of our analysis for high-income countries with a GNI ex-
ceeding 12,275 USD per capita. It is evident from these results that democracy does not exert a
significant effect on the marine environment in groups where the GNI per capita is between 12,276
and 20,000 USD. However, an interesting finding is that a positive and significant effect is visible
among the countries with a GNI exceeding 20,000 USD per capita.
In sum, the empirical analysis shows negative effects of democracy in the poorer section of
the lower middle-income countries, no significant effects in the upper middle-income countries,
and positive effects in the richest of the high-income countries. In all, this lends some support to
the theoretical argument made in this article, i.e., that the effect of democracy on the marine envi-
ronment is conditioned by economic development and, more specifically, the institutions that are
16
often missing in low-income settings while they are relatively well established at higher develop-
ment stages.
The sizes of the effects of our measure of democracy on the changes in MTI are, however,
generally quite small, yet significant in certain groups of income. Thus, they should be interpreted
with care. The explained variance is often low in a first difference model, a fact that is evident in
the tables above.
Conclusions
With the point of departure in theories about democratic consolidation and sequencing, this article
argues that the debate over democracy’s virtuous or vicious effects on the environment may be
partly misinformed. More specifically, we argue that there are substantial reasons to believe that the
way democracy works – whether it is an instrument for collective action beneficial to the environ-
ment or an instrument for patronage, clientelism and redistribution to the ruler’s closest allies –
fundamentally depends on level of economic development. As such, we hypothesize that if not
preceded or accompanied by institutions that generate economic development, democracy may in
fact not be more than an empty shell, potentially even opening up yet other arenas for exploitation,
patronage and clientelism.
These theoretical propositions partly gain support in our empirical investigations. When we
analyze the effect of democracy on the changes in MTI in the entire sample of 142 countries across
34 years, we find a negative effect, indicating that democratic regimes tend to have a negative im-
pact on the marine environment. However, we contribute by advancing the analysis to study the
effect of democracy at different stages of economic development. The strongest and most straight-
forward result is that democracy has a significant negative effect on the health of marine ecosys-
tems during early stages of economic development, but as we climb the income ladder the effect
turns positive. That is, there are negative effects of democracy in settings of low gross national
income and positive effects when the economic development has reached a certain threshold. Until
a country becomes an upper middle-income country, democracy seems to have a negative effect on
the health of the marine environment, but the effect then turns positive and is significant for the
richest countries with a GNI per capita exceeding 20,000 USD.
Although these findings lend support to the theoretical claims about democracy’s different
effects, future studies ought to look closer into the specific mechanisms producing these outcomes. For
17
example, is it the institutions normally accompanying economic development – such as rule of law
or property rights protection – that make democracy have different effects during different stages
of economic development? Or, is it rather economic development per se that affects resource use
and exploitation patterns in society? That is, while we have strong theoretical reasons to believe that
democracy is more likely to work as an instrument for collective action in settings where other fun-
damental collective action problems involved in the process of state building and development
have already been solved, the exact blending, pacing and sequencing of institutional reforms neces-
sary to foster sustainable development and stewardship of natural resources remain to be explored.
18
REFERENCES
Achterberg, W. (1993) Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Environmental Crisis? Sustainability,
Liberal Neutrality and Overlapping Consensus. In: Dobson, A. and Lucardie, P., The Politics of
Nature. Explorations in green political theory. Routledge, London.
Antweiler, W., Copeland, B. R. and Taylor, M. S. (2001) Is Free Trade Good For The Environ-
ment? American Economic Review 91, 877-908.
Arrow, K., Bolin, B., Costanza, R., Dasgupta, P., Folke, C., Helling, C. S., Jansson, B. -O., Levin, S.,
Mailer, K. -G., Perrings, C. and Pimental, D. (1995) Economic growth, carrying capacity, and
the environment. Science 268, 520-521.
Arvin, M. B. and Lew, B. (2011) Does democracy affect environmental quality in developing coun-
tries? Applied Economics, 43(9), 1151-1160.
Barrett, S. and Graddy, K. (2000) Freedom, Growth and the Environment. Environ-
ment and Development Economics, 5(4), 433-456.
Beck, N. and Katz, J. N. (1995) What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data.
American Political Science Review 89, 634-647.
Bhattarai, M. and Hammig, M. (2001) Institutions and the Environmental Kuznets Curve for De-
forestation; A Cross-country Analysis for Latin America, Africa and Asia. World Development
29(6), 995-1010.
Bohrnstedt, G. W. (1969) Observations on the measurement of change. In: Borgatta, E. F. (ed.),
Sociological Methodology, 1113-1136. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P. (2000) Global Business Regulation. Cambridge University Press, UK.
Branch, T. A., Watson, R., Fulton, E. A., Jennings, S., Mc Gilliard, C. R., Pablico, G. T., Ricard, D.
and Tracey, S. R. (2010) The trophic fingerprint of marine fisheries. Nature 468, 431-435.
Bratton, M. (2007) Formal versus informal institutions in Africa. Journal of Democracy 18(3), 96-110.
Bruyn, S. M., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. and Opschoor, J. B. (1998) Economic growth and emis-
sions: reconsidering the empirical basis of environmental Kuznets curves. Ecological Economics
25, 161-175.
Caddy, J., Csirke, J., Garcia, S. M., Grainger, R. J. L. (1998) How pervasive is ‘Fishing down marine
food webs’? Science 282, 1383.
Cole, M. A., Rayner, A. J. and Bates, J. M. (1997) The Environmental Kuznets Curve: an Empirical
Analysis. Environment and Development Economics 2(4), 401-416.
Clausen, R. and York, R. (2008a). Economic Growth and Marine Biodiversity: Influence of Human
Social Structure on Decline of Marine Trophic Levels. Conservation Biology 22(2), 458-466.
Clausen, R. and York, R. (2008b) Global biodiversity decline of marine and fresh water fish: A
cross-national analysis of economic, demographic, and ecological influences. Social Science Re-
search 37, 1310-1320.
Collier, P. (2009) Wars, Guns, and Votes. HarperCollins, New York.
Collier, P. (2007) The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Daly, H. (1993) The Perils of Free Trade. Scientific American, November, 51-55.
Diamond, L. (2007) A quarter-century of promoting democracy. Journal of Democracy 18, 118-120.
Diamond, L. (2008) The Democratic Rollback. The Resurgence of the Predatory State. Foreign
Affairs, March/April.
Dryzek, J. S. (1987) Rational ecology. Environment and Political Economy. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Dryzek, J. S. (1992) Ecology and Discursive Democracy: Beyond Liberal Capitalism and the Ad-
ministrative State. CNS 3(2), 18-42.
19
Ehrhardt-Martinez, K., Crenshaw, E. and Jenkins, C. (2002) Deforestation and the Environmental
Kuznets Curve: A Cross-National Investigation of Intervening Mechanisms. Social Science Quar-
terly 83(1), 226-243.
Emerson, J. W., Esty, D. C., Levy, M. A., Kim, C. H., Mara, V., de Sherbinin, A. and Srebotnjak, T.
(2010) 2010 Environmental Performance Index. Yale, Center for Environmental Law and Pol-
icy, New Haven.
Esty, D. and Gentry, B. (1997) Foreign Investment, Globalisation, and the Environment. In: Jones,
T., Globalization and the Environment, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Paris.
Folke, C., Colding, J. and Berkes, F. (2003) Synthesis: Building resilience and adaptive capacity in
social-ecological systems. In: Berkes, F., Colding, J. and Folke, C. (eds.), Navigating Social-
Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, UK 352-383.
Frankel, J. A. and Rose, A. K. (2005) Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting Out the
Causality. Review of Economics and Statistics 87(1) 85-91.
Freedom
House
(2010)
Freedom
in
the
World
[Online].
Available
at
Dostları ilə paylaş: |