example, with the Muslim Uyghurs and Buddhist Tibetans and Mongols; this
double distinction increases their determination to preserve their cultural
existence under some form of autonomy.
Beijing knows that its own future power in Asia depends on close working
relations
with Muslim states and peoples, including the all-vital energy sector
that lies primarily in Muslim hands from Xinjiang to the Caspian Sea. The
chances are that the “bloody borders of Islam” is not at all an active working
assumption for the leadership of Beijing, even as it seeks to crush sparks of
Uyghur or Tibetan separatism, resistance, or violence. A tiny
jihadist minority
will probably seek to continue the struggle in Xinjiang,
but with only minor and
diminishing impact as China gradually and quietly extirpates the Uyghurs as a
distinctive autonomous society.
In most of the Muslim world, China is seen as an important and welcome
counterpoise to the unlimited exercise of American power in the Muslim world.
Only in regions closer to China, as in Central Asia, does China present a more
ambiguous picture to Muslims, who are familiar with Chinese expansionism in
the past and its ability to permanently “absorb” (drown)
other cultures through
sheer demographic weight. But even here, China and Russia each serve as
counterweights to each other, giving Muslims slightly greater breathing space.
It is clear, then, that diverse ethnicity in China is the particular problem, not
Islam. Problems with these ethnic groups would not have been greatly different
even without Islam. Chinese Han Muslims are essentially integrated and
creatively forge links between Muslim and Chinese cultures. Those Muslims
who are ethnically very distinct are fighting
an essentially ethnic war of
separation, albeit bolstered by their religious differences with China as well.