particularly if wee turn from the present to the future.
For once thing, the possibility of preserving a healthy peasant
class as a foundation for a whole nation can never be valued
highly enough. Many of our presentday sufferings are only the
consequence of the unhealthy relationship between rural and city
population A solid stock of small and middle peasants has at all
times been the best defense against social ills such as we possess
today. And, moreover this is the only solution which enables a
nation to earn its daily bread within the inner circuit of its
economy. Industry and commerce recede from their unhealthy
leading position and adjust themselves to the general framework
of a national economy of balanced supply and demand. Both thus
cease to be the basis of the nation's sustenance and become a
mere instrument to that end. Since they now have only a balance '
Aberdeen domestic production and demand in all fields, they
make the Subsistence of the people as a whole more or less
independent foreign countries, and thus help to secure the
freedom of the stite and the independence of the nation,
particularly in difficult Periods.
It must be said that such a territorial policy cannot be fulfilled in
the Cameroons, but today almost exclusively in Europe. We
must, therefore, coolly and objectively adopt the standpoint that
it can certainly not be the intention of Heaven to give one people
fifty times as much land and soil in this world as another. In this
case we must not let political boundaries obscure for us the
boundaries of eternal justice. If this earth really has room for all
to live in, let us be given the soil we need for our livelihood.
True, they will no t willingly do this. But then the law of
selfpreservaion goes into effect; and what is refused to amicable
methods, it is up to the fist to take. If our forefathers had let their
decisions depend on the same pacifistic nonsense as our
contemporaries, we should possess only a third of our present
territory; but in that case there would scarcely be any German
people for us to worry about in Europe today. Noit is to our
natural determination to fight for our own existence that we owe
the two Ostmarks of the Reich and hence that inner strength
arising from the greatness of our state and national territory
which alone has enabled us to exist up to the present.
And for another reason this would have been the correct solution
Today many European states are like pyramids stood on their
heads. Their European area is absurdly small in comparison to
their weight of colonies, foreign trade, etc. We may say: summit
in Europe, base in the whole world; contrasting with the
American Union which possesses its base in its own continent
and touches the rest of the earth only with its summit. And from
this comes the immense inner strength of this state and the
weakness of most European colonial powers.
Nor is England any proof to the contrary, since in consideration
of the British Empire we too easily forget the AngloSaxon world
as such. The position of England, if only because of her linguistic
and cultural bond with the American Union, can be compared to
no other state in Europe.
For Germany, consequently, the only possibility for carrying out
a healthy territorial policy lay in the acquisition of new land in
Europe itself. Colonies cannot serve this purpose unless they
seem in large part suited for settlement by Europeans. But in the
nineteenth century such colonial territories were no longer
obtainable by peaceful means. Consequently, such a colonial
policy could only have been carried out by means of a hard
struggle which, however, would have been carried on to much
better purpose, not for territories outside of Europe, but for land
on the home continent itself.
Such a decision, it is true, demands undivided devotion. It is not
permissible to approach with half measures or even with
hesitation a task whose execution seems possible only by the
harnessing of the very last possible ounce of energy. This means
that the entire political leadership of the Reich should have
devoted itself to this exclusive aim; never should any step have
been taken, guided by other considerations than the recognition
of this task and its requirements. It was indispensable to see
dearly that this aim could be achieved only by struggle, and
consequently to face the contest of arms with calm and
composure.
All alliances, therefore, should have been viewed exclusively
from this standpoint and judged according to their possible
utilization. If land was desired in Europe, it could be obtained by
and large only at the expense of Russia, and this meant that the
new Reich must again set itself on the march along the road of
the Teutonic Knights of old, to obtain by the German sword sod
for the German plow and daily bread for the nation.
For such a policy there was but one ally in Europe: England.
With England alone was it possible, our rear protected, to begin
the new Germanic march. Our right to do this would have been
no less than the right of our forefathers. None of our pacifists
refuses to eat the bread of the East, although the first plowshare
in its day bore the name of 'sword' !
Consequently, no sacrifice should have been too great for
winning England's willingness. We should have renounced
colonies and sea power, and spared English industry our
competition.
Only an absolutely clear orientation could lead to such a goal:
renunciation of world trade and colonies; renunciation of a
German war fleet; concentration of all the state's instruments of
power on the land army.
The result, to be sure, would have been a momentary limitation
but a great and mighty future.
There was a time when England would have listened to reason on
this point, since she was well aware that Germany as a result of
her increased population had to seek some way out and either
find it with England in Europe or without England in the world.
And it can primarily be attributed to this realization if at the turn
of the century London itself attempted to approach Germany. For
the first time a thing became evident which in the last years we
have had occasion to observe in a truly terrifying fashion. People
were unpleasantly affected by the thought of having to pull
Fngland's chestnuts out of the fire; as though there ever could be
an alliance on any other basis than a mutual business deal. And
with England such a deal could very well have been made.
British diplomacy was still clever enough to realize that no
service can be expected without a return.
Just suppose that an astute German foreign policy had taken over
the role of Japan in 1904, and we can scarcely measure the
consequences this would have had for Germany.
There would never have been any 'World War.'
The bloodshed in the year 1904 would have saved ten times as
much in the years 1914 to 1918.
And what a position Germany would occupy in the world today!
In that light, to be sure, the alliance with Austria was an
absurdity.
For this mummy of a state allied itself with Germany, not in
order to fight a war to its end, but for the preservation of an
eternal peace which could astutely be used for the slow but
certain extermination of Germanism in the monarchy.
This alliance was an impossibility for another reason: because we
could not expect a state to take the offensive in championing
national German interests as long as this state did not possess the
power and determination to put an end to the process of de
Germanization on its own immediate borders. If Germany did not
possess enough national awareness and ruthless determination to
snatch power over the destinies of ten million national comrades
from the hands of the impossible Habsburg state, then truly we
had no right to expect that she would ever lend her hand to such
farseeing and bold plans. The attitude of the old Reich on the
Austrian question was the touchstone of its conduct in the
struggle for the destiny of the whole nation.
In any case we were not justified in looking on, as year after year
Germanism was increasingly repressed, since the value of
Aushia's fitness for alliance was determined exclusively by the
preservation of the German element.
This road, however, was not taken at all.
These people feared nothing so much as struggle, yet they were
finally forced into it at the most unfavorable hour.
They wanted to run away from destiny, and it caught up with
them. They dreamed of preserving world peace, and landed in the
World War.
And this was the most significant reason why this third way of
molding the German future was not even considered. They knew
that the acquisition of new soil was possible only in the East,
they saw the struggle that would be necessary and yet wanted
peace at any price; for the watchword of German foreign policy
had long ceased to be: preservation of the German nation by all
methods; but rather: preservation of world peace by all means.
With what success, everyone knows.
I shall return to this point in particular.
Thus there remained the fourth possibility Industry and world
trade, sea power and colonies.
Such a development, to be sure, was at first easier and also more
quickly attainable. The settlement of land is a slow process, often
lasting centuries; in fact, its inner strength is to be sought
precisely in the fact that it is not a sudden blaze, but a gradual yet
solid and continuous growth, contrasting with an industrial
development which can be blown up in the course of a few years,
but in that case is more like a soapbubble than solid strength. A
fieet, to be sure, can be built more quickly than farms can be
established in stubborn struggle and settled with peasants, but it
is also more rapidly destroyed than the latter.
If, nevertheless, Germany took this road, she should at least have
clearly recognized that this development would some day
likewise end in struggle. Only children could have thought that
they could get their bananas in the 'peaceful contest of nations,'
by friendly and moral conduct and constant emphasis on their
peaceful intentions, as they so highsoundingly and unctuously
babbled; in other words, without ever having to take up arms.
No: if we chose this road, England would some day inevitably
become our enemy. It was more than senselessbut quite in
keeping with our own innocenceto wax indignant over the fact
that England should one day take the liberty to oppose our
peaceful activity with the brutality of a violent egoist.
It is true that we, I am sorry to say, would never have done such
a thing.
If a European territorial policy was only possible against Russia
in alliance with England, conversely, a policy of colonies and
world trade was conceivable only against England and with
Russia. But then we had dauntlessly to draw the consequences
and, above all, abandon Austria in all haste.
Viewed from all angles, this alliance with Austria was real
madness by the turn of the century.
But we did not think of concluding an alliance with Russia
against England, any more than with England against Russia, for
in both cases the end would have been war, and to prevent this
we decided in favor of a policy of commerce and industry. In the
'peaceful economic ' conquest of the world we possessed a recipe
which was expected to break the neck of the former policy of
violence once and for all.l Occasionally, perhaps, we were not
quite sure of ourselves, particularly when from time to time
incomprehensible threats came over from England; therefore, we
decided to build a fleet, though not to attack and destroy
England, but for the 'defense' of our old friend 'world peace' and
'peaceful ' conquest of the world. Consequently, it was kept on a
somewhat more modest scale in all respects, not only in number
but also in the tonnage of the individual ships as well as in
armament, so as in the final analysis to let our 'peaceful'
intentions shine through after all.
The talk about the 'peaceful economic' conquest of the world was
possibly the greatest nonsense which has ever been exalted to be
a guiding principle of state policy. What made this nonsense
even worse was that its proponents did not hesitate to call upon
England as a crown witness for the possibility of such an
achievement. The crimes of our academic doctrine and
conception of history in this connection can scarcely be made
good and are only a striking proof of how many people there are
who 'learn' history without understanding or even comprehending
it. England, in particular, should have been recognized as the
striking refutation of this theory; for no people has ever with
greater brutality better prepared its economic conquests with the
sword, and later ruthlessly defended theme than the English
nation. Is it not positively the distinguishing feature of British
statesmanship to draw economic acquisitions from political
strength, and at once to recast every gain in economic strength
into political power? And what an error to believe that England is
personally too much of a coward to stake her own blood for her
economic policy! The fact that the English people possessed no
'people's army' in no way proved the contrary; for what matters is
not the momentary military form of the fighting forces, but rather
the will and determination to risk those which do exist. England
has always possessed whatever armament she happened to need.
She always fought with the weapons which success demanded.
She fought with mercenaries as long as mercenaries sufficed; but
she reached down into the precious blood of the whole nation
when only such a sacrifice could bring victory; but the
determination for victory, the tenacity and ruthless pursuit of this
struggle, remained unchanged.
In Germany, however, the school, the press, and comic
magazines cultivated a conception of the Englishman's character,
and almost more so of his empire, which inevitably led to one of
the most insidious delusions; for gradually everyone was infected
by this nonsense, and the consequence was an underestimation
for which we would have to pay most bitterly. This falsification
went so deep that people became convinced that in the
Englishman they faced a business man as shrewd as personally
he was unbelievably cowardly. The fact that a world empire the
size of the British could not be put together by mere subterfuge
and swindling was unfortunately something that never even
occurred to our exalted professors of academic science. The few
who raised a voice of warning were ignored or killed by silence. I
remember well my comrades' looks of astonishment when we
faced the Tommies in person in Flanders. After the very first
days of battle the conviction dawned on each and every one of
them that these Scotsmen did not exactly jibe with the pictures
they had seen fit to give us in the comic magazines and press
dispatches.
It was then that I began my first reflections about the importance
of the form of propaganda.
This falsification, however, did have one good side for those who
spread it: by this example, even though it was incorrect, they
were able to demonstrate the correctness of the economic
conquest of the world. If the Englishman had succeeded, we too
were bound to succeed, and our definitely greater honesty, the
absence in us of that specifically English 'perfidy,' was regarded
as a very special plus. For it was hoped that this would enable us
to win the affection, particularly of the smaller nations, and the
confidence of the large ones the more easily.
It did not occur to us that our honesty was a profound horror to
the others, if for no other reason because we ourselves believed
all these things seriously while the rest of the world regarded
such behavior as the expression of a special slyness and
disingenuousness, until, to their great, infinite amazement, the
revolution gave them a deeper insight into the boundless
stupidity of our honest convictions.
However, the absurdity of this 'economic conquest' at once made
the absurdity of the Triple Alliance clear and comprehensible.
For with what other state could we ally ourselves? In alliance
with Austria, to be sure, we could not undertake any military
conquest, even in Europe alone. Precisely therein consisted the
inner weakness of the alliance from the very first day. A
Bismarck could permit himself this makeshift, but not by a long
shot every bungling successor, least of all at a time when certain
essential premises of Bismarck's alliance had long ceased to
exist; for Bismarck still believed that in Austria he had to do with
a German state. But with the gradual introduction of universal
suffrage, this country had sunk to the status of an unGerman
hodgepodge with a parliamentary government.
Also from the standpoint of racial policy, the alliance with
Austria was simply ruinous. It meant tolerating the growth of a
new Slavic power on the borders of the Reich, a power which
sooner or later would have to take an entirely different attitude
toward Germany than, for example, Russia. And from year to
year the alliance itself was bound to grow inwardly hollower and
weaker in proportion as the sole supporters of this idea in the
monarchy lost influence and were shoved out of the most
decisive positions.
By the turn of the century the alliance with Austria had entered
the very same stage as Austria's pact with Italy.
Here again there were only two possibilities: either we were in a
pact with the Habsburg monarchy or we had to lodge protest
against the repression of Germanism. But once a power embarks
on this kind of undertaking, it usually ends in open struggle.
Even psychologically the value of the Triple Alliance was small,
since the stability of an alliance increases in proportion as the
individual contracting parties can hope to achieve definite and
tangible expansive aims. And, conversely, it will be the weaker
the more it limits itself to the preservation of an existing
condition. Here, as everywhere else, strength lies not in defense
but in attack.
Even then this was recognized in various quarters, unfortunately
not by the socalled 'authorities.' Particularly Ludendorff, then a
colonel and officer in the great general staff, pointed to these
weaknesses in a memorial written in 1912. Of course, none of the
'statesmen' attached any value or significance to the matter; for
clear common sense is expected to manifest itself expediently
only in common mortals, but may on principle remain absent
where 'diplomats' are concenned.
For Germany it was sheer good fortune that in 1914 the war
broke out indirectly through Austria, so that the Habsburgs were
forced to take part; for if it had happened the other way around
Germany would have been alone. Never would the Habsburg
state have been able, let alone willing, to take part in a confiict
which would have arisen through Germany. What we later so
condemned in Italy would then have happened even earlier with
Austria: they would have remained 'neutral' in order at least to
save the state from a revolution at the very start. Austrian
Slavdom would rather have shattered the monarchy even in 1914
than permit aid to Germany.
How great were the dangers and difficulties entailed by the
alliance with the Danubian monarchy, only very few realized a'
that time.
In the first place, Austria possessed too many enemies who were
planning to grab what they could from the rotten state to prevent
a certain hatred from arising in the course of time against
Germany, in whom they saw the cause of preventing the
generally hoped and longedfor collapse of the monarchy. They
came to the conviction that Vienna could finally be reached only
by a detour through Berlin.
In the second place, Germany thus lost her best and most hopeful
possibilities of alliance. They were replaced by an evermounting
tension with Russia and even Italy. For in Rome the general
mood was just as proGerman as it was antiAustrian, slumbering
in the heart of the very last Italian and often brightly flanng up.
Now, since we had thrown ourselves into a policy of commerce
and industry, there was no longer the slightest ground for war
against Russia either. Only the enemies of both nations could still
have an active interest in it. And actually these were primarily
the Jews and the Marxists, who, with every means, incited and
agitated for war between the two states.
Thirdly and lastly, this alliance inevitably involved an infinite
peril for Germany, because a great power actually hostile to
Bismarck's Reich could at any time easily succeed in mobilizing
a whole series of states against Germany, since it was in a
position to promise each of them enrichment at the expense of
our Austrian ally.
The whole East of Europe could be stirred up against the
Danubian monarchyparticularly Russia and Italy. Never would
the world coalition which had been forming since the initiating
efforts of King Edward have come into existence if Austria as
Germany's ally had not represented too tempting a legacy. This
alone made it possible to bring states with otherwise so
heterogeneous desires and aims into a single offensive front.
Each one could hope that in case of a general action against
Germany it, too, would achieve enrichment at Austria's expense.
The danger was enormously increased by the fact that Turkey
seemed to be a silent partner in this unfortunate alliance.
International Jewish world finance needed these lures to enable it
to carry out its longdesired plan for destroying the Germany
which thus far did not submit to its widespread superst3te control
of finance and economics. Only in this way could they forge a
coalition made strong and courageous by the sheer numbers of
the gigantic armies now on the march and prepared to attack the
horny Siegfried at last.
The alliance with the Habsburg monarchy, which even in Austria
had filled me with dissatisfaction, now became the source of long
inner trials which in the time to come reinforced me even more in
the opinion I had already conceived.
Even then, among those few people whom I frequented I made
no secret of my conviction that our catastrophic alliance with a
state on the brink of ruin would also lead to a fatal collapse of
Germany unless we knew enough to release ourselves from it on
time. This conviction of mine was firm as a rock, and I did not
falter ill it for one moment when at last the storm of the World
War seemed to have excluded all reasonable thought and a frenzy
of enthusiasm had seized even those quarters for which there
should have been only the coldest consideration of reality. And
while I myself was at the front, I put forwards whenever these
problems were discussed, my opinion that the alliance had to be
broken off, the quicker the better for the German nation, and that
the sacrifice of the Habsburg monarchy would be no sacrifice at
all to make if Germany thereby could achieve a restriction of her
adversaries; for it was not for the preservation of a debauched
dynasty that the millions had donned the steel helmet, but for the
salvation of the German nation.
On a few occasions before the War it seemed as though, in one
camp at least, a gentle doubt was arising as to the correctness of
the alliance policy that had been chosen. German conservative
circles began from time to time to warn against excessive
confidence, but, like everything else that was sensible, this was
thrown to the winds. They were convinced that they were on the
path to a world ' conquest,' whose success would be tremendous
and which would entail practically no sacrifices.
There was nothing for those not in authority to do but to watch in
silence why and how the ' authorities' marched straight to
destruction, drawing the dear people behind them like the Pied
Piper of Hamelin.
The deeper cause that made it possible to represent the absurdity
of an ' economic conquest ' as a practical political method, and
the preservation of 'world peace' as a political goal for a whole
people, and even to make these things intelligible, lay in the
general sickening of our whole political thinking.
With the victorious march of German technology and industry,
the rising successes of German commerce, the realization was
increasingly lost that all this was only possible on the basis of a
strong state. On the contrary, many circles went so far as to put
forward the conviction that the state owed its very existence to
these phenomena, that the state itself Drimarilv represented an
economic institution, that it could be governed according to
economic requirements, and that its very existence depended on
economics, a state of affairs which was regarded and glorified as
by far the healthiest and most natural.
But the state has nothing at all to do with any definite economic
conception or development.
It is not a collection of economic contracting parties in a definite
delimited living space for the fulfillment of economic tasks, but
the organization of a community of physically and
psychologically similar living beings for the better facilitation of
the maintenance of their species and the achievement of the aim
which has been allotted to this species by Providence. This and
nothing else is the aim and meaning of a state. Economics is only
one of the many instruments required for the achievement of this
aim. It is never the cause or the aim of a state unless this state is
based on a false, because unnatural, foundation to begin with.
Only in this way can it be explained that the state as such does
not necessarily presuppose territorial limitation. This will be
necessary only among the peoples who want to secure the
maintenance of their national comrades by their own resources;
in other words, are prepared to fight the struggle for existence by
their own labor. Peoples who can sneak their way into the rest of
mankind like drones, to make other men work for them under all
sorts of pretexts, can form states even without any definitely
delimited living space of their own. This applies first and
foremost to a people under whose parasitism the whole of honest
humanity is suffering, today more than ever: the Jews.
The Jewish state was never spatially limited in itself, but
universally unlimited as to space, though restricted in the sense
of embracing but one race. Consequently, this people has always
formed a state within states. It is one of the most ingenious tricks
that was ever devised, to make this state sail under the fiag of
'religion,' thus assuring it of the tolerance which the Aryan is
always ready to accord a religious creed. For actually the Mosaic
religion is nothing other than a doctrine for the preservation of
the Jewish race. It therefore embraces almost all sociological,
political, and economic fields of knowledge which can have any
bearing on this function.
The urge to preserve the species is the first cause for the
formation of human communities; thus the state is a national
organism and not an economic organization. A difference which
is just as large as it is incomprehensible, particularly to our so
called ' statesmen ' of today. That is why they think they can
build up the state through economics while in reality it results
and always will result solely from the action of those qualities
which lie in line with the will to preserve the species and race.
And these are always heroic virtues and never the egoism of
shopkeepers, since the preservation of the existence of a species
presupposes a spirit of sacrifice in the individual. The sense of
the poet's words, 'If you will not stake your life, you will win no
life,' is that the sacrifice of personal existence is necessary to
secure the preservation of the species. Thus, the most sensible
prerequisite for the formation and preservation of a state is the
presence of a certain feeling of cohesion based on similarity of
nature and species, and a willingness to stake everything on it
with all possible means, something which in peoples with soil of
their own will create heroic virtues, but in parasites will create
lying hypocrisy and malignant cruelty, or else these qualities
must already be present as the necessary and demonstrable basis
for their existence as a state so different in form. The formation
of a state, originally at least, will occur through the exercise of
these qualities, and in the subsequent struggle for self
preservation those nations will be defeated that is, will fall a
prey to subjugation and thus sooner or later die out which in the
mutual struggle possess the smallest share of heroic virtues, or
are not equal to the lies and trickery of the hostile parasite. But in
this case, too, this must almost always be attributed less to a lack
of astuteness than to a lack of determination and courage, which
only tries to conceal itself beneath a cloak of humane
convictions.
How little the stateforming and statepreserving qualities are
connected with economics is most clearly shown by the fact that
the inner strength of a state only in the rarest cases coincides with
socalled economic prosperity, but that the latter, in innumerable
cases, seems to indicate the state's approaching decline. If the
formation of human societies were primarily attributable to
economic forces or even impulses, the highest economic
development would have to mean the greatest strength of the
state and not the opposite.
Belief in the stateforming and statepreserving power of
economics seems especially incomprehensible when it obtains in
a country which in all things clearly and penetratingly shows the
historic reverse. Prussia, in particular, demonstrates with
marvelous sharpness that not material qualities but ideal virtues
alone make possible the formation of a state. Only under their
protection can economic life flourish, until with the collapse of
the pure stateforming faculties the economy collapses too; a
process which we can observe in so terrible and tragic a form
right now. The material interests of man can always thrive best as
long as they remain in the shadow of heroic virtues; but as soon
as they attempt to enter the primary sphere of existence, they
destroy the basis for their own existence.
Always when in Germany there was an upsurge of political
power, the economic conditions began to improve; but always
when economics became the sole content of our people's life,
stifling the ideal virtues, the state collapsed and in a short time
drew economic life along with it.
If, however, we consider the question, what, in reality, are the
stateforming or even statepreserving forces, we can sum them
up under one single head: the ability and will of the individual to
sacrifice himself for the totality. That these virtues have nothing
at all to do with economics can be seen from the simple
realization that man never sacrifices himself for the latter, or, in
other words: a man does not die for business, but only for ideals.
Nothing proved the Englishman's superior psychological
knowledge of the popular soul better than the motivation which
he gave to his struggle. While we fought for bread, England
fought for 'freedom'; and not even for her own, no, for that of the
small nations. In our country we laughed at this effrontery, or
were enraged at it, and thus only demonstrated how emptyheaded
and stupid the socalled statesmen of Germany had becorne even
before the War. We no longer had the slightest idea concerning
the essence of the force which can lead men to their death of their
own free will and decision.
In 1914 as long as the German people thought they were fighting
for ideals, they stood firm; but as soon as they were told to fight
for their daily bread, they preferred to give up the game.
And our brilliant 'statesmen' were astonished at this change in
attitude. It never became clear to them that from the moment
when a man begins to fight for an economic interest, he avoids
death as much as possible, since death wo lid forever deprive him
of his reward for fighting. Anxiety for the rescue of her own
child makes a heroine of even the feeblest mother, and only the
struggle for the preservation of the species and the hearth, or the
state that protects it, has at all times driven men against the
spears of their enemies.
The following theorem may be established as an eternally valid
truth:
Never yet has a state been founded by peaceful economic means,
but always and exclusively by the instincts of preservation of the
species regardless whether these are found in the province of
heroic virtue or of cunning craftiness; the one results in Aryan
states based on work and culture, the other in Jewish colonies of
parasites. As soon as economics as such begins to choke out
these Instincts in a people or in a state, it becomes the seductive
cause of subjugation and oppression.
The belief of prewar days that the world could be peacefully
opened up to, let alone conquered for, the German people by a
commercial and colonial policy was a classic sign of the loss of
real stateforming and statepreserving virtues and of all the
insight, will power, and active determination which follow from
them; the penalty for this, inevitable as the law of nature, was the
World War with its consequences.
For those who do not look more deeply into the matter, this
attitude of the German nationfor it was really as good as
generalcould only represent an insoluble riddle: for was not
Germany above all other countries a marvelous example of an
empire which had risen from foundations of pure political
power? Prussia, the germcell of the Empire, came into being
through resplendent heroism and not through financial operations
or commercial deals, and the Reich itself in turn was only the
glorious reward of aggressive political leadership and the death
defying courage of its soldiers. How could this very German
people have succumbed to such a sickening of its political
instinct? For here we face, not an isolated phenomenon, but
forces of decay which in truly terrifying number soon began to
flare up like willo'thewisps, brushing up and down the body
politic, or eating like poisonous abscesses into the nation, now
here and now there. It seemed as though a continuous stream of
poison was being driven into the outermost bloodvessels of this
once heroic body by a mysterious power, and was inducing
progressively greater paralysis of sound reason and the simple
instinct of selfpreservation .
As innumerable times I passed in review all these questions,
arising through my position on the German alliance policy and
the economic policy of the Reich in the years 1912 to 1914the
only remaining solution to the riddle became to an ever
increasing degree that power which, from an entirely different
viewpoint, I had come to know earlier in Vienna: the Marxist
doctrine and philosophy, and their organizational results.
For the second time I dug into this doctrine of destruction this
time no longer led by the impressions and effects of my daily
associations, but directed by the observation of general processes
of political life. I again immersed myself in the theoretical
literature of this new world, attempting to achieve clarity
concerning its possible effects, and then compared it with the
actual phenomena and events it brings about in political, cultural,
and economic life.
Now for the first time I turned my attention to the attempts to
master this world plague.
I studied Bismarck's Socialist legislation 1 in its intention
struggle, and success. Gradually I obtained a positively granite
foundation for my own conviction, so that since that time I have
never been forced to undertake a shift in my own inner view on
this question. Likewise the relation of Marxism to the Jews was
submitted to further thorough examination.
Though previously in Vienna, Germany above all had seemed to
me an unshakable colossus, now anxious misgivings sometimes
entered my mind. In silent solitude and in the small circles of my
acquaintance, I was filled with wrath at German foreign policy
and likewise with what seemed to me the incredibly frivolous
way in which the most important problem then existing for
Germany, Marxism, was treated. It was really beyond me how
people could rush so blindly into a danger whose effects,
pursuant to the Marxists' own intention, were bound some day to
be monstrous. Even then, among my acquaintance, just as today
on a large scale, I warned against the phrase with which all
wretched cowards comfort themselves: 'Nothing can happen to
us!' This pestilential attitude had once been the downfall of a
gigantic empire. Could anyone believe that Germany alone was
not subject to exactly the same laws as all other human
organisms?
In the years 1913 and 1914, I, for the first time in various circles
which today in part faithfully support the National Socialist
movement, expressed the conviction that the question of the
future of the German nation was the question of destroying
Marxism.
In the catastrophic German alliance policy I saw only one of the
consequences called forth by the disruptive work of this doctrine;
for the terrible part of it was that this poison almost invisibly
destroyed all the foundations of a healthy conception of economy
and state, and that often those affected by it did not themselves
realize to what an extent their activities and desires emanated
from this philosophy srhich they otherwise sharply ejected.
The internal decline of the German nation had long since begun,
yet, as so often in life, people had not achieved clarity
concerning the force that was destroying their existence.
Sometimes they tinkered around with the disease, but confused
the forms of the phenomenon with the virus that had caused it.
Since they did not know or want to know the cause, the struggle
against Malsisrs was no better than bungling quackery.
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