and recruitable cerebral networks (both MCS
patients studied
121
had herniated with mid-
brain signs of third nerve palsies during the
acute phase of their injuries). As discussed in
Chapter 1, the paramedian mesencephalon and
thalamus contain several interconnected brain
systems that interact closely with the brain-
stem arousal systems. Although these struc-
tures were originally identified as the primary
arousal systems, the thalamic intralaminar nu-
clei (ILN) (and paralaminar regions of the
thalamus rich in neurons that preferentially
project to layer I of the cerebral cortex), the
mesencephalic reticular formation (MRF),
and their connections with the thalamic retic-
ular nucleus appear to play a key role linking
arousal states to the control of moment-to-
moment intention or attentional gating (re-
viewed in
144
). These structures are well posi-
tioned to control interactions of the cerebral
cortex, basal ganglia, and thalamus through
their patterns of innervation within the cortex
as well as rich innervation from the brainstem
arousal systems.
145,146
Even incomplete in-
juries to these networks may produce unique
deficits in maintaining adequate cerebral ac-
tivation and patterns of brain dynamics neces-
sary to establish, maintain, and complete com-
plex behaviors.
The Potential Role of Regionally
Selective Injuries Producing
Widespread Effects on
Brain Function
At least three different mechanisms may lead
to marked alteration of integrative brain ac-
tivity following relatively focal or regionally
restricted brain lesions: (1) a form of passive
inhibition of a brain area following deaffer-
entation of remote but strongly connected ar-
eas, (2) active inhibitory phenomena resulting
from altered connectivity and neuronal func-
tion following injury, and (3) persistent or par-
oxysmal functional activity producing excess
excitation of distributed neuronal networks.
121
Whether such processes underlie partially re-
versible impairment of cognitive function in
severely disabled patients is unknown. It is
likely, however, that transient changes in dis-
tributed network function underlie the wide
fluctuations in cognitive performance in some
MCS patients and patients who emerge from
MCS. These phenomena are well known but
not frequently described in the medical liter-
ature.
91,127
We briefly discuss potentially rel-
evant sources of variations of brain dynamics
within the wakeful state of the injured brain.
A relatively common finding following focal
ischemia or traumatic brain injury is a reduc-
tion in cerebral metabolism in brain regions
remote from the site of injury. This transsy-
naptic (or ‘‘crossed’’) down-regulation of dis-
tant neuronal populations results from the loss
of excitatory inputs from the damaged re-
gions.
147
The clinical significance of these
changes is unclear, although electrophysiologic
correlates have been identified. A recent study
by Gold and Lauritzen
148
showed that al-
though changes in blood flow may be modest
in remote cortical regions, the transsynaptic
down-regulation produces dramatic decreases
in neuronal firing rates (e.g., a neuronal firing
rate decreased by 80% with only a 20% re-
duction in regional blood flow). Thus, stable
374
Plum and Posner’s Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma
down-regulation of cortical, thalamic, or basal
ganglia neuronal populations through passive
inhibition secondary to deafferentation is a
possible source of functionally reversible al-
teration of cerebral network function. Intrinsic
neuronal membrane properties allow nonlin-
ear state changes on the basis of small devia-
tions in excitation. In vivo experimental studies
demonstrate that the loss of excitatory drive
to neuronal populations as a result of transsy-
naptic down-regulation produces a powerful
form of inhibition that hyperpolarizes the neu-
ronal membrane potential.
149
In cerebral cor-
tex
150
and basal ganglia,
151
up and down states
have been identified in in vitro studies com-
parable to burst and tonic mode firing in the
thalamus (Chapter 1). The potential interplay
of these mechanisms in the setting of brain
injury remains to be unraveled, but the ob-
servations suggest mechanisms by which large
connected networks of potentially functional
systems might remain dormant despite a bal-
ance of neuromodulators producing a wakeful
EEG and arousal pattern.
152
Other types of alteration of the balance of
excitation and inhibition, particularly hypersyn-
chronous discharges, may play a key role. Ex-
perimental studies have shown increased excit-
ability following even modest brain trauma that
may promote epileptiform activity in both cor-
tical and subcortical regions.
153,154
Hypersyn-
chronous activity within relatively restricted
networks may underlie several different clinical
phenomena following structural brain injuries.
For example, a patient fluctuating from classic
akinetic mutism to interactive awareness fol-
lowing an encephalitic injury
155
had epilepti-
form activity in the thalamus that appeared only
as surface slow waves in the EEG. Such a mech-
anism might also explain a reported case of
episodic remission of akinetic mutism.
91
A 52-
year-old man remained in an akinetic mute state
following the rupture of a basilar artery aneu-
rysm with infarcts in the thalamus and basal
ganglia. This behavioral state persisted without
change for 17 months, at which time a sponta-
neous fluctuation in behavioral state occurred,
described as a return to his ‘‘premorbid state,
with full return of his demeanor and affect.’’
The patient’s functional recovery lasted 1 day
and then he relapsed. One year after this event,
the patient had a second ‘‘awakening’’ following
a grand mal seizure. Electroconvulsive therapy,
tried empirically, also reproduced the change.
A related mechanism may explain the late
emergence from MCS reported by Clauss and
colleagues.
127
A 28-year-old man suffered a
diffuse axonal injury (presumably grade III
with subcortical hemorrhages in the basal gan-
glia, thalamus, and brainstem). Spontaneous
eye opening with a GCS of 9 persisted for 3
years following injury until 10 mg of zolpidem
(a GABA
A
potentiator that binds to many of
the same sites as benzodiazepines) was admin-
istered. Within 15 minutes of administration,
the patient began to speak and was able to
respond to questions with ‘‘yes or no’’ answers
and ultimately demonstrated intact remote and
immediate memory. Temporary remission of
chronic aphasia in a 52-year-old woman 3 years
following administration of zolpidem has also
been reported.
156
In this patient, regional ce-
rebral blood flow (CBF) measurements using
SPECT demonstrated a 35% to 40% increase
in the medial frontal cortex bilaterally, and left
middle frontal and supramarginal gyri (Broca’s
area) 30 minutes after zolpidem ingestion. Sim-
ilar mechanisms most likely underlie the well-
publicized cases of Gary Dockery (‘‘The Coma
Cop’’) and Donald Herbert, a fireman who
made international headlines in 2005 with a
marked recovery of speech and cognitive func-
tion after 9 years of remaining in MCS fol-
lowing traumatic brain injury.
Injury to the paramedian thalamus (intra-
laminar and related thalamic nuclei) and upper
brainstem alone can produce widespread hemi-
spheric transsynaptic down-regulation,
157,158
as well as a variety of paroxysmal disturbances.
Most common among the types of paroxysmal
alterations in brain dynamics following injury
to the paramedian thalamus are generalized
epileptic seizures, typically variations of the
3/s spike-and-wave form.
90,159
Other less well-
known phenomena, such as oculogyric crises,
are also associated with injuries to this region.
160
Hypersynchronous discharges restricted to the
thalamostriatal system might also account for
forms of catatonia
161,162
and the obsessive-
compulsive disorder infrequently observed
after brain injuries.
163
Thus, damage to the up-
per brainstem and medial thalamus, in combi-
nation with other cerebral injuries, may lead to
a variety of partially reversible mechanisms of
dysfunction that could contribute to a reduced
baseline activity in severely disabled patients
and provide a structural basis for wide varia-
tion in functional performance. Overreliance
Consciousness, Mechanisms Underlying Outcomes, and Ethical Considerations
375
on clinical examination features and structural
imaging may fail to identify such changes in
brain dynamics arising in the setting of abnor-
mal connective topologies induced by severe
injuries.
ETHICS OF CLINICAL
DECISION MAKING AND
COMMUNICATION WITH
SURROGATES (J.J. FINS)
Decisions concerning care for patients with
severe disorders of consciousness necessarily
involve surrogates. Family members, friends,
or other intimates must make decisions about
care or its withdrawal. In this section, we con-
sider the special challenges faced by those
decision makers entrusted with the care of a
patient with a disorder of consciousness and
describe what practitioners might do to ease
their burden by improving communication.
Surrogate Decision Making,
Perceptions, and Needs
A surrogate decision maker is a person, other
than the patient, who directs care when the
patient is unable to provide consent. Under pre-
vailing legal and ethical norms, surrogate de-
cisions should be based on what is known about
the patient’s expressed choices when he or she
was able to give informed consent.
164
Thus,
surrogates should follow expressed wishes of the
patient when they are known and invoke sub-
stituted judgment, what is believed or inferred
about patient choices, when actual preferences
are unknown. In the absence of evidence of
prior wishes or known patient values, surro-
gates should invoke a best interests standard,
intended to represent what an average person
would do when confronted by prevailing cir-
cumstances.
When working with surrogates, the physi-
cian must determine who among many has
standing and priority.
165
A surrogate designated
by the patient through an advance directive
has precedence over other potential decision
makers because he or she was expressly chosen
by the patient. This exercise of patient self-
determination can take place through an ad-
vance directive, variably called a durable power
attorney for health care, health care agent,
or health care proxy.
166
Alternately, a patient
without a designated surrogate can express
preferences in a living will. A living will details
patient wishes, but does not authorize a des-
ignated spokesperson. If there is no designated
surrogate, family members and close friends
are selected in order of their relationship
to the patient (spouse > parents > children >
siblings > other relatives > friends).
The importance of advance care planning, or
the use of living wills or health care proxies, has
been inextricably linked to prominent legal
cases involving patients in a VS. In the Cruzan
case, which considered the withdrawal of arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration in a young woman
in a persistent VS, Justice Sandra Day O’Con-
nor first suggested a greater role for advance
care planning, a mechanism for patients to ex-
press their wishes before decisional incapacity.
The lack of such an advance directive became
part of the conflict in the now well-known case
of Terri Schiavo, who remained in a permanent
VS following a cardiac arrest and anoxic brain
injury in 1990.
167
Her case gained national
prominence in 2003 and again in 2005 when
family members disputed the propriety of re-
moving her feeding tube. Multiple courts ruled
that her prior wishes were known and that her
husband, who advocated the removal of her
percutaneous gastrostomy, was the appropri-
ate surrogate decision maker under state law.
Nonetheless, the tragedy of that family dispute
illustrated the utility of talking about prefer-
ences in advance and sharing wishes with
one’s family and friends. Prompting discus-
sions ahead of incapacity is a lesson for the
general medical and neurology outpatient clin-
ics as much as it is for the neurology ICU.
168,169
Even without an advance directive surrogate
designate, the ethical challenge of determining
the best course of action remains. Surrogates
balance their knowledge of the patient’s pref-
erences with their own sense of prognosis and
likely outcome,
170
as it is unusual for the pa-
tient to have anticipated the precise set of cir-
cumstances in advance. When the patient is
comatose, surrogates may step forward and au-
thorize a DNR order and pursue a less aggres-
sive course of care than in an awake patient.
However, in one study, only 32% of patients
had consented to their own DNR orders; in the
remaining cases, 64% had been put in place by
a surrogate, and 5% by physicians alone.
171
This
376
Plum and Posner’s Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma
figure is comparable to a study a decade earlier
in which only 30% of patients discussed resus-
citation with a physician prior to a cardiac ar-
rest.
172
Thus, the decision on DNR orders
frequently rests on the shoulders of the surro-
gate.
Because perception of outcome hinges so
strongly on the question of recovery of con-
sciousness, the physician must communicate to
surrogates the best estimate of the likelihood
and degree of recovery, or conversely the inev-
itability of death or permanent VS. This is eas-
ier said than done as indicated in previous sec-
tions of this chapter. Moreover, it is important
to recognize that the right to die (i.e., the
negative right to be left alone) was established
through cases involving patients in the VS.
173
In addressing the case of Karen Anne Quinlan
in 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court asser-
ted that the justification of the removal of her
ventilator was predicated upon her irreversible
loss of a ‘‘cognitive sapient state. ’’
174,175
The
identification of VS with medical futility al-
lowed surrogates to be granted the discretion
to withdraw life-sustaining therapy.
176
This historical legacy may lead in some cases
to a diagnostic and therapeutic nihilism, in
which diagnostic categories that are relevant
are conflated and confused. VS is but one of
many disorders of consciousness; patients who
are vegetative may progress to permanence or
move on to the minimally conscious state or
another level of brain function. Because of the
importance of consciousness to surrogate de-
cision makers and the value placed on the
‘‘cognitive sapient state,’’ it is important to
strive toward diagnostic accuracy and preci-
sion. This is particularly important as evolving
knowledge indicates that obtaining an accurate
diagnosis of MCS may strongly alter prognosis
for some patients, particularly those recover-
ing from traumatic brain injury.
77,79
As more
attention is paid to the varying outcomes of
coma, it is likely that practice norms will be
influenced.
Professional Obligations
and Diagnostic Discernment
It is the professional obligation of the physician
caring for individuals with a disorder of con-
sciousness to bring evolving scientific knowl-
edge to the bedside and use it to inform the
decision-making process with surrogates. It is
especially critical that surrogates understand
that the probability of the recovery of con-
sciousness is dynamic and depends on consid-
erations of etiology of injury, structural patterns
of brain injury, and duration of the clinical state.
Physicians should use their knowledge to or-
chestrate strategic discussions at key clinical
milestones that have prognostic and diagnos-
tic importance, recognizing that for the most
part, these categorizations remain crude and
mostly descriptive. Because of the rudimentary
nature of this emerging nosology, it is inevitable
that patients with variable injuries and out-
comes will be included in diagnostic categories
that are too broad and heterogeneous. This can
make prediction difficult and undermine laud-
able efforts to achieve greater diagnostic refine-
ment and precision.
177
For these reasons, a delicate balance needs
to be achieved between too quickly foreclos-
ing any prospect of recovery and the offering
of false hope. Even ‘‘favorable’’ outcomes,
marked by survival and recovery, force difficult
quality-of-life choices for those whose exis-
tence has been irrevocably altered by a disor-
der of consciousness and most often an alter-
ation of the self. Translating the medical facts
that are provided by clinicians into such choi-
ces is the work of surrogates.
The physician’s function, assisted by mem-
bers of the interdisciplinary team needed to
care for these patients and the families, is si-
multaneously to preserve the right to die while
also affirming the right to care.
177
This means
respecting the decisions of surrogates when
they believe that ongoing life-sustaining ther-
apy would result in an existence that would
have been unacceptable to the patient or incon-
sistent with their prior wishes. Patients should
receive the appropriate amount of clinical care,
diagnostic and interventional, that allows for
informed decisions about treatment options,
whether it be under the rubric of an informed
consent or informed refusal of care.
Time-Delimited Prognostication
and Evolving Brain States: Framing
the Conversation
To ensure that these decisions are indeed in-
formed, it is essential to ensure that there is
proper information flow between clinical staff
Consciousness, Mechanisms Underlying Outcomes, and Ethical Considerations
377
and surrogates when clinical findings warrant
discussion or when a prognostic milestone is
reached. How much information is conveyed to
achieve this objective and how determinative it
can be will depend upon clinical circumstances.
For example, it may be justified to provide an
early and definitive prognosis of permanent un-
consciousness or death while a patient is coma-
tose following an out-of-hospital cardiac arrest
and if there are clear negative prognostic pre-
dictors including loss of pupillary function and
corneal reflexes and bilateral absence of
somatosensory-evoked responses.
In contrast, it would be inappropriate, and
premature, to offer a conclusive prognosis in the
comatose traumatic brain injury patient who
demonstrates brainstem function and appears to
be moving quickly into VS. The rate of recovery
of such patients may warrant a cautiously opti-
mistic approach
70
delineated by a prognostic
time trial in which the clinician gives a time-
delimited prognosis. Time-delimited prognoses
are contingent upon the patient’s continued
evolution by certain temporal milestones.
To prepare for and organize such discussions
with surrogates, we focus on major clinical and
temporal milestones, which are important occa-
sions for speaking with surrogates about the
patient’s current status and goals of care.
Brain death involves the most straightfor-
ward decision making. In brain death, there are
no clinical goals of care as the patient cannot
benefit from further therapeutic efforts and the
focus for the practitioner should be to commu-
nicate these facts and address specific religious
or moral concerns in individual cases. Although
widely accepted in professional circles, the con-
cept of brain death is not well understood
among lay people when consent for organ do-
nation is sought.
178
A more challenging issue is
that some segments of our society reject this
definition of death, most notably members of
some orthodox religious groups and others with
cultural roots in Asia, most notably Japan, which
has only recently legalized brain death deter-
minations.
179,180
Two states, New Jersey and
New York, have accommodation clauses to ac-
commodate religious and moral objections to
determination of death by brain death test-
ing, with New Jersey exempting this standard
when it would violate religious beliefs. Working
with surrogates who reject brain death stan-
dards requires cultural sensitivity and the use
of cultural intermediaries to enhance commu-
nication.
181
When speaking with surrogate decision mak-
ers for a comatose patient, it is important to be as Dostları ilə paylaş: |