Synod. Nat., p. 10), as to whether a banker might
become an elder of the Church; and in spite of Calvin’s own
definite stand, the repeated discussions in the same bodies of
the permissibility of taking interest occasioned by the ques-
tions of ultra-scrupulous members. It is partly explained by the
number of persons having a direct interest in the question, but
at the same time the wish to practise usuraria pravitas without
the necessity of confession could not have been alone decisive.
The same, see below, is true of Holland. Let it be said explicitly
that the prohibition of interest in the canon law will play no part
in this investigation.
18 Gothein, Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Schwarzwaldes, I, p. 67.
19 In connection with this see Sombart’s brief comments (Der
moderne Kapitalismus, first edition, p. 380). Later, under the
influence of a study of F. Keller (Unternehmung und Mehrwert,
Publications of the Goerres-Gesellschaft, XII), which, in spite of
many good observations (which in this connection, however,
are not new), falls below the standard of other recent works of
Catholic apologetics, Sombart, in what is in these parts in my
opinion by far the weakest of his larger works (Der Bourgeois),
has unfortunately maintained a completely untenable thesis, to
which I shall refer in the proper place.
20 That the simple fact of a change of residence is among the
most effective means of intensifying labour is thoroughly estab-
lished (compare note 13 above). The same Polish girl who at
home was not to be shaken loose from her traditional laziness
by any chance of earning money, however tempting, seems to
change her entire nature and become capable of unlimited
accomplishment when she is a migratory worker in a foreign
notes
136
country. The same is true of migratory Italian labourers. That
this is by no means entirely explicable in terms of the educative
influence of the entrance into a higher cultural environment,
although this naturally plays a part, is shown by the fact that the
same thing happens where the type of occupation, as in agri-
cultural labour, is exactly the same as at home. Furthermore,
accommodation in labour barracks, etc., may involve a degrad-
ation to a standard of living which would never be tolerated at
home. The simple fact of working in quite different surround-
ings from those to which one is accustomed breaks through
the tradition and is the educative force. It is hardly necessary to
remark how much of American economic development is the
result of such factors. In ancient times the similar significance
of the Babylonian exile for the Jews is very striking, and
the same is true of the Parsees. But for the Protestants, as
is indicated by the undeniable difference in the economic
characteristics of the Puritan New England colonies from Cath-
olic Maryland, the Episcopal South, and mixed Rhode island,
the influence of their religious belief quite evidently plays a part
as an independent factor. Similarly in India, for instance, with
the Jains.
21 It is well known in most of its forms to be a more or less
moderated Calvinism or Zwinglianism.
22 In Hamburg, which is almost entirely Lutheran, the only fortune
going back to the seventeenth century is that of a well-known
Reformed family (kindly called to my attention by Professor A.
Wahl).
23 It is thus not new that the existence of this relationship is
maintained here. Lavelye, Matthew Arnold, and others already
perceived it. What is new, on the contrary, is the quite
unfounded denial of it. Our task here is to explain the relation.
24 Naturally this does not mean that official Pietism, like other
religious tendencies, did not at a later date, from a patriarchal
point of view, oppose certain progressive features of capitalistic
development, for instance, the transition from domestic indus-
try to the factory system. What a religion has sought after as an
ideal, and what the actual result of its influence on the lives of
notes
137
its adherents has been, must be sharply distinguished, as we
shall often see in the course of our discussion. On the specific
adaptation of Pietists to industrial labour, I have given
examples from a Westphalian factory in my article, “Zur Psy-
chophysik der gewerblichen Arbeit”, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft
und Sozielpolitik, XXVIII, and at various other times.
2 THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
1 These passages represent a very brief summary of some
aspects of Weber’s methodological views. At about the same
time that he wrote this essay he was engaged in a thorough
criticism and revaluation of the methods of the Social Sciences,
the result of which was a point of view in many ways different
from the prevailing one, especially outside of Germany. In order
thoroughly to understand the significance of this essay in its
wider bearings on Weber’s sociological work as a whole it is
necessary to know what his methodological aims were. Most
of his writings on this subject have been assembled since his
death (in 1920) in the volume Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wis-
senschaftslehre. A shorter exposition of the main position is con-
tained in the opening chapters of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,
Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, III.—Translator’s Note.
2 The final passage is from Necessary Hints to Those That would
Be Rich (written 1736, Works, Sparks edition, II, p. 80), the rest
from Advice to a Young Tradesman (written 1748, Sparks edition,
II, pp. 87 ff.). The italics in the text are Franklin’s.
3 Der Amerikamüde (Frankfurt, 1835), well known to be an
imaginative paraphrase of Lenau’s impressions of America. As
a work of art the book would to-day be somewhat difficult to
enjoy, but it is incomparable as a document of the (now long
since blurred-over) differences between the German and the
American outlook, one may even say of the type of spiritual life
which, in spite of everything, has remained common to all
Germans, Catholic and Protestant alike, since the German mys-
ticism of the Middle Ages, as against the Puritan capitalistic
valuation of action.
notes
138
4 Sombart has used this quotation as a motto for his section
dealing with the genesis of capitalism (Der moderne Kapitalis-
mus, first edition, I, p. 193. See also p. 390).
5 Which quite obviously does not mean either that Jacob Fugger
was a morally indifferent or an irreligious man, or that Ben-
jamin Franklin’s ethic is completely covered by the above
quotations. It scarcely required Brentano’s quotations (Die
Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus, pp. 150 ff.) to protect this
well-known philanthropist from the misunderstanding which
Brentano seems to attribute to me. The problem is just the
reverse: how could such a philanthropist come to write
these particular sentences (the especially charactenstic form
of which Brentano has neglected to reproduce) in the manner
of a moralist?
6 This is the basis of our difference from Sombart in stating the
problem. Its very considerable practical significance will
become clear later. In anticipation, however, let it be remarked
that Sombart has by no means neglected this ethical aspect of
the capitalistic entrepreneur. But in his view of the problem it
appears as a result of capitalism, whereas for our purposes we
must assume the opposite as an hypothesis. A final position
can only be taken up at the end of the investigation. For Som-
bart’s view see op. cit., pp. 357, 380, etc. His reasoning here
connects with the brilliant analysis given in Simmel’s Philoso-
phie des Geldes (final chapter). Of the polemics which he has
brought forward against me in his Bourgeois I shall come to
speak later. At this point any thorough discussion must be
postponed.
7 “I grew convinced that truth, sincerity, and integrity in dealings
between man and man were of the utmost importance to the
felicity of life; and I formed written resolutions, which still
remain in my journal book to practise them ever while I lived.
Revelation had indeed no weight with me as such; but I enter-
tained an opinion that, though certain actions might not be bad
because they were forbidden by it, or good because it com-
manded them, yet probably these actions might be forbidden
because they were bad for us, or commanded because they
notes
139
were beneficial to us in their own nature, all the circumstances
of things considered.” Autobiography (ed. F. W. Pine, Henry
Holt, New York, 1916), p. 112.
8 “I therefore put myself as much as I could out of sight
and started it”—that is the project of a library which he
had initiated—“as a scheme of a number of friends, who had
requested me to go about and propose it to such as they
thought lovers of reading. In this way my affair went on
smoothly, and I ever after practised it on such occasions; and
from my frequent successes, can heartily recommend it. The
present little sacrifice of your vanity will afterwards be amply
repaid. If it remains awhile uncertain to whom the merit
belongs, someone more vain than yourself will be encouraged
to claim it, and then even envy will be disposed to do you
justice by plucking those assumed feathers and restoring them
to their right owner.” Autobiography, p. 140.
9 Brentano (op. cit., pp. 125, 127, note 1) takes this remark as an
occasion to criticize the later discussion of “that rationalization
and discipline” to which worldly asceticism
1
has subjected
men. That, he says, is a rationalization toward an irrational
mode of life. He is, in fact, quite correct. A thing is never
irrational in itself, but only from a particular rational point of
view. For the unbeliever every religious way of life is irrational,
for the hedonist every ascetic standard, no matter whether,
measured with respect to its particular basic values, that
opposing asceticism is a rationalization. If this essay makes
any contribution at all, may it be to bring out the complexity of
the only superficially simple concept of the rational.
1
This seemingly paradoxical term has been the best translation I could find
for Weber’s innerweltliche Askese, which means asceticism practised within
the world as contrasted with ausserweltliche Askese, which withdraws from
the world (for instance into a monastery). Their precise meaning will
appear in the course of Weber’s discussion. It is one of the prime points of
his essay that asceticism does not need to flee from the world to be ascetic.
I shall consistently employ the terms worldly and otherworldly to denote
the contrast between the two kinds of asceticism.—Translator’s Note.
notes
140
10 In reply to Brentano’s (Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus,
pp. 150 ff.) long and somewhat inaccurate apologia for Franklin,
whose ethical qualities I am supposed to have misunderstood,
I refer only to this statement, which should, in my opinion, have
been sufficient to make that apologia superfluous.
11 The two terms profession and calling I have used in translation
of the German Beruf, whichever seemed best to fit the particular
context. Vocation does not carry the ethical connotation in
which Weber is interested. It is especially to be remembered
that profession in this sense is not contrasted with business,
but it refers to a particular attitude toward one’s occupation,
no matter what that occupation may be. This should become
abundantly clear from the whole of Weber’s argument.—
Translator’s Note.
12 I make use of this opportunity to insert a few anti-critical
remarks in advance of the main argument. Sombart (Bourgeois)
makes the untenable statement that this ethic of Franklin is a
word-for-word repetition of some writings of that great and
versatile genius of the Renaissance, Leon Battista Alberti, who
besides theoretical treatises on Mathematics, Sculpture, Paint-
ing, Architecture, and Love (he was personally a woman-hater),
wrote a work in four books on household management (Della
Famiglia). (Unfortunately, I have not at the time of writing been
able to procure the edition of Mancini, but only the older one of
Bonucci.) The passage from Franklin is printed above word for
word. Where then are corresponding passages to be found in
Alberti’s work, especially the maxim “time is money”, which
stands at the head, and the exhortations which follow it? The
only passage which, so far as I know, bears the slightest resem-
blance to it is found towards the end of the first book of Della
Famiglia (ed. Bonucci, II, p. 353), where Alberti speaks in very
general terms of money as the nervus rerum of the household,
which must hence be handled with special care, just as Cato
spoke in De Re Rustica. To treat Alberti, who was very proud of
his descent from one of the most distinguished cavalier fam-
ilies of Florence (Nobilissimi Cavalieri, op. cit., pp. 213, 228, 247,
etc.), as a man of mongrel blood who was filled with envy for
notes
141
the noble families because his illegitimate birth, which was not
in the least socially disqualifying, excluded him as a bourgeois
from association with the nobility, is quite incorrect. It is true
that the recommendation of large enterprises as alone worthy
of a nobile è onesta famiglia and a libero è nobile animo, and as
costing less labour is characteristic of Alberti (p. 209; compare
Del governo della Famiglia, IV, p. 55, as well as p. 116 in the
edition for the Pandolfini). Hence the best thing is a putting-out
business for wool and silk. Also an ordered and painstaking
regulation of his household, i.e. the limiting of expenditure to
income. This is the santa masserizia, which is thus primarily a
principle of maintenance, a given standard of life, and not of
acquisition (as no one should have understood better than
Sombart). Similarly, in the discussion of the nature of money,
his concern is with the management of consumption funds
(money or possessioni), not with that of capital; all that is clear
from the expression of it which is put into the mouth of Gian-
ozzo. He recommends, as protection against the uncertainty of
fortuna, early habituation to continuous activity, which is also
(pp. 73–4) alone healthy in the long run, in cose magnifiche è
ample, and avoidance of laziness, which always endangers the
maintenance of one’s position in the world. Hence a careful
study of a suitable trade in case of a change of fortune, but
every opera mercenaria is unsuitable (op. cit., I, p. 209). His idea
of tranquillita dell’ animo and his strong tendency toward the
Epicurean
(vivere a sè stesso, p. 262); especially
his dislike of any office (p. 258) as a source of unrest, of making
enemies, and of becoming involved in dishonourable dealings;
the ideal of life in a country villa; his nourishment of vanity
through the thought of his ancestors; and his treatment of the
honour of the family (which on that account should keep its
fortune together in the Florentine manner and not divide it up)
as a decisive standard and ideal—all these things would in the
eyes of every Puritan have been sinful idolatry of the flesh, and
in those of Benjamin Franklin the expression of incompre-
hensible aristocratic nonsense. Note, further, the very high
opinion of literary things (for the industria is applied principally
notes
142
to literary and scientific work), which is really most worthy of a
man’s efforts. And the expression of the masserizia, in the sense
of “rational conduct of the household” as the means of living
independently of others and avoiding destitution, is in general
put only in the mouth of the illiterate Gianozzo as of equal
value. Thus the origin of this concept, which comes (see below)
from monastic ethics, is traced back to an old priest (p. 249).
Now compare all this with the ethic and manner of life of
Benjamin Franklin, and especially of his Puritan ancestors; the
works of the Renaissance littérateur addressing himself to
the humanistic aristocracy, with Franklin’s works addressed to
the masses of the lower middle class (he especially mentions
clerks) and with the tracts and sermons of the Puritans, in
order to comprehend the depth of the difference. The economic
rationalism of Alberti, everywhere supported by references to
ancient authors, is most clearly related to the treatment of eco-
nomic problems in the works of Xenophon (whom he did not
know), of Cato, Varro, and Columella (all of whom he quotes),
except that especially in Cato and Varro, acquisition as such
stands in the foreground in a different way from that to be
found in Alberti. Furthermore, the very occasional comments of
Alberti on the use of the fattori, their division of labour and
discipline, on the unreliability of the peasants, etc., really sound
as if Cato’s homely wisdom were taken from the field of the
ancient slave-using household and applied to that of free
labour in domestic industry and the metayer system. When
Sombart (whose reference to the Stoic ethic is quite mislead-
ing) sees economic rationalism as “developed to its farthest
conclusions” as early as Cato, he is, with a correct interpret-
ation, not entirely wrong. It is possible to unite the diligens pater
familias of the Romans with the ideal of the massajo of Alberti
under the same category. It is above all characteristic for Cato
that a landed estate is valued and judged as an object for the
investment of consumption funds. The concept of industria, on
the other hand, is differently coloured on account of Christian
influence. And there is just the difference. In the conception of
industria, which comes from monastic asceticism and which
notes
143
was developed by monastic writers, lies the seed of an ethos
which was fully developed later in the Protestant worldly asceti-
cism. Hence, as we shall often point out, the relationship of the
two, which, however, is less close to the official Church doctrine
of St. Thomas than to the Florentine and Siennese mendicant-
moralists. In Cato and also in Alberti’s own writings this ethos is
lacking; for both it is a matter of worldly wisdom, not of ethic.
In Franklin there is also a utilitarian strain. But the ethical qual-
ity of the sermon to young business men is impossible to mis-
take, and that is the characteristic thing. A lack of care in the
handling of money means to him that one so to speak murders
capital embryos, and hence it is an ethical defect.
An inner relationship of the two (Alberti and Franklin) exists
in fact only in so far as Alberti, whom Sombart calls pious, but
who actually, although he took the sacraments and held a
Roman benefice, like so many humanists, did not himself
(except for two quite colourless passages) in any way make use
of religious motives as a justification of the manner of life he
recommended, had not yet, Franklin on the other hand no
longer, related his recommendation of economy to religious
conceptions. Utilitarianism, in Alberti’s preference for wool and
silk manufacture, also the mercantilist social utilitarianism
“that many people should be given employment” (see Alberti,
op. cit., p. 292), is in this field at least formally the sole justifi-
cation for the one as for the other. Alberti’s discussions of
this subject form an excellent example of the sort of econ-
omic rationalism which really existed as a reflection of eco-
nomic conditions, in the work of authors interested purely in
“the thing for its own sake” everywhere and at all times; in the
Chinese classicism and in Greece and Rome no less than in
the Renaissance and the age of the Enlightenment. There is no
doubt that just as in ancient times with Cato, Varro, and Colu-
mella, also here with Alberti and others of the same type, espe-
cially in the doctrine of industria, a sort of economic rationality
is highly developed. But how can anyone believe that such a
literary theory could develop into a revolutionary force at all
comparable to the way in which a religious belief was able to set
notes
144
the sanctions of salvation and damnation on the fulfillment of a
particular (in this case methodically rationalized) manner of
life? What, as compared with it, a really religiously oriented
rationalization of conduct looks like, may be seen, outside of
the Puritans of all denominations, in the cases of the Jains, the
Jews, certain ascetic sects of the Middle Ages, the Bohemian
Brothers (an offshoot of the Hussite movement), the Skoptsi
and Stundists in Russia, and numerous monastic orders, how-
ever much all these may differ from each other.
The essential point of the difference is (to anticipate) that an
ethic based on religion places certain psychological sanctions
(not of an economic character) on the maintenance of the atti-
tude prescribed by it, sanctions which, so long as the religious
belief remains alive, are highly effective, and which mere worldly
wisdom like that of Alberti does not have at its disposal. Only in
so far as these sanctions work, and, above all, in the direction in
which they work, which is often very different from the doctrine
of the theologians, does such an ethic gain an independent
influence on the conduct of life and thus on the economic order.
This is, to speak frankly, the point of this whole essay, which I
had not expected to find so completely overlooked.
Later on I shall come to speak of the theological moralists of
the late Middle Ages, who were relatively friendly to capital
(especially Anthony of Florence and Bernhard of Siena), and
whom Sombart has also seriously misinterpreted. In any case
Alberti did not belong to that group. Only the concept of Dostları ilə paylaş: |