Star Search
In the early 1980s, a psychologist named Dov Eden published the first in a series of extraordinary
results. He could tell which soldiers in the
Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) would become top
performers before they ever started training.
Eden is a physically slight but psychologically intense man who grew up in the United States.
After finishing his doctorate, he immigrated to Israel and began conducting research with the IDF. In
one study, he examined comprehensive assessments of nearly a thousand soldiers who were about to
arrive for training with their platoons. He had their aptitude test scores, evaluations during basic
training, and appraisals from previous commanders. Using this information alone, which was
gathered before the beginning of training for their current roles, Eden was able to identify a group of
high-potential trainees who would emerge as stars.
Over the next eleven weeks, the trainees took tests measuring their expertise in combat tactics,
maps, and standard operating procedures. They also demonstrated their skill in operating a weapon,
which was evaluated by experts. Sure enough, the candidates Eden spotted as high-potentials at the
outset did significantly better than their peers over the next three months: they scored 9 percent higher
on the expertise tests and 10 percent higher on the weapons evaluation. What information did Eden
use to identify the high-potentials? If you were a platoon leader in the IDF, what characteristics would
you value above all others in your soldiers?
It’s helpful to know that Eden drew his inspiration from a classic study led by the Harvard
psychologist Robert Rosenthal, who teamed up with Lenore Jacobson, the principal of an elementary
school in San Francisco. In eighteen different classrooms, students from kindergarten through fifth
grade took a Harvard cognitive ability test. The test objectively measured students’ verbal and
reasoning skills, which are known to be critical to learning and problem solving. Rosenthal and
Jacobson shared the test results with the teachers: approximately 20 percent of the students had shown
the potential for
intellectual blooming
, or spurting. Although they might not look different today, their
test results suggested that these bloomers would show “unusual intellectual gains” over the course of
the school year.
The Harvard test was discerning: when the students took the cognitive ability test a year later, the
bloomers improved more than the rest of the students. The bloomers gained an average of twelve IQ
points, compared with average gains of only eight points for their classmates. The bloomers
outgained their peers by roughly fifteen IQ points in first grade and ten IQ points in second grade.
Two years later, the bloomers were still outgaining their classmates. The intelligence test was
successful in identifying high-potential students: the bloomers got smarter—and at a faster rate—than
their classmates.
Based on these results, intelligence seems like a strong contender as the key differentiating factor
for the high-potential students. But it wasn’t—at least not in the beginning. Why not?
The students labeled as bloomers didn’t actually score higher on the Harvard intelligence test.
Rosenthal chose them at random.
The study was designed to find out what happened to students when teachers believed they had
high potential. Rosenthal randomly selected 20 percent of the students in each classroom to be
labeled as bloomers, and the other 80 percent were a control group. The bloomers weren’t any
smarter than their peers—the difference “was in the mind of the teacher.”
Yet the bloomers became smarter than their peers, in both verbal and reasoning ability. Some
students who were randomly labeled as bloomers achieved more than 50 percent intelligence gains in
a single year. The ability advantage to the bloomers held up when the students had their intelligence
tested at the end of the year by separate examiners who weren’t aware that the experiment had
occurred, let alone which students were identified as bloomers. And the students labeled as bloomers
continued to show gains after two years, even when they were being taught by entirely different
teachers who didn’t know which students had been labeled as bloomers. Why?
Teachers’ beliefs created self-fulfilling prophecies. When teachers believed their students were
bloomers, they set high expectations for their success. As a result, the teachers engaged in more
supportive behaviors that boosted the students’ confidence and enhanced their learning and
development. Teachers communicated more warmly to the bloomers, gave them more challenging
assignments, called on them more often, and provided them with more feedback. Many experiments
have replicated these effects, showing that teacher expectations are especially important for
improving the grades and intelligence test scores of low-achieving students and members of
stigmatized minority groups. In a comprehensive review of the evidence, psychologists Lee Jussim
and Kent Harber concluded, “
Self-fulfilling prophecies
in the classroom are real.”
But we all know that children are impressionable in the early phases of intellectual development.
When Dov Eden began his research at the IDF, he wondered whether these types of self-fulfilling
prophecies could play out with more fully formed adults. He told some platoon leaders that he had
reviewed aptitude test scores, evaluations during basic training, and appraisals from previous
commanders, and that the “average command potential of your trainees is appreciably higher than the
usual level . . . Therefore, you can expect unusual achievements from the trainees in your group.”
As in the elementary school study, Eden had selected these trainees as high-potentials at random.
He was testing the effect of leaders believing that their trainees were high-potentials. Amazingly, the
trainees randomly labeled as high-potentials did significantly better on expertise tests and weapons
evaluations than the trainees who were not arbitrarily designated as high-potentials. Just like the
teachers, when the platoon leaders believed in the trainees’ potential, they acted in ways that made
this potential a reality. The platoon leaders who held high expectations of their trainees provided
more help, career advice, and feedback to their trainees. When their trainees made mistakes, instead
of assuming that they lacked ability, the platoon leaders saw opportunities for teaching and learning.
The supportive behaviors of the platoon leaders boosted the confidence and ability of the trainees,
enabling and encouraging them to achieve higher performance.
Evidence shows that leaders’ beliefs can catalyze self-fulfilling prophecies in many settings
beyond the military. Management researcher Brian McNatt conducted an exhaustive analysis of
seventeen different studies with nearly three thousand employees in a wide range of work
organizations, from banking to retail sales to manufacturing. Overall, when managers were randomly
assigned to see employees as bloomers,
employees bloomed
. McNatt concludes that these
interventions “can have a fairly large effect on performance.” He encourages managers to “recognize
the possible power and influence in (a) having a genuine interest and belief in the potential of their
employees . . . and (b) engaging in actions that support others and communicate that belief . . .
increasing others’ motivation and effort and helping them achieve that potential.”
Some managers and teachers have already internalized this message. They see people as
bloomers naturally, without ever being told. This is rarely the case for takers, who tend to place little
trust in other people. Because they assume that most people are takers, they hold relatively low
expectations for the potential of their peers and subordinates. Research shows that takers harbor
doubts about others’ intentions, so they monitor vigilantly for information that others might harm them,
treating others with suspicion and distrust. These
low expectations trigger a vicious cycle
,
constraining the development and motivation of others. Even when takers are impressed by another
person’s capabilities or motivation, they’re more likely to see this person as a threat, which means
they’re less willing to support and develop him or her. As a result, takers frequently fail to engage in
the types of supportive behaviors that are conducive to the confidence and development of their peers
and subordinates.
Matchers are better equipped to inspire self-fulfilling prophecies. Because they value reciprocity,
when a peer or subordinate demonstrates high potential, matchers respond in kind, going out of their
way to support, encourage, and develop their promising colleagues and direct reports. But the
matcher’s mistake lies in waiting for signs of high potential. Since matchers tend to play it safe, they
often wait to offer support until they’ve seen evidence of promise. Consequently, they miss out on
opportunities to develop people who don’t show a spark of talent or high potential at first.
Givers don’t wait for signs of potential. Because they tend to be trusting and optimistic about
other people’s intentions, in their roles as leaders, managers, and mentors, givers are inclined to see
the potential in everyone. By default, givers start by viewing people as bloomers. This is exactly
what has enabled C. J. Skender to develop so many star students. He isn’t unusual in recognizing
talented people; he simply starts by seeing everyone as talented and tries to bring out the best in them.
In Skender’s mind, every student who walks into his classroom is a diamond in the rough—able and
willing to be mined, cut, and polished. He sees potential where others don’t, which has set in motion
a series of self-fulfilling prophecies.
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