A comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy
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plan had crystallized with clear objectives, one which the United States could readily support." (Robertson, 1964, p. 122) Dulles knew the Soviet Union would likely veto any resolution brought before the Security Council which punished Egypt and recognized British and French rights to the Canal. As Dulles left London on September 23, Britain and France re quested U.N. action on the Suez crisis without telling Dulles of their secret moves. They asserted their rights under the 1888 Convention and urged Egypt to negotiate a settlement of the dispute based on the 18- Nations Proposal. Dulles supported the British-French assertion of their rights but said the 18-Nations Proposal was not sacrosanct. There were other solutions to the problem. If Dulles had been con sulted on bringing the issue before the U.N., he would have rejected the proposal. SCUA had not been given a chance. More important, Dulles knew a move by Britain and France to involve the U.N. was a prelude to use of force. Dulles would have argued for further diplo matic efforts outside the U.N., while secretly hoping to gain more time. But Dulles was not given the opportunity. France and Britain moved swiftly in appealing to the U.N. The Security Council members met with the Egyptian representative privately from October 9 to 12. Some progress was reported and Secre tary-General Dag Hanunarskjold outlined six principles governing a solution to the Suez dispute. These six principles paralleled Dulles' original plan. They had been formulated at the First London Conference 91 and Menzies had presented them to Nasser in September. Under U.N. auspices, the parties--Egypt, France and Britain--were to meet in Geneva on October 29 for further negotiations. But nothing further was done on the proposed Geneva Conference. On October 16, three days after the six principles were made public, Eden and Lloyd were persuaded by Mollet and Pineau to join in a mili tary plan, devised by France and Israel, to attack Egypt in late October or early November. Such collusion entailed a revision of the British-French plan of action, but the potential payoff was worth the effort. The new plan was for Israel to invade the Sinai and cross to the Suez Canal. Britain and France were to issue an ultimatum to both countries--Israel and Egypt--to stop fighting or face British French intervention. This was to make it easier for Britain and France to use military action in subduing Egypt. (Bowie, 1974, pp. 66-67) French-Israeli collusion had developed several months before the British became involved. France furnished Israel with weapons in violation of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration. By October� Britain and France had already mobilized their forces and moved them to Malta in preparation for an invasion of Egypt. On October 25 reports reached the State Department that Israel was beginning a military mobilization. By October 28 this was con firmed as a total mobilization. Eisenhower sent Prime Minister Ben Gurion two personal messages in as many days saying he hoped Israel would take no steps endangering the peace. But Israeli troops crossed the Sinai on Monday, October 29, 1956 and dropped paratroopers within 40 miles of the Suez Canal. 92 On October 30, Britain and France issued an ultimatum that both sides withdraw to within 10 miles of the Canal or they (Britain and France) would occupy the Canal to insure free passage and safety for its users. Britain and France also vetoed a U.S. resolution in the U.N. calling on Israel and Egypt to stop fighting and on member nations to refrain from the use of or threat of force. Eisenhower went on television on October 31 and explained his policy: "We do not accept the use of force as a wise and proper in strument for settlement of international disputes." (Bowie, 1974, p. 61) October 31 was also the first day of the British-French air attacks on Egypt. Eisenhower hoped the U.N. General Assembly would be able to bring a "just end to this tormenting problem ... The U.N. 's in ability to halt Soviet intervention in Hungary was already undermining its standing. An added failure to cope with the Suez attack in viola tion of the Charter could discredit it utterly." (Bowie, 1974, p. 62) Eisenhower and Dulles could not allow the U.N. to be so discredited. Neither could tbey condone aggression by allies while denouncing aggression by adversaries (the Soviets). They had to be consistent, especially since Soviet aggression in Hungary was so recently denounced by the U.S. in the U.N. The U.S. also saw long-range damage to Western influence in Africa, Asia and Latin America due to the British-French action. The U.S. thus sought to separate itself sharp ly and clearly from the French-British-Israeli action. The General Assembly met in emergency session on November 1. Late that evening, Dulles spoke to the session. I doubt that any delegate ever spoke from this forum with 93 as heavy a heart as I have brought here tonight ... The U.S. finds itself unable to agree with three nations with whom it has ties, deep friendship, admiration, and respect, and two of whom constitute our oldest, most trusted and reliable allies ... Even after re-evaluation (of our position) we still find ourselves in disagreement ... It seems to us that that dis agreement involves principles which far transcend the im mediate issue ..• If we were to agree that the existence of injustices in the world ... means that the principle of re nunciation of force is no longer respected, and that there still exists the right wherever a nation feels itself sub ject to injustice to resort to force to try to correct that injustice, then we would have, I fear, torn the Charter to shreds and the world would again be a world of anarchy ... It is still possible for the united will of this organiza tion to have an impact on the situation and perhaps to make it apparent to the world that there is here the beginning of a world of order ... We do have a power of recommendation, a power which, if it reflects the moral judgment of the world community, of world opinion, will, I think, be influential on the present situation. (Finer, 1964, pp. 394-396) In the early morning hours of November 2 (about 3 a.m.), a U.S. resolution passed the General Assembly by 64 to 5 with 6 abstentions. The resolution called for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of all forces behind the 1949 armistice line, and after the ceas�-fire,. the clearing of the Canal, which Nasser had blocked with sunken ships. Dulles returned to his Waldorf-Astoria hotel room at 5 a.m., was up by 9:30 a.m. talking to the President and was in Washington at 2:30 p.m. Dulles retired about 10:00 p.m. that evening but was awakened by severe abdominal pains at 2:00 a.m., Saturday, November 3. By 5:30 a.m. physicians were in attendance, and by 7:30 a.m. he was rushed to Walter Reed Hospital. He was operated on almost immediately. Dulles had cancer of the small intestine. Though the Secretary of 94 State was out of action for the remainder of the crisis, he could still "pull strings" in the background. An important part of the U.N. solution to the Suez Crisis which Dulles supported was Lester Pearson's (Canada's Minister for External Affairs) proposal to set up a U.N. Emergency Force. The force (UNEF) would "keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is worked out." (U .N. GAOR, First Emergency Special Session, 1956, pp. 35-36) UNEF was accepted by the General Assembly 57 to Oat 1:00 a.m. (New York time) on November 5, as the first British and French para troopers were landing at the north end of the Suez Canal. The U.N. and American actions as well as the economic and political pressures were more than Britain and France could manage. The British Pound rapidly lost value, oil reserves were depleted, and the U.S. refused aid if the Europeans ignored the U.N. demands. Thus, Britain and France accepted a cease-fire on the night of November 6 (election day in the U.S.) and the Anglo-French Suez Expeditionary Force halted their advance about 20 miles south of Port Said. A U.S. loan of $1 billion was irmnediately promised to Britain. Egypt and Israel also accepted the U.N. cease-fire resolution on November 5 after the Israelis successfully crushed the Fedayeen guerillas and Egyptian troops. The impact of personality on policy Dulles' role in handling the Suez Crisis was applauded by many Americans: he had kept a volatile situation from becoming a general 95 war. He also demonstrated consistency in his aversion to aggression from any quarter. Dulles was also criticized (mainly by Anglophilic authors) for acting with duplicity, i.e., telling British and French officials privately that he supported their objectives while publicly disavowing any resort to force or to pressure on Nasser. Dulles was also criticized for not telling his allies his true position, whether he accepted their view (and the use of force) or whether he rejected it outright. Dulles was further accused of single-handedly ruining Western unity by abandoning his friends to world criticism and by even leading that criticism. Western unity was damaged, but Dulles was not to be blamed. Eden and Mollet deserve their share of criticism for deciding on aggression before diplomatic efforts were allowed to take their course. Their near-maddened quest to "destroy Nasser" made any peaceful solution to the crisis impossible. Dulles, on the other hand, pursued what he believed to be a rational solution. His objective was peace with justice, not destruction or violence. In the final analysis, he de fused a potentially calamitous crisis. Dulles pursued his objective the way he knew how--he sought to mobilize "world opinion" through negotiations. His personal approach to the problem led to the 18-Nations Proposal that conveyed a portion 96 of the opinion that was intended to influence Egyptian behavior. Dulles traveled extensively between Washington, London and New York in the hope of buying time. He worked feverishly to persuade Eden and Mollet to rely on diplomacy and peaceful solutions rather than force. Although force was ultimately used in the Suez affair, Dulles did 97 not fail in his task. He succeeded in avoiding a general war. He forced the belligerents to give up their aggressive action. Dulles' performance in the Suez Crisis of 1956 was consistent with the behavior he exhibited throughout his lifetime. He emphasized the personal rela tions style which he learned at Versailles in 1919. His later world view was also consistent with previous beliefs. Dulles believed, early in his life, that change was inevitable and that if the status quo was maintained forcefully, then violence would be used by those who resisted the status quo. In November, 1956, Dulles supported Canada's proposal for UNEF not only to respect the 1949 Armistice line, but to find a political solution to the long-standing disputes in that region--i.e., Dulles sought peaceful change, not status quo. Dulles' character was also consistent during the Suez Crisis with that which he developed early in life: Active-Positive. Dulles worked hard from the first sign that a crisis was building over the seizure of the Canal by Egypt. He typified Barber's description of the Active Positive Character all through the crisis. Dulles put "an emphasis on rational mastery ... This may get him into trouble; he may fail to take account of the irrational in politics. Not everyone he deals with sees things his way and he may find it hard to understand why." (Barber, 1977, p. 12) Eden and Mollet were acting irrationally--they wanted to destroy Nasser regardless of the consequences to them; Dulles assumed high government officials would act sensibly and analyze every solution rationally. He could not understand why Eden and Mollet were dead-set on using force when Dulles offered "better," peaceful solutions. Dulles did not personalize this crisis, which is indicative of an Active-Positive character. Had he failed to deal with the Suez Crisis (which he did not), he would not have allowed such failure to destroy his whole career or his personal life (as Active-Negative char acters do when they personalize crises and fail). Dulles did not fail in dealing with the Suez Crisis. The positive attitude which he took in dealing with the crisis indicates that it would not ruin his career or his life even if he did fail. Nobody knows whether I'm doing a good job or a bad job as Secretary of State. This is a great comfort for me when people are certain I'm doing a bad job, and criticize me so severely. I realize that they don't really know and the re turns are't in yet .•• But it works both ways. And when you're excessively praised, you've got to discount that too. Because they don't know either. Your friends don't know either. (Mosley, 1978, p. 411) 98 Barber's analysis appears to be appropriate when applied to Dulles' political career. Dulles maintained the Active-Positive character until his death on Sunday, May 24, 1959. Although Barber's theory is directly applicable to politicians, Erikson's is not. In that sense, Erikson's theory does not account for the unique circumstances in which a politician finds himself. Yet, his theory describes the human being rather than taking into account the human being's career. In this way, Erikson complements Barber. Together, both theorists provide insight into Dulles the man and Dulles the politician. In describing Erikson's theory in Chapter II, it was indicated that normal completion of the stage in which Dulles acted as Secre tary of State, the old age stage, would be highlighted by ego integrity. Dulles achieved this integrity. He did not feel his life was wasted. 99 He did not regret his actions. He could boast he kept the world at peace by facing the brink of war and by not backing away from it. The U.S. did not go to war during Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State. Dulles could brag that no country was overtaken by Communism while he was in office. North Vietnam was under Communist domination before Dulles came to power and the Geneva Convention on Indochina in 1954 formalized this domination.· Iraq did not fall to the Communists despite leftist support for the military coup there in 1958. Dulles was generally satisfied with his success at "winning" several battles in the Cold War. He achieved ego integrity. Erikson also notes that people in this stage take life easy, relax with their families and enjoy watching their grandchildren play and grow. But Dulles did little of this. He was totally involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation. According to Erikson's theory, Dulles could be judged a "normal" human being. Dulles is also "normal" in regard to Barber's theory. He was consistent throughout his career, i.e., in his actions, beliefs and attitudes. With such a consistent personality, it should have been possible to determine Dulles' moves in situations such as the Suez Crisis. This is not to say Eden and Mollet should have known beforehand what Dulles intended to do to solve the crisis. It is only to say that Dulles was consistent in this as in other situations and that if they made the effort, they would have known how he would act. CHAPTER V Kissinger: Presidential Advisor and Secretary of State (1969-77) Henry Kissinger assumed his duties as Advisor to the President on National Security Affairs on January 20, 1969. He was untested in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Over the next eight years, however, he would be confronted with several problems and po tential diplomatic breakthroughs. These situations rigorously tested his ability to perform as chief diplomatic and foreign policy spokesman for two administrations. The Vietnam negotiations, detente with the Soviet Union, the opening to China, and the October War in the Middle East would be the most prominent of these tests. As National Security Advisor, Kissinger only answered to the President. This is what President Nixon wanted. The President was determined to manage foreign policy from the White House, not through the State Department. Nixon entertained some ambitious projects--e.g., the opening to China--and did not want to be impeded (nor did Kissinger) by a slow-moving, bureaucratic machine. The National Security Council (NSC) had been used differently by different presidents. Kissinger assumed a primary role on the NSC. Under Nixon, Kissinger advised the President on all national security and foreign policy issues. He soon became the dominant influence in the direction of foreign policy, at Nixon's insistence, bypassing the Secretary of State. In addition to the NSC, Kissinger developed other committees offering foreign policy advice to the President. They 100 101 included the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), the 40 Committee, and the Senior Review Group. The membership of the groups was similar, but they each grappled with different questions. WSAG was the NSC sub committee for contingency planning and crisis management. The 40 Committee was the interagency committee supervising covert intelli- gence activities. The Senior Review Group also discussed intelligence activities but had more input from staff members than did the 40 Com mittee. This chapter deals with the more prominent tests which Kissinger dealt with as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. It will give background to the issues, explain the decisions Kissinger made and the suggestions he offered to Nixon, and reiterate his own opinions about the actions he took. The Vietnam negotiations and settlement Nixon and Kissinger inherited a war in Southeast Asia. The Vietnam War was to claim some 56,000 American lives, 31,000 of whom were lost by the time Nixon came to power. Nixon promised to end the war within his first term. He missed that rriark by only three days. Kissinger was more optimistic than Nixon. He told a group of Quaker anti-war activists, "Give us six months, and if we haven't ended the war by then, you can come back and tear down the White House fence." (Kalb, 1974, p. 120; Stoessinger, 1976, p. 51) His plan was entitled "The Vietnam Negotiations" and an outline of it appeared in the Janu ary 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs. His approach to negotiations promised to be two-track. On one track, the U.S. and North Vietnam would work out a military settlement of the war. On the other track, South Vietnam and the Communist National Liberation Front would find a political solution for South Vietnam. If Hanoi rejected this plan, Kissinger said the South Vietnamese army would be strengthened as American combat troops were gradually withdrawn. But America's credi bility as an ally and as a counterweight to Connnunism was at stake in Vietnam. Peace had to come, but only if the U.S. retained its honor. It was more than just saving face. Ending the war honorably was es sential for the peace of the world. "Any other solution may 1.n1loose forces that would complicate the prospects of international order." (Foreign Affairs, 1969, p. 234) 102 Hanoi, however, had its own plan. It called for total and im mediate U.S. withdrawal, the removal of South Vietnam's President, Nguyen Van Thieu, and the installation of a coalition regime dominated by Connnunist Viet Cong. On February 22, 1969, Hanoi launched a country wide offensive that cost 453 American lives during the first week. In retaliation, Nixon ordered the bombing of North Vietnam sanctuaries in Cambodia. The B-52 attacks took place on March 18. In his memoirs, Kissinger justified this action. The North Vietnamese had controlled these areas in Cambodia for four years. From these sanctuaries they launched numerous offensives against South Vietnam. "Over the next 15 months, more than 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Cambodia, and the operation (MENU) was kept secret from the American public and indeed from much of the government." (Herring, 1979, p. 221) The U.S. did not publicize the bombings because, according to Kissinger, "we saw no sense in announcing what Cambodia encouraged and North 103 Vietnam accepted ... Our bombing saved American and South Vietnamese lives." (Kissinger, 1979, pp. 251-252) But Americans did learn of the bombings. Information of such magnitude could not be kept from the press. Nixon and Kissinger, how ever, saw leaks of military operations to the press as endangering American lives in Vietnam. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), recommended wiretaps on the telephones of Kissinger's NSC staff as well as certain newsmen. Attorney General John Mitchell defended the legality of the action and President Nixon ordered them carried out. Kissinger "went along with what (he) had no reason to doubt was legal and established practice in (those) cir cumstances." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 253) Kissinger had met secretly with Le Due Tho, a member of Hanoi's politburo, to discuss peace proposals for Vietnam. Their first meet ings were held between February 21 and April 4, 1970. These sessions ended with Tho telling Kissinger that unless the U.S. accepted Hanoi's demands, there was nothing more to discuss. In March, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia was ousted by Lon Nol, an anti-Connnunist. Hanoi's forces began overrunning Cambodia in late March, 1970. Weeks later, the U.S. began arming Cambodia to fend off North Vietnamese troops. Nixon also gave the order to invade the "Parrot's Beak" (33 miles west of Saigon) and "Fishhook" sanctuaries in Cambodia. Kissinger supported the de cision to invade, but he warned Nixon of the possible adverse reaction to the U.S. move and the deeper cleavages it would cause in the country. Kissinger cited these shortcomings but he also saw benefits in the U.S. action if Hanoi's next major offensive was delayed by six to eight months. The delay was closer to two years. The remainder of 1970 and 1971 found no conclusive military or diplomatic achievements. On March 30, 1972, the North Vietnamese began their major offensive. Kissinger was convinced this would be Hanoi's last serious effort. If the allies held fast, North Vietnam would be forced to negotiate more seriously. But on April 27, North Vietnamese forces attacked in even greater strength. On May 2, Kissinger met with an inflexible and confident Le Due Tho. Negotia tions crumbled. Kissinger advised Nixon to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong. The North Vietnamese, however, continued their advance. In retaliation, Nixon ordered the mining of the Port of Haiphong against Kissinger's advice. Kissinger felt this action threatened the impending Moscow Summit and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks. Nonetheless, he told reporters, the President felt the mining was necessary. Kissinger, however, led the press to believe he had disassociated himself from Nixon's decision. "On all previous occasions, he had announced decisions in a way that made Nixon's policies indistinguishable from his own." (Stoessinger, 1976, p. 63) Nixon's actions brought the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and Hanoi began to negotiate more seriously. In fact, the Vietnamese pressed for a quick settlement. Tho dispensed with the idea of a coalition government in the South, and with his insistence that Thieu be removed. It was agreed the U.S. would continue aiding Saigon, but the remaining 60,000 American troops would be withdrawn 60 days following a settlement. Prisoners of War (POWs) would be released at that time. A timetable for ending hostilities was drawn 104 105 up with a cease-fire arranged for October 27, 1972. Kissinger, . how- ever, required President Thieu's concurrence. To Kissinger's surprise, the South Vietnamese leader rejected the proposal. Instead, Thieu presented Kissinger with 69 changes in the draft peace treaty. He accused the U.S. of subverting his rule. Kissinger was reluctant to sign a separate peace with Hanoi and Thieu's rejection meant the war would continue. The North Vietnamese tried to force Nixon's hand by broadcasting the secret terms of the peace treaty. They also accused the U.S. of stalling. Kissinger returned to Paris in November, 1972 to resume negotia tions with Tho. Tho seemed less eager for a settlement. Kissinger warned Nixon that North Vietnam was playing for a clear-cut victory, anticipating a split with Saigon or a domestic collapse. (Herring, 1979, p. 247) Kissinger was even more convinced that a solution to the war would come about through diplomacy combined with force. He preferred to negotiate from a position of strength. Thus, he told Nixon to step up the military pressure on Hanoi. Nixon o.rdered B-52 bombings on North Vietnam, especially Hanoi. The bombings started on December 18 and lasted for 12 days. (Millet, 1978, p. 154) Public reaction to the "Christmas bombings" was fierce and critical, but many journalists reported Kissinger had opposed the bombings. These reports infuriated Nixon. Kissinger sensed his tenure as National Security Advisor was in jeopardy. If the negotiations with North Vietnam collapsed, he in tended to resign immediately. If they succeeded, he expected to see the settlement through and resign toward the end of 1973. In his memoirs, Kissinger notes, "Except for Watergate, I would have carried out this plan." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1456) Although he was opposed to the Christmas bombings, Kissinger did go along with them. And, although he preferred other actions, he did see benefits accruing from the attacks. Later, Kissinger wrote, Nixon's "decision speeded the end of the war; even in retrospect, I can think of no other measure that would have." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1461) Hanoi finally agreed to resume negotiations on January 8, 1973 and a breakthrough came on January 9. A demilitarized zone was de cided on, thus recognizing the sovereignty of South Vietnam. Kissinger returned to the U.S. for consultation with the President. Nixon was urged to send a letter to Thieu indicating the United States would sign the treaty on January 27--alone, if necessary. If along, he said he would declare President Thieu an obstruction to the peace and all aid to South Vietnam would be terminated. Thieu accepted the treaty. On January 23, 1973, Kissinger and Tho initialed the peace agreement. The Vietnam War was over. The Soviet Union: Detente, SALT, and linkage Nixon and Kissinger hoped to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The two men did not want to be overly friendly with the Soviets because they did not trust them. But they did wish to see a lessening of tensions between the two superpowers in order to work for a more peaceful world. 106 In Kissinger's view, peace was impossible without stability. And without Soviet cooperation, there would be no stability and maybe even no survival. To achieve Soviet participation, a relaxation of tensions--a detente--between the superpowers was first necessary. Detente is rooted in a recognition of differences and based on the prevention of disaster ••. (It) is a process of managing relations with a potentially hostile country in order to preserve peace while maintaining our vital in terests. (Stoessinger, 1976, pp. 79 and 81) In his first inaugural address, Nixon announced that "after a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiations." (Kalb, 1974, p. 100) The Soviet Union took this as an offer and announced that it was ready to start a serious exchange of views on limiting the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. Neither Kissinger nor Nixon wanted to rush into SALT talks. Though it was important, the limitation of nuclear weapons was not an isolated issue, but rather it was a key element in a broader dialogue with the Soviet Union. Every problem between the United States and the Soviet Union was linked with every other problem. The linkage of various issues of concern would be the new approach to dealing with the Soviets. Nixon and Kissinger felt the Soviet Union was a key to peace in Vietnam. So if the Soviets wanted American credits, trade, and technology, and if they wanted a SALT agreement, they would have to engage in diplomatic barter. That is, if they helped the U.S. get out of Vietnam honorably, the U.S. would be more helpful in getting the Soviets what they wanted. This was the basis of the Nixon Kissinger policy of linkage. Nixon rejected the initial bid for SALT discussions. Kissinger 107 wanted to be better prepared for the negotiations. He prepared studies on the nation's strategic posture, what the Soviets had in their nuclear arsenal, and the basis for arms limitations. When SALT negotiations opened in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, he felt the U.S. delegation was ready. Earlier in the year, he had convinced Nixon to alter the U.S. position in order to make negotiations more acceptable to the Soviets. Instead of superiority over the Soviet Union as the goal of U.S. military policy, Nixon said sufficiency was a better term to use. This reflected Kissinger's more modest approach to stabiliz ing the balance of power. In July, 1971, the announcement was made that Nixon would travel to China in early 1972. Less than four weeks later, the Soviet Union formally invited the U.S. President to Moscow. As with the visits to China, Kissinger served as a diplomatic advance. Kissinger secretly visited Moscow on April 20, 1972. He met with Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev and told him that Hanoi's March 30 offensive threatened the summit. He also told the Soviet leader that he (Brezhnev) had an interest in preventing a North Vietnamese victory because Nixon would probably not come to Moscow if the U.S. suffered a defeat at the hands of the North Vietnamese Communists. Kissinger concluded from his meetings with Soviet leaders that the U.S. role in Vietnam did not jeopardize the summit. Nixon arrived in Moscow on May 22, 1972. His meetings with Brezhnev were generally cordial. At least one Soviet-American agree ment was signed everyday. Scientific research and environmental pro tection, the Apollo-Soyuz space mission, prevention of naval incidents, 108 and credit and commercial agreements were all signed during the summit. Friday, May 26 was the day arranged for the signing of SALT 1--if difficulties could be worked out at the last minute. Kissinger was responsible for the American negotiating team while Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko assumed a similar role for his government. Kissinger did not appear to be under as much pressure as Gromyko. By 3:00 a.m., Friday, no agreement had been reached. Later that morning, Kissinger was summoned back to the conference table by the Soviets. Once there, Gromyko told him the Soviet Union would accept the U.S. position. The details of that position included re placement of missiles on G-class submarines and the dimensions of missile silos. Kissinger could only guess why the Soviets suddenly accepted the SALT agreement. They were probably satisfied with the agreement, believing they could not expect more concessions from the Americans. Moreover, Gromyko accepted the American formula because Brezhnev "had staked his prestige on a Friday ceremony." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1241) SALT, however, gave the Soviets an advantage in the number of missiles and submarines. Thus, the agreement came under immediate attack in the U.S. But, "even its ardent critics like Senator Henry Jackson (later) agreed that the agreement had saved a generation of weapons unbuilt and billions unspent." (Morris, 1977, p. 279) Perhaps linkage was working, too, if only slightly. Nixon won Brezhnev's promise to persuade Hanoi to negotiate more seriously with the U.S. Detente between the two superpowers passed through several stages 109 in the next several years. Part of the tenuous effectiveness of detente was due to the differing interpretations given it by both countries. The U.S. felt it meant a lessening of tensions based on not only arms control but also on restrained international involve ment in other nations' affairs. The Soviets were more inclined to see it as acceptance of their view of peaceful coexistence in tandem with each country's agreement not to tamper with the internal affairs of the other. Kissinger was under no illusions when he left the Soviet Union. For reasons deeply rooted in the ideology of the regime and the structure of internal Soviet politics, Soviet foreign policy will remain antagonistic to the West and especially to the U.S. The world-power ambitions of the Soviet leaders, and any likely successors, plus their confidence in their capability to support their ambitions with material resources, suggest that the USSR will press their challenge to Western interests with increasing vigor and in certain situations assume risks which heretofore would have seemed excessively dangerous. (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1203) Kissinger says America's task should be "a willingness to confront Soviet expansionism and a simultaneous readiness to mark out a cooper ative future. A more peaceful world is prevented if we lean too far in either direction." (Kissinger, 1979, p. 1254) Playing the China hand From the start of his political career, Richard Nixon was avowedly anti-Cormnunist, and especially anti-Chinese Communist. Yet, he was shrewd enough to try to exploit the reality of Cormnunist China. In October, 1967, he wrote in Foreign Affairs: Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China ... Taking the long-view, we simply 110 cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. (Nixon, 1967, p. 121) Nixon may have been the only presidential candidate who could suggest a new China policy without fear of a right-wing backlash due to his spotless anti-Communist credentials. Nixon was determined to open the door to China. In April, 1969, he asked French President Charles de Gaulle to convey this to China's leaders. In June, Kissinger asked the State Department what the U.S. could do toward normalizing relations with Peking without disturbing America's Pacific allies. The U.S. began unilateral acts of reconcil iation toward China. These actions overlapped military clashes between China and the Soviet Union on their common--disputed--border. Between December, 1970 and January, 1971, secret messages were passed between American and Chinese leaders. Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan, was Kissinger's confidential courier to Peking. In February, 1971, the Indochina War interrupted the U.S.-China exchange, but in March, another note was passed to Kissinger. China extended an in vitation for an American envoy to come to Peking. Kissinger and 111 Rogers were the names suggested by the Chinese. Nixon decided Kissinger would go. Kissinger departed Washington on July 1, ostensibly on an around the world tour. On July 8, he flew into Islamabad, Pakistan. At 3:00 a.m., July 9, he secretly boarded a Pakistani plane and flew to Peking. En route, he recalled how John Foster Dulles refused to shake ChouEn lai's hand at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. The 112 Chinese would also recall it during Kissinger's visits. He was deter- mined to make amends for the diplomatic snub to the Chinese Premier. Four Chinese officials met Kissinger at a military airfield and drove him and his aides to a guesthouse outside Peking. At 4:00 p.m., Chou-En lai arrived at the guesthouse. Kissinger read an opening state ment and made a reference to China as a mysterious land. This prompted Chou to enquire into the nature of the term "mysterious" and the two statesmen engaged in philosophical and historical discussions for the next eight hours. Both men had powerful intellects, shared an elitist disdain for bureaucracy, and recognized the necessity to adjust to reality. They developed a personal rapport and a lasting friendship. While in China, Kissinger was completely cut off from Washington and the rest of the world. He made decisions on his own. He found the best way to deal with Chou was to present a reasonable position, explain it in detail and stick to it. Chou acted the same way. Kissinger found that the Chinese would stick to the spirit and the letter of any agreement, a position which he found lacking in the Soviets and the North Vietnamese. He left China with an invitation for Nixon to visit there in 1972. On July 15, Nixon told a stunned television audience of Kissinger's secret visit and his own plan to visit China. In October, 1971, Kissinger returned to China with an advance team to prepare for Nixon's visit. The Presidential visit was set for February 21-28, 1972. A communique, to be issued at the end of Nixon's visit, was also outlined in October. The document provided for separate state ments by China and the U.S. Kissinger felt this novel approach would 113 allow the U.S. to reassure its allies of its support. And if some common positions were found with the Chinese, these would stand out as authentic convictions of the countries' leaders. In December, events in Southeast Asia occurred which had implica tions for the growing U.S.-China relationship. The Indian army crossed into East Pakistan on December 3. Kissinger had been trying to arrange secret talks between Yahya Khan and Bengali leaders as well as the release of Mujibur Rahman, the Bengali nationalist leader im prisoned in West Pakistan. Kissinger believed the Indian invasion destroyed his efforts to effectuate a political evolution toward autonomy in East Pakistan. He also feared India wanted more than just to set up an independent Bangladesh. He was certain India hoped also to dismember all of West Pakistan. He would not abandon an ally- Pakistan--especially one who was instrumental in opening the door to China for the U.S. and who was also friendly with China. He feared that China might think the U.S. was not an effective counterweight to adversaries--whether it is India vs. Pakistan or _ the Soviet Union vs. China. For these reasons, Kissinger announced his and Nixon's tilt in favor of Pakistan. This announcement came in a policy meeting but someone leaked the news to the press and the press and congressional leaders began criticizing Nixon and Kissinger for their policy. But they stuck to their position. Nixon's visit went off as planned. Within three hours of their arrival at Peking Airport, Nixon and Kissinger--but not Rogers--were invited to visit with Chairman Mao Tse tung. The two Americans were impressed by this legend, Mao, who was alert, philosophical and humorous 114 despite his declining health. The rest of the week was filled with high-level discussion, friendly dinner toasts, sight-seeing and working out last-minute details of the joint communique that would be issued in Shanghai. Kissinger had a taste of late-night, early-morning ne gotiating in China that would be so commonplace at the Moscow Summit later that year. In Shanghai, the communique was issued. The most delicate issue in it dealt with each country's stand on Taiwan. The People's Republic of China called the issue an internal problem. The United States did not dispute the fact that there is only one China. It hoped for a peaceful settlement to the issue and called for the removal of U.S. troops on the island as the tension in the area diminishes--i.e., when the Vietnam War ended. With this, the linkage policy was used in China. At the final banquet on Sunday, February 28, Nixon said, "This was the week that changed the world." (Kalb, 1974, pp. 281-282) Nixon returned to Washington to a hero's welcome. As with the Soviets, Kissinger was under no illusions about U.S. China relations. Peking and Washington were entering a marriage of convenience transformed into an emotional tie primarily by Chinese psychological skill and American sentimental recollection of a China that no longer existed, if ever it had. Once China becomes strong enough to stand alone, it might discard us. A little later it might even turn against us, if its perception of its interests requires it. Before then, the Soviet Union might be driven into a genuine re laxation of tensions with us--if it has not first sought to break out of its isolation by a military assault on China. But whatever China's long-term policy, our medium-term interest was to cooperate, and to support its security against foreign pressures. (Kissinger, 1979, pp. 1090-1091) Neglected allies Like Dulles before him, but for different reasons, Kissinger has been criticized for threatening the relationship between America and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. Some European leaders felt he placed the interests of U.S.-Soviet detente above the interests of Europe. With the Vietnam War behind him, the China policy well under way, and the Soviets reacting positively to detent with the U.S., Kissinger did turn his attention to Europe. On April 23, 1973, he announced a Year of Europe and called for a "new Atlantic Charter". (Stoessinger, 1976, p. 139) He persuaded Nixon to meet with West European leaders in the summer and fall of 1973. But the Middle East War in October consumed virtually all of Kissinger's diplomatic energies and Watergate consumed Nixon's attention in 1973-74. These events rendered both men unable to meet with friends. 115 Watergate's impact on Kissinger's career. Kissinger planned to resign in the fall of 1973. His image in the press and public was one of admiration and acclaim. Nixon seemed to be bearing the brunt of his administration's failures--the Christmas bombings, the secret bombings--while Kissinger enjoyed approval for the successes--the opening to China, end to the Vietnam War. Nixon felt his assistant should not receive such public acceptance while he was being constantly criticized. Their relationship deteriorated. But Nixon was pragmatic enough to exploit a potential asset. When Watergate 116 was tarnishing, and later destroying, his image, his foreign policy successes--personified in Henry--provided a crutch. This was a new turn of events for Kissinger. All his life he depended on others to further his career--Fritz Kraemer in the army, William Y. Elliott in Harvard, Nelson Rockefeller, and finally, Richard Nixon. Now someone--Nixon--depended ·on Kissinger's reputa tion to maintain his career. Kissinger had been called Secretary of State in everything but name. Nixon gave him a chance to change that one minor detail when William Rogers left his post in 1973. While swimming with Kissinger in his San Clemente pool in August, 1973, Nixon asked him to succeed Rogers as Secretary of State. Nixon told reporters of his decision on August 21, but if be felt it would divert attention from Watergate, he was wrong. Kissinger held a news conference the next day and said his conduct of foreign policy would be more open than it had been. He also said his Jewish heritage would not bias U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Asked if he preferred to be called Mr. Secretary or Dr. Secretary, he replied, "I don't stand on protocol. If you just call me Excellency, it will be okay." (Kalb, 1974, p. 447) Kissinger's confirmation hearings lasted between September 7 and 17. He was applauded by senators for his contributions to U.S. foreign policy and for his brilliance. He was questioned about his secretive style of diplomacy, his role in the secret bombings of Cambodia, and the wiretapping of NSC staffers and newsmen. He was also questioned about any involvement in Watergate. But Kissinger satisfied the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and on September 18 he was recommended for confirmation. On September 21, by a vote of 78 to 7, the U.S. Senate confirmed Kissinger's nomination. He was sworn in the next day as America's 56th--and the first Jewish-American--Secretary of State. The October War Two weeks after becoming Secretary of State, Kissinger was faced with a crisis in the Middle East. On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched Operation Badr, the invasion against Israel. Israeli and American officials were aware of the impending attack several hours before the Arabs launched it at 14:00 hours on Yam Kippur. But Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and her Cabinet decided against a pre-emptive strike "in order to have the political advantage of being the side that is attacked." (Sobel, 1974. p. 90) Kissinger also warned Meir not to pre-empt, for if Israel did, it would have to fight alone--i.e., without American resupply of military weapons. Nonetheless, Kissinger was surprised that the Arabs initiated the attack. He thought it was folly, given Israel's qualitative military advantage. Indeed, Kissinger initially thought Israel had started the October War as Egypt had claimed. But he soon realized that he was wrong. Regardless of who started it, Kissinger saw the war as an oppor tunity to formulate a lasting solution to the tensions in the Middle East. To find this solution, he felt that the outcome of this fourth Arab-Israeli war must not have a clear winner or loser. Both sides must be in a position to find it advantageous to agree to a diplomatic effort for peace. The Egyptians had made substantial military gains in crossing Israeli-occupied Sinai and the Syrians had pushed Israel 117 118 back across the Golan Heights all within the first few days of the War. Despite these achievements, U.S. officials were certain that Israel would deliver a devastating counter-attack against the Arabs within 48 hours of the opening of hostilities. (Heikal, 1975, p. 228) But Israel did not turn the tide of war to its favor until the second week of the War. Its supplies were insufficient to keep up with the heavy losses. Two days into the War, Israel's Ambassador to the U.S., Simcha Dinitz, had been asking for anununition, spare parts, and accelerated delivery of aircraft promised to his country before the War. But massive American resupply did not occur until October 13, when President Nixon ordered Secretary of Defense Arthur Schlesinger to conunence the airlift of supplies. From October 14-25, the U.S. de livered 11,000 tons of equipment, 40 F-4 Phantoms, 36 A-4 Skyhawks, 12 C-130 transports and 20 tanks. There is some contention over why it took the U.S. eight days to respond to Israel's near-hysteric demands for resupply. One story holds that Kissinger was very willing to get supplies sent to Israel, but that Schlesinger and the Pentagon were holding back. In this story, Kissinger is seen as a friend of Israel, fighting the Defense bureaucracy, yet constantly reassuring Dinitz that supplies would be sent soon. Finally, Nixon convened between his feuding Cabinet min isters by personally demanding the airlift. (Kalb, 1974, pp. 464-478) The other story said, "Kissinger did not fight for resupply but actually led the fight against it." (AlRoy, 1975, p. 76) He supposed ly ordered Schlesinger to hold off on resupply. Even though Israel was losing the War due to lack of supplies on its part, plus a massive Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria, Kissinger still held his position as late as October 12. Nixon stepped in, against Kissinger's wishes. Despite the conflicting stories, the evidence does suggest "that Kissinger tried to use the War to promote a settlement. If neither side should win decisively, it would be easier for him to launch a diplomatic offensive." (Stoessinger, 1976, p. 186) As long as the Soviets showed restraint, Kissinger would withhold major resupply, but would provide enough to keep the balance. But the Soviets were not restrained and Israel was losing, so Kissinger decided to release a massive flow of arms to Israel. With the resupply, Israel did turn the tide of the War. It had, as early as October 10, turned back the Syrian invasion and had re taken the Golan Heights and even moved past the 1967 cease-fire lines heading for Damascus. On October 15, Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal in small numbers and were moving into the Egyptian missile fields. October 16, Soviet Premier Alexsei Kosygin flew to Cairo to try to persuade Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to stop fighting. Also on that day, Kissinger said at a WSAG meeting that the U.S. airlift would run the Soviets into the ground. Kissinger was looking at the War not in terms of Arab-Israeli tensions but as a superpower confrontation. By October 20, Israel had pushed 20 miles west of the Suez Canal and had cut off the road leading south from Ismailia to Suez City, entrapping the Egyptian Third Army. That day, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia announced an embargo of oil to the U.S., as well as substantial production cuts, as a response to Nixon's request to Congress for $2.2 119 billion in aid for Israel. On October 19, Brezhnev sent a message to Nixon "requesting ur gent consultations on the Middle East Crisis. Either Kissinger would come to Moscow or Gromyko would fly to the U.S ...• Kissinger now felt that a cease-fire could be achieved quickly." (Quandt, 1977, p. 190) He told Dinitz that by going to Moscow, he would be able to gain a few more days for Israel to complete her military operations. He felt that if he rejected Brezhnev's invitation, the Soviets may have intervened militarily on the Arab side to save their allies from de feat and humiliation. He flew to Moscow in the early morning hours of October 20. He wanted to obtain Soviet and Arab agreement to a cease-fire resolution that was a basis for a subsequent diplomatic effort. If the agreement was not forthcoming, he would wait tm.til Israeli military achievements created a new reality. If the agree ment was forthcoming, he expected Israel to stop all fighting. He had no interest in humiliating Sadat, especially in view of the en couraging U.S.-Egyptian exchanges which were coming through the "back channel"--a secret message channel set up between the two countries aimed at improving relations. While he was airborne, Kissinger received two important messages. One was that of the oil embargo. The other, from Nixon, gave Kissinger full authority to negotiate the terms of a cease-fire agreement without further Presidential approval. Nixon was too bogged down with Watergate to deal with the cease-fire. He fired Archibald Cox, the first Watergate Special Prosecutor, and this action in turn forced the resignations of Attorney General Elliott Richardson and his 120 deputy William Ruckelshaus. These events came to be known as the "Saturday Night Massacre". (Kalb, 1974, p. 484) Kissinger met with Brezhnev on Saturday, October 20 until well past midnight Sunday morning. No agreement was reached, but Kissinger felt Brezhnev was eager for a quick cease-fire. On Sunday afternoon, the two men met for four hours. Brezhnev accepted Kissinger's dP.mand for a cease-fire linked with direct peace talks between the Arabs and Israelis. Kissinger knew the Israelis would not be happy with the timing of the agreement. A few days more and they could defeat the Egyptian and Syrian armies. But Kissinger also knew they would be glad for the opportunity for direct talks with Egypt. The United Nations Security Council met in New York at 10:00, Sunday night and by 12:58 a.m., October 22, Resolution 338 was adopted. The Resolution called on all parties to stop fighting within 12 hours, to implement Resolution 242, and to start negotiations aimed at a durable peace in the Middle East. Resolution 242 recognized the rights of all states in the Middle East to exist and called on Israel to with draw from occupied Arab lands. Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv at noon (Middle East Time) on Monday, before the cease-fire went into effect, to urge the Israelis not to violate the cease-fire or it would risk losing American support. On October 23, the cease-fire was violated. The Israelis blamed the Egyptians, the Egyptians and the Soviets blamed the Israelis. Re gardless of whom was to blame, it was the Israeli forces that were advancing beyond the October 22 cease-fire lines and threatening to cut off the Third Army from supplies. The U.N. passed Resolution 339 121 122 calling for an immediate cease-fire, return to the October 22 lines, and dispatch of U.N. observers to supervise the cease-fire. Syria finally accepted the cease-fire later on October 23. On October 24, Sadat asked for Nixon's help in getting the Israelis to allow food and medical supplies through to the Third Army. Kissinger called Dinitz and asked that Israel stop fighting and let supplies through to the trapped Egyptians. Later that day, Sadat asked the U.S. and the Soviet Union to send troops to the area to oversee the cease- fire. The White House immediately rejected the idea. Dobrynin called Kissinger with a message that Brezhnev accepted the idea. Brezhnev "invited" the U.S. to join Moscow "to compel observance without delay. I will say it straight, that if you find it impossible to deal with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity -urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally." Kissinger quickly relayed the message to Nixon, who re- portedly empowered him to order a military alert if necessary. (Quandt, 1977, p. 196) At 1:30 a.m., October 25, Nixon approved Kissinger's order for placing U.S. forces on military alert. The U.S. was not put on a war footing but the alert provided for cancellation of leaves, the return of men to their units and preparation to move out if necessary. (Sobel _ , 1974, p. 115) On October 26, Brezhnev assailed the rumors of Soviet plans for unilateral military intervention. With this, the brink of war with the Soviet Union was walked away from. But the U.S. was prepared to send troops into the Middle East in case the Soviets in tervened. On October 25, the U.N. passed Resolution 240--the third call for a cease-fire--calling for implementation of Resolution 338 and the establishment of a U.N. Emergency Forse (UNEF). This call 123 for a cease-fire did take hold and the fourth Arab-Israeli War finally ended. But the diplomatic effort was just beginning. In shaping the American diplomatic policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kissinger and Nixon defined the parameters of that policy. The U.S. was committed to a step-by-step process toward peace but could not promise peace. Israel depended on the U.S. for economic and mili tary aid to insure its security. The Arabs needed the U.S. because the Soviets could provide them with arms, but only the U.S. could give them their land back by producing Israeli territorial concessions through negotiations. Thus, both sides of the conflict needed the U.S. as an intermediary to negotiations aimed at a more permanent solution to the crisis than just a cease-fire. And the U.S. needed a more per manent solution to establish a dominant role in the region while pushing the Soviets out, and to stabilize the area to end the then-present oil embargo and to avoid such future actions. The agreed-to negotiating format was a multilateral conference with U.S. and Soviet participation, to be held in Geneva under U.N. auspices. But, instead of relying on Geneva, Kissinger planned to deal with concrete issues by personal diplomacy. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy met with Kissinger on October 29 and 31 to outline his country's position on implement_ing the cease-fire pro visions. Israeli Prime Minister Meir also met with Kissinger and Nixon on October 31 to outline her position. It was far away from Egypt's. With these talks behind him, Kissinger left for the Middle East on November 5. November 7 he met Sadat for the first time and in their private talks, they began to develop a genuine admiration for each other. Sadat agreed not to demand Israel's return to the October 22 lines and to work for a larger disengagement of forces. Meir called this a "fantastic achievement". (Quandt, 1977, p. 217) Two days later, agreement on a cease-fire plan and the exchange of POWs was announced. This was signed two days later by Egyptian and Israeli military representatives at a poin,t along the Cairo to Suez Road known as Kilometer 101. Kissinger began his second Middle East trip on December 12. He met with Algerian President Botlllledienne, Sadat, King Faisal, Syrian President Hafez Asad, and Meir. Israel appeared reluctant to attend the Geneva Conference. It opposed a strong role for the U.N. Secre tary-General Kurt Waldheim and any mention of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and it refused to sit in the same room with Syrian representatives until Syria complied with Israeli demands for a list of POWs and Red Cross visits to them. Kissinger urged them to attend and offered favorable U.S. consideration of Israel's request for arms. Sadat said Egypt would attend. Jordon would also go. But Syria re fused to attend until a disengagement of forces was agreed to. The PLO was neither mentioned nor invited, as a concession to Israel. The Conference convened on December 21 with the U.S. and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen. Israeli elections were held on December 31. Gold Meir's Labor Coalition was weakened somewhat but not enough to require a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was in Washington with Kissinger on January 4 and 5, 1974 to present his country's proposals for disengagement. Kissinger returned to the 124 Middle East at Dayan's and Sadat's request on January 10. Kissinger hoped merely to establish a framework for an agreement with the details to be worked out in Geneva. But Sadat asked Kissinger to stay on in the region until the disengagement agreement was finalized. This was the start of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, flying between Aswan and Jerusalem with each side's proposals. On January 13, the Israelis gave Kissinger a map with the proposed disengagement of forces in the Sinai. Kissinger took this to Sadat who approved the idea, but not the extent of force limits. Kissinger told him the limit need not be stated in the formal document but could be defined in letters exchanged by Sadat and Nixon. Sadat also agreed to committing to private letters his assurances on Israeli cargos transiting the Canal. In Israel on January 15, Meir dropped her demand for an end of belligerency as part of the disengagement agree ments. With a few other changes in the parties' positions, an agree ment was reached and was signed on January 18, 1974. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank of the Suez Canal and from the East Bank 20 miles into the Sinai. This 20-mile strip had three zones. Egypt would control the zone closest to the Canal with a maximum of 7000 troops. The U.N. would control the middle zone; And, the last zone would be con trolled by Israel, also with 7000 troops. Israel would retain con trol of the Mitla and Giddi Passes. The U.S. would perform reconnais sance flights to monitor the agreement and give the results to both sides. On January 20, Kissinger talked with Asad and obtained a new 125 Syrian disengagement proposal, which he delivered to the Israelis. He returned to Washington and tried to end the oil embargo while also laying the groundwork for Syrian-Israeli talks, by meeting and phoning the appropriate Middle East officials. But Asad, Sadat, Boumedienne and Faisal decided not to lift the embargo until further progress toward a Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement had been made. Kissinger returned to the Middle East and met with Asad on February 26. He was authorized to deliver to the Israelis the list of POWs in return for a concrete Israeli proposal on disengagement. He returned to Damascus with an Israeli proposal which he was certain Asad would reject outright, so he did not show him the proposal. 126 He merely tried to explain the benefits of U.N. buffers and limited zones. He left Damascus and the Middle East with nothing substantial accomplished. Kissinger began his fifth Middle East mission on April 28, after fighting had intensified on the Syrian-Israeli border. He realized that achieving a disengagement of forces between Syria and Israel would be more difficult than it was between Egypt and Israel. The U.S. was in ne · ed of an agreement. Its new moderate Arab friend, Sadat, could not be isolated as the only Arab leader promoting peace with Israel. Asad must also reach agreement with Israel. Without such an agreement, the oil weapon--the embargo being partially lifted on March 18--may continue to be used against the U.S. If war broke out again between Syria and Israel, Egypt might be pulled in and the Soviets may also use it as a pretext to intervene militarily, threat ening the stability of the region, the world and the vital interests of the U.S. And Watergate was continuing to cripple Nixon domest ically and he needed to achieve a further foreign policy success accredited to his administration. On April 28-29, Kissinger met in Geneva, before flying to the Middle East, with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to enlist his help in achieving a Syrian-Israeli accord. The Soviets had earlier criti cized Kissinger for his one-man style of diplomacy in the Middle East, saying that Geneva was to be the place for negotiations. Kissinger replied that the parties concerned had asked him to personally mediate the negotiations. In April, he assured the Soviets that a final settlement would be handled in Geneva. Kissinger flew to Algeria and Egypt to ask the support of Boumedienne and Sadat for the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. These ne gotiations proved to be long and arduous. Several times, Kissinger was so exasperated at the intransigence of Asad and the Israelis that he decided to end his shuttle diplomacy. But something always happen ed to make him continue. Once Nixon interceded and urged Kissinger to continue. If Israel was not negotiating seriously, Nixon was pre pared to pressure it by perhaps holding back aid. He was also pre pared to offer aid to Syria as an incentive to be more flexible in 127 its negotiating stance. Two other times when Kissinger was ready to quit, Asad changed his position and agreed to Kissinger's terms (or Israel's terms). One of these times, when _ Kissinger was prepared to leave, Asad said, "What a pity. We have come so far and we have not succeeded. Can't anything be done? 11 (Stoessinger, 1976, p. 193) Asad asked him to stay and two days later the deal was concluded, Thirty-three days after starting his journey, on May 29, the announcement was ma.de that Syria and Israel had reached a disengage ment agreement. Two days later, Syrian and Israeli representatives signed the document in Geneva. Some of the concessions made during the negotiations included an Israeli agreement to a Syrian presence in all of Quneitra on the Golan Heights. Asad dropped his demand to con trol the hills west of Quneitra if Kissinger could guarantee that no heavy weapons would be placed there. The U.S. also had to insure, at Israel's request, that the U.N. force would not be withdrawn with out the consent of both parties. Asad also gave Kissinger his oral commitment that he would not allow the Syrian side of the disengage ment line to be used for terrorists' attacks against Israel. The disengagement agreement stated that a U.N. buffer zone would parallel the 1967 cease-fire line, including the city of Quneitra. Ten kilometers east and west of the zone, each side could station 6000 128 men, 75 tanks and 36 122nnn artillery weapons. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces (UNDOF) would inspect the various zones and U.S. aircraft would carry out reconnaissance flights. Nixon assured Asad that Israel would observe the cease-fire and its other agreements. He also assured Israel that the U.S. recognized Israel's right of self-defense in case of violations of the agreement--i.e., terrorists' attacks across the disengagement lines. In June, Nixon set off for a tour of the Middle East. Watergate was smothering him at home and he hoped to escape this critical atmo sphere and perhaps even hear applause coming from cheering Middle East crowds for his support of the peace process. Kissinger was also being criticized at home, not for his shuttle diplomacy but for his alleged role in ordering wiretaps of NSC members and journalists in 1969. In Salzburg, the first stop of Nixon's trip to the Middle East, Kissinger threatened to resign unless the Senate cleared him of any wrongdoing. And the Senate did clear him. Two months later, on August 8, 1974, Richard Nixon resigned as President as of noon the next day. Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977) became the 38th President of the United States. After the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement, Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy was halted for a while as other events vied for his attention. In the summer of 1974, two NATO allies--Greece and Turkey--found themselves at war over Cyprus. Also that summer, and for the next year, Kissinger had to confront the possibility of a Communist domination of Portugal, another NATO ally. But in February 1975, Kissinger again set out for the Middle East to rebuild the momentum toward peace by attempting another step in the process. Expecting no breakthrough in a second round of Egyptian-Israeli talks, he was not disappointed when none emerged. The only positive outcome of this trip came when the Shah of Iran indicated he would provide Israel with oil if it gave up the Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudr oil fields in the Sinai. Kissinger again traveled to the Middle East in mid-March with higher hopes for a breakthrough. He and Ford needed a new foreign policy achievement. Their popularity was declining. Congress sought to be more assertive in guiding for eign policy. Kissinger was dismayed over what he saw as Israeli in flexibility, which caused his third shuttle to end in stalemate. 129 Returning to Washington on March 24, Kissinger and Ford embarked on an agonizing reappraisal of U.S.-Israeli relations. Ford, in an attempt to pressure Israel for concessions, suspended military and economic agreements with Israel. During the next several months, international crises occurred but the U.S. seemed powerless to act constructively. On April 17, 1975, the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh fell to Communist forces. On April 29, Saigon also came under Communist control. These events acted as a slap in the face to Kissinger's and Nixon's peace with honor policy · in Indochina. Also that spring, King Faisal was assas sinated leaving the future of Saudi Arabia and its relations with the U.S. and Egypt in doubt. Another Middle East crisis, the civil war in Lebanon, began to erupt in April. Domestically, congressional leaders voiced their opposition to Ford's reappraisal of U.S. Israeli relations. Perhaps more than before, Kissinger had to achieve an Egyptian Israeli agreement, a further step toward peace. He had to guarantee U.S. influence in the region, at the exclusion of the Soviets. He also had to stabilize the region where the potential for radical re gimes was great. And he had to save his hard-won reputation of peace maker and foreign policy genius. His initial mediation was held in Washington, where for six weeks in the summer of 1975, Israeli and Egyptian positions were sent through him to the other side. By the time he left for Israel on August 6, an agreement was within reach for a further pull-back of forces in the Sinai. Sinai II, the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement, was signed in Geneva on September 4, 1975. 130 The main points of the agreement include the commitment of both sides to resolve the conflict between them by peaceful means and not to use or threaten force. UNEF's mandate would be extended annually. Egypt agreed to allow non-military cargo to transit to and from Israel through the Suez Canal, which had been reopened the previous June. The parties agreed that their next agreement would be a final peace agreement. Israel agreed to withdraw from the Mitla and Giddi passes as well as the Abu Rudais and Ras Sudr oil fields. The new buffer zone was enlarged as Israel withdrew further east. Arrangements for an early warning system operated by U.S. civilian personnel were also spelled out. Three watch stations in the Mitla and Giddi passes would monitor the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations and report 131 any movements to both parties. This system was subject to Congressional approval, which was received on October 9. (Moore, 1977, pp. 1208- 1212; 1225) Four secret agreements were also signed by the U.S. Three were with Israel, one with Egypt. The U.S.-Israeli agreements dealt with military assistance to Israel, assurances on Israel's supply of oil, and the need for consultations between the two cotn1tries in the event of Soviet military intervention. The freeze on new weapons agreements, started in April, was ended. The U.S. also reiterated its position not to recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organiza tion until that Organization recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. The U.S.-Egyptian agreement committed the U.S. to try to continue negotiations between Syria and Israel and to aid Egypt in the early warning system in the buffer zones. Kissinger was unable to complete his step-by-step diplomatic process for peace in the Middle East as James E. Carter (1977-1981) defeated Ford in the 1976 Presidential election. Now, it was up to the Democrats to build upon Kissinger's achievements. Psychological conclusions Kissinger's diplomatic initiative during and after the October War substantiates the behavioral psychologists' claim that past behavior determines future action. His personal style of diplomacy in the Middle East was the same type of style he used in his past diplomatic efforts. In addition to his style, his world view and character were also consistent with how they developed earlier in his life. His Active-Positive Character was especially evident in the after math of the October War when Kissinger became the indefatigable shut tling diplomat. He enjoyed the fast-paced mediation between adver saraes. Although the possibility for success was tenuous, if it was achieved, he saw benefits not only to his reputation but moreso to world stability. This desire for world stability is consistent with his world view, which he developed in adolescence. As an adolescent in Nazi Germany, he developed the preference for a stable society, rather than a revolu tionary one. Although peace was not necessarily achieved in a stable world order, it did have a chance. There was no chance for peace if a revolutionary state existed in the world system. Kissinger's deci sion to use step-by-step diplomacy instead of trying for an all-out peace agreement is also consistent with his world view. In his 132 133 doctoral dissertation, he wrote that world stability is the goal to strive for and peace would be a bonus--if it were achieved. Step-by- step diplomacy was used to stabilize the Middle East and thus the world. Peace was never promised by Kissinger. As a young adult, Kissinger adopted a style in order to implement his desire for world stability. The style he used was personal rela tions, as indicated by his information-gathering trip to Vietnam for President Johnson. His adopted style remained consistent when he was Nixon's foreign policy advisor. His negotiations with Le Due Tho, his warm relations with Chou En lai, detente with the Russians, and espe cially his handling of the disengagement agreements between Israeli leaders and Sadat and Asad--all these suggest that Kissinger consistently relied on personal relations in a sincere attempt to stabilize a volatile world. Inasmuch as Kissinger achieved what he sought in Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East, Kissinger was a success. Active Positives are motivated by success. They do not seek power for power's sake, as Active-Negatives do. They are not in politics out of a sense of duty or merely to be liked, as Passive-Negatives or Passive Positives do. Success is an Active-Positive's reward and Kissinger felt rewarded again and again. In an interview with Orianna Fallaci, as quoted in Chapter III, Kissinger said he would "like to leave behind a world that seemed more peaceful than the one we entered." (Kalb, 1974, p. 12) Kissinger was correctly assuming that stability and peace depended a lot on his behavior as the foreign policy spokesman of the Nixon and Ford Administrations. He was thus placing himself in the role as a leader of his nation. He perceived his role as one used to guide Americans into a more stable world. This attitude corroborates Erikson's theory of generativity, which is the successful completion of the adulthood stage, ages 30-65. Kissinger thus successfully completed another of Erikson's stages by hoping to guide those with less power than he. Kissinger has one final stage, old age, to complete. For the most part, being successful in the previous stages, he should expect to succeed in the last. If he does, he will be happy with how his life has progressed. He will feel his life was worthwhile and that it "made sense". He will not regret his past actions. As a preview, perhaps, into his attitude toward past actions, his memoirs indicate that he fully supports the decisions he made as Nixon's National Security Advisor. He realizes that mistakes were made, but says that they are inevitable and that the outcome compensates for them. 134 CHAPTER VI Dulles and Kissinger in American Foreign Policy To better understand the formulation of American foreign policy, an analyst must consider the psychological constraints on a formula tor as well as the circumstances of the problem or policy in question. The goals, opinions, ideas and assumptions that a policy-maker brings to the decision-making process are psychologically constraining. These psychological constraints are . rooted in a person's background and early life experiences. John Foster Dulles and Henry Alfred Kissinger display different backgrounds and environmental influences. Yet both men achieved the same position--one of the most powerful non-elected political offices in the United States. Dulles was born into an aristocratic, upper-class Christian family. The world around him was peaceful and serene. He grew up admiring wonderful stories of the adventures of a world statesman. His family traveled widely and Dulles became familiar with many dif ferent countries and cultures. With Dulles' family connections and family reputation, it was easy for him to become involved in for eign affairs. It would have been a surprise if he had not been. Kissinger, on the other hand, was born into a middle-class German-Jewish family and into a turbulent world in a revolutionary country. He grew up watching his people persecuted because of their heritage. He "traveled i :, but only to escape persecution. There 135 was no great political family reputation as the Dulles family enjoyed. To become Secretary of State would be an "impossible dream" for Kissinger. When he achieved that post, he declared that, for a man of his background, his attainment of that post could only happen in America. As an emerging statesman, Dulles was a champion for peace. He was a promoter of bipartisanship in foreign affairs. Kissinger was a teacher who criticized American foreign policy as practiced by various presidents and offered his own strategies for international stability. Like Dulles, Kissinger was non-partisan in his willingness to work for any president, regardless of party. Whether called bi Yüklə 3,51 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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