party's nomination. Kissinger's only hope of serving the next President
was if Hubert Humphrey beat Nixon. Kissinger was staunchly anti-Nixon.
He referred to Nixon as a "disaster" and "not fit to be President".
(Kalb, 1974, p. 16) Because he was so opposed to Nixon, he did not
even consider the possibility that Nixon might ask Kissinger to serve
him.
But Nixon did invite Kissinger to his room gt the Hotel Pierre
on November 25, 1968, after Nixon defeated Humphrey for the Presidency
earlier that month. Nixon and Kissinger spoke for four hours on
foreign policy issues. On November 27, Kissinger was offered the
position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Kissinger was not sure he could accept, but one week later, after
talking with Rockefeller and other friends, he did. Kissinger needed
52
that week to reassess Nixon and to decide if he could work with this
man of whom he was so critical. He could. Their discussions erased
some prejudices both men had of each other and indicated that they
held similar views on how foreign policy should be conducted. Both
men distrusted the bureaucracy. They agreed that the Soviets should
be brought in to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War. Triangular
diplomacy with the Soviet Union and China was also likely. Kissinger
would work with Nixon, not because he liked him personally, but because
he would be at the center of power in foreign policy formation.
It was not surprising that Kissinger took the job. What is sur
prising is why Nixon offered it. In addition to their discussions,
Nixon knew of and agreed with Kissinger's hard-line views as expressed
in his several books and articles. Also, Nixon wanted to run foreign
policy by himself, not through the State Department. Kissinger would
be totally accessible to and dependent on Nixon and would serve him
well as National Security Advisor, especially since both men shared a
distrust of the bureaucracy. Whatever the other reasons may be, Nixon
did ask Kissinger to serve him and Kissinger accepted. Kissinger, at
the age of 45, thus began his first truly political career--a career
which lasted 8 years in the service of two presidents in a period which
was one of the most tumultuous in America's history.
Kissinger's writings
Kissinger's philosophy on foreign policy can easily be examined
by studying his writings. The two works for which he is best known
and which best typify his outlook on the world order are A World
Restored and Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. In the former, he
says the objective of an international system is not peace but rather
stability, which is dependent on a generally accepted legitimacy.
Peace is the bonus that follows from the attainment of stability.
Should peace be the objective, every state within the system would be
at the mercy of the most ruthless--the revolutionary--state, since
there was an incentive to mollify the aggressor and to accept its
demands in order to maintain peace. Negotiating is impossible when
a revolutionary state exists in a state system. Negotiating is pos
sib1e within a legitimate state system. Napoleon's France was a revo
lutionary state. Metternich, Foreign Minister of Austria, saw France
as such in the Nineteenth Century and sought to destroy Napoleon.
53
Henry admired Metternich for his ability to form a coalition
against Napoleon; but Henry criticized him for his unwillingness to
achieve social and political reform in the Austrian Empire. Henry
also admired Castlereagh, Foreign Minister of Great Britain, for in
sisting on a peace settlement that did not seek retribution when his
countrymen were clamoring for vengeance against France; Henry criti
cized Castlereagh for not gaining parliamentary support for his Quad
ruple Alliance, which he had proposed would guard Europe against revo
lutionary power. Largely by Metternich and Castlereagh's efforts, a
balance of power was set up and Europe was spared a major war for a
century.
Through his studies, Henry learned that the statesman, who "knows"
the future prospects of his nation, has to act before his intuition
is made actual. But this would make the statesman suspect in his
countrymen's eyes. Therefore, the statesman has to educate his fellow
citizens about his insights to "bridge the gap between a people's ex
perience and his vision, between a nation's tradition and its future."
This has to be done in order to gain public support for the statesman's
policies. But:
A statesman who too far outruns the experience of his
people, will fail in achieving a domestic concensus, how
ever wise his policies; witness Castlereagh. A statesman
who limits his policy to the experience of his people will
doom himself to sterility; witness Metternich. (Kissinger,
1957, p. 329)
54
In Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger says that with the
discovery of atomic weaponry, man held an excess of power. The sur
vival of the earth and its inhabitants depended on man's ability to
use that power subtly and with discrimination. Total war was no longer
thinkable because of this power and the risk of nuclear holocaust.
He said the U.S. required a strategic doctrine suited to its
defense needs. It had wasted the years in which it had an atomic mon
opoly because it failed to establish a stable world order •. He credit
ed the Soviets with gaining control of East Europe and with stock
piling nuclear weapons during the American atomic monopoly without
causing American retaliation. The Soviets thus learned how to gain
increments of power and to present challenges to the U.S. without
being confronted by an all-out war. Americans, he wrote, were only
used to all-out war and unconditional surrender. But what they needed
to realize was that "massive retaliation", as enunciated by John
Foster Dulles, was the wrong policy. A limited war could produce
specific political objectives. The SoYiets were not deterred from a
U.S. threat of massive retaliation because they knew the U.S. would
not follow through. And a deterrent which one is afraid to use when
it is challenged ceases to be a deterrent. Nuclear weapons could
also be used in a limited fashion without risking nuclear holocaust-
unless, of course, the enemy escalated the war. Thermonuclear war
must be avoided, wrote Kissinger, except as a last resort.
Diplomacy was also too concerned with absolutes--its only objec
tive was absolute peace. Kissinger proposed that negotiations should
focus on limiting the use of atomic weapons rather than on only search
ing for "peace". The Soviet Union, a revolutionary state, existed
within the state system and therefore peace was unattainable as the
primary objective. Kissinger further proposed an approach to arms
control that would have the advantage of focusing thinking on things
to accomplish rather than on things to prohibit.
55
Kissinger also took the U.S. alliance system to task. The success
of alliances depends on a recognition of the fact that the interests
of the U.S. and those of its allies could not in all cases coincide.
The disparity of power was too great for the interests of all allies
to be the same. Cooperation was possible on regional matters; but not
always on world balance of power issues. However, "no progress can be
made in our policy of alliances until there has been an agreement on
strategic doctrine".
(Kissinger, 1957, p. 246)
Psychological considerations
To consider the psychological aspects of Kissinger's life,
Erikson's developmental theory is applied in this section. As in the
56
case of Dulles, assumptions must be made concerning the earliest
stages of Kissinger's life. But for Kissinger, the first three stages
(rather than the first two in Dulles' case) are assumed to have been
completed normally for "there are no data whatever on how he was
raised in infancy. Our first glimpse of him is in school, that is,
after his sixth year." (Mazlish,
1976,
p.
29)
Mazlish adds,
Kissinger's childhood seems to have been normal, at least until the
Nazis came to power when Kissinger was about 10.
It is assumed then that Kissinger became a Trusting Infant (Stage
1: 0-2 years). This Trust, once established, would help him meet
future crises with a good chance of normal development. Between 2
and 4 years old, Kissinger probably asserted his independence (Auto
nomy, Stage 2) by self-regulating his own behavior. Stage 3, 5-7 years,
is the play age where Kissinger developed a sense of Initiative by
being energetic and adventuresome.
Beginning with Erikson's Stage 4,
6-12
years (School Age), data
on Kissinger are available.· Normal development in this stage would be
evident by the industry Kissinger showed in school (and in play).
Being a school teacher, Louis Kissinger probably helped his son pre
pare for his formal education. It is known that young Heinz showed
none of his later brilliance while in school in Germany.
With the Hitler youth groups attacking him, his brother and
friends, Heinz was shaken emotionally. Like other children in this
stage, Heinz wanted to accept his environment for what it was but
further wanted to master its problems. He could not. He was a victim
of one of the most bizarre moments in history. Because he failed in
57
this stage, he developed an inferiority complex. He would later
overcompensate or rebel because of his failure in this stage, says
Erikson. He could, of course, later regress to this stage from a
higher one, solve its problems, and continue to develop normally.
The Adolescent Stage lasts roughly from 13 to 19 years of age.
Identity is the goal sought and can be achieved by normal adjustment
to the physical and social changes occurring within and to the youth.
The biggest social change for Kissinger in this stage was his escape
from Nazi Germany. Perhaps he finally overcame his environment, a
feat he could not achieve previously. His adjustment to American life
was slow but steady. He was shy and a loner. He worked hard in high
school and earned excellent grades--even with his "foreign language
handicap". He attended baseball games and enjoyed his American sur
roundings.
As a young adult, ages 20-30, a person's outlook turns toward in
timacy. He seeks a lasting, loving relationship with a member of the
opposite sex. Kissinger married Anne Fleischer when he was 25. The
marriage did not fit Erikson's ideal where each individual would sur
render part of his/her hard-won identity in order to succeed in the
relationship. Kissinger required silence from his wife during his
long writing episodes. He usually was overextended in his responsi
bilities (aside from his husbandly duties) and he demanded submissive
ness from Anne. The marriage was unstable, perhaps due to the inabil
ity to surrender identity and independence for the sake of the marriage.
In 1964, after having two children, Henry and Anne were divorced. Where
intimacy fails, isolation occurs. Kissinger was isolated in his own
home and marriage.
Generativity, or the desire to establish and guide the next gen
eration, is the result of successful completion of adulthood, ages
30-65. A teacher is a good example of someone successful in this
stage. This stage is not only the one in which Kissinger performed as
an instructor at Harvard; it is also the one in which he was National
Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Nixon and Gerald Ford
(1974-77). Thus, not only did Kissinger help guide a younger genera
tion through college; he tried to guide all generations of Americans
(and as a consequence, everyone else in the world) toward a more
stable world order. This was his goal, as is evident from virtually
all his writings. He was successful as a professor at Harvard, guid
ing a future generation to a better understanding of world politics.
Whether he was equally successful in guiding all generations toward a
more stable world order will be discussed in Chapter V.
Because he failed to attain intimacy in the previous stage,
Kissinger regressed to that stage from adulthood. He married Nancy
Maginnes in 1974. By doing so, he hoped to achieve that intimacy
which he was unable to achieve before.
James David Barber's personality theory also may provide some in
sight as to why Kissinger behaved the way he did as chief foreign
policy advisor. An individual's character is developed mainly in
childhood and is the way a person confronts new experiences.
Kissinger's character was one of overcoming handicaps. He overcame
the pressures of Nazi Germany when his family left that country. He
overcame his "foreign language handicap" in America by working hard
58
at his studies. He overcame his "handicap" of being a potentially
biased participant in Germany as an American soldier of German-Jewish
origin by being objective and judicious in dealing with Nazis in
Krefeld. He overcame a similar handicap by saying how his child-
hood experiences as a persecuted Jew in Germany are "not a key" to how
he thinks or acts. He even overcame his handicap of not being able
to date many girls during his first few years in America by becoming a
middle-aged "swinger". Kissinger still has a sense of vulnerability
which he acquired in his youth. He is forever on the lookout for
enemies. He is still a loner. He does not let many people get too
close to him personally; nor does he let anyone know who or what
Henry A. Kissinger really is: "No, I won't tell you what I am. I'll
never tell anyone." (New Republic, December 16, 1972)
Like Dulles, Kissinger did not suffer from economic or psycholog
ical deprivation. Though the Dulles family was much better off finan
cially, Kissinger's father earned a good salary as a teacher-advisor
during the character-formative years of young Heinz' life. In America,
Louis worked as a bookkeeper, Paula earned money as a cook, and even
tually Henry worked in a factory to supplement the family income.
Again, there was enough money to keep the family of four happy. "We
59
had a very close family relationship and things did not seem that hard
to me. I was not brought up to have a lot of leisure; there was no
shame in that." (Kalb & Kalb, 1974, p. ,37) The Kissingers were close-
brother and brother, parents and children. Louis spent much time
with his sons, teaching them in the ways of his faith, watching them
play, disciplining them, helping them with homework. Paula was a
good and loving mother--at home (in Germany) when her sons needed her;
in America she was working and not always home but was no less atten
tive to her sons. There was no deprivation, which is surprising given
the circumstances in which Kissinger grew up.
To describe Kissinger as active is perhaps an understatement.
"Workaholic" may be a more suitable term. He was constantly busy
throughout his life (as he admits, he had little time for leisure).
And he usually overextended himself in his responsibilities. Yet,
60
he received much satisfaction from his work, whether it was working on
books and articles or with the Council on Foreign Relations or for presi
dents. Thus, he enjoyed his activity which indicates a positive
approach to his work.
An Active-Positive uses "his styles flexibly, adaptively, suiting
the dance to the music." (Barber, 1977, p. 12) When Harvard refused
to hire him full-time in 1954, Kissinger directed his talents to the
Council on Foreign Relations. Though a known "Rockefeller Republican",
Kissinger saw Kennedy's election as a chance to influence foreign
policy in a Democratic Administration. And he advised Johnson on the
role the U.S. should play in Vietnam. Here Kissinger proved his
ability to work for anyone--regardless of party--so long as he was
influencing the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Kissinger truly
proved his flexibility and his ability to succeed when all else pointed
to failure when he went to work for Nixon. Ardently anti-Nixon and
deeply rooted in the Rockefeller camp, Kissinger proved to Nixon that
he could serve and be loyal to him (as Nixon had hoped).
An Active-Positive works toward "well defined personal goals".
Kissinger's goal:
I'd like to leave behind a world that seemed more peace
ful than the one we entered. More creative in the sense
of fulfilling human aspirations. And of course it's been
my dream, which for many reasons has not been fully reali
zable, to have contributed in some sense to unity in the
American people. (Kalb, 1974, p. 12)
He has written about such goals in most, if not all, of his books:
Metternich and Castlereagh established a stable world order; Nuclear
Weapons could be used in a limited way for political goals--namely
stability.
Kissinger's World View was developed in his adolescence, roughly
between 13 and 19 years of age. His early adolescence was spent in
tumultuous Germany; he moved to America at 15. In his doctoral dis-
sertation, Kissinger said if revolutionary states were allowed to
exist in the world, stability and therefore peace would never be
achieved. Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin were revolutionary leaders.
The world system was unstable as long as these leaders (and any others
like them) were in power.
Style is developed in early adulthood. It is the way a person
behaves. When the person moves from thinking about what he wants to
do to actually doing it, he adopts a style. The period this happens
in is when the person emerges as an independent actor. Kissinger's
time of emergence was when he directed the Council on Foreign Rela
tions Committee on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and when he
wrote his book on its deliberations. The style he used to achieve
his success would be used throughout the rest of his political career.
Barber offers three styles: rhetoric, homework and personal relations.
61
Kissinger dominated the discussions on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy. He was confident that his ideas were correct. He told the
Council that he would write the book only if he could do it his own
way. He wrote the book and did express his ideas, relying on the data
supplied by the discussions. In expressing his controversial ideas,
Kissinger relied on the power of persuasion via his writing. But
Barber does not provide for a style of "persuasion". It is difficult
to determine which style of persuasion is most related to--rhetoric,
homework or personal relations.
Analyzing a subsequent political success, his style will be more
evident. When Kissinger visited Vietnam for Johnson, he relied on
personal contacts to find a realistic picture of life and society
in South Vietnam. He reported his findings directly to Ambassador
Lodge and to President Johnson because he was always "a believer in
62
face to face exchanges". (Kalb, 1974, p. 63) It was in such situa
tions that Kissinger was at his best. He could make two adversaries be
lieve that he agreed with both of them. He manipulated a co-negotiator,
making him feel that he and Kissinger were smarter than a third party.
Kissinger would do the same with the roles reversed, with the third
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