A comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy
participate in discussions on the Balkan and Finnish peace treaties
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participate in discussions on the Balkan and Finnish peace treaties because they (the French and Chinese) were not parties to the surrender terms. Dulles told Byrnes that he opposed the Soviet demands and that he would go public with his views unless Byrnes stood firm against the Soviets. Byrnes did not yield to Soviet demands and gained the neces sary Republican support. In 1948, it was generally believed Dewey would defeat Truman for the Presidency. Dulles was overseas during much of the campaign work ing with Secretary of State Marshall at a U.N. meeting in Paris. President Harry S Truman (1945-53) set up a transatlantic communica tion system so Dulles could be in touch with Dewey. Many foreign ministers talked with Dulles at the meeting, expecting him to be the next Secretary of State. Truman's surprising victory over Dewey, however, left Dulles still on the margins of power. When Robert Wagner, Sr. resigned as U.S. Senator from New York in 1949, Governor Dewey appointed Dulles to replace Wagner until a new election could be held. Dulles resigned from Sullivan & Cromwell and was sworn in as a member of the United States Senate. Breaking the Senate tradition of silence for newcomers, Dulles challenged Senator Robert Taft by advocating the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion (NATO). Dulles said that security was not achieved just because the United Nations existed to keep peace and that it was necessary to secure peace through a series of organizations that provided for col lective self-defense. The NATO treaty was approved by the Senate, but Dulles lost his bid for election in November 1949. 29 Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican leader in the Senate, gained Dulles a position in the State Department in March 1950. In this job, he masterminded the treaty of peace with Japan, a task that lay tmtouched for five years. In drafting the treaty, Dulles used his experience at Versailles in 1919. He did not want to be vindictive or to force Japan into a position similar to the one Germany found it self in in the 1920's and 1930's. He wanted Japan to prosper and to be an ally of the U.S. Japan was required to pay reparations and it had to provide free services, technical assistance and manufacturing facilities for those it injured in the war. But security was also provided Japan by a U.S. pledge to protect Japan. Japan, however, was allowed to· decide which China it would recognize, thus avoiding a dis pute between Great Britain, which recognized the People's Republic of China, and the United States, which recognized Nationalist China. Whenever Dulles made a breakthrough in the treaty process, he delivered a major speech thus informing the world of his progress and waiting to hear its reaction. Dulles also wrote his second book, War or Peace, in 1950. It was a tract telling of the probability but not the inevitability of 30 war. He offered hope for peace, provided Americans followed enlightened policies. Dulles believed the U.S. also needed to better understand the Soviet Union which he was convinced was aimed at the destruction of non-Connnunist governments. He reiterated his distaste for status quo thinking and called for greater unity within Europe in order to fend off the Communist menace. By working closely with the Soviets in negotiations over the U.N. and at the Council of Foreign Ministers, Dulles perceived them as being dishonest and concerned only with spread ing their influence throughout the world. Dulles, the champion of world peace, saw the Soviet Connnunists as a threat to peace. The "small, fanatical Soviet Communist Party" with Stalin as its leader, uses fraud, terrorism and violence to extend their control throughout the world. (Dulles, 1950, p. 5) Dulles had no quarrel with the Russian people, only their "despotic" leaders who forcibly spread Communism to other nations. (Dulles, 1950, p. 6) On May 5, 1952, Dulles spoke on the subject of Indochina to the French National Political Science Institute in Paris. The actual pur pose of his trip was to talk with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Com mander of NATO forces. Dewey had previously thrown his support behind Eisenhower and now it was Dulles' turn. Dulles found Eisenhower's views coincided with his own. The two agreed on the need for opposi tion to Communism, on the principle of collective defense, and on the need for promoting unity through the European Defense Community. Dulles returned home committed to Eisenhower as his choice for the 31 Presidency in the 1952 campaign. Dulles wrote the foreign policy plank at the 1952 Republican Convention. It was a hard indictment against Communism and an accusa tion that Truman "lost" Nationalist China to the Communists and that the Korean Conflict could have been averted with foresight. Dulles later said he could not accept all of these statements as true, but that he was merely stating the Republican case against the Democrats. When Eisenhower was elected President in November, he offered Dulles the position of Secretary of State in his administration. Both men opposed the isolationist sentiments in the traditional wing of the GOP. They agreed on a strategy of deterrence, free trade, and access to raw materials (Guhin, 1972, p. 165) as well as other issues. Both men respected the other's views on virtually all foreign policy matters. Dulles had hoped for the position of Secretary of State in 1944, and had expected it in 1948. In 1952, however, he questioned whether it was what he wanted. He was indifferent toward administration and wanted to devote himself solely to foreign policy planning. He accepted the position because it would allow him to pursue the goal of world peace at a critical time. Psychological considerations Applying psychological theory to this extensive background should be able to explain Dulles' behavior as Secretary of State. James David Barber's personality analysis of presidential performance can be helpful in this explanation and has been adopted below. Character is developed mainly in childhood and is the way a person 32 orients himself toward life. It is the person's stance as he confronts experience. Dulles had a self-confidence that allowed him to succeed in new endeavors, such as sailing, scholastics, and diplomacy. Dulles was raised in a wealthy home where he received a great deal of parental and grandparental affection and guidance. Thus, young Dulles did not suffer from either economic or psychological deprivation. This, says Barber, is one of the most important determinants of character develop ment. Lack of either deprivation means a freedom from various financial and emotional problems, which may otherwise occur when deprivation is experienced. Lack of deprivation, as is common among middle and upper class families, is associated with an Active-Postive character, as in the cases of Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. An Active Positive person is achievement-oriented and has high self esteem. He uses his styles flexibly, adaptively. "He sees himself as developing over time toward relatively well-defined personal goals--growing toward his image of himself as he might yet be. There is an emphasis on rational mastery, on using the brain to move the feet. This may get him into trouble; he may fail to take account of the irrational in politics. Not everybody he deals with sees things his way and he may find it hard to understand why." (Barber, 1977, p. 12) Early in his lif"e, Dulles adopted a rigid code of conduct in keep ing with his Christian u�bringing. He achieved positions of influence, power and wealth relatively early in his life. He called for rational solutions to world problems, rejecting the emotional as not a basis for sound, equitable answers. Versailles was his model of irration ality leading to disaster. Dulles could be flexible when he wanted to 33 be; he could also be rigid. His support of "no appeasement" is an example of the latter; his successes at negotiating prove the former- e.g., the Japanese peace treaty. His desire for peaceful change also implies his flexibility. Dulles worked hard in all his endeavors, especially politics: he was Active. He enjoyed politics, ever since he was a young boy listening to his grandfather's stories of world travel and diplomacy, and he got much satisfaction once he developed his own political career: he was Positive. Dulles' world view focused on the inevitability of change in the world. He saw that if the status quo was maintained by forceful methods then change would also come about violently. He stressed the need for peaceful, deliberate change to avoid violent change--i.e., war. World View, in Barber's terms, is developed in adolescence, or between 13 and 19 years of age. Dulles went to The Hague Peace Con ference when he was 19 and witnessed the clashes of national interests embodied in the delegates. Dulles, later in life, developed a concept calling for a dilution of the sovereignty system to avoid violent clashes of interest and to promote peaceful, open change. Style refers to the person's habitual way of performing his poli tical roles: rhetoric, homework, or personal relations. Virtually everyone exhibits elements of all three, but one is usually dominant in a person and that is his main Style. Character and World View come together in early adulthood when a person adopts a Style. This period stands out as "the time of emergence, the time the young man found himself." (Barber, 1977, p. 10) This is his first independent 34 political success, when the man moves away from detailed guidance of his family. For Dulles, this would be Versailles in 1919. Although Dulles was not successful in changing the dangerous outcome of the ne gotiations, he was successful in proving himself as an intelligent, conscientious diplomat which earned him fame as an expert on inter national finance and reparations. Dulles had "arrived". This Active-Positive with a realistic yet hopeful view of the world, who used personal relations and diplomacy to gain support for his views had, in 1953, attained a position where all his characteristics would determine the decisions he would come to make as Secretary of State, or so says Barber. With his type of character, Dulles' perfor mance as Secretary should be one of flexible, goal-oriented, positive programs. Dulles would not let failure destroy his career or himself, as happened with the Active-Negative Woodrow Wilson who was so totally absorbed in the League of Nations project that when it was defeated, Wilson too was destroyed politically. Dulles, as Active-Positive, would not do this. He would accept defeat as the reality of politics. Whether Barber's theory, as here applied, holds up to reality will be analyzed in a later chapter dealing with the actual performance of Dulles as Secretary of State as compared with Barber's psychology theory. Another personality theorist is Erik Erikson. Erikson, as opposed to Barber, is a developmental psychologist. That is, he does not say that only early-life experiences shape and determine behavior for the rest of a person's life, but that new experiences continue to affect behavior all through life. Erikson has developed eight stages which he says everyone goes through. Successful adjustment to one stage helps in, but does not guarantee, the normal adjustment to sub sequent stages. Abnormality or illness occurs when (a) there is fail ure to resolve a psychological crisis appropriate to a given stage; and (b) regression occurs--i.e., the use of behavior which is appropriate to earlier stages. (Lowe, 1972, p. xxii) It can only be assumed that Dulles had a normal upbringing because the signs which Erikson says are signs of normality cannot be checked--e.g., the first stage (Trust) is seen by ease in feeding the baby, the length of his naps and whether he lets his mother out of sight without crying long. Assuming normal ity where it is unable to be checked is not taking unwarranted liberty. Disproving this assumption would be possible by viewing regression tendencies in later life. The first two stages of Dulles' life are here assumed to have been completed normally. These are the Trust stage from 0-2 years old and the Autonomy stage from 2-4 years old. From 5-7, Dulles did show Initiative in his relationships. He was an energetic and adventure some youth who enjoyed new experiences and learning new things. The initial school age years run roughly from 6-12 in Erikson's category where Industry proves normality. "The child's ability to adapt to the school environment depends on how well family life prepared him for school." (Lowe, 1972, p. 130) Dulles was a quick learner before he even started school, a trait which continued with him through life. The Adolescent years of 13-19 are the Identity years. Physical and social changes cause a disruption in the adolescent and his ability to cope with these changes and to "find himself" demonstrates a normal adjustment so his Identity is firmly rooted. Again, this was the 35 36 period where Dulles attended The Hague Conference. He saw the neces- sity for international conferences and agreements to avoid war. He developed an Identity that was to thereafter seek world peace as the number one priority in his life. In young adulthood, between 20 and 30 years of age, Intimacy is the goal. This requires finding someone you love, of the opposite sex, and surrendering part of your identity in order to live with that loved partner. Dulles found Janet Avery when he was 23, married her, and brought her into his life and his career as she traveled with him on career-related trips. In adulthood, 30-65 years old, a person seeks interest in guiding the next generation. Dulles raised a family and enjoyed spending time playing games with his children. Apparently, he did not have a great deal of time to spend with them as he traveled often and spent much of his free time with Janet. But his children, when they grew up, said the time he spent with them was sufficient. Perhaps Dulles did not succeed in this Generativity stage w�th a per fect 100%. If not, he would likely regress to this stage later in life. Old Age, 65 and older, is the last stage and it is the stage in which Dulles acted as Secretary of State. This will be discussed in a later chapter. But, the relative successes of earlier stages should give an indication of how Dulles would behave as Secretary. Assuming the last stage is successful, as were previous ones, it would be ex pected that Dulles would have a feeling that his life had not been wasted and that it "makes sense". He should have Ego Integrity where he does not regret the things he has done in his life. A normal Old Aged person will also have a good-humored serenity and an eager involvement in ordinary things. This would mean, in effect, that Dulles would not work so hard in his career and would relax with his family and enjoy playing with his grandchildren. If this were so, Dulles would have to neglect many of his career-related duties. This will be analyzed in Chapter Four dealing with his actual performance as Secretary of State. 37 CHAPTER III Henry Alfred Kissinger Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born in Furth, Germany, on May 27, 1923. This year is best remembered in Germany as the year in which Hitler made his premature attempt to seize control of the German government with his "beer-hall putsch" in Munich. Germany also suf fered from severe unemployment and high inflation in the early 1920's. Heinz' father, Louis, was a teacher-advisor at a high school for privileged girls. His position brought him sufficient income and the family did not suffer, even in those inflationary years. Louis' father, David, was also a school teacher. Like Louis, David was an Orthodox Jew and attended the synagogue frequently. Heinz loved his grandfather and eventually named his own first born son, David, after him. Heinz' grandfather did not live near the Louis Kissinger family in Germany and thus he did not have much influence over his grandson. Louis was a strict father, keeping close watch on Heinz and always checking his school homework. Louis has also been described as "ser- ious, cultured, refined, a person of courtly manners ... shy ... a man of utmost sincerity, genuine piety and kindness, friendly ... witty ... author- itarian." (Mazlish, 1976, pp. 23-24) Heinz respected his father as a youth. Although Louis did not play soccer or other sports with his children, he was a loving and concerned parent. Heinz' mother was Paula Stern Kissinger. Paula's mother died� when she was quite young. Paula was raised by a step-mother and her 38 39 father, who was a cattle dealer and prominent member of the Jewish community in Leutershausen. As a teenager, Paula moved to Furth to attend school and lived with an aunt. She married Louis when she was 20 and he was 35. She was the driving force in the family. A natur- al leader, it was Paula who arranged for the family's deparature from Germany. Heinz' hometown, Furth, emerged as a village as a result of Four teenth Century anti-semitism in Nuremberg which banned Jews from liv ing within the city limits. By the Twentieth Century, Furth was known for its religious harmony. Oppression and anti-semitism returned to Germany and came to Furth in the 1920's. Heinz and his younger brother Walter began to mature when the Nazis were gaining influence. But Heinz' childhood was relatively normal. Heinz was an average student. He was also a normal child, preferring soccer and socializing with the girls over academic assignments. Religious practice took up much of Heinz' time. He attended synagogue each morning before school and studied the Torah on Satur days. His family observed the dietary laws and all the Jewish holidays. In preparing for his Bar Mitzvah at 13, Heinz learned to chant the Torah. He also helped his brother prepare for his Bar Mitzvah the following year. He conducted the synagogue choir and assumed a variety of leadership roles in the community. This otherwise idyllic life came to an abrupt halt when Adolph Hitler was chosen to lead the German nation. When the Nazis came to power, Heinz, Walter and their Jewish friends were constantly harassed and beaten up by the Nazi youth. This did leave marks. Even after coming to America, Heinz would cross the street if he saw a group of boys approaching on his side. The Kissingers fled Furth in 1938. Paula had an aunt in London and after visiting with her, the family went to America. Heinz was then 15, old enough to remember the tragedy which his town and his country suffered. He would later write that "it is difficult for Americans to visualize national disaster". (Kalb, 1974, p. 34) But 40 he also dismissed his childhood experiences as "not a key to anything ... the political persecutions of my childhood are not what control my life". (Kalb, 1974, p. 35) The family settled in the German-refugee section of Washington Heights in New York. Louis Kissinger found it difficult to adjust to his new country. He was 50 and did not have command of the English language. He took a job as a bookkeeper as his teaching career was ended. Paula, however, adapted quickly. She worked as a cook at private parties and then established her own professional catering business. She also learned English quickly. Heinz, soon to be Henry, was enrolled in George Washington High School in 1938. His school record shows that he had a foreign langu- age handicap. Henry did not lose his German accent and he became self-conscious about it. In the strange new world of America, Henry was shy and a loner. He devoted his time to his studies and he earned good grades. He did not date much, if at all. He had to work in a brush factory during the day to supplement the family income. He finished high school at night. After graduating from high school, Henry enrolled in the College of the City of New York. He wanted to be an accountant. His college career was cut short, however, when he was drafted into the U.S. Army in 1943. With this, Henry became an American citizen and he was sent to South Carolina for basic training. But he was soon returned to college. His IQ (Intelligence Quotient) and aptitude tests qualified him for specialized training at army expense. His record as a student in engineering at Lafayette College, in Pennsylvania, was outstanding. But he did not finish his training as this special army program was terminated. The American public voiced opposition to the fact that some soldiers spent their time in a classroom while others were on the battlefield. 41 Back on the rifle range, Henry met Private Fritz Kraemer. Kraemer was a Protestant German who voltmtarily left Germany because he could not tolerate Nazism. Kraemer held a doctorate of law from the Goethe University in Frankfurt and a doctorate in political science from the University of Rome. He turned down an officer's commission but he commanded substantial personal authority for a man of his low military rank. His superiors respected his insights and intelligence and they welcomed his advice. He spoke to Henry's unit about the necessity of fighting the Germans to get rid of the Nazi menace. Henry was im pressed by Kraemer. Kraemer saw that Henry had potential and a desire to learn. With Kraemer's help, Henry became the German-speaking in terpreter for the 84th Infantry Division. In January 1945, his divi sion occupied Krefeld, Germany, and Henry was made military administra tor--again on Kraemer's recommendation. In Krefeld, the mtmicipal government was not functioning when Henry arrived. He reversed this situation within three days. His success in Krefeld led to an assign ment to run the district of Bergstrasse. Henry was now a sergeant, but his powers were extensive--including the power to arrest. "When it came to Nazis," Kraemer recalls, "Kissinger showed human understanding, self-discipline. Unbelieving impartiality, really. He was guided in everyday life by an unshakable conviction that moral values are ab solute." (Kalb, 1974, pp. 40-41) 42 Henry was also on his way to becoming a marginal Jew, respectful of his parents' views but no longer a practicing adherent to his faith. He was, it seemed, giving up his Jewish heritage. Even after the war, friends in college thought of Henry only as German and learned of his being Jewish months or years later. Why he gave up his faith is a dif ficult question to answer. One reason may be that as a youth he saw his God as unable to prevent the oppression of his people. He may have seen his faith as inadequate and therefore not worth the effort to practice it. With the help of Kraemer, Henry was transferred to the European Command Intelligence School at Oberammergau in 1945. Henry was still shy and a loner at this school, but because of his performance, he was asked to teach at the school and he remained there after the war had ended and he was discharged. He was 23 years old teaching Gennan history. He was in a position of authority, as he had been in Krefeld and Bergstrasse, over men his superiors in age and rank. In the spring of 1947, Henry decided to return to America and to college. He applied to several prestigious universities and Harvard accepted him with the offer of a scholarship to start in the fall of 1947. Kissinger at Harvard As an undergraduate at Harvard, Henry kept to himself and was con stantly studying. He would discuss his experiences in the military with his roommate. In these discussions, his roommate listened to Henry's concern that the Russians were out to .dominate the world. He would also hear his anti-Communist and anti-facist views. In addition to voicing his views on various issues to his roommate, Henry took the time to date and fall in love with Anne Fleischer, also a German-Jewish refugee. He married her in February 1949. Henry's undergraduate senior honors thesis was "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant". In it he spoke of the importance of reason, rational analysis and objectivity. He wrote mockingly of those who felt everything was reduceable to formu las, that all problems were solvable, and that good will would cause injustice to be abolished and peace to reign. He believed in the in determinacy of the future. The work was 377 pages long, which led the Goverment Department at Harvard to set a maximum limit on the length of future theses. Because of the work, Henry graduated summa cum laude (with highest honors) in 1950 and was elected to Phi Betta Kappa. By now Henry had decided to become a professor. To do so it was necessary for him to secure a Ph.D. degree. He would, of course, stay at Harvard. He chose for his dissertation, not a contemporary problem as his colleagues had chosen, but to analyze. the European world order in the first decades of the Nineteenth Century. Henry wanted to learn 43 44 more about international relations and he argued for the continuing importance of history as a guide for the present and future. Quoting Thucydides, he said the present, while never replicating the past, must inevitably resemble it; so must the future. The task of the historian was to find where the similarities lay and where the differences were. Professor William Yandell Elliott was Henry's tutor for graduate studies. In 1951, Elliott named Henry to be Director of the Harvard Inter national Seminar. The Seminar brought foreign persons to Harvard to discuss relations between states. These individuals were oftentimes about to reach positions of leadership in their own countries. This gave Henry the opportunity to meet with future world leaders and to establish contact with them--contacts that would be helpful in his later governmental career. The Seminar initially attracted West Europeans, but later was attended by Indians, Pakistanis, Arabs, Israelis, Africans, Latin Americans, Chinese, Japanese, Greeks and Turks. East Europeans and Russians were invited but never attended. The Seminar folded in 1969 when Henry left Harvard. In 1952, Henry became editor of Confluence, An International Forum. It was a quarterly journal financed by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. This magazine brought together European and American thinkers to express a variety of ideas and positions. It was another vehicle for Henry to become acquainted with world political figures as well as intellectuals. Though the journal was criticized as having an anti Connnunist slant, it allowed various ideological positions--leftist, centrist, and rightist--to be aired without bias. The journal folded in 1958, but it served Henry well in exposing him further to American and European circles of power. Henry completed his dissertation in 1954, which was later pub lished under the title A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22. With this completed, he received his Ph.D. and was confident of being appointed to the Harvard faculty. But his hopes were dashed. The judgment against him had nothing to do with his academic credentials. The Harvard administration felt Kissinger wanted a post on the faculty only as a stepping stone to another career. (Ashman, 1972, p. 61) Kissinger was not tmemployed very long. Council on Foreign Relations The Council on Foreign Relations set up a discussion group on nuclear weapons and foreign policy in 1954. The Council wanted to produce a book from these discussions and sought someone outside the Council to write it. Kissinger was recommended for the position by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., McGeorge Bundy, and William Elliott. Kissinger also exhibited such self-confidence when interviewed that the Council hired him. This self-confidence was later seen by some Council members as arrogance. Kissinger seemed to dominate the dis cussions, never fearing to contradict men his superiors in back ground, power and practical knowledge. Foreign Affairs is the widely known quarterly publication of the Council on Foreign Relations. However, it is only the Council's public face. The Council is comprised of bankers, lawyers, former government officials, professors, journalists, and business executives. 45 This basically male club continues to meet two or three times a week to confer with American or foreign dignitaries. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, however, was Kissinger's book. He made sure that he could write it the way he wanted. But it would not have been possible to mobilize the various sources for that book without the Council's help. The Council had sponsored other books before, but none had met with the success of Kissinger's book. It was 46 a bestseller, an instant success that catapulted Kissinger to the center of discussion on foreign policy issues. Nelson Rockefeller was a member of the Council on Foreign Rela tions but attended few of the meetings during Kissinger's two-year tenure as Director of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. In 1956, Rockefeller set up a Special Studies Project under the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to make projections on United States � domestic and international problems. Rockefeller asked Kissinger to be Director of the Project. Kissinger accepted but because he was still working on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, the work load on him was tremendous. As Director of the Special Studies Project, he was again overseeing the work of men his superior in experience in foreign affairs. The final report of the Project was written under Kissinger's di rection. It was entitled Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports and was released in January 1958, just as Nelson Rockefeller entered the first of his successful campaigns for Governor of New York. The report reflected Kissinger's view of the need for a strategy focused on tactical use of nuclear weapons. It called for an expanded 47 national civil defense system (an idea especially favored by Rockefeller) and for a sharp increase in defense spending. When the project ended, Kissinger remained a consultant to and close associate of Nelson Rockefeller. Teaching at Harvard Although Harvard rejected Kissinger's request for a permanent position in 1954, it did offer him a position in 1957. He was appoint ed lecturer in the Goverment Department and was confident of a perma nent appointment on the faculty shortly thereafter. He was made Director of Harvard's Defense Studies Program. And he was appointed Associate Director of the Center for International Affairs with Robert Bowie as its Director. Again, Kissinger was overextended in his respon sibilities. Aside from Harvard, he was still tied to Rockefeller and to the Special Studies Project. Bowie and Kissinger did not get along. Their personalities clashed and ideas for the Center diverged greatly. Kissinger was unable to influence the shape the Center would take. He did not try to wrest control of the Center from Bowie. It was not worth the effort. This attitude fits in with how Kissinger viewed his professorial colleagues: they struggle too hard for prizes too small; they are insecure and narrow-minded. (Graubard, 1973, p. 118) Yet, Kissinger liked being a professor, mainly because of the independence the position afforded. He did not like Harvard much, but it provided more independence and opportunity to associate with practical politicians than most any other university. He was proud of his position. But he distrusted 48 the values of his colleagues. He did not belong at Harvard as others did. He was not wholeheartedly dedicated to the academic world. He enjoyed associating with political figures, hoping to influence foreign policy. Kissinger "did not figure among the most distinguished teachers of the university or even among the best in his own department". (Graubard, 1973, p. 114) He had, as mentioned, several different sets of responsibilities but never found enough time to prepare for his course lectures to his own satisfaction. Some years later, however, he gained the reputation as an outstanding teacher. By then, the Harvard undergraduate newspaper referred to his lectures as meaty, invariably interesting and at times witty. But, it continued, some students found his delivery monotonic and his 16-page reading list savagely long. Kissinger's colleagues differed in their opinions of him. Some thought very highly of him. Others found him arrogant. He was an intellectual heavyweight with a wide range of outside contacts. He used his contacts and invited men in power to speak to his classes. Secretaries, assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries of the Departments of Defense and State spoke in his Defense Policy Seminar. His students gained valuable insight into foreign policy from these practitioners of power. And he was expanding his ties with the power brokers of Washington. Foreign policy advisor When John F. Kennedy was elected President in 1960, he appointed 49 members of the professorial ranks of Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to administrative positions. Kissinger also worked for the Kennedy Administration (1961-1963). Kennedy did not invite Kissinger to the White House. It was Kissinger's friendship with McGeorge Bundy and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. that brought him to the stage of American policy making. Bundy was Kennedy's National Security Advisor and Schlesinger was Special Assistant to the Presi dent. In the summer of 1961, before and after the Berlin Wall was built, Kissinger commuted to Washington several days each week as a junior advisor to Kennedy. His immediate boss was Bundy, but he tried to cir cumvent him to propose his suggestions directly to Kennedy. Kennedy did not appreciate this attempt by Kissinger, nor did he agree with his advice on foreign policy. In February 1962, Kissinger was told his services were no longer required by the President. He returned to Harvard and to writing. His last book had been Necessity for Choice, published in January 1961. In it he repudiated limited nuclear war as a doctrine and proposed the strengthening of conventional forces. After leaving his advising post in the Kennedy Administration, Kissinger published articles in Foreign Affairs and The Reporter. He criticized the Kennedy Administration's handling of foreign policy, but not as severely as he did the Eisenhower Admini stration. In 1964, Nelson Rockefeller sought the Republican nomination for President against Barry Goldwater. Kissinger was Rockefeller's foreign policy advisor. He was still teaching at Harvard and was working on another book, The Troubled Partnership. A Rockefeller victory in November would have put Kissinger at the pinnacle of power in the form ulation of foreign policy. Kissinger did not even come close. Rocke feller did not even gain his party's·nomination and Goldwater was pitted against Lyndon Johnson (1963-69). When Johnson was elected President in 1964, Kissinger had another chance to advise a president. Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam, asked Kissinger to visit Vietnam and make a report suggesting the role the U.S. should play there. Kissinger knew virtually nothing about the culture or history of Vietnam, so he prepared for his trip with the aid of briefings by academic experts. His first visit to Vietnam was in October 1965. He conferred with Embassy and military personnel, but he knew their official version of conditions in Vietnam was self-serving. Determined to get a more realistic view of the situation, he traveled the countryside, sometimes at considerable risk to his safety. He made contact with political dissidents, espe cially Buddhists. He talked to army privates, village dwellers, news men, and village leaders. He asked questions about history, society, and culture. He wanted to know if the South Vietnamese army could be improved and, if so, how fast. Kissinger was dismayed over what he discovered in Vietnam. He found American and South Vietnamese officials "untalented and corrupt". (Landau, 1972, p. 156) He decided the U.S. was pursuing a hopeless and worthless cause. He was sure the Saigon government would collapse, but he could not predict the date. Yet, despite his feelings, he did not recommend withdrawal from Vietnam. In an article for Look so 51 magazine in 1966, he said withdrawal would be disastrous because "a demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields". (Look, August 1966, p. 28) The United States was fighting for international stability in Vietnam, but to achieve its goals, negotiations were indispensable. Kissinger visited Vietnam twice. In 1966, he was involved in secret exchanges of messages between Hanoi and Washington. These ex periences were valuable to him and he would later use them in his dealings with North Vietnam. In 1968, Kissinger returned as foreign policy advisor to Rockefeller in the latter's campaign for the Presidency. Kissinger poured all his energies into the campaign. He even became interested in the domestic side of the campaign. It was clear, however, that Nixon would win the Yüklə 3,51 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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