24
Platts continues to call the physical market Dated Brent or Dated North Sea Light while Argus calls it North Sea
Dated. As shall be discussed later, the continued use of the term „Dated Brent‟ by Platts and much of the industry is
not an arcane point, because the price of physical Dated Brent cargoes will be different from its „Dated Brent‟ price.
The prices of physical Brent, Forties and Oseberg all differ from the (Argus) North Sea Dated/(Platts) Dated Brent
value.
25
Some governments (Oman, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Malaysia, and Indonesia) do not use benchmarks at all and instead
set their own official selling prices (OSPs) on a monthly basis. These can be set retroactively or retrospectively.
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
Jan
0
0
M
ay
0
0
S
ep
0
0
Jan
0
1
M
ay
0
1
S
ep
0
1
Jan
0
2
M
ay
0
2
S
ep
0
2
Jan
0
3
M
ay
0
3
S
ep
0
3
Jan
0
4
M
ay
0
4
S
ep
0
4
Jan
0
5
M
ay
0
5
S
ep
0
5
Jan
0
6
M
ay
0
6
S
ep
0
6
Jan
0
7
M
ay
0
7
S
ep
0
7
Jan
0
8
M
ay
0
8
S
ep
0
8
Jan
0
9
M
ay
0
9
S
ep
0
9
Jan
1
0
Saudi Arabia
Light-33.0
Saudi Arabia
Arab Medium-3.5
Saudi Arabia
Arab Heavy-27.6
25
Table 1: Main Benchmarks Used in Formula Pricing
Asia
Europe
US
Saudi Arabia
Oman and Dubai
BWAVE from Jul.'00, Dated Brent
Until Jun.'00
ASCI from
Jan.2010, WTI
until Dec.'09
Iran
Oman and Dubai
BWAVE from Jan.'01, Dated
Brent Until Dec.'00
Kuwait
Oman and Dubai
BWAVE from Jul.'00, Dated Brent
Until Jun.'00
ASCI from
December 2009 ;
Previously WTI
Iraq (Basrah
Blend)
Oman and Dubai
Dated Brent
ASCI from April
2010, Previously
WTI Second
Month
Nigeria
Dated Brent
Brent
Mexico (Maya
Blend)
Dated Brent x0.527
+ 3.5%HSFO x0.467
- 1%FO x.25
+ 3.5%FO x0.25‟
WTS x0.4
+ 3%HSFO x0.4
+ LLS x0.1
+ Dtd.Brent x0.1
The pricing may be based on „physical‟ benchmarks such as Dated Brent or on the financial layers
surrounding these physical benchmarks such as the Brent Weighted Average (BWAVE), which is an
index calculated on the basis of prices obtained in the Brent futures market. Specifically, the BWAVE is
the weighted average of all futures price quotations that arise for a given contract of the futures exchange
during a trading day, with the weights being the shares of the relevant volume of transactions on that day.
Major oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran use BWAVE as the basis of pricing crude
exports to Europe. As seen from Figure 4 below, the price differential between Dated Brent and BWAVE
is quite variable with the differential in some occasions exceeding plus or minus three dollars per barrel.
This is expected as BWAVE is considerably less prompt than Dated Brent and thus variability between
the two should consider this time basis issue.
26
Therefore, the choice of benchmark has serious
implications on government revenues. This is perhaps most illustrated in the recent shift from WTI to
ASCI by some Gulf exporters. Figure 5 plots the price differential between the two US benchmarks WTI
and ASCI. WTI traded at a premium to ASCI through most of this time but occasionally (four significant
times) WTI moved to a discount when WTI collapsed versus other world benchmarks, with the WTI
discount to ASCI reaching close to $8/barrel on 12 February 2009. The January/ February events
prompted Saudi Arabia to consider alternatives to Platts WTI cash assessment.
26
Furthermore, as volatility is strongly backwardated itself along its own forward curve for most markets, this is
also a relevant factor.
26
Figure 4: Price Differential between Dated Brent and BWAVE ($/Barrel)
Source: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
Figure 5: Price Differential between WTI and ASCI ($/Barrel) (ASCI Price=0)
Source: Argus
Given the central role that benchmarking plays in the current oil pricing system, it is important to
highlight some of the main features of the most widely used benchmarks. First, unlike the futures market
where prices are observable in real time, the reported prices of physical benchmarks are „identified‟ or
„assessed‟ prices. These assessments are carried out by oil pricing reporting agencies, the two most
important of which are Platts and Argus.
27
Assessments are needed in opaque markets such as oil where
physical transactions concluded between parties cannot be directly observed by market participants. After
all, parties are under no obligation to report their deals. Assessments are also needed in illiquid markets
27
There are other PRAs but these are often more specialised such as OMR (focus on Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland), APPI (focus on Asia), RIM (focus on Asia), ICIS-LOR (focus on petrochemicals) and OPIS (focus on
US). In December 2010, Platts announced an agreement to acquire OPIS. The acquisition is expected to be
completed in the first half of 2011, subject to regulatory approval.
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
...
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
-10.00
-8.00
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
ASCI
WTI vs ASCI
27
where not enough representative deals or where no transactions take place. Oil reporting agencies assess
their prices based on information on concluded deals which they observe, or bids and offers, and failing
that on market talk, other private and public information gathered by reporters, and information from
financial markets. It is important to note that PRAs do not use in all markets a hierarchy of information
cascading down from deals to bids and offers, which would imply that deals are the best price discovery
and bids/offers are a poorer alternative. The methodology may vary from market to market in accordance
with the published methodology for that market. In some markets, bid/offer information takes precedence
over deals in identifying the published price – e.g. if the deal is either not representative of the market as
defined in the methodology, or was done earlier or later in the day to the prevailing depth of market. In
other markets, price identification relies on observed deals. For instance, Argus‟ main benchmark ASCI is
entirely deal based. Most however accept that a done deal does represent the highest form of „proof‟ of
value, unless there is a supervening issue with the trade‟s conduct. If assessments are intended to
represent an end-of day price, analogous to a futures „settlement „ however, a fully evidenced bid/offer
spread at a later point when markets have clearly moved in value is an acceptable proxy in the absence of
a trade .
Sometimes a distinction is made between prices identified through observed deals or transactions using a
direct mathematical formula such as volume-weighted average (referred to as an index) and prices
identified through a process of interpretation based on bids and offers, market surveys, and other
information gathered by reporters (referred to as price assessment) (see Argus, 2010). The choice of the
method varies across markets and depends on the structure of market, particularly on the degree of market
opaqueness and liquidity. While an index is suitable for markets with high trading liquidity and
transparency, assessments are more suitable in opaque and illiquid markets. In this paper, we do not make
this distinction and refer to both categories as price assessment. However, regardless of the method used,
there is an important element of subjectivity involved as the methodology has to be decided by managers
and editors. The choice of methodology (the time window in which the price is assessed, the grade
specification, location) in an index based system is just as subjective as price assessment. In that respect,
one approach (index or assessment) is no more subjective than the other.
Second, these agencies do not always produce the same price for the same benchmark as these pursue
different methodologies in their price assessments. Even if price quotations are based on a mechanical
methodology of deals done, two price reporting services could publish different prices for the same crude
because their price identification process and the deals they include in the assessment could be different.
For example, one PRA might use a volume weighted average of transactions between 9.00am and 5.00pm
while another PRA might use last trade or open bid/offer at specified period of time. Or one PRA might
include transactions within a 10-21 day price range and another includes transactions in a 10-15 day price
range. Or one PRA might only include fixed-price transactions and another include fixed-price and
formula-related transactions.
Third, the nature of these benchmarks tends to evolve over time. Although the general principle of
benchmarking has remained more or less the same over the last twenty-five years, the details of these
benchmarks in terms of their liquidity and the type of crudes that are included in the assessment process
have changed dramatically over that period. The assessment of the traditional Brent benchmark now
includes the North Sea streams Forties, Oseberg and Ekofisk (BFOE) and that of Platts Dubai price
includes Oman and Upper Zakum. These streams are not of identical quality and often fetch different
prices. Thus, the assessed price of a benchmark does not always refer to a particular „physical‟ crude
stream. It rather refers to a constructed „index‟
28
which is derived on the basis of a simple mathematical
formula which takes the lowest priced grade of the different component crudes to set the benchmark.
28
This may take the form of a matrix of closely-related prices which use the total physical liquidity by engineering
price floors and caps to reduce or eliminate the possibility of price distortion or skews.
28
Table 2 below summarises some basic statistics of the main international benchmarks: BFOE in the North
Sea, WTI and ASCI in the US, and Dubai-Oman in the Gulf. In terms of production, the underlying
physical base of the benchmark amounts to slightly more than 3 million b/d, i.e., around 3.5% of global
production. In terms of liquidity, there is wide difference across benchmarks. While in the US the number
of spot trades per calendar month is close to 600, the number of spot trades does not exceed three per
month in the case of Dubai. The divergence in liquidity across benchmarks reflects the low underlying
physical base and the different nature of benchmarks where US crudes are pipeline crudes with small
trading lots whereas Brent and Dubai are waterborne crudes with large trading lots. Table 2 also shows
that the degree of concentration in traded volumes varies considerably across markets. From the sellers‟
side, Dubai, Oman and Forties exhibit a high degree of concentration in the total volume of spot trades
especially when compared to US markets. From the buyers‟ side, Dubai and Forties exhibit a high degree
of concentration whereas Oman compares favourably with other benchmarks.
Table 2: Some Basic Features of Benchmark Crudes
First-quarter 2010 averages
by Argus
ASCI
WTI CMA
+ WTI P-
Plus
Forties
BFOE
Dubai
Oman
Production (MBPD)
736
300-400
562
1,220
70-80
710
Volume Spot Traded (MBPD)
579
939
514
635
86
246
Number of Spot Trades per
Cal Month
260
330
18
98
3.5
10
Number of Spot Trades Per
Day
13
16
<1
5
<1
<1
Number of Different Spot
Buyers per Cal Month
26
27
7
10
3
5
Number of Different Spot
Sellers per Cal Month
24
36
6
9
3
6
Largest 3 Buyers % of Total
Spot Volume
43%
38%
63%
72%
100%
50%
Largest 3 Sellers % of Total
Spot Volume
38%
51%
76%
56%
100%
80%
Source: Argus
Notes: Daily statistics are per trade day, except production which is per calendar day; Forties: The physical grade
usually sets North Sea Dated/Dated Brent; BFOE: Forward cash contracts deliverable as physical BFOE cargoes,
used in setting the flat price against which North Sea Dated is calculated; Oman: Excludes physical deliveries
through DME. Estimated deliveries on DME contacts are 300,000-400,000 barrels per day; WTI: Includes cash
market trade for WTI Calendar Month Average and WTI P-Plus. Cash market at Cushing no longer trades except at
last three days of trade month as spread for 2
nd
month. Roll trades are not included here. Also does not include any
volumes on CME Nymex futures.
Finally, in the last two decades or so, many financial layers (paper markets) have emerged around these
benchmarks. These include the forward market (in Brent), swaps, futures, and options. Some of the
29
instruments such as futures and options are traded on regulated exchanges such as ICE and CME Group,
while other instruments, such as swaps and forward contracts, are traded bilaterally over the counter
(OTC). Nevertheless, these financial layers are highly interlinked through the process of arbitrage and the
development of instruments that link the various markets together such as the Exchange of Futures for
Swaps (EFS) which allow traders to roll positions from futures to swaps and vice versa. Over the years,
these markets have grown in terms of size, liquidity, sophistication and have attracted a diverse set of
players, both physical and financial. These markets have become central for market participants wishing
to hedge their risk and to bet (or speculate) on oil price movements. Equally important, these financial
layers have become central to the oil price identification process. In Sections 5, 6 and 7, we discuss the
main benchmarks used in the current oil pricing system and the financial layers surrounding these
benchmarks.
30
4. Oil Price Reporting Agencies and the Price Discovery Process
The oil price reporting agencies (PRAs) are an important component of the oil industry. The prices that
these agencies identify or assess underlie the basis of long-term contracts, spot market transactions,
futures markets contracts and derivatives instruments. Some PRAs argue that through their
methodological structure for reporting physical transactions, they act as „a mirror to the trade‟ and provide
„transparency on what would otherwise be a collection of bilateral deals‟.
29
However, as argued by
Horsnell and Mabro (1993:155) oil PRAs are
far more than mere observers of crude oil and oil product markets. If they were, then their only
role would be to add to the price transparency of the market. However, deals worth hundreds of
millions of dollars per day ride on published assessment and the nature and structure of oil
reporting create trading opportunities and new markets and affect the behaviour of oil traders.
Price reporting does more than provide a mirror for oil markets; the reflection in the mirror can
affect the image itself.
Indeed, in their attempt to identify the price that reflects accurately the market value of the oil barrel,
PRAs enter into the decision-making territory that can influence market structure. For instance, Platts
decides on the time of pricing of oil (the time stamping), the width of the Platt‟s window, the size of the
parcel to be traded, the process of delivery, and the time of delivery of the contract. PRAs make these
decisions on the basis of regular consultations with the industry. In return, PRAs influence the trading
strategies of the various participants and their reporting policies. In fact, new markets and contracts may
emerge to hedge the risks arising from some of the decisions that PRAs make. Even when price
assessments are based on observed transactions and mathematical formula, there is still an important
element of decision-making involved as this entails the choice about the assumptions behind the
methodology. Editors and managers in PRAs choose how to build the index (in the case of Argus) and
how to allow for non-deals-based methodologies in case of a lack of deals.
While PRAs have been an integral part of the crude oil market especially since the shift to the market-
related pricing system in 1986
30
, their role has recently been attracting considerable attention. In the G20
summit in Korea in November 2010, the G20 leaders called on „the IEF, IEA, OPEC and IOSCO to
produce a joint report, by the April 2011 Finance Ministers‟ meeting, on how the oil spot market prices
are assessed by oil price reporting agencies and how this affects the transparency and functioning of oil
markets „.
31
In its latest report in November 2010, IOSCO points that „the core concern with respect to
price reporting agencies is the extent to which the reported data accurately reflects the cash market in
question‟.
32
As discussed below, the accuracy of price assessments heavily depends on large number of
factors including the quality of information obtained by the PRA, the internal procedures applied by the
PRAs and the methodologies used in price assessment.
To evaluate the role of PRAs in the oil market, it is important to look at three inter-related dimensions: the
methodology used in identifying the oil price; the accuracy of price assessments;
33
and the internal
measures that PRAs implement to protect their integrity and ensure an efficient price assessment process.
There is a fundamental difference in the methodology and in the philosophy underlying the price
assessment process between the various pricing reporting agencies. As a result, different agencies may
produce different prices for the same benchmark. Even if price quotations are based on a mechanical
methodology of deals done, two price reporting services could publish different prices for the same crude
29
Argus Response to the „Report of the Working Group on the Volatility of Oil Prices‟ chaired by Professor Jean-
Marie Chevalier, p.5.
30
PRAs assessment were already widely used in the price formation process for refined products prior to 1986.
31
G-20 Seoul Summit 2010, THE SEOUL SUMMIT DOCUMENT, Paragraph 61.
32
IOSCO (2010), Task Force on Commodity Futures Markets: Report to the G20, November 2010, p. 17.
33
Though other attributes such as representativeness and usefulness could also be included.
31
because their mechanical price identification process could be different. This raises the issue of which of
the methods generates a more accurate price assessment. Given that assessed prices underlie long-term
contracts, spot transactions and derivatives instruments, even small differences in price assessments
between PRAs have serious implications for exporters‟ revenues and financial flows between parties in
financial contracts.
PRAs use a wide variety of methods to identify the oil price which may include the volume weighted
average system, low and high deals done, and market-on-close (MOC). In January 2001, Platts stopped
using the volume-weighted average system and replaced it with the MOC methodology.
34
In this system,
Platts sets a time window, known as the Platts window, and only deals transacted within this time window
are used to assess the oil price.
35
The price is assessed on the basis of concluded deals, or failing that, on
bids and offers. Assessment will also make use of information from financial layers about spreads and
derivative „to help triangulate value‟.
36
Thus, the MOC can be thought of a structured system for
gathering information on the basis of which Platts assesses the daily price of key physical benchmarks. In
a way, it is similar to a futures exchange where traders make bids and offers, but with two major
differences: the parties behind the bids and offers are known, and Platts decides on the information to be
considered in the assessment, i.e., the information passes through the Platts filter. These price assessments
are then transmitted back to the market through a variety of channels. The reason for the shift to MOC is a
concern that „an averaging system for price determination could result in assessments that lag actual
market levels as deals done early in an assessment period at a level that is not repeatable, could
mathematically drag prices down or up‟ (Platts, 2010a:7).
37
Thus, Platts emphasises the time sensitivity of
its assessed prices which are „clearly time-stamped‟ on a daily basis.
38
Time stamping not only allows for
an accurate reflection of price levels at particular point in time, but also for accurate assessment of time
spreads and inter-crude spreads.
Both the volume-weighted average method and the MOC have received their share of criticism. While the
volume-weighted average method allows the inclusion of a large number of deals and hence is more
representative, the method has been criticised as it
34
In the US, Platts used a volume weighted average for domestic crude. But for products, it has always used a low
and high of deals done. In the WTI crude market prior to 2001 Platts used a volume weighted average of a 30-
minute window. In Asia, Platts used the window or page 190, its first „market on close‟, also before 2001. The
market on close went global for Platts in 2001.
35
It is important to note that the window opens all day and Platts will accept trades, bids and offers at any time of
the day. But only deals transacted within a specified period of time (for instance from 4:00 to 4:30 for European
crudes) are considered for assessing the price for that day. Some argue that this may encourage traders to present
their bids/offers to Platts during this time window in order to maximize their impact on prices.
36
Thorne, S. (2010), „A User guide to Platts Assessment Processes‟, Presentation at the Platts Crude Oil
Methodology Forum 2010, London, May.
37
Platts (2010a), Methodology and Specifications Guide: Crude Oil, The McGraw Hill Companies, October.
38
Some commentators consider that through its window, Platts is able to establish the marginal price of oil, which in
principle should set price for the rest of the market. It is not clear what is meant by the marginal price, but in terms
of theory, the closest one can think of the Platts‟ window is in terms of the Walrasian auctioneer. The Walrasian
auctioneer is a fictitious construct who aggregates traders‟ demand and supplies to find a market clearing price,
through a series of auctions. While Platts window resembles the Walrasian auctioneer, it differs fundamentally in
many respects such as the existence of transactions costs, barriers to entry and the fact that the auctioneer does not
perform a passive role in the market. It decides who enters the market and when to the set the price. It has also been
long realised that trading has a timing dimension. While over time, the number of buyers and sellers may be equal,
at any particular the time, this is not guaranteed in which case it is not possible to find a market clearing price
(Demsetz, 1968). This could be overcome by participants paying an immediacy premium in which case the
equilibrium will be characterised by two demand and supply curves and two prices. Furthermore, the literature
shows that market structure such as the number of players, their size, the timing of entry matters and could affect the
trading price. Therefore, the actual mechanism used to set the price is not simply a channel, but is an input into the
price and as such cannot be ignored (see O'Hara, 1997).
32
may result in an index that is out of step and not reflective of the actual market price prevailing at the
close of the day. This would especially be the case on days with high volatility. Trade- weighted
averages may also be distorted by the pattern of trading liquidity over the day…. A key weakness in
all trade-weighted average assessments is that they will lag the market price. They always reflect a
price that „was‟ rather than the price that „is.‟ (Platts, 2010b:6).
39
The main criticism of the MOC methodology is that the Platts window often lacks sufficient liquidity and
may be dominated by few players which may hamper the price discovery process. For instance, Argus,
Platts‟ main competitor, argues that in US crude markets
MOC methodology would work if the industry poured liquidity into the window. Without this
liquidity, the methodology is left to assess the value at the close based on bids, offers and other
related factors. This means that the price derived from an MOC assessment can diverge widely
from a weighted average of all deals done in the trading day.
40
This divergence is expected given that the average price is different from the stamped price and the
convergence of the two is just a statistical accident if it ever happens.
Argus conducted a study on the US crude oil market in 2007 which compares the spot market traded
volume inside the window with the volume traded during the entire day. The study finds that the volume
traded within the Platts window constitutes only a very small fraction of daily traded volumes, as seen in
Table 3 below. This applies to a wide variety of US crudes. Argus argues that such low liquidity and
„complete lack of participant breadth‟ raise „serious questions about the efficiency of price discovery‟ in
the US oil market.
41
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