basic tenets. One, separate the person—the emotion—from
the problem; two, don’t get wrapped up in the other side’s
position (
what they’re asking for)
but instead focus on their
interests (
why they’re asking for it) so that you can find what
they really want; three, work cooperatively to generate win-
win options; and, four, establish mutually agreed-upon
standards for evaluating those possible solutions.
It was a brilliant, rational, and profound synthesis of the
most advanced game theory and legal thinking of the day.
For years after that book came out, everybody—including
the FBI and the NYPD—focused on a problem-solving
approach to bargaining interactions. It just seemed so
modern and
smart.
Halfway
across the United States, a pair of professors at the
University of Chicago was looking at everything from
economics to negotiation from a far different angle.
They were the economist Amos Tversky and the
psychologist Daniel Kahneman. Together, the two launched
the field of behavioral economics—and Kahneman won a
Nobel Prize—by showing that man is a very irrational beast.
Feeling, they discovered, is a form of thinking.
As you’ve seen, when business schools like Harvard’s
began teaching negotiation in the 1980s, the process was
presented as a straightforward economic analysis. It was a
period when the world’s top
academic economists declared
that we were all “rational actors.” And so it went in
negotiation classes: assuming the other side was acting
rationally and selfishly in trying to maximize its position, the
goal was to figure out how to respond in various scenarios
to maximize one’s own value.
This mentality baffled Kahneman, who from years in
psychology knew that, in his words, “[I]t is self-evident that
people are neither fully rational
nor completely selfish, and
that their tastes are anything but stable.”
Through decades of research with Tversky, Kahneman
proved that humans all suffer from
Cognitive Bias, that is,
unconscious—and irrational—brain processes that literally
distort the way we see the world. Kahneman and Tversky
discovered more than 150 of them.
There’s the
Framing Effect, which demonstrates that
people respond differently to the same choice depending on
how it is framed (people place greater value on moving
from 90 percent to 100 percent—high probability to
certainty—than from 45 percent to 55 percent, even though
they’re both ten percentage points).
Prospect Theory
explains why we take unwarranted
risks in the face of
uncertain losses. And the most famous is
Loss Aversion ,
which shows how people are statistically more likely to act
to avert a loss than to achieve an equal gain.
Kahneman later codified his research in the 2011
bestseller
Thinking, Fast and Slow.3 Man, he wrote, has two
systems of thought: System 1, our animal mind, is fast,
instinctive, and emotional; System 2 is slow, deliberative,
and logical. And System 1 is far more influential. In fact, it
guides and steers our rational thoughts.
System 1’s
inchoate beliefs, feelings, and impressions
are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate
choices of System 2. They’re the spring that feeds the river.
We react emotionally (System 1) to a suggestion or
question. Then that System 1 reaction informs and in effect
creates the System 2 answer.
Now think about that: under this model, if you know
how to affect your counterpart’s System 1 thinking, his
inarticulate feelings, by how
you frame and deliver your
questions and statements, then you can guide his System 2
rationality and therefore modify his responses. That’s what
happened to Andy at Harvard: by asking, “How am I
supposed to do that?” I influenced his System 1 emotional
mind into accepting that his offer wasn’t good enough; his
System 2 then rationalized the situation so that it made sense
to give me a better offer.
If you believed Kahneman, conducting negotiations
based on System 2 concepts without the tools to read,
understand, and manipulate the System 1 emotional
underpinning was like trying to
make an omelet without first
knowing how to crack an egg.
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