Allmark-Kent 57
of Pi
concerns itself with problems of anthropomorphism more overtly than
Bear
” (118). Here, rather than the attribution of human characteristics onto
animals, anthropomorphism is used to describe
any
human attempts to know or
understand the nonhuman. Early in the text, for instance, assertions are made
against the danger of
“Animalus anthropomorphicus
, the animal as seen
through human eyes […] we look at an animal and see a mirror” (Martel 39).
This statement is certainly true of the ‘failure of knowing’ narratives, at least. In
each text, one or both participants in a human-animal relationship experience
some form of violence as a consequence of the human’s inability to understand
or interpret the animal. As such, there is often also a sense of loss or
disappointment associated with the animal’s defiance of human expectations,
hopes, and fantasies. There is no doubt, however, that in these extreme
(sometimes obsessive) relationships, the nonhuman presence is both
fascinating and confusing for the human protagonist.
Alternatively, the ‘acceptance of not-knowing’ attaches no such negativity
to the nonhuman’s ability to resist categorization. In “The Coyote Came Back,”
for instance, John Sandlos describes Coyote’s subversive strength as a trickster
figure:
The ancient myth-character of Coyote is an enigmatic paradox whose
‘nature’ is both multi-faceted and constantly shifting. […] His
contradictory nature and locally-coloured personality resists
universalizing academic interpretations, but is, in each of his
manifestations, merely one aspect of an elusive protagonist. (101)
Thus, there is n
o ‘failure’ of knowing the animal here; the acceptance of not-
knowing is to be expected from both characters and readers. For instance, one
of the ways King uses the trickster figure in
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