Time in the Teachings of Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi

Derekh mitsvotekha
, 57a), formulates 
the general principle that “the infinite may not come into being out of the finite [
min ha-gevul lo 
yithaveh ha-bilti ba‘al gevul
]”.
7
See for example Maimonides, 
Moreh nevukhim
, 2:13, discussed in Davidson, 
Moses Maimonides
, 
366-67; Wolfson,
 Crescas’ critique
, 663-64; Gersonides, 
Milhamot ha-Shem
, 6, 1:11, 55a-57a. 
8
See for example Vital, 
‘Ets hayim
, Sha‘ar 1, ‘anaf 1, 25, where the infinite and supra-temporal 
Ein 
Sof
is juxtaposed with 
Adam kadmon 
and the created worlds, which have beginning and end and are 
therefore subject to time.
9
As explicitly expressed by the Tsemah Tsedek: “He, blessed be He, is not dependent on time at all. 
That being the case we say [about Him] ‘the Ancient One’ [
kadmon
], but not [in the sense of] 
temporal precedence [
kedimah zemanit
], heaven forefend, which would mean that He preceded the 
world in time […]. Rather the precedence, which we ascribe to Him, means that He preceded 
everything, including the aspect of time […]. He, blessed be He, was alone prior to the existence of 
world, and when He created the world, he created time, too.” Schneersohn, 
Derekh mitsvotekha
, 57a 
[Appendix 3]. 
10
For the origins and history of the term 
Ein Sof
see Scholem, 
Kabbalah
, 131. For the use of this term 
and the difference between 
Ein Sof 
and the light of 
Ein Sof
in Rashaz’s teachings, see Schwartz, 
Mahashevet Habad
, 28-9; Jacobson, “Torat ha-beri’ah,” 308-10. 

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28 
He, may He be blessed, is verily in the nature of 
Ein Sof
. He was, He is and 
He will be [
hayah
, 
hoveh
,
ve-yihyeh
] verily with no change, as in the 
statement [in the daily morning service]: “Thou wast the same before the 
world was created; thou hast been the same since the world hath been 
created” etc.
11
 
Rashaz goes to great lengths to emphasize that God’s creative act does not limit or 
influence Him in any way. Since God endures while being indifferent to temporal 
change, even such a dramatic event as the creation of the world should not be 
perceived as an orientation point in the history of the divine. In a similar way Rashaz 
employs another expression from the daily morning service, which describes God as 
the “king who alone wast exalted from aforetime […] extolled from days of old [
ha-
mitnase mi-yemot ‘olam
]. In Rashaz’s explanation, God is exalted and extolled not 
‘from’, namely ‘since’ but rather above and beyond 
yemot ‘olam
, which he 
 
understands literally as the “days of the world”, namely worldly days symbolising 
temporality. Thus in Rashaz’s understanding the verse of the prayer reaffirms God’s 
supra-temporal status. 
1.2 The timing of the creation of time. 
The belief that time is a created entity enables Rashaz to resolve the rabbinic 
difficulty with the question why the world was not created earlier or later than it 
actually was. The Sages entertained the idea that since the creation was subject to 
time, it could have, at least theoretically, occurred at any other time. This 
presumption is attested, for example, in the Midrash: “Said Rabbi Tanhuma: the 
world was created at the proper time. The world was not ready to be created prior to 
that time.”
12
While Rabbi Tanhuma’s statement merely alludes to the possibility of 
an earlier or a later creation, the argument between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi 
Yehoshua whether the world was created in the month of Tishri or in the month of 
Nissan
13
clearly entails the pre-existence not only of time but also of the Jewish 
11
TO 9a [Appendix 4]. See also T1, 20:25b-26a; MAHZ 
Ketsarim
25-26.
12
Bereshit rabah
9:2 [Appendix 5]. See also Rudavsky, 
Time Matters
, 6. 
13
See 
b
Rosh ha-shanah 10b-11a. 

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29 
calendar. This is also the opinion of the Tosafists, who reconcile the two opinions of 
the Sages by stating that “in the month of Tishri [God] thought about creating [the 
world], but it was not created until Nissan.”
14
Rashaz, however, dismisses the whole 
problem of the proper time of the creation: 
In the beginning of the book 
‘Ets hayim
15
[Hayim Vital] asks in the name of 
the kabbalists why the creation did not occur at an earlier time. He answers 
that due to the cause and effect order of concatenation, etc., the creation took 
a long time, etc. […] However, this answer does not resolve this issue at all, 
for one may still ask the question why the cause and effect order of 
concatenation took place at that time and not either earlier or later, etc. The 
true answer is known in the name of the Maggid, of blessed memory: [it is 
so] because time itself comes [into being] and flows by way of creation 
ex-
nihilo
[
yesh me-ayin
] and is a newly created being like the rest of all created 
beings.
16
Rashaz restates the Lurianic resolution of the dilemma of the Sages. According to 
‘Ets hayim
, the emanation of the 
sefirot
in sequence must have taken place before the 
actual event of the creation. Thus the duration of the process of emanation 
determined the timing of the subsequent creation. However, Rashaz points out that 
the answer offered by 
‘Ets hayim 
is unsatisfactory, for one could further ask why the 
process of emanation began at that particular point in time rather than earlier or later. 
In order to resolve this difficulty, he refers to the teachings of his mentor, Dov Ber, 
the Maggid of Mezeritch (d. 1772),
17
explaining that time itself is an entity created 
ex-nihilo
[
yesh me-ayin
], and as such it could not have predated or in any way 
conditioned the creation. For that reason, the very problem that 
‘Ets hayim 
strived to 
14
Tosafot 
Rosh ha-shanah, 27a. 
15
Vital, 
‘Ets hayim
, Sha‘ar 1, ‘anaf 1, 25. 
16
Seder tefilot
75d-76a [Appendix 6]. 
17
This particular teaching is not attested in any of the Maggid’s published works. In the Habad 
edition of his sermons it has been added in the supplement with “Teachings and sayings of the Rav 
Maggid of Mezeritch, collected from the books of our holy rabbis and leaders [
rabotenu nesi’enu
] and 
their disciples.” See Dov Ber of Mezeritch,
 Magid devarav le-Ya‘akov
, Torot u-fitgemei ha-Rav ha-
Maggid, 14b-15a. 

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30 
tackle appears to be merely the result of a misconception of the nature of time and 
the limits of the temporal discourse. To recap Rashaz’s argument is that there was no 
time before the creation, and therefore the temporal categories of “earlier” and 
“later” simply do not apply.
18