Table of contents introduction

The Second Karabakh War

Both sides have suffered thousands of military and civilian casualties since the 1994 ceasefire, including the war. The conflicts that took place after the violations and provocations committed by Armenia in 2008, 2010, 2016 and 2018, respectively, have been at a level that completely includes the risk of starting a war. The conflicts that took place in April 2016 resulted in the superiority of Azerbaijan and some territorial gains (Bilgin, 2020: 17).

The Tovuz attack carried out by Armenia in July 2020 also ended with the superiority of Azerbaijan. Armenia has experienced great military losses against a large number of soldiers and vehicles (Bilgin, 2020: 17).

The Nagorno-Karabakh region has become the main center of the large-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020. Numerous ceasefires have been violated since 1994, as a result, clashes took place on September 27, 2020 and then turned into a material war (22).

The Second Karabakh War started with the clashes that took place on the contact line during the daylight hours of 27 September 2020. If we examine the geographical conditions of the battlefield; Considering that Karabakh has a very narrow operating area and that about 20% of Azerbaijan's lands are occupied, it can be thought that the main conflicts took place in a very narrow area. In addition, we can say that the most distinctive feature of Karabakh and other occupied regions is that there are almost no flat areas. It should be noted that the Lachin Corridor is a gateway for transportation between Armenia and Karabakh, and the region between Karabakh and the Iranian border is the flattest region of the entire operation area (Özgen, 2021: 110).

This war, which lasted for 44 days, resulted in the decisive military victory of Azerbaijan. The capture of the city of Shusha by the Azerbaijani forces was the turning point of the war. With the capture of Shusha, the withdrawal routes of the Armenian invading forces were blocked, and the Yerevan administration had to agree to the ceasefire against the threat that their troops would be destroyed (Özgen, 2021: 117).

A ceasefire agreement was signed between Ilham Aliyev, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, ending the conflict in Karabakh on the night of 9 November. The contents of the 9 articles agreed upon in the agreement are summarized below, respectively (Güler, 2020: 2-3):

In Article 1, it was decided to end all conflicts in the conflict areas in Nagorno-Karabakh and to achieve a fully peaceful agreement. It is also included as a provision of this article that the parties (the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia) remain in their current positions from the date of the decision.

In Article 2, it was decided to leave the Aghdam region to the Republic of Azerbaijan until 20 November 2020.

In Article 3, it was decided that the Russian Federation peacekeeping force, consisting of the front line in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin corridor, approximately 2,000 lightly armed soldiers and war equipment in determined quantities, would be placed in a strategic region.

In Article 4, it is decided that the said peacekeeping force will be deployed depending on the withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces and the mandate of this peacekeeping force is 5 years and the decision will be continued for 5 years if the parties do not make a request 6 months before the end of the decision.

In Article 5, it was decided to establish a ceasefire control center responsible for inspection in order to effectively control the compliance of the parties with the terms of the agreement.

In Article 6, the Republic of Armenia, Kelbacer and Lachin, respectively; It has been decided to extradite him to the Republic of Azerbaijan until November 15 and December 1, 2020. The process of the Laçin corridor being under the control of peacekeepers and the creation of the new route construction plan for this corridor were discussed. It was decided to ensure the safety of travel in both directions along the Azerbaijan Lachin corridor.

In Article 7, it was decided that the natives and their surroundings who were forced to leave their habitats should return to Nagorno-Karabakh under the control of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

In Article 8, the parties decided to replace the prisoners of war, hostages, remaining detainees and existing bodies.

In Article 9, it was decided to remove the economic and transportation-related obstacles in the region, such as ensuring the security of transportation between the west of the Azerbaijan Republic and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, in order to ensure the smooth travel of people and vehicles in the Republic of Armenia. It was decided to control the transport activities with the Border Unit of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). The construction of a transportation area that provides a connection between the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and the west of Azerbaijan is also among the decisions taken in this article. (Guler, 2020: 3)

Turkey has been an important actor in the course of this conflict (Pehlivan, 2016: 93). President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan has openly shown his support for Azerbaijan by saying that "The Turkish nation stands by its Azerbaijani brothers with all its resources and strengthens its solidarity" (Khan, 2021: 31).

In the war, Azeri forces, supported by armed drones and other military equipment equipped with new technology supplied by Turkey to defeat the Armenian army and retake the lands, managed to control more than 40% of the lands. This war brought great geopolitical gains to both Turkey and Russia. While Turkey sided directly with Azerbaijan in this war, Russia indirectly supported its ally Armenia. Participating in the military parade after Azerbaijan's glorious victory, Erdoğan stated in his speech that Turkey's support for Azerbaijan continues: “As long as Turkey and Azerbaijan work hand in hand, they will continue to overcome all difficulties and run from one success to the next” (Khan). , 2021: 31).

With the ceasefire declaration signed by Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia on 9 November 2020, a new era has started in the Karabakh conflict. This time, whether a solution has been provided or not will become clear with the progress of this process. For now, it is in turmoil in more than one dimension, with Armenia losing its morale tremendously. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, experiences the joy and pride of achieving a military victory. It is understood from the statements made by Turkey that Azerbaijan is described as the absolute winner and that the public is generally of this opinion (Sarıkaya, 2020: 8-9). With this war, Azerbaijan took the opportunity to regain its occupied lands since ancient times and succeeded in regaining the occupied lands to a large extent (Özgen, 2021: 105).