11
Furthermore, parliamentary procedures were violat-
ed because the parliament’s decision
taken to build
new energy generators was ignored
9
.
From the current practices it can be concluded that
larger deficiencies are expressed through: (1) not
respecting the decisions of the Parliament
10
, (2)
keeping in confidence
the process of development
of international tenders for the construction of new
generators, which were entirely elaborated by inter-
national institutions, without sufficient consultation
with national
experts and institutions, (3) not dis-
cussing publicly the different development options
of this sector by communicating rarely and with in-
complete information with citizens, civil society and
institutions
with expertise in this area, and (4) the
smuggling of development options without strate-
gic documents drawn up beforehand like VSSM
11
and without communicating and discussing the re-
sults of these studies with the general public.
The lack of a long-term
development vision in this
sector creates room for quick decision-making, not
well controlled: Kosovo has never drafted a long-
term development plan in this sector. If we do not
have a vision for the sector for at least the next 40
years, then we are not responsible for the “ad hoc”
measures that we are constantly taking. The lack
of a long-term development
vision of this sector
undermines decisions that were taken, and shows
a blurry picture of where we want to go and how
we want to arrive there. EU
energy policies already
require concrete actions from member states and
those who want to join the EU by 2040. Besides,
new generators are placed with an operational term
9 The strategy was first approved by the Government and was
then sent for approval in the Assembly. MPs received on August
18, 2005 Strategy and the Strategy was
approved in the Assem-
bly session beginning on September 28, 2005 02
and ended
October 5, 2005.
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