The Wild Animal’s Story: Nonhuman Protagonists in Twentieth-Century Canadian Literature through the Lens of Practical Zoocriticism

unique innovation
of these early Canadian animal stories” 
(79, emphasis added). Without going into further detail here, I argue that we can 

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Allmark-Kent 26 
roughly define the wild animal story as a scientifically-informed, zoocentric 
speculation; a sustained attempt to imagine the lives, experiences, and unique 
perspectives of one or more nonhuman protagonists, living independently and 
autonomously from humans. Through the study of animal protagonists in the six 
twentieth-century texts that I have identified, I will investigate the ways in which 
each author engages with this endeavour in a post-Nature Fakers context. It is 
worth noting that, at present there are no sustained analyses of Seton
’s and 
Roberts’ influence on subsequent representations of animals in Canadian 
literature. Nor has literary studies produced any major investigations 
concentrating solely on nonhuman protagonists. 
Most established interpretations of the wild animal story undermine 
Seton
’s and Roberts’ commitment to representing nonhuman minds and 
perspectives, prioritizing anthropocentric readings instead. Even within more 
recent literary animal studies work, efforts to read their work as a sincere 
zoocentric endeavour have been minimal. Recalling Bergman’s comments 
above, we might attribute this to the general negligence towards real animals, 
which seem “almost an embarrassment, a disturbance to the symbolic field” 
(Bergman). Here, then, we can begin to detect some factors contributing to the 
aura of embarrassment and discomfort attached to the wild animal story. In 
literary animal studies, this is exacerbated by Seton
’s and Roberts’ 
preoccupation with notions of fact, accuracy, and truth, which drew considerable 
attention during the Nature Fakers controversy. Understandably, these claims 
are especially problematic for animal-sceptical critics. From the animal-
endorsing perspective of practical zoocriticism, however, I propose that we must 
accept some damage to the agency and alterity of the 
imagined animal 
(its 
ability to resist interpretation and representation), if it can be of benefit to the 

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Allmark-Kent 27 
living animal
. Indeed, I have observed that authors of wild animal stories
—both 
the original and post-Nature Fakers iterations
—all share a commitment to 
seeking some form of practical engagement: raising awareness of ecological 
and conservation issues; encouraging empathy and moral concern for animal 
exploitation; facilitating the imaginative exploration of nonhuman perspectives; 
or speculating on the upper limits of animal cognitive, social, linguistic, 
emotional, or cultural complexity. Hence, in order for such endeavours to be 
productive, we must reconcile our embarr
assment with the ‘fantasy of knowing 
the animal.’ 
This issue of ‘knowing’ was much-debated in the Nature Fakers 
controversy, but not from an animal-sceptical perspective. In the article that 
instigated the debate, “Real and Sham Natural History,” (1903) John Burroughs 
derides Seton’s work by modifying the title to “
Wild Animals I ALONE Have 
Known
” (129).
 
Indeed, Burroughs’ criticism was not that Seton had claimed to 
know these animals, but that the abilities and behaviours depicted in the book 
were previous
ly unknown: “There are no stories of animal intelligence and 
cunning on record, that I am aware of, that match his” (132). Although the 
controversy is remembered in terms of Seton
’s and Roberts’ sentimental 
anthropomorphism, it is crucial to observe that these accusations were made on 
the grounds of