Rep36 Understanding Personality Disorder

1.2.4 Criminal behaviour and personality
disorder 
Although most individuals who have a
personality disorder are not involved in criminal
behaviour, offenders who have a personality
disorder may be at a higher risk of committing
serious crimes (Blackburn, 2000). A recent
Home Office study examined research on factors
associated with increased risk for causing serious
harm in different types of offenders (Powis,
2002). The results showed links between
personality disorders and offences of general
violence, domestic violence, sex offending,
stalking and arson. However, the definitions of
personality disorder used in the studies reviewed
were not always consistent with DSM-IV.
The greatest volume of research on the links
between criminal behaviour and personality
disorder has been carried out into psychopathy,
a type of serious personality dysfunction
observable across the interpersonal, affective and
behavioural domains. Psychopathy is traditionally
measured using the Psychopathy Checklist-
12
Should people with personality disorder be held criminally responsible?
Legal determination of guilt is based on the law’s view that people are autonomous agents who
can be held morally, and hence criminally responsible. The law’s concern with ‘insanity’ as an
excuse from legal blame assumes that only in serious mental disorders is the ability to make ‘free’
choices impaired. Personality disorders are not considered sufficient to impair free choice, and
few legal systems currently recognise these disorders as grounds for excusing a person from
criminal responsibility. 
In contrast to the law, psychology assumes that all behaviour is determined. In its extreme
form, determinism negates the notion that people are blameworthy, but differing philosophical
positions are identifiable (Blackburn, 1993). Hard determinism holds that human behaviour is
completely determined by factors outside the conscious person: choice is irrelevant and is at best
an illusion. Soft determinism accepts the reality of human choice, but argues that choices
themselves are determined. Recent psychological views, however, see human agency as the basis
for purposeful, intentional choices. Bandura (1986), for example, argues that although humans
are never wholly autonomous, and behaviour is always constrained by an individual's experience
and circumstances, self-regulating processes allow people to be partial authors of their situations.
Differences between the law and psychology may therefore lie less in acceptance of the human
capacity for autonomy and free choice than in the extent to which constraints on choice and
behaviour are recognised. Most psychological disorders impose constraints on people that
seriously limit their options in making choices. Personality disorder is one such constraint.
However, the insanity defence is no longer of practical significance in Britain, and a finding of
guilt is not incompatible with diversion to the mental health system. Most psychologists would
argue that personality disorders are psychological impairments that impair freedom of choice and
this should be taken into account by the courts in determining the most appropriate
disposal/sentencing.